Weight & Balance for the CESSNA L19 305A BIRD DOG

a rich vein that, as yet, has not been deeply mined . Thousands of important stories, yet untold, lay buried in these pages. Length has permitted us to extract only a few . I wish to thank the many senior officers who went out of their way to contribute their own special comments for this monograph Vll and the officers who wrote special studies as basic reference material for the monograph. I have drawn extensively on two such studies prepared by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Galvin of Combat De- velopments Command and Major Bobby D. Harber of the U.S. Army Aviations Systems Command. Because the published version of my monograph contains no documentation, the extent of my indebtedness to these two officers is not readily apparent. Major Harber's manuscript was subsequently published by the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command under the title, LogisticaL Support of Airmobile Opemtions, RepubLic of Vietnam, 1961-1971. Finally, I must recognize the two officers who were primarily responsible for researching, drafting, and compiling this volume. Colonel James J. Brockmyer, who was my senior assistant, has been associated with airmobility for more than two decades and was the editor of the test report of the 11 th Air Assault Division. CW-2 Charlie M. Montgomery, who researched and typed the multiple drafts, was a special assistant to General Westmoreland for four years in Vietnam. These two officers must share with me any credit (or blame) that this study might generate. Airmobility is no panacea; it brings with it many unique prob- lems as well as unique capabilities. It is hoped that this study will give the reader some insight into both of these areas. Washington, D.C. 15 ~oveOlber 1972 VUI JOH~ J. TOLSO~ Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Contents Chapter Page I. THE GROWTH OF THE AIRMOBILE CONCEPT 3 The First Airmobile Units in Vietnam 3 The Growth of the Concept. . . . 3 The Armed Helicopter . . . . . . 6 Stall Plans an Army Aircraft «.Family" 7 The Rogers Board . . . . 8 Army-Air Force Differences . . . . 10 Vietnam Fleet Expands . . . . . . 15 The Events Leading to the Howze Board 16 The Howze Board . . . 20 The Howze Board Report. . . . 22 II. THE EARLY YEARS IN VIETNAM, 1961-1965 . 25 The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Becomes Airmobile . . 25 Enemy Reaction . . . . . . . . . 26 Early Problems . . . . . . . . . . 28 The Armed Helicopter in Vietnam . 29 Techniques of Using the Armed Helicopter. 33 Tactical Troop Transport. . . . . . 35 Methodology of the Early Air Assaults 36 The Eagle Flight . . . . . . . 38 The Growing Aircraft Inventory 39 The Mohawk in Vietnam . . . 40 The Caribou in Vietnam . . . 44 Other Army Aviation Units in Vietnam. 47 Increasing Viet Cong Threat. . . . . . 48 III. THE EARLY YEARS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1963-1965 ..... . .. 51 The Air Assault Tests. 51 lX Chapter Page Joint Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Formation of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 61 IV. THE FIRST AIRMOBILE DIVISION AND THE BUILDUP. 1965 ......... . Buildup of u.s. Ground Forces . A Critique of an Air Assault . Aviation Support . . . . . Growing Pains . . . . . . Deployment of the Cavalry . The An Khe Hub. The 1a Drang .. Overview of 1965 . V. AIRMOBILITY COMES OF AGE. 1966 . Airmobility in the Delta. . . . Airmobile Logistics . . . . . . The Army·s "Aircraft Carrier" .. The 1st Cavalry Division in Binh Dinh . The Role of the Chinook . Operation Crazy Horse ..... . VI. AIRMOBILE DEVELOPMENTS. 1966 . The Genesis of the 1st Aviation Brigade. The Caribou Transfer . Army Aviation Personnel "Arc Light" . . . . . . Techniques of the lOlst . Airmobility and the U.S. "Presence" . Fall, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . Artillery in the Airmobile Concept. Other Operations . . . . . . . . . VII. THE PEAK YEAR. 1967 . . . . . Parachute Assault in Vietnam Change of Command . . . Operation Lejeune . . . . The Cavalry Spread Thin x 63 63 64 66 67 68 72 73 83 86 86 88 91 92 94 95 102 102 104 108 113 114 115 117 120 123 126 126 129 130 136 ChapteT Reconnaissance in Force . . . . . . . . . . . . The Chinook as a "Bomber" and "Flying Tank" . Armor in an Airmobile Division1 . The "Cobra" Arrives . . . DECCA "Fire Brigades" Sent North . . Operation Pershing Continues Tam Quan ..... 1967 Draws to a Close VIII. TET, 1968 .. ... . .... . Summary of Operation Pershing The Enemy Tet Offensive . .. The Tet Offensive at Quang Tri . The Move North . .... . The Battle of Quang Tri City The 1st Cavalry at Hue Summary of Tet .. .. IX. MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1968 Khe Sanh ...... . Operation Pegasus . . . 9th Division in the Delta The A Shau Valley . . . X. AIRMOBILE DEVELOPMENTS , 1968 Change of Command at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam . . . . . Enemy Helicopters1 . . . . . . . The Second Airmobile Division .. Thoughts on Leaving the Cavalry . Status of the 1st Aviation Br£gade . An Example of Cordon Operations . T he Cavalry Moves South . . . . . XI. THE CHANGING WAR AND CAMBODIA, 1969-1970 The Changing War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supporting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in the Delta . . . . . . . . . . The Cavalry's Cambodian Campaign Xl Page 139 141 142 144 147 147 148 149 150 1.1)2 152 154 158 .159 161 162 164 165 165 169 180 182 193 193 193 195 198 201 205 209 214 214 214 218 Chapter Page XII. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES AND LAOS. 1970-1971 ................ . 234 Organizational Changes 234 Into Laos. . . . . . . 235 The Battle . . . . . . 240 Review of Airmobile Support During Lamson 719 244 XIII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 253 APPENDIX. ARMY AIRCRAFT PHOTOGRAPHS. . .. 261 GLOSSARY INDEX Charts No. I. 1st Cavalry Division Organization . 2. 1st Aviation Brigade Organization Maps 285 291 Page 59 203 I. South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 2. The Ia Drang Valley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 3. Comparative Sizes: United States and South Vietnam. 116 4. Operation Pegasus. 1-2 April 1968 173 5. Operation Pegasus. 3-4 April 1968 175 6. Operation Pegasus. 5-6 April 1968 176 7. A Shau Valley . . . 183 tl. Vinh Loc Island. . . 205 9. Thrust into Cambodia 219 10. The City . . . . . . 225 II. Tactical Concept of LAMSON 719 239 12. LAMSON 719 ...... 243 xii Illustrations Page Troop Helicopters Pick Up a Rifle Company From the Field.. 35 Mohawk Taking Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : 42 The Boxer, Loaded with 1st Air Cavalry Aircraft, Just Prior to Departure for Vietnam. . . . 69 The Boxer Leaves for Vietnam . . . . . . . 70 Jumping From a Huey Helicopter . . . . . . 74 Troops Boarding CH-47 Chinook Helicopters. 96 CH-47 Chinook Delivering IOS-mm Howitzer (Towed ) with Ammunition Pallet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 CH-54 Skyhook Helicopter Delivering 155-mm Howitzer. .. 119 Combat Assault-Troops Moving Out to Secure the Landing Zone 135 Huey Cobra Firing in Support of a Combat Assault. . . . . . 145 Awaiting the Second Wave of Combat Helicopters on an Isolated Landing Zone During Operation Pershing . _ . . . . . . . 150 A Blue Team Rifle Squad From the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Exiting From a Huey Helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 171 Landing Zone Stallion in the A Shau Valley, Occupied by the 1st Brigade Headquarters, 1st Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Cambodians Fill Bags with Captured Rice, 18 May 1970 . . . . 226 A CH-47 Chinook Helicopter Lifts Off a Slingload of Ammuni- tion From Fire SupportBas~ Myron in Cambodia, 24 June 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 Troops Descending an Aerial Ladder Into Triple Canopied Jungle ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 230 CH-47 Chinook Delivering Captured Rice in Republic of Viet- nam Controlled Rural Area 231 UH-19D Chickasaw 262 CH-34C Choctaw 263 CH-23 Raven . . 264 OH-13S Sioux. . 265 CH-37B Mohave . 266 XH-40 . . . . . 267 UH-IA Iroquois . 268 CH-47 Chinook . 269 CH-21 C Shawnee 270 UH-IB Iroquois 271 UH-ID Iroquois 272 UH-IC Iroquois 273 CH-54 Tarhe . . 274 OH-6A Cayuse . 275 AH-IG Huey Cobra 276 OH - 58A Kiowa . . 277 XUl 0-1 Bird Dog . U-l Otter .. U-6 Beaver. U-8 Seminole C-7 Caribou . OV-IMohawk . U-21 Ute ... All illustrations are from Department of Defense files. XIV Page 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 AIRMOBILITY, 1961-1971 ---> CHAPTER I The Growth of the Ainnobile Concept The First Airmobile Units in Vietnam On 11 December 1961 the United States aircraft carrier USNS Card docked in downtown Saigon with 32 U. S. Army H-21 heli- copters and 400 men. The 57th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) from Fort Lewis, Wash., and the 8th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) from Fort Bragg, N. C., had arrived in Southeast Asia. This event had a two-fold significance: it was the first major symbol of United States combat power in Vietnam; and, it was the beginning of a new era of airmobility in the United States Army. Just twelve days later these helicopters were committed into the first airmobile combat action in Vietnam, Operation CHOPPER. Approximately 1,000 Vietnamese paratroopers were airlifted into a suspected Viet Cong headquarters complex about ten miles west of the Vietnamese capitol. The paratroopers captured an elusive underground radio transmitter after meeting only slight resistance from a surprised enemy. Major George D. Hardesty, Jr. of the 8th Transportation Company and Major Robert J. Dillard of the 57th could report that their units had performed outstandingly under their first baptism of fire. The events of December 1961 prefaced a decade of unparalleled growth of airmobility. But they also were a culmination of many decisions during the preceding decade which allowed the President of the United States to exercise this option in support of the Gov- ernment of Vietnam. The Growth of the Concept In its broadest sense, the airmobility concept envisages the use of aerial vehicles organic to the Army to assure the balance of mobility, firepower, intelligence, support-and command and con- trol. The story of airmobility in the Army is inextricably inter- woven with the story of Army aviation. Airmobility could be 4 AIR,MOBILITY viewed as the warp of new tactics and techniques with organic aviation providing the woof of skills and technology to make the whole cloth. The airmobility concept was not a product of Vietnam expedi- ency. It would probably not be practical to make a record of every decision which formed a part of the airmobile concept. It certainly had its roots in both the airborne techniques of World War II and the early doctrine for organic aviation for ground forces for that era. However, from a practical viewpoint, the embryonic decision can be said to be the Army's move to form twelve helicopter bat- talions on 21 August 1952. This key decision was made to commit the Army to airmobility even though a practical troop-carrying helicopter was still unproven and the helicopter tactics and tech- niques existed only in the minds of a handful of men. Though the twelve battalion goal was overly optimistic at that time, it dramatized how the impact of Korean experience had influenced Army planners. In Korea the Army had learned that the difficult terrain in that land mass and the numerical superiority of the enemy combined to provide the communist with an advantage that was not easily balanced by the qualitative superiority of the American soldier and his supporting firepower. Many thoughtful officers had watched the little observation helicopter-turned ambulance-flit up and down the steep hills with effortless agility. It was not hard to en- vision the possibilities inherent in hundreds of larger machines carrying combat troops up and over those deadly slopes. The Marines had already demonstrated the possibility of a small unit being carried into combat and the helicopter itself was beginning to mature, with more power and more dependability. After Korea many senior commanders restudied the lessons of that war and compared actual campaign operations with hypo- thetical airmobile operations under the same conditions. Various Army aviators and members of the helicopter industry were keep- ing a close watch on the French and British helicopter operations in Algeria and Malaysia. The mid-fifties were gestation years for new tactics and tech- nology. Major General James M. Gavin's article in Harpers maga- zine (April 1954) "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses!" was indicative of the sort of vision some enthusiasts had for the future. The .article was an unofficial summation of several staff · studies prepared in his. office while he was G-3, Department of the Army. During this period I was General Gavin's Director of Doctrine and Combat Development, and through his Deputy, Major General GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT 5 Paul D. Adams, he had tasked my shop to design new hypothetical cavalry organizations around the potential of the helicopter. These new units were to perform the traditional missions of horse cavalry using a third dimension and a ten-fold increase in speed. Not entirely by accident, one of the key action officers was a young Major Edwin C. ("Spec") Powell, later to become Director of Army Aviation. The growing helicopter industry was groping for direction from the military. At the same time, its engineers were pushing design proposals to potential military customers who weren't at all sure of their requirements. Many new approaches to vertical (or near vertical) flight were being tested as a replacement for, or an exten- sion of, the helicopter. For the first time, the Army placed major Research and Development funds in aeronautic programs. There were precious few guidelines for airmobile doctrine in the early fifties and none had the formal stamp as official U. S. Army policy. Recognizing this deficiency, General Gavin decided to plant the seed in the Army School System. Through the good offices of Major General Robert M. Young, G-I of the Army, and Major General Joseph H . Harper, Commandant of the Infantry School, I was ordered to Fort Benning with instructions to develop tactical doctririe for the combat employment of helicopters. As Director of the Airborne Department, I was able to broaden its charter and change the name to the Airborne-Army Aviation Department. A new Airmobility Division was established as the focal point for doctrinal innovation. We started gathering the necessary people and equipment to develop procedures, organiza- tional concepts, and materiel requirements for airmobility. A heli- copter company, equipped with H-19's and, later, H-34's was placed at our disposal for field experiments. The company com- mander, Major William C. Howell, Jr., was to beco:ne President Eisenhower's personal helicopter pilot and, after retirement, curator of the U. S. Army Aviation Museum at Fort Rucker. The results of a few months of concentrated activity were climaxed with the publication of a new field manual, FM 57-35, "Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations." The basic tactics and techniques described in this manual stood the test of time and would be vindicated in the tests of the II th Air Assault Division and in Vietnam. The first formal military requirement for an aerial weapon for Army helicopters was initiated during this same period at Fort Benning and, subsequently, approved through the chains of com- mand by Department of the Army. The requirement specified a 6 AIRMOBILITY light-weight, simple, flexible turret gun to be provided for all Army transport helicopters. Tactical experiments had proven the obvious requirement for some type of suppressive gunfire to be delivered by transport helicopters during the critical approach phase of a combat assault. Unfortunately, the light turret gun was never developed .as conceived, but the Ordnance Corps latched onto the requirement as the justification of expenditures in the initial de- velopment of helicopter armament. The Armed Helicopter During this same time frame, a small group of pioneers, with the blessing and backing of Brigadier General Carl I. Hutton, Commandant of the Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, were making the first crude experiments with armed helicopters. Scrounging discarded hardware from the other services' junkyards, they improvised various combinations of machine guns and rockets in the face of ridicule and outright opposition. At the same time they began to develop tactics and techniques which they felt would prove useful when the technology of helicopter armament caught up to the theory. The guiding genius for much of this development was a colorful officer, Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool. Colonel Vanderpool was Chief of the U. S. Army Aviation School's Combat Development Office, which was under the direct supervision of the Assistant Com- mandant. This arrangement was fortuitous since we could make all the assets of the School available to his project if required. In June 1956, with two officers, two enlisted men, and unbounded enthusiasm, Colonel Vanderpool went to work without a charter, without money and, by explicit direction, without publicity. With borrowed personnel from the Department of Tactics, Colonel Vanderpool formed a "Sky-Cav" platoon which became notorious for its hair-raising demonstrations of aerial reconnais- sance by fire. By mid-1957 this provisional unit, redesignated Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, had somehow acquired two H-21's. one H-25, and one H-19 armed with a wondrous variety of unlikely weapons. Colonel Vanderpool and his "hoods" were to see their efforts officially recognized when the Aerial Combat Re- connaissance Platoon became the nucleus of the 7292d Aerial Com- bat Reconnaissance Company (Provisional) with an approved Table of Distribution sanctioned by the Department of the Army on 25 March 1958. In subsequent work, Colonel Vanderpool and his group developed, on paper, organizations for an "Armair" troop, GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT 7 squadron, and brigade. As the Assistant Commandant of the Army Aviation School, I was present when Colonel Vanderpool gave a briefing to Major General Hamilton H. Howze, the first Director of Army Aviation, on the organization of an "Armair Division." Staff Plans an Army Aircraft "Family" Near the end of the 1950's, the Army staff recognized the over- whelming need to get its "aviation house" in order. It was becom- ing big business. Too many programs were going in too many directions. Many Army agencies had separate responsibilities and were pursuing their own program in happy isolation of the rest. The Transportation Corps and Signal Corps had reluctantly brought their test activities to Fort Rucker with the Army Aviation Test Board, but there were still many fragmented efforts at many echelons. The Army seemed uncertain of its goals; Congress was unhappy with some of the budget justifications; and, the aviation industry was uncertain . . At the end of June 1959, the Army had 5,500 aircraft, most of them substandard, with a requirement for 6,400. Taking into account normal losses, wearout, and attrition, the aviation picture was very poor for 1970. The greatest need was for a light observa- tion aircraft to perform the "bread and butter" mission of Army aviation. One of the most important milestones during this pcriod was the decision to develop the XH-40 Bell Utility Helicopter and to power it with a turbine engine. Although designed as an aerial ambulance, it was recognized even then that this machine might turn out to be the most useful aerial platform ever put in production. In October 1959 the Army Chief of Research and Development, Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, initiated an Army Air- craft Development Plan to advance firm guidance for research and development efforts during the next decade. He felt the plan would bridge the gap between the Army and U. S. Air Force capabilities and give the Army the initiative in the manned aircraft field. In- dustry was expected to contribute a major effort. To implement the Army Aircraft Development Plan, the Office of the Chief of Research and Development prepared three broad development objectives which they called Army Study Require- ments. These study requirements forecast a need for light observa- tion, manned surveillance, and tactical transport aircraft. They were presented to all members of industry on 1 December 1959 at 8 AIRMOBILITY Fort Monroe, Virginia. The requirements spelled out enough information, along with available parallel U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy studies, to enable industry to explore technical ap- proaches to meet the requirements. The Rogers Board On 15 January 1960 the Army Chief of Staff established the Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board chaired by Lieutenant General Gordon B. Rogers, the Deputy Commanding General of the Continental Army Command, to consider the Army Aircraft Development Plan and to review the industry proposals. Other members of the Board were Major Generals Robert J. Wood, Hamilton H. Howze, Thomas F. Van Natta, Alva R. Fitch, Richard D. Meyer, and Ernest F. Easterbrook; and Brigadier Generals Lawrence J. Lincoln, William M. Thames, Jr., and Clifton F. von Kann. The Board was supported by the Army general staff and elements of the Continental Army Command. Colonel Robert R. Williams, then Chief of the Airmobility Division, Office of the Chief of Research and Development, was the guiding genius behind the formation of the Rogers Board and Secretary (without vote) . As the Deputy Director of Army Aviation, I also served on the Board without vote. On 1 February 1960, forty-five companies submitted 119 de- signed concepts as their solutions to the problems posed by the Army Study Requirements. These concepts were evaluated in two phases-a technical evaluation under the direction of the Chief of Transportation from 1-15 February and an opera!ional evaluation from 16-28 February under the direction of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development. It is important to note that this was the first time that most of the major aircraft companies took official notice of the aviation potential within the Army. Before the Rogers Board, only the helicopter manufacturers and a few light airplane companies had any comprehension of the Army's requirements. After the evaluation period, the Rogers Board met at Fort Monroe from 29 February to 6 March. During that time it reviewed the Army Aircraft Development Plan, discussed roles and missions of Army aviation, projected Army funding, assessed combat sur- veillance requirements, and detailed procurement plans. The Rogers Board made recommendations regarding three types of aircraft-observation, surveillance and transport. In the observation field it advocated conducting an immediate design GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT 9 competition to develop a new helicopter, selecting at least two designs for full development, and competitive tests. The selected design would begin production in Fiscal Year 1964 and eventually phase out the existing observation aircraft, the L-19, H-13, and H-23. In the surveillance field, the Rogers Board believed that more testing on sensory devices, data link, and intelligence proces- sing were necessary before military characteristics could be pre - pared for a penetration surveillance aircraft. Pending these studies, the Board recommended a new aircraft be developed with an operational target date by 1970. In the area of transport aircraft, the Board determined that more specifics were needed on exact requirements for Army airlift to support contingency plans and a program was needed to provide a vertical or short-take-off-and- landing long-range replacement for the Chinook and Caribou in the early 1970's. Two other recommendations were made by the Board which are not generally well-known. The Board recommended the estab- lishment of a policy to replace each model of aircraft at least every ten years or sooner if warranted by operational requirements or technological advances. It also recommended that Department of the Army and Continental Army Command prepare an in depth study to determine whether the concept of air fighting units was practical and if an experimental unit should be activated to test its feasibility. On ' 19 March 1960 the Army Chief of Staff approved the Rogers Board recommendations with implementation for planning pur- poses and assigned various staff agencies primary responsibility to carry out these recommendations. Regarding air fighting units, he charged Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations with the responsibil- ity for preparing recommendations in this area. The importance of the Rogers Board has been somewhat ob - scured by the later Howze Board and tests of the 11 th Air Assault Division. However, it was a remarkable milestone in Army air- mobility. It set forward a chain of actions which had a profound effect on later concepts. With historical hindsight, it is apparent that the scope of the 1960 Rogers Board review was limited. It obviously did not con- stitute a major advance in tactical mobility for the Army. But in comparison with the advances made during the 1950's, the Board's objectives, if obtained, would have represented a substantial gain in mobility through the use of aviation. The Rogers Board pro- vided essential aviation guidance for development, procurement, and personnel planning. 10 AIRMOBILITY The work of the Rogers Board was symptomatic of a renaissance throughout many segments of the Army-in its schools and its fighting units. As an example of the latter, Lieutenant Colonel Russell P. Bonasso, the Aviation Officer of the 101st Airborne Division, made what could be called a drastic organizational pro- posal in 1960. After studying the fragmented aviation assets in the division, he briefed the Commanding General, Major General William C. Westmoreland, on the advantages of centralized con- trol. At the conclusion of a lengthy discussion, General Westmore- ' land authorized the formation of the 101st Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional) -the first such organization in the Army. Army-Air Force Differences The early development of the airmobile concept was not with- out controversy. As the direct result of the experiences in Korea and the disagreements over Army aviation between the Air Force and the Army, Secretaries Frank Pace, Jr. of the Army and Thomas K. Finletter of the Air Force signed a special Memorandum of Understanding dated 2 October 1951. Under the terms of this document organic Army aircraft would be used by the Army "as an integral part of its components for the purpose of expediency and improving ground combat and logistics procedures within the combat zone," Detailed functions under the exclusive control of the ground force commander which might be performed by Army organic aircraft were spelled out in this Magna Carta of Army aviation. Predictably this did not settle the so-called roles and missions issues between the Services. Other memoranda were to follow. The Air Force witnessed the rapid growth of Army aviation during the 1950's. From 668 light airplanes and 57 light helicopters that comprised the Army inventory on 30 June 1950, it saw the Army acquire over 5,000 aircraft of fifteen different varieties by 1960. The Air Force had watched the Army become the acknowl- edged leader in vertical flight and ground effects machines. Against strenuous objections, the Army had "borrowed" three Air Force, T -37 jets for testing and a number of Army aviators were being qualified in various transonic aircraft from other Services and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Worst ot all, ' the Air Force found itself with a growing number of "technologically unem- ployed" pilots and they heard themselves described in front of a Congressional committee as the "silent silo-sitters-of-the-seventies." GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT 11 A briefing of particular significance took place in the late after- noon of 12 December 1960. General Thomas D. White , Chief of Staff of the Air Force, had requested this briefing on the future Anny aviation program and, as the Deputy Director of Anny Avia- tion, it was my duty to present the fonnal portion of the briefing in the presence of General George H. Decker, the Anny Chief of Staff; and many senior officers of both Services. At that time the focus in the Army was on the nuclear battle- field. Organic aviation was viewed by the Army as the best means of maintaining combat operations in an area characterized by great depth and frontage with the dispersion of many small self.-contained units. The major threat was viewed as a sophisticated enemy attack- ing with masses of annor on the plains of Europe . Counter·guerrilla warfare at that time was viewed as a secondary mission. N ever the - less, the early planners in airmobility perceived that one of the automatic fallouts in organizing the Anny for greater ainnobility would be much greater capabilities in the lower spectrums of warfare. . The Anny had already made a decision to replace its light fixed-wing observation airplane and the two light observation heli· copters with a single light turbine helicopter. This had been a fundamental decision of the Rogers Board the year before and was another example of the Anny's commitment to the turbine engine. The early Bell XH-40 had been standardized as the HU-I and was envisioned then as the replacement for the L-20 utility air - plane and the H-19 utility helicopter. Further growth versions of the Bell machine were planned to replace the bulk of the missions then perfonned by the Sikorsky H-34 and the Vertol H-21. The Vertol HC-IB Chinook was then on the drawing boards to replace the piston powered Sikorsky H-37 . To provide background for understanding the question and answer period which followed the briefing I must digress to com- ment on the Mohawk and the Caribou aircraft. Since its inception as a joint Army and Marine program, the OV-I Mohawk had been a center of controversy. Actually the Army and Marine requirements were never compatible and compromises were made that suited neither . From the Anny's viewpoint, the original design was compromised by shipboard requirements and other specific Marine specifications which had little application for an Army observation aircraft. From the .Marine viewpoint, they were looking for a fixed·wing replacement for the old Cessna light observation aircraft and they did not require sophisticated sensor systems which they planned to carryon other aircraft. As it turned 12 AIRMOBILITY out, the Marines dropped out of the development program before the first prototypes were ready for flight. Because the Mohawk was an exception to the Secretary of De- fense's memorandum on weight limitations for Army aircraft and because it had inherent capabilities for armament, the Air Force had opposed its development from the beginning. There is no doubt that certain Army extremists viewed the Mohawk as the "nose of the camel within the tent of tactical air support." The Army was to suffer for their enthusiasm for years to come. The manufacturer, Grumman, did not help by publishing carefully placed brochures which showed the Mohawk in a variety of attack roles. The Mohawk was originally designed as a visual reconnaissance aircraft with better survivability than the L-19 of Korean vintage. In addition, it was to have an integral camera sY-6tem for spot photo coverage. Above all, it was to land and take off in the same distance as the L-19 which it was to supplement. It was not long, however, -that "improved" versions of the Mohawk were visualized carrying sophisticated sensor systems developed by the Army surveillance agencies such as infra-red and side-looking radar . Weight, space, and power provisions had not been made for these systems in the original design. As a result, the gross weight increased and per- formance declined. These growth versions of the Mohawk were coming off the drawing board before the first "A" model had even been tested throughout its entire flight envelope and subsequent tests were to prove that major engineering modifications to both wing and power plants would be necessary in the latter versions. Furthermore, the addition of all this sophisticated sensor equip- ment not only raised die unit cost significantly but, in the view of many, watered down the Army contention that this was truly a front line low echelon aircraft. Turning to the Caribou, this aircraft came into the Army by the sheer persistence of a few perceptive representatives of deHavi- land Aircraft Corporation of Canada and a few equally perceptive Army aviation enthusiasts who recognized the natural affinity of the deHaviland aircraft to the Army environment. Starting with the Beaver-which was designed as a "bush pilot's dream," and progressing to the reliable, but somewhat clumsy Otter-the Cari- bou seemed a natural to those Army planners who saw a significant gap between the Army's organic capability and the C-130 Air Force transport. The Caribou was the second exception by the Secretary of De- fense to his memorandum on the weight limitations for Army fixed-wing aircraft. Its very size threw down a gantlet to the Air GR.QWTH OF THE CONCEPT 13 Force strategists. It could carry as much as the venerable C-47 and land and take off of remarkably short unimproved airstrips. It had a rear end loading door which facilitated rapid cargo handling and was relatively easy to maintain and operate. The Air Force saw this 32 passenger aircraft as a second invasion of its domain and the projected rise of the Army's inventory at a time that the Air Force aircraft inventory was declining was bound to cause more heat than light. 1 The Caribou proved to be an extremely useful addition to the United States aircraft inventory and did yeoman service in Vietnam. Later it would be transferred to the Air Force in 1966 as part of another Army-Air Force agreement, but in the early 1960's the Caribou and the Mohawk were the two major symbols of Army- Air Force disagreement and more time was devoted to these systems than to the entire airmobility concept itself. The question and answer period that followed the briefing began with a discussion about the Russians' effort in the helicopter field and the Russians' method of organizing their aviation. Gen- eral White then turned to the growth of aviation in ~e United States Army and got to the heart of the meeting. To the obvious dismay of some Air Force staff officers, he said, I don't disagree with the Army concept. Obviously there is always going to be the clash of budgetary impingements. Your idea of supply- ing yourselves and thiS "Sky Cav," I can't quarrel with. But what worries me and must worry you for other reasons is what does the future hold? Two of these airplanes are probably as big as our bombers were eighteen or twenty years ago. What does the future hold? How do we get along, because the air does clash at a certain point? How do we work this out? General Decker indicated that Army aviation would take up where the Air Force left off and that he was perfectly happy to leave it that way-provided the Air Force provisioned the necessary airlift and tactical air support to complement the Army's need. The conversation then shifted to the type of close air support that the Army felt was best. General Decker espoused a single-purpose, 1 The very existence of the Caribou in the Army inventory changed one Air Force program-the Fairchild C-12! "Provider." This latter aircraft was scheduled to be phased out of the active Air Force inventory in 1961, with a few programmed to the reserves and the remainder to be declared surplus. When Secretary of Defense Robert S. Mc:-.iamara suggested that the Air Force tum over the C-12!'s to the Army (to train on this type aircraft prior to the receipt of the Caribou) , the Air Force suddenly discovered new and pressing Air Force requirements for the C-12!. Thus the Army Caribou protagonists not only pushed the Caribou into being, but-incidentally- saved the C-12! for much·needed duty in Vietnam. 14 AIR.MOBILITY simple combat airplane for close support, while General White defended the Air Force viewpoint that a multi-purpose aircraft could do the job better and also perform as an air defense weapon. The rest of the conversation centered about the Army's testing of certain jet aircraft for deep surveillance. Finally, the problems of command and control of two distinct systems-Air Force and Army-were discussed. General White and General Decker closed the session with a resolution to have Major General David A. Burchinal and Major General Barksdale Hamlett work on more specific agreements be- tween the Air Force and the Army. The two Chiefs of Staff closed the session with the following remarks: General White: We waste more money; we waste time; we waste energy; and we waste dispositions. I doubt that we will solve all our problems but I am certainly for solving as many of them as . we can. General Decker: Well, I am, too. We will go halfway or even more. I will say this, that there is a group around this city not confined to the Army, who think the Army is nor-doing itself justice for coming out and making a pitch to take over some of these things such as tacti- cal air support. I won't agree with them. I think as long as the Air Force has the mission and can do it they ought to do it. We don't want to take it over, but there is that kind of pressure as you probably know. I want you to know that that is not my position. The Air Force and the Army differences brought out in the briefing just described were not to be entirely solved during the next decade, but many problems between the services disappeared in the crucible of combat. Working agreements between those actively engaged in battle were developed and standardized. But the fundamental differen(:es remained between those who viewed aviation as an end in itself and those who saw aviation merely as a means to free the ground soldier from the "tyranny of terrain." Reviewing the Army's position in 1960, a full year before the first helicopter companies landed in Saigon, it should be noted that the Army was well along its way in airmobility. At the time it had the following basic objectives: each division to have the capability of moving at least a company of Infantry by its organic airlift; aerial surveillance to match the firepower of the unit at each echelon; rapid purification of the aircraft inventory to reduce the types of aircraft to the minimum; acquisition of a limited number of flying cranes; and, increased logistical capabilities as represented by the Caribou and Chinook team and any possible successor. It is important to view these objectives in their proper time frame for they were not necessarily geared to the prospect of an increased involvement in Vietnam, but rather to a new Army GROWTH OF. THE (:ONCEPT 15 structure, worldwide. The planners at that time felt certain that if they provided increased airmobility for most Army units it would be useful for the major contingencies that could be forecast. Vietnam Fleet Expands Early in 1961 General Maxwell D. Taylor, who was then the Military Advisor to the President, made a situation survey visit to Southeast Asia. During his visit he felt that the lack of adequate roadnets, lines of communication, and means of mobility con- tributed heavily to the government's problems in South Vietnam. As a result of General Taylor's recommendations, President John F. Kennedy approved a more active support program to South Vietnam to assist in the fight against the communist-directed Viet Cong. Generally, the support included the establishment of a joint headquarters for directing the program; increasing the number of U. S. advisors for the South Vietnamese armed forces; and additional support through Army Aviation, communications units, and Navy and Air Force units. This began a chain of events culminating in the arrival of the helicopter units mentioned at the beginning of this study. The first few helicopters to arrive "in country" were based at Tan Son Nhut and provided support to all the Army of the Re- public of Vietnam units they could reach. Naturally, this support was based on operational priorities-the average Army of the Re- public of Vietnam infantry unit saw very few helicopters in its day-to-day operations. This was, however, a period of innovation and of "trial-and-error" schooling for the U. S. pilots and crews, and also for the Viet Cong. There is one hair-raising tale of the H-21 pilot who put down in a landing zone only to see a squad of Viet Cong step from the woods and open fire o~ him at point blank range. Fortunately for the pilot and crew, the Viet Cong squad leader had firmly em- bedded in the minds of his men the necessity to "lead" the heli- copter with their fire. The amazed pilot watched the squad pour their fire into the ground 20 yards in front of him. He took off without a single hit. This kind of strange tale in a sense character- izes the early days-you might say the bailing wire days-of air- mobility in the Vietnam War. Following the 57th and 8th, the 93d Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) arrived off the coast of Vietnam in January 1962. Ten miles out in the South China Sea from DaNang, the aircraft were flown off the carrier deck of the USNS Card to Da 16 AIRMOBI(JTY Nang Air Base. This unique delivery was accomplished without serious incident even though ceilings were down to 100 feet over the ocean. These three aviation companies experienced seemingly insurmountable difficulties because. of a critical shortage of en- gines and deterioration of rotor blades and aviation equipment due to high humidity. Nevertheless, they continually overflew their programmed flying hours and exceeded aircraft availability normal rates. To some extent the support gap was bridged upon arrival from Fort Riley, Kansas, in January 1962 of the 18th Aviation Company (U-IA Otter). These aircraft were spread throughout the four corps areas to provide a utility supply net throughout the length of the country. Most of their missions involved delivery of aircraft parts and supplies to rotary wing aviation units that were widely separated frorr:. their support elements. The first Marine helicopter squadron arrived in country in April 1962 and was established at the old French base at Soc Trang in the Mekong Delta. In June and July of that year the Marines swapped bases with the 93d Transportation Company at Da Nang because of the greater capability of the Marine H-34 helicopters to operate in the higher elevations of the northern region. To provide better command and control of the Army's growing fleet, the 45th Transportation Battalion was deployed to Vietnam in early 1962 from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and assumed command of the three Army helicopter companies and the fixed-wing Otter company. Shortly thereafter two more light helicopter companies, the 33d and the 81st, were deployed and also came under the com- mand of the 45th Transportation Battalion. The first of "a long line of Hueys" arrived in Vietnam as part of the 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) in early 1962. They were shortly followed by the 23d Special Warfare Avia- tion Detachment equipped with OV-l Mohawks to provide recon- naissance and photographic coverage in support of ARVN forces. Much of this early effort was classified. As a result, many Army aviators felt a bit frustrated that they were being kept "under wraps" at the same time they read of Marine exploits around Da Nang in the daily newspapers. Nevertheless, their operations were receiving official attention at the highest levels. The Events Leading to the Howze Board While the first Army aviation units were deploying to Vietnam, settling in-country and making their first tentative tests in combat, GROWTH OF TlJE CONCEPT 17 events in Washington were occurring which would have a profound influence on the future of. airmobility.2 Some of the events which greatly influenced an increasing use of airmobility included the reorganization of the Army divisions, an increase in the number of divisions, the Berlin buildup and call up of reserves, insurgency operations in general, and additional requirements for Army-type aircraft in military assistance programs throughout the world. The Army found that the requirements for its aircraft outpaced current procurement and deployment of aviation units depleted the inven- tory in the Continental United States. In late September 1961 Secretary of Defense McNamara re- viewed the Army aviation plans and indicated tentative decisions concerning procurement of Army aircraft and the number of Army aviation companies. Uneasy over his tentative decision in this matter, he sought further information. On 4 October he conferred with General Clyde D. Eddleman, Army Vice Chief of Staff, Brigadier General von Kann, Director of Army Aviation, and Major James J. Brockmyer, Army Aviation Action Officer. During this conference he sympathetically questioned the Army program, especially the Bell utility helicopter program, stating that he felt the procurement was strung out too many years. If the Army really needed these helicopters and its design offered many advantages over the current models, he felt the early procurement of large numbers would best serve the national interest. As a result of this conference and the previous study effort of his own staff, Mr. McNamara sent a short memorandum to the Secretary of the Army on 5 October requesting a study of all Army aviation requirements. As part of this study, he desired an Army evaluation of his previously proposed cuts in the Army aviation program. He asked for a progress report by 20 October and a final report by mid-November. General von Kann, as Director of Army Aviation, began to compile his own report of the entire Army aviation program and a forecast for requirements for aircraft through 1970. By the time Mr. McNamara's memorandum reached the Army Staff, this report was well underway. General von Kann's report and the reclama of the proposed reduction in Army aircraft procurement constituted the Secretary of the Army's answer to the Secretary of Defense. I After living with the early problems of airmobility for six full years, it was a disappointment to me that I would be out of the mainstream of airmobility actions for the next exciting two years. I was promoted out of my job as Deputy Director of Army Aviation in the spring of 1961 and served as Chief, MAAG, Ethiopia until 1963. I was then fortunate to return to the Pentagon as Director of Army Aviation. 18 AIIlMOBll..ITY Analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the Army's submission during January and February 1962. Their review was extremely critical of the Army's so-called caution. Key action officers prepared a draft for Mr. McNamara which would have a long-range effect on the structure of the Army. On 19 April 1962 Mr. McNamara sent a now famous mem- orandum to the Secretary of the Army in which he stated he felt the Army's program was dangerously conservative. He . believed the procurement program fell short of meeting requirements and failed to give a rationale for an optimum mix of aircraft types. The staff paper supporting the memorandum listed three major criticisms of the Army aviation program. First, OSD did not think the Army had fully explored the opportunities offered by technology to break their traditional ties to surface mobility. Second, they claimed that air vehicles operating close to the ground offered a possible quantum increase in effectiveness. Third, they stated that air trans- portation, all things considered, · was less costly than rail or ship transportation even in peacetime, and wartime urgency would make it even more important. Therefore, the OSD staff stated that the Army needed a major effort to exploit the aeronautical potential and increase its effectiveness vis-a-vis ground transportation systems. The Secretary believed the Army needed to re-examine its aviation requirements with a bold "new look" at land warfare mobility. Though previous studies had produced doctrinal con- cepts, action was needed to carry the concepts into effect. Studies of air vehicles were needed also. He directed the re-examination of tactical mobility requirements divorced from traditional view- points and past policies, and free from veto or dilution by con- servative staff review. He felt the Army should be willing to substitute airmobile systems for traditional ground systems if it would improve capabilities and effectiveness. The final objective of the re-examination was to recommend action which would give the Army the maximum ' attainable mobility in the combat area within the bounds of aeronautical technology, within alternative funding levels. The Secretary of Defense directed that the results of re- examination be presented in terms of cost effectiveness and trans- port effectiveness, and that full use be made of field tests and exercises. Mr. McNamara urged Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr. to give the matter his personal attention and, in a most unusual departure from accepted procedure, suggested the follow- ing individuals to manage the Army's effort: Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze, Brigadier Generals Delk M. Oden, Walter GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT 19 B. Richardson, and Robert R. Williams; Colonels John Norton and Alexander J. Rankin; and Mr. Frank A. Parker Jr., President of the Research Analysis Corporation, Dr. Edwin W. Paxson of the RAND Corporation, and Mr. Edward H. Heinemann, a well- known aviation consultant. Secretary McNamara summed up the emphasis he placed on the Army reexamination of tactical mobility this way: "I shall be disappointed if the Army's reexamination merely produces logis- tically oriented recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for employment of fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility." This benchmark in airmobility history resulted from the fortu- nate confluence of several trends: first, the personal dissatisfaction of the Secretary of Defense with the Army's failure to exploit the potential capabilities of airmobility; secondly, an undeniable at- titude of many office of the Secretary of Defense civilian analysts who looked upon the service staffs and most officers as reluctantly being dragged into the twentieth century; third, there was a nucleus of Army aviation oriented officers both in the office of the Secretary of Defense staff and Army Staff who recognized the possibility of capitalizing on Mr. McNamara's attitude to sweep aside ultraconservative resistance within the Army itself. Finally, there was an opportunity to present to the Secretary of Defense for his signature directives that would cause the Army to appoint an evaluation by individuals known for their farsightedness and to submit recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense in order to avoid intermediate filtering. For the record, it should be noted that General Howze knew nothing of this background maneuvering and would have sternly protested had be been aware. The Army Vice Chief of Staff immediately alerted the General Staff of Secretary McNamara's requirements. The staff suggested the appointment of a board of general officers and selected civilians with subordinate working groups similar to the organization of the Rogers Board. Departmerit of the Army directed General Herbert B. Powell, Commanding General, Continental Army Command, to establish the Board which would have three suspense dates to meet. On 10 May 1962 the Board would submit an outline plan of how it would conduct its review, including an estimate of funds re- quired. Beginning I June the Board would submit monthly prog- ress reports and by 24 August a final report incorporating a recommended program for development and procurement of Army . aircraft. Department of the Army directed other agencies to pro- 20 AIRMOBILITY vide appropriate support and assistance as required to Continental Army Command and the Board. The Howze Board Within a week after Secretary McNamara's memorandum of 19 April, Continental Army Command appointed General Howze, Commanding General of the Strategic Army Corps and of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, as president of the ad hoc U. S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board to conduct a reexamination of the role of Army aviation and aircraft require- ments. On 25 April Continental Army Command contacted Gen- eral Howze to alert him of the job to be done, outlined preliminary instructions, and provided pertinent details. The formal directive dated 3 May was not issued until the Board had begun work. In fact, General Howze did not read it until 5 May. Continental Army Command warned General Howze that the deadlines were ex- tremely demanding. On 25 April, the same day on which General Howze was notified that he was to form the Board, General Decker, Chief of Staff of the Army, informed his staff of the establishment of the Board and outlined the Board's purpose and function, com- position, direction and control, and administrative procedures. His directive formalized the verbal instructions previously given. General Howze initial reaction was that the magnitude of the job and the consideration of avoiding false starts might prohibit the Board from accomplishing all the assigned tasks by the deadline. For example, he believed that exercises and troop tests should be continued beyond that time frame to further refine requirements for aircraft and of the materiel. However, he felt that within the time limitation the Board could arrive at most of the essential con- clusions and provide a conservative estimate of the proper program on which the Army could embark without wasting assets. General Howze was free to convene portions of the Board at installations other than Fort Bragg if convenient. He could organize the Board as he saw fit. Within the first few days of May, aviation units and support elements awaited his bidding, funds had been earmarked, and instructions had been issued to insure that supply and maintenance priorities were clearly understood throughout the Army . General Howze was free to deal directly with the Depart- ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, the other military services, government agencies, and civilian industry for coordina- tion on the technical aspects of his evaluation. Seldom has there ever been such a broad and open-end charter in military history. GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT 21 The basic Board membership was thirteen general officers and five civilians.3 Some 3,200 military personnel and 90 civilians par- ticipated in various phases of war games, equipment and troop testing. Whole units were diverted from overseas deployments to be included in the tests. For example, a Caribou company which had been planned for the Pacific was delayed specifically by the Secretary of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary of De- fense, so that it might take part in the tests. The Office of the Secretary of Defense instructed the Depart- ment of the Air Force to support the Howze Board. On 8 May the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, requested the U. S. Air Force to contribute to the efforts of the Board through the use of its air transport capability, especially as a means of achieving air lines of communication within a combat theater. He stated that the Army would request up to a squadron of C-130's in its exercise and tests and that this would be a good chance for the U. S. Air Force to "sell" its services and capabilities. After detailed requirements were formulated, Secretary Stahr contacted Air Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert to work out arrangements between Continental Army Command and the Air Force Tactical Air Command. The most significant major activity of the Board throughout its deliberations was the investigation, testing and evaluation of the organizational and operational concepts of airmobility. The findings and evaluations of field tests, war games, operations re- search, and visits to overseas combat theaters provided support to the final Board report. Much effort was devoted to field experimentation for the pur- pose of comparing a conventionally equipped force with one made airmobile by adding aircraft. The Board had for a test force one battle group and part-time use of two others plus the artillery and engineers of the 82d Airborne Division. In addition, the testing • General Howze was not only President of the Board , but Chairman of the Steer· ing and Review Committee as well. In addition to General Howze, seven other officers and six top .level civilians originally composed the Steering and Review Com- mittee. These included Major General Ben Harrell, Major General William B. Rosson , Brigadier General John J . Lane, Brigadier General Edward L. Rowny , Brigadier General Delk M. Oden , Brigadier General Robert R. \,\!illiams, Colonel William M. Lynn, Jr., Dr. Jacob A. Stockfisch , Dr. Edwin W. Paxson, Eugene Vidal, Fred Wolcott, Frank A. Parker , and Edward H . Heinemann. Mr. Parker , General Rowny, and Colonel Lynn also served as chiefs of working committees. Other senior board rhem· bers (eventually added to the Steering and Review Committee) were named working committee chiefs-Major General Clifton F. von Kann , Major General Norman H . \"issering, Brigadier General Frederic W . Boye, Jr., and Brigadier General Walter B. Richardson. 22 AIRMOBILITY committee used 150 Army aircraft, both rotary and fixed-wing, for eleven weeks, augmented by aircraft support from the U . S. Air Force. About fifty officers designed, controlled, and evaluated the tests assisted by an advisory group of civilian scientists. The Board conducted approximately forty tests ranging in magnitude from fairly elaborate live-fire exercises and three major week-long exercises against an assumed force of irregulars to aux- iliary tests of new items of equipment. Results of the three largest tests indicated that Army aircraft would enhance combat effective- ness' in both conventional and counter-guerrilla actions and that Army tasks could be accomplished by smaller forces in shorter campaigns. The Howze Board Report The final report of the Howze Board was submitted on 20 August 1962. The air assault division was the principal tactical innovation. As compared with about one hundred aircraft in the standard division, it would have 459. Airmobility would be achieved by extensive reduction in ground vehicles from 3,452 down to 1,100 which would also reduce the airlift requirement for strategic deployment. Despite the reduction in total number of vehicles the cost of the new division, based upon the initial investment and a five-year operating cost, was about half again the cost of an infantry division. Artillery consisted of only 105-mm howitzers and Little John rockets (airtransportable in the Chinook helicopter). Aug- menting this greatly reduced firepower, the division would employ twenty-four armed Mohawks and 36 Huey helicopters armed with 2.75-inch rockets. The aircraft of the division could lift one third of its assault elements at one time . Three brigade headquarters provided major tactical sub-divisions to which the fighting battalions and support elements would be assigned according to the nature of the task and the terrain. The brigades in turn could mix units assigned to them as could the battalions and to a lesser extent the subordinate units of the battalions. All the essential elements of combat power- maneuver forces, reconnaissance, firepower, communications, and service support-were present. The Board also recommended the organization of an air cavalry combat brigade having 316 aircraft, 144 of which would be attack helicopters. Its function was the classical one for cavalry-to screen, reconnoiter, and wage delaying actions. Unlike the air assault division which was designed to join battle on the ground, all of GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT 23 the air cavalry combat brigade was to be airborne including its anti-tank capacity. A distinct feature of the proposed air assault operations was the requirement for an - increased use of support aircraft to carry supplies as far forward as the tactical situation would permit. The Board envisioned Caribous and Chinooks located in the forward Army area to deliver men, equipment, and supplies after Air Force aircraft had deposited them as far forward as possible. The Board presented Mr. McNamara five alternative programs whiCh would modernize the Army structure by replacing conven- tional forces by airmobile forces. Of the five programs the Board recommended its Alternative Three as the "most responsive to the requirement and most compatible with the Army's mission and overall structure." This program within six years would provide eleven Reorganization Objective Army Divisions, five air assault divisions, three air cavalry combat brigades, and five air transport brigades. It would also increase the mobility of other combat units and the effectiveness of their logistical support. The Board emphasized the quantitative and qualitative im- provements that would be necessary for Army aviation personnel programs. Its proposed alternative would require 8,900 aviators in 1963, growing to 20,600 in 1968. The Board foresaw an increased need for warrant officer pilots and recommended an officer to warrant officer ratio of one to one by the end of five years. It also recommended major changes in the ' officer career program to en- hance their training, administration, and utilization. In a letter prefa.cing the final report, General Howze com- mented that the job was in some respects incomplete and further testing was recommended. He said, "The foregoing does not indi- cate that I consider the Board's findings unvalidated or its judg- ment faulty. The time made available although not sufficient to prove all details of the Board's recommendations as respects orga- nization, personnel, equipment, maintenance and doc~rine, was quite sufficient to enable it, with conviction, to chart a course of action which will serve to increase markedly the combat and logis- tical efficiency of the Army." The Board was aware that its proposals were not infallible and that subsequent tests and developments could alter some elements of the proposed force structure. There- fore, the Board recommended a continuing program of field tests using the first units becoming operational under the activation schedule. It also recommended that progress on the Board's pro- posals be reviewed annually as a safeguard against any errors in 24 AIRMOBILITY details of organization and any slippage In implementing the program. The single major conclusion reached by the Board was terse and emphatic. "The Board has only a single, general conclusion," stated General Howze. "Adoption by the Army of the airmobile concept-however imperfectly it may be described and justified in this report-is necessary and desirable. In some respects the transi- tion is inevitable, just as was that from animal mobility to motor ." The Howze Board accomplished its mission in 90 days, from the original assignment to the finished report. In view of the enormous staffing task involved, and the sheer size of the analytical task, such alacrity has few parallels in staff work in or out of the military service. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, having received what it had asked for, now turned the report over to its systems analysts in the Office of the Comptroller to study in minute detail all 3,500 pages of the main report. The review by the office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller was to focus on certain procurement actions and to make certain recommendations of its own which had no relation to the Howze Board's basic recommendations. In mid-September 1962 the Chief of Staff directed General Howze, Colonel Norton, and one of the editors of the Board Report to work in his office in preparing rebuttals for the various attacks that were coming from all directions. This "ten-day" TDY mission was to last almost until Christmas (with General Howze being replaced by General Williams when the former had to return to his command at Fort Bragg as commander of the Strategic Army Corps during the Cuban missile crisis) . Throughout the fall of 1962 it appeared, at times, that the work of the Howze Board was going to be studied to death and finally filed away for historians. The fact that it survived attacks by mem- bers of Congress, the Air Force, and conservative elements within the Army was a tribute both to the soundness of its basic con- clusions and to the dedicated officers within the Army who believed that airmobility was the wave of the future. CHAPTER II The Early Years in Vietnam, 1961-1965 The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Becomes Airmobile There is no precise method to divide the Vietnam War into convenient phases. However, from the standpoint of an airmobility study, one can consider the first phase as a learning period-a time when U. S. Army pilots were teaching Army of the Republic of Vietnam commanders and soldiers how to effectively employ heli- copter tactics, while at the same time the pilots were learning by experience, trial and error . As more and more helicopters became available, we built additional aviation units to help the Vietnamese Army become as mobile as the enemy. This second phase of the war was characterized by battalion- size air assaults of selected Vietnamese units, including the para- troopers, the rangers, and the regular infantry. It was the success of this phase that forced the enemy to increase his effort in South Vietnam. This proved to be something that the North Vietnamese Army was quite ready to do, and the improved capabilities of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were matched step-by-step with increased resistance of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army , as additional units and supplies poured down the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex and across the border. It was during this second phase that we made great improvements on our tactical employ- ment of helicopters. It was also during this period that we created our own airmobile division, tested it, and concluded that in terms of ground tactics, airmobility was here to stay. We studied the variety of tactics used by the Vietnamese and their U. S. support in these airmobile operations of extended scope and we tried to apply everything we learned to the organization and training of our airmobile units. It was also during this second phase that the Huey came into its own. The turbine engine helicopter with its great power , its reliability, and its smaller requirement for maintenance, was the technological turning point as far as airmobility is concerned. Actually, the key improvement of technology was the trio of the 26 AIRMOBILITY Huey as a troop lift bird , the Chinook with its larger capacity for resupply and movement of artillery, and the fledgling attack heli- copter-these three together allowed us to take a giant step forward at this time. From the time of the first major commitment of helicopters to Vietnam on II December 1961 until the buildup of major U. S. forces in 1965, airmobility was-like diplomacy-confined to the art of the possible. The early helicopters were old and unsuited for this particular mission; the rules of engagement were set by the South Vietnamese Government-a Government that was con- tinually changing in a series of coups and counter-coups; and the Viet Cong was undergoing a phenomenal period of growth. The primary mission of U. S. military forces was to advise and assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to build a viable military structure to meet the needs of its national security. Be- cause of the increasing scope and intensity of Viet Cong operations, this advisory task expanded very rapidly during this period. The Viet Cong regular force grew steadily from two to five regimental headquarters , the Viet Cong battalions doubled in the same period, and the quality and quantity of their weapons and equipment improved considerably. This build up necessitated the deployment of additional U. S. Army aviation units to support Government of Vietnam forces. From a single transportation battalion with three helicopter companies in early 1962, the U. S. Army developed an enormous operational and logistical support complex consisting of many battalions of helicopter companies, fixed-wing units, maintenance units , and special purpose organizations. Enemy Reaction It is interesting to note how the enemy viewed this increasing airmobility potential. The following is a translation of an extract from a North Vietnamese instruction pamphlet captured on 16 November 1962: It can be said that all the recent augmentations of forces that the USA has sent to the Diem government were primarily intended to strengthen the Diem rear area forces, increase their ability to pass infor- mation rapidly and the wide employment of helicopters in the move- ment of troops. Therefore if we can destroy or greatly reduce the enemy's heliborne capability we will, in essence, have destroyed the mobility necessary to the US raid ta<:tics. Although we have succeeded in inflicting some loss on the enemy in his heliborne operations the enemy has in some places calised us EARLY YEARS IN VIETNAM 27 fairly heavy losses. We must therefore find means of coping with the enemy's helicopter tactics. Widespread efforts must be directed to com- batting heliborne landings and shooting at helicopters . .Following are the advantages which the enemy enjoys due to his employment of heli- borne strike tactics: 1. Careful planning and preparations are possible together with complete mobility in an attack, support or relieving role. 2. Secrecy can be preserved and surprise strikes can be accomplished. 3. Landings can be effected dee.p into our rear areas with the capa- bility to attack and withdraw rapidly. 4. An appropriate means of destroying our forces while they are still weak. However, these tactics suffer the following disadvantages: 1. The population in our rear areas is on our side and will resist the enemy in every way. 2. Small forces are usually employed by the enemy in their deep strikes and if counterattacked may find it difficult to withdraw. 3. Heliborne operations require the latest inf~rmation (old info may have lost its timeliness and new info must be checked for accu- racy) . If the time is taken to acquire confirmatory info then the situa- tion may have changed rendering the info inaccurate. 4. The enemy's strike elements are usually unfamiliar with the terrain and can easily be surrounded and rapidly defeated. 5. The present available helicopters prevent the enemy from em- ploying large forces (although this is only a temporary disadvantage it will take the enemy some time before he will be able to overcome it.) 6. The effectiveness of heliborne tactics is greatly reduced in forested and jungle covered mountain areas where a clear knowledge of the nature of the terrain ·cannot be discerned from the air, where landings are difficult and ambushes easily employed against the landings. 7. The disadvantages inherent in helicopters are difficult to over- come. If they are flown slow or low they are vulnerable to ground fire; every flying hour must be complemented by 3 hours ground mainte- nance; they cannot be flown for more than 70 hours in any 2 or 3 days (TN: Obvious typographical or technical error. IO hours in 2 or 3 days seems app,ropriate) ; the helicopter consumes much fuel, carrying a full load of troops its fuel capacity is reduced and as a consequence its range is reduced, as a result the starting point for heliborne operations is usually near the objective and thus the enemy's element of surprise can be compromised. A landing right within our position is the most effec- tive, but also subject to coming under our firepower while a landing outside of our position, though avoiding our firepower, loses the ele- ment of surprise. It is obvious that the Viet Cong, in spite of all their polemics, had recognized that the advent of airmobility in Vietnam had changed the name of the game. True, the a.IIies had much to learn about the employment of this new capability, but the war would never be the same. 28 AIRMOBILITY Early Problems It is important to recognize that the early airmobility efforts with the H-21 and Army of the Republic of Vietnam personnel repr.esented the lowest order of airmobility . . . that is, simply transporting people from point "A" to point "B". This is analogous to the requisitions of French taxis in World War I. It provided better and faster transportation than walking. But, it lacked the essentials of unified command, specially trained personnel, organic firepower, and responsive reconnaissance. The early Army aviators in 1962 spent a great deal of their time simply training the Vietnamese in the rudiments of getting in and out of a helicopter and conducting themselves properly in a landing zone. This was further complicated by fuzzy command relationships. The U . S. Army helicopter pilot belonged to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and was attached to the U. S. advisor on a one-time mission basis. The aircraft commander still had the authority to abort a mission that he did not feel safe; yet, he was not in the early planning phases and did not share the responsibility of the success or failure of the mission. Furthermore, he did not control the tactical air support or artillery fire nor the timing thereof. It is easy to understand the frustrations some of the early relationships generated. Little by little, sheer necessity forced those in-country to make workable agreements on standing operating procedures. The "who- does-what-to-whom" on command and control, flight levels, and fire support were among the most important procedures agreed upon . The evolution of a command and control helicopter, carry- ing all the essential commanders and liaison officers plus the proper communications equipment, soon came about. Armed helicopters would soon be part and parcel of every transport column-and the polywog shape of the Huey would soon become the universally recognized silhouette in Southeast Asia. 1 1 The transition to the Huey had its beginning in January 1955 when a design competition was held to select the new standard Arm}' utilit y helicopter. The first model. designated the XH-40 . flew in 1956 and the UH-IB model did not begin its user evaluation testing until 28 :"ovember 1960. By June of 1963 . most of the light helicopter companies had phased in the new lJH-I B helicopters and had tran si tioned their aviators. maintenance personnel. and crew chiefs to the new aircraft. But. it would not be until 27 June 1964 that the last tired old CH -2 1 was formally retired by General Oden. Acting Commanding General. U, S. Army S upport Command. Viet· nam . These times tend to give some appreciation of the long lead time necessary to develop and prove a new helicopter. EARLY YEARS IN VIETNAM 29 The Armed Helicopter in Vietnam Early attempts had been made to arm the CH-21 with a light machine gun at the door, but this fire was relatively ineffective. To better meet this requirement, the Army formed the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company and deployed it to Viet- nam in mid-1962. This company was equipped with UH-I heli- copters armed with .3 0-caliber machine guns and 2.75-inch rocket launchers and was designed to provide protective fires for the CH-2I transport helicopters. Much of the tactical doctrine for armed helicopter employment evolved during this period including the techniques for protective fire preparation of landing zones prior to and during a helicopter assault. The Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company was redesignated the 68th Aviation Company and later the 197th Airmobile Company. Its early history was studied intensely by a special group known as the Army Con- cept Team in Vietnam which was established in Saigon on 6 No- vember 1962. General Rowny, after duty with the Howze Board, had been designated to form the Army Concept Team in Vietnam by the Chief of Staff of the Army with the mission to evaluate new methods of countering insurgency in actual combat. The Army Concept Team in Vietnam had a variety of projects to include rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, communications , armored personnel carriers, logistics, and civic action tests. Fortunately for the pur- pose of this study, they were able to document the early attempts at airmobility in a special and objective way. One of the most important reports made by General Rowny's Army Concept Team in Vietnam evaluators was their analysis of the effectiveness of the armed helicopter company during the period 16 October 1962 through 15 March 1963. This test unit had a dual mission in that it was actually fighting a real war and provid- ing armed protection for the transport helicopters, while, at the same time, it provided data to the evaluators (who sometimes were heavily engaged in combat themselves) . The first element of fifteen armed Hueys was deployed to Viet- nam in September 1962. To assure proper employment, General Rowny hammered out a modus operandi with Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, on 29 September 1962, which provided a framework for the forthcoming test. The terms of reference pro- vided that the test activities must not have an unacceptable impact on military operations. Therefore , testing was undertaken only in conjunction with actual operations, and in no case was the test 30 AIRMOBILITY unit required to engage in activities designed solely for test purposes. More fundamental limitations were the rules of engagement for U.S. Army armed helicopters, which precluded testing of any tactical concepts involving "offensive" employment. Under these rules, the armed helicopters could deliver fire only after they or the escorted transport helicopters had been fired upon. In late February 1963 the rules were modified to permit the armed helicopters to initiate fire against clearly identified insurgents who threatened their safety or the safety of escorted transport helicopters. Initially, the fifteen UH-IA helicopters were armed with locally fabricated weapons systems consisting of two .30 caliber machine guns and sixteen 2.75-inch rockets. In November 1962 the unit was augmented with eleven UH-I B helicopters. The "B's" were equipped with factory installed weapons systems of four M-60 machine guns per aircraft and locally fabricated clusters of eight 2.75 -inch rockets. The "B" model eventually replaced most of the less powerful "A's." The provisional Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter com- pany was based at Tan Son Nhut Airport on the outskirts of Saigon and was under the direct operational control of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. From this base, it supported trans- port operations of the 57th, 33d, and 93d Light Helicopter Com- panies, all equipped with CH-21 aircraft. In the latter part of the test period, one platoon of helicopters was sent to escort the Marine H-34 squadron operating in I Corps. The plan of test for this company called for the evaluation of the armed helicopter in the "escort" role. Although "escort" was not defined, actual experience determined that the escort role broke down into an enroute phase} that was generally flown at a relatively safe altitude, the approach phase} where the heliborne force usually descended to nap-of-the-earth heights several kilometers away from the landing zone, and the landing zone phase. It was in the landing zone phase that the armed helicopter proved most valuable. Prior to the advent of the escort by the Utility Tactical Trans- port Helicopter company, transport helicopters on the "dangerous" combat support missions were being hit at a rate of .0 II hits per flying hour. For similar missions escorted by the Utility -Tactical Transport Helicopter company, the rate declined to .0074. During this same period of time, the hit rate for all other flying done by Army helicopters rose from .0011 to .0024. In other words, the Viet Cong effectiveness against un escorted aircraf~ doubled while EARLY YEARS IN VIETNAM 31 the efficacy of their fire against escorted aircraft dropped by 25 percent. Consequently, it was concluded that the suppressive fires delivered by armed escort helicopters were highly effective in re- ducing the amount and accuracy of enemy fires placed on transport helicopters. The response of the transport helicopter pilots to this added protection was clearly enthusiastic. Even the skeptical Marine pilots began to rely heavily on the Army armed helicopters. Although the safety of the transport helicopters was the primary consideration in escort operations , the vulnerability of the escorts themselves was a matter of concern. The escorts preceded the trans- ports into the landing zone and remained until all transports had departed . When the landing zone was small and the transport force used an extended formation, the period of exposure for armed escorts was unnecessarily long. The escorts generally flew at no more than 100 or 200 feet above the ground and were well within the zone of maximum vulnerability from small arms . The Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter company flew 1,779 combat support hours from 16 October 1962 through 15 March 1963. Most of the operations were conducted in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Suppressive fire delivered by the escort heli- copters accounted for an estimated 246 Viet Cong casualties. During this period, eleven armed helicopters were hit by hostile fire. While no armed helicopter was shot down, one UH-l B was seriously damaged as a result of ground fire. It appeared that the vulnerability of armed helicopters was well within acceptable risk limits. The first official Air Force recognition of the role of armed helicopters, and their first attempt to regulate their use in Vietnam, appeared in a document dated 27 December 1962, entitled "Heli- copter Escort," and signed by Brigadier General Rollen H . Anthis, Commander of the Second Air Division. Generally, the armed helicopter was limited to one minute of fire before the transport helicopters landed and one minute after the last departed . . . . The fighter aircraft will have primary responsibility for the security of the entire helicopter formation during the escort phase until the formation commander makes the one minute warning call prior to landing. At this time the responsibility will shift to the armed helicopters and they will precede the transport helicopters to the land- ing zone to draw fire or engage targets. Armed helicopters may be designated to attack specific targets enroute when their assistance is requested by the fighter aircraft. This arrangement proved unworkable and the Army continually sought more flexible guidelines. The Air Force consistently main- 32 AIRMOBILITY tained the helicopter must be limited to strictly defensive fires and they were quick to report to Military Assistance Command , Viet- nam, of an incident where the Army in their opinion usurped the role of close support. For example , on 26 July 1963, the Second Air Division wrote a letter to General Paul D . Harkins stating that, in three recent incidents, Army helicopters were used "offensively." Further, the Air Division inferred that: " ... Employment of the HU-1B's in the above incidents appears to be an expansion of your directive for the use of armed helicopters to include inter- diction and close air support missions. It also appears that air requests are being stopped prior to arrival at the ASOC's , with subsequent substitution of U. S. Army aircraft from Corps Advisor and Division Advisor resources." Major General Richard G . Weede, USMC, Chief of Staff, Mili- tary Assistance Command, Vietnam, replied: . . . All incidents mentioned occurred in the immediate battle areas of the ground units. These are not subjects for ASOC / TOC coordina- tion but rather matters for the ground commander to handle as he deems appropriate. Direct support aviation is controlled by the ground element commander and requires no supervision or control by a tactical air control system far removed from the ground battle. U. S. Army aviation when employed in a combat support role is normally under the operational control of the Corps Senior Advisors. Therefore, incidents of the type reported are of mutual concern of the AR VN Corps Commander and his U. S. Advisor. Request future inci- dents be referred to Corps Senior Advisors by your Air Liaison Officers for resolution at the operating level. By mid-1963 the 1st Platoon of the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company which worked with the Marine H-34's in the I Corps sector had become adopted by their comrades-in-arms as an integral part of their operations and few, if any, H-34 pilots elected to fly without the armed Hueys nearby. Procedures were developed whereby the armed Hueys picked up the fire support right after the fixed-wing fighter planes broke off their support for safety reasons, and that, in most cases, the last minute reconnais- sance by the armed helicopters prevented the Marine H-34 from going into extremely hot ambushed landing zones. Ironically during this same period, I found myself as Director of Army Aviation testifying in front of Congressional committees on the role and absolute necessity of more and better armed heli- copters. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and various Air Force officers gave negative testimony on the merits of this system. Fortunately, the Army viewpoint prevailed. EARLY YEARS IN VIETNAM 33 After the tests of the armed helicopter and the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter company were concluded and more Hueys became available for replacing the CH-21, the Department of the Army decided to convert the helicopter companies within Vietnam to a new airmobile company Table of Organization and Equip- ment. Each of the airmobile companies was organized into one armed platoon consisting of eight UH-IB helicopters with installed weapons systems and two transport platoons with eight UH-IB helicopters each. The Utility Tactical Transport helicopter com- pany remained in-country and supported the Marines and U. S. Army units without organic armed helicopters. The early tests with the Utility Tactical Transport helicopter company indicated that a platoon from five to seven armed heli- copters could protect a transport helicopter force of from twenty to twenty-five aircraft. The organization of the new airmobile company was a compromise between the requirement to provide organic arms support and the requirement to lift troops and cargo. The armament system brought the armed UH-IB up to its maximum gross weight thereby eliminating it from a troop or cargo-carrying role. In addition to the integrated machine gun and rocket systems, two door gunners were used on the armed heli- copters. The door gunners provided additional fire when a threat was clearly identified, and they also performed the functions of clearing and reloading weapons between engagements and clearing some stoppages during engagements. The UH-IB was not designed for an armed configuration and the weight of the armament system reduced the maneuverability of the aircraft and induced sufficient drag to lower the maximum speed to approximately 80 knots. As a consequence, the armed helicopters could not overtake the airmobile force if they left the formation to attack targets enroute. The early armed UH-IB's did an outstanding job in proving the concept of the armed helicopters, but they also pointed out many deficiencies that the Army would correct in later versions. Techniques of Using the Armed Helicopter Some basic operating procedures became standard . 'Vhen a target was identified, the escort leader determined whether it could be attacked under the rules of engagement and, if so, directed the engagement. \Vhere possible, targets were engaged at the maximum range of the weapon. This usually consisted of a continuous burst of machine gun fire throughout each firing run . The flight pattern 34 AIRMOBILITY was so planned that when the lead aircraft completed its firing run the next aircraft was in position to engage the target. This tactic placed continuous fire on the target until it was neutralized. Rocket fire was used when necessary to reinforce the fires of the machine guns. The techniques of fire for all weapons systems were based on maneuvering the helicopter and manipulating the weapons during the firing run. The flexibility of the armed helicopter's weapons systems allowed targets to be engaged without a requirement to maintain the armed helicopter on an aircraft-to-target line. This feature was exploited whenever possible to minimize helicopter exposure to the target engaged. When using rockets to attack targets obscured by trees or overhanging foliage, it was found that best results were obtained with a delayed fuse. Fire of the armed escort helicopters during the enroute phase was controlled by the armed escort leader. The pre-mission briefings identified the probable insurgent areas and prescribed fire control procedures to be used by both the armed escorts and transports enroute and during the landing phase. In the landing zone, before friendly troops were on the ground, armed escort fire was con- trolled by the escort leader. After the ground force arrived in the landing zone, the ground commander often marked and identified insurgent targets so that suppressive fire could be quickly and accurately placed on them. On medical evacuation missions and other missions of this type, when the ground unit was in control of the landing zone, the fire of the helicopters was controlled by the ground commander. He designated targets, marked friendly areas, and determined if escort fire could be used without endan- gering friendly forces. In mountain and jungle terrain, where targets were obscured, the suppressive fire had to be accurately controlled and fire discipline maintained in order to avoid hitting friendly troops and to prevent needless expenditure of ammunition. The armed escort was under operational control of the trans- port commander during the enroute and landing phases of air- mobile operations. If the armed escort remained in support of the troops in the landing zone, the ground commander assumed opera- tional control. During this period of time opinion varied on the necessity for door gunners on transport helicopters. Generally speaking, those not close to the action favored elimination of the door gunner for the additional weight and space, while the transport helicopter pilots favored the retention of the door gunner without exception. EARLY YEARS IN VIETNAM 35 TROOP HELICOPTERS PICK Up A RIFLE COMPANY FROM THE FIELD In mid-1963 the question of camouflaging the helicopters arose. Both camouflaged and uncamouflaged helicopters were used by U. S. Army units. Some pilots reported that the camouflaged heli- copters were more difficult to see especially in mountainous terrain and a pilot spent an undue amount of his time keeping track of his other ships. Other pilots and evaluators expressed the opinion that the white Army markings and the yellow rings on the tails of the uncamouflaged helicopters were of value to the enemy gunneTs fOT the pUTpose of aiming and tracking. By and large, it was deteTmined that the advantages of camouflage outweighed the disadvantages. Tactical Troop Transport \Vhen the UH-lB transpoTt helicopteT was first introduced in Vietnam , it usually carried ten combat -equipped Vietnamese sol- dieTs and at times as many as eleven. An investigation deteTmined that the aveTage helicopter was grossly overloaded with this many soldiers. A combat-equipped Vietnamese soldieT averaged 167 pounds . \Vhen ten personnel were loaded into the Huey with a 36 AIRMOBILITY full fuel load, a U. S. Army crew of four, armor plate, a tool box, a container of water, a case of emergency rations, weapons, armored vests for the crew, the Huey grossed 8,700 pounds, or 2,100 pounds over normal gross weight and 200 pounds over the maximum operational weight. Not only that, the center of gravity had shifted beyond safe limits. As a consequence, the standard procedure was to limit the UH-I B to eight combat troops except in grave emergencies. It was also directed that the armed helicop- ters would carry no more than the normal complement of five personnel and armament with the basic load. It was the company commander's respons