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AAIB Bulletin: 8/2009 G-VIPP EW/C2008/05/09

Piper PA-31 Navajo Chieftain · Other Documents

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Overview

This document is an AAIB Bulletin detailing a serious incident involving the Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, registration G-VIPP. The incident occurred on May 30, 2008, during a commercial flight after departure from Boscombe Down. The crew noticed smoke and flames in the cockpit due to a failure in the air recirculation fan circuit, which led to overheating and damage to electrical components. The report outlines the sequence of events, the investigation findings, and the safety actions taken by the operator following the incident. It emphasizes the importance of regular maintenance checks on circuit breakers and the need for prompt action in emergency situations to ensure safety.

  • Aircraft Type: Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain
  • Incident Date: May 30, 2008
  • Crew Experience: 980 hours total, 280 hours on type
  • Circuit Breaker Rating: 10 Amps
  • Maintenance Check Interval for Fans: Every 200 hours

Document

Source

Originally published by assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. Sprinkle hosts a reference copy with an added summary, specifications and searchable full text.

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Document details

Type
Other Documents
Year
2009
Pages
3
File size
352 KB
Publisher
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
Documentation completeness
4/7

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In this document

Incident Overview

The incident involved the Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, G-VIPP, which experienced smoke and flames in the cockpit shortly after takeoff. The crew managed to return safely to the departure airfield without injuries, thanks to their quick actions in turning off non-essential electrics and communicating with air traffic control.

Aircraft Information

The aircraft was equipped with two Lycoming TIO-540-J2BD piston engines and had two air recirculation fans located in the lower fuselage. The fans were checked for condition and operation every 200 hours, and the circuit breakers were checked for compliment and rating but not functionally tested.

Investigation Findings

The investigation revealed that the circuit breaker for the air recirculation fans had significant heat damage and failed to trip during an overload situation. The right fan was found to have seized, leading to an electrical overload that caused smoke and flames.

Operator’s Safety Actions

In response to the incident, the operator implemented several safety actions, including the embodiment of Service Bulletin 704 for cabin fan fuse installation and amendments to the maintenance program to include functional checks of circuit breakers and abnormal noise checks during fan operation.

Discussion and Recommendations

The report discusses the crew's effective management of the situation, which prevented a more serious incident. It highlights the need for regular maintenance checks on circuit breakers and the importance of crew training in emergency procedures.

Safety notes

  • Ensure regular checks on circuit breakers to prevent failures during flight.
  • Monitor the condition of air recirculation fans and their circuit breakers.

Full document text

28 © Crown copyright 2009 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2009 G-VIPP EW/C2008/05/09 SERIOUS INCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, G-VIPP No & Type of Engines: 2 Lycoming TIO-540-J2BD piston engines Year of Manufacture: 1979 Date & Time (UTC): 30 May 2008 at 0915 hrs Location: After departure from Boscombe Down, Wiltshire Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Passenger) Persons on Board: Crew - 2 Passengers - 1 Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - None Nature of Damage: Fire damage to a circuit breaker and to electrical wiring near the overhead panel Commander’s Licence: Commercial Pilot’s Licence Commander’s Age: 29 years Commander’s Flying Experience: 980 hours (of which 280 were on type) Last 90 days - 270 hours Last 28 days - 60 hours Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form and subsequent AAIB investigation Synopsis During the climb after departure, the crew observed smoke in the cockpit and flames emanating from the overhead panel. All non-essential electrics were turned off and the aircraft returned to the departure airfield safely. There were no injuries. One of the air recirculation fans was found to have suffered a mechanical failure and there was evidence that its circuit breaker had failed to trip. The excessive current drawn by the fan had caused the wiring to overheat, producing the smoke and flames. History of the flight The aircraft departed from Boscombe Down and was passing through FL70 when a burning smell was noticed by the crew. Flames then appeared from the overhead panel and smoke emanated from the circuit breaker for the air recirculation fans. The commander attempted to pull the circuit breaker, but found that it was stuck in the closed position. He turned off all non-essential electrics, but kept the radio, transponder and navigation equipment on to avoid entering Danger Areas, and proceeded to return to Boscombe Down. He maintained frequent radio communication with Boscombe ATC and requested fire service attendance. 29 © Crown copyright 2009 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2009 G-VIPP EW/C2008/05/09 The co-pilot tackled the fire with a BCF fire extinguisher, but the fire continued to smoulder throughout the descent. The aircraft landed with a fire crew in attendance. Although the three occupants reported no ill effects or injuries, they were taken to a local medical centre as a precaution. Aircraft information The aircraft is fitted with two air recirculation ‘blower’ fans, located in the lower fuselage, just forward of the wing main spar. The fans draw cabin air from floor level and distribute it to vents situated throughout the cabin. There is a HIGH/LOW switch in the overhead panel, and a single 10 Amp (A) circuit breaker in the switch and circuit breaker panel, located to the left of the left pilot’s seat. The fans are checked for ‘condition and operation’ every 200 hours. They are classified as ‘on-condition’ and therefore have no overhaul life. Circuit breakers must be checked for ‘compliment and rating’ every 200 hours, but they are not required to be functionally checked. Service Bulletin (SB 704) ‘Cabin Fan Fuse Installation’, applicable to certain PA-31-350 models, was introduced in 1982 due to problems with the windings in fan motors shorting and circuit breakers failing to trip. SB 704 required the installation of in-line fuses in the fan motor power circuit, of a lower rating than the circuit breaker. However, SB 704 was not applicable to this aircraft. Engineering investigation The 10A circuit breaker was found to have significant heat damage and although it would operate mechanically, it remained in the open circuit electrical state. There was also significant heat damage to the wiring and connectors in the cockpit roof area, near the overhead panel. Both fan units were removed, whereupon the right fan was found to have seized. Further inspection revealed that the impeller had detached from the central boss. This was apparently due to a material failure in the fan back plate. The insulation on two of the three wires in the power feed cable had suffered significant heat damage. It was concluded that the fan failure had caused the circuit to become overloaded and, since the circuit breaker had not opened, a small fire had ensued. The circuit breaker was found in the open circuit state; this was probably due to the effects of the heat. Internal inspection of the circuit breaker revealed significant heat damage. There were some signs of slight corrosion but, given the heat damage, it was not possible to make any firm conclusions about the serviceability of the circuit breaker at the time of the incident. The circuit breaker and heat damaged wires were taken to a specialist electrical laboratory. Tests were carried out on lengths of wire in an attempt to generate similar heat damage to the insulation material and thus infer the electrical loading in the circuit during the incident. The currents tested ranged from 20A to 50A. The most noteworthy test was on the undamaged third wire from the fan motor which was tested for 30 minutes at 40A. Whilst there was some discolouration of the insulation material, there was no significant deformation. The temperature of the wire reached 80°C after three minutes and remained constant thereafter. Although it was not possible to simulate accurately the physical environment of the various wires that were damaged (for example the proximity of other cables or the volume of air around the cable), the test results suggested that the fan motor circuit was probably subjected to a current of at least 40A, well in excess of the 10A circuit breaker rating. At 400% of the maximum rated load, a 10A circuit breaker should typically trip in under 5 seconds. 30 © Crown copyright 2009 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2009 G-VIPP EW/C2008/05/09 Civil Aircraft Airworthiness Information and Procedures – CAP 562 CAP 562 gives general information on a variety of

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matters concerned with the manufacture, overhaul, repair, maintenance and operation of civil aircraft. Leaflet 11-22 Appendix 24-4 is entitled ‘Thermal Circuit Breakers’, and in Section 5 ‘Maintenance Considerations’ it states: ‘It has become apparent that the progressive development of the Maintenance Review Board determining scheduled maintenance has led to a significant erosion of maintenance checks on circuit breakers. Users are reminded that there is a continuing duty to monitor the performance of equipment and that items such as circuit breakers which are largely passive in nature should be assessed for dormant faults. As a minimum and where Maintenance Schedules do not require a high level of checking, all CBs which are not regularly exercised by mechanical switching should be checked for correct mechanical operation by performing two manual switching cycles at periods of not more than two years. The necessary action should be taken to revise Maintenance Schedules as appropriate.’ Operator’s safety actions As a result of this incident the operator has: 1. Embodied SB 704: ‘Cabin Fan Fuse Installation’ 2. Amended the maintenance programme to include a check for ‘any abnormal noise’ during the recirculating fan functional check 3. Amended the maintenance programme to include a circuit breaker functional check every 600 flying hours or 12 calendar months Some time after the incident the operator discovered that a landing gear circuit breaker on the same panel on the incident aircraft was open circuit, despite appearing to work mechanically. When the circuit breaker was opened significant internal corrosion was found that showed some similarities to the heat damaged circuit breaker from this incident. The proximity of the circuit breaker panel to the DV window might be a contributory factor to the corrosion and the operator is considering a program of circuit breaker replacement. Other circuit breaker failures Interrogation of the CAA Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) database for circuit breaker failures resulting in smoke in the cockpit revealed only three occurrences since January 2002. One of these was attributed to a ‘faulty circuit breaker’, but no further information was available. There have been several incidents worldwide of arcing faults which failed to trip a circuit breaker due to the current remaining within the rated circuit breaker load; this has led to research into alternative circuit protection devices. However, there is good evidence that this incident was caused by a failure of the circuit breaker to trip when exposed for a significant period of time to levels of current well in excess of the rated value. Discussion The crew’s actions of concentrating on flying the aircraft, isolating all non-essential electrics, fighting the fire and making a prompt decision to return to Boscombe Down ensured that a more serious, potentially catastrophic situation was avoided. The aircraft landed safely and there were no injuries to the crew or passenger. The operator’s decision to include a functional check of the recirculation fan circuit breaker and to check for abnormal fan noise should help to identify fan problems prior to failure and thus prevent similar incidents in the future.