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OPM-71

· DOI Office of Aviation Services · 2026

Public domain · DOI Office of Aviation ServicesAviation Safety Documents

Overview

The OPM-71 () is a public-domain DOI Office of Aviation Services aviation safety document, republished here as a free chaptered HTML edition with a linked table of contents and the official PDF.

Publisher
DOI Office of Aviation Services
Document
Year
2026
Pages
7
Chapters
20

Key points

  • OPM-71 outlines the Department of the Interior's policies and procedures for safeguarding DOI-owned or controlled aircraft and aviation facilities.
  • Aviation Facility Security Assessments and Security Plans are required for each DOI aviation facility to ensure adequate protection against theft and misuse.
  • The dual-lock method must be used to physically secure DOI-owned or controlled aircraft when not attended by authorized personnel.
  • Compliance with the security policy will be evaluated through the aviation safety program evaluation process outlined in Departmental Manual 352 DM 2.
  • The effective date of OPM-71 is April 1, 2026, and it will expire on December 31, 2026.
Frequently asked questions
What is the purpose of OPM-71?

OPM-71 modifies the DOI aviation policy regarding aircraft and aviation facility security and outlines procedures to safeguard DOI assets.

How often must Aviation Facility Security Assessments be updated?

Aviation Facility Security Assessments must be reviewed and updated at least every 5 years or sooner if there are major changes to the facility.

What is required for securing DOI-owned aircraft?

DOI-owned or controlled aircraft must be physically secured using the dual-lock method when not attended by authorized personnel.

Who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the security policy?

The Bureau Aviation Manager is responsible for ensuring compliance with the aircraft and aviation facility security policy.

What training is required for employees involved in aviation resources?

The heads of bureaus must ensure that all employees involved in the control or use of aviation resources receive appropriate aviation security training.

DOI OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MEMORANDUM (OPM) - 71

Subject: Aircraft and Aviation Facility Security

Effective Date: April 1, 2026

Last Updated: Initial Distribution

Expiration Date: December 31, 2026

1. Summary of Changes. The Executive Aviation Subcommittee (EAS) reviewed on 12 March 2026 and concurred with this new OPM.

2. Purpose.

3. Authority. This policy is established by the Director, Department of the Interior, Office of Aviation Services (OAS) in accordance with the provisions of Departmental Manual 112 DM 12, 350 DM 1 and Secretarial Order 3322 dated August 23, 2012.

4. Scope and Applicability.

5. Definitions. Terms are defined in Appendix 1.

6. Aviation Facility Security Requirements.

United States Department of the Interior

Office of Aviation Services

300 E Mallard Drive, Suite 200

Boise, Idaho 83706-3991

DOI OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MEMORANDUM (OPM) - 71 Subject : Aircraft and Aviation Facility Security Effective Date : April 1, 2026 Last Updated: Initial Distribution Expiration Date : December 31, 2026 1. Summary of Changes. The Executive Aviation Subcommittee (EAS) reviewed on 12 March 2026 and concurred with this new OPM.

2. Purpose.

A. This OPM modifies Department of Interior (DOI) aviation policy 352 DM 5 Aircraft and Aviation Facility Security and supersedes the 2006 Field Reference Guide for Aviation Security for Airport or other Aviation Facilities (AAF).

B. This OPM outlines DOI policies and procedures designed to safeguard DOI owned or controlled aircraft against unauthorized use; protect the health and welfare of tenants, users, and employees at DOI aviation facilities; and preserve DOI aviation facilities as a critical asset by preventing its degradation.

3. Authority. This policy is established by the Director, Department of the Interior, Office of Aviation Services (OAS) in accordance with the provisions of Departmental Manual 112 DM 12, 350 DM 1 and Secretarial Order 3322 dated August 23, 2012.

4. Scope and Applicability.

A. These policies and procedures supplement the minimum physical security requirements outlined in 444 DM 1 “ Physical Protection and Building Security ” and apply to all aviation facilities and aircraft owned or controlled by the DOI.

B. Nothing in this OPM reduces the requirements prescribed by 444 DM 1, or any other requirement established by law or authority as it pertains to DOI aviation operations.

C. Additional security requirements may be imposed if the DOI facility is located within an airport.

Tenants of an airport must also ensure compliance with the airport’s security requirements.

D. Small Uncrewed Aircraft System (sUAS) security requirements are covered in OPM-11.

5. Definitions. Terms are defined in Appendix 1.

6. Aviation Facility Security Requirements .

A. Security levels and minimum-security requirements for federal facilities are detailed within 444 DM 1, “ Physical Protection and Building Security .” DOI aviation facilities must comply with this Part.

7. Aviation Facility Security Assessment. A security assessment must be conducted for each DOI aviation facility to assess the potential of theft and misuse of DOI aircraft, and to ensure a level of protection commensurate with the assessed level of v...

8. Aviation Facility Security Plan. A written security plan must be prepared for each aviation facility to ensure uniform security practices and incident response procedures.

9. Aircraft Physical Security Requirements. The policies and procedures in this section are intended to make the theft of Departmental aircraft more difficult and time consuming and, therefore, an unattractive target to potential criminals.

OPM - 71 Page 2 B. For each DOI aviation facility, the following is required to be completed: 1) DOI Aviation Facility Security Assessment and 2) DOI Aviation Facility Security Plan 7. Aviation Facility Security Assessment. A security assessment must be conducted for each DOI aviation facility to assess the potential of theft and misuse of DOI aircraft, and to ensure a level of protection commensurate with the assessed level of vulnerabilities.

A. Individuals conducting aviation facility security assessments shall utilize the Aviation Facility Security Assessment template provided in Appendix 3.

B. Individuals responsible for conducting aviation facility security assessments should be intimately familiar with the facility, its activities, and the surrounding areas.

C. Upon completion, the Aviation Facility Security Assessment with identified threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures must be submitted to the Bureau Aviation Manager. The Bureau Aviation Manager’s signature is required to formally document acceptance of the assessment.

D. If the mitigation planning requires additional security measures, consult with the DOI Office of Law Enforcement and Security (OLES) for recommendations.

E. Additional airport security enhancements can be found in the 2025 Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airport Operators and Users issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

F. Each Aviation Facility Security assessment will be reviewed and updated at least every 5 years, or sooner if there are major changes to the facility, such as new tenants, major construction, or other significant modifications. The Bureau Aviation Manager is responsible for ensuring this occurs.

G. Aviation Facility Security assessments will be maintained by the Bureau Aviation Manager.

These assessments will be made available to OLES upon request.

8. Aviation Facility Security Plan . A written security plan must be prepared for each aviation facility to ensure uniform security practices and incident response procedures.

A. Plans must adhere to the Aviation Facility Security Plan template, as provided in Appendix 2.

B. The scope of the plan should be commensurate with the facility's size and operating complexity.

C. Plans must be reviewed, updated for currency, and formally endorsed on an annual basis by the Bureau Aviation Manager.

D. Security plans will be maintained by the Bureau Aviation Manager. These plans will be made available to OLES upon request.

9. Aircraft Physical Security Requirements. The policies and procedures in this section are intended to make the theft of Departmental aircraft more difficult and time consuming and, therefore, an unattractive target to potential criminals.

A. DOI-owned or controlled aircraft not directly attended by authorized personnel must be physically secured and disabled via the dual-lock method. Examples of acceptable dual-lock devices are listed in Appendix 4.

B. Additional requirements specifically addressing physical security of Small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) are outlined in OPM-11.

10. Training

11. Compliance Evaluations

OPM - 71 Page 3 C. Exceptions.

1) Military (including National Guard) aircraft adhere to their respective security requirements.

2) Cooperator aircraft adhere to their respective security requirements and as required by the applicable NWCG Cooperator Standard.

3) DOI contracted aviation service providers are responsible for ensuring the security of their aircraft.

All DOI aviation contracts must include relevant DOI aviation security requirements.

10. Training A. The heads of bureaus are responsible for ensuring that all employees involved in the control or use of aviation resources receive appropriate aviation security training.

B. Training resources to support the accomplishment of this objective are available in the Interagency Aviation Training Guide, which can be accessed on the Interagency Aviation Training website at: https://www.iat.gov 11. Compliance Evaluations A. Compliance with the aircraft and aviation facility security policy will be assessed through the aviation safety program evaluation process outlined in Departmental Manual 352 DM 2, Aviation Program Evaluation . This document is available on the OAS website at https://www.doi.gov/aviation/library/dm B. The OLES may participate in aviation program evaluations and preparation of findings and recommendations when security issues are in question. At its discretion, OLES, in consultation with the OAS Director, may conduct independent evaluations of aircraft and aviation facility security policy compliance at any time.

Susan E. Bates Deputy Director, Aviation Operations and Management Attachments: Appendix 1: Definition of Terms Appendix 2: DOI Aviation Facility Security Plan Template Appendix 3: DOI Aviation Facility Security Assessment Appendix 4: Dual-Lock Method- Locking Devices and Methods

Appendix 1 Definitions of Terms

OPM - 71 Appendix 1 Appendix 1 Definitions of Terms For the purpose of this OPM, the following definitions apply: A. The term DOI “ aviation facility ” means any DOI-owned or controlled real property at which DOI owned or controlled aircraft are based. These facilities (helibases, retardant bases, and airport facilities) are permanent installations (owned or leased) and are used on a continuous or seasonal basis for aviation operations (aircraft take off, landing, loading, fueling, parking).

B. The term “ Bureau Aviation Manager ” refers to that individual delegated by the agency or office head to be responsible for the management of all aspects of a bureau or office aviation program.

C. The term “ control ” is used in two contexts.

(1) As it relates to aviation facilities, the term “control” refers to the condition existing when a DOI entity has authority to institute, modify, or otherwise effect physical security changes at an aviation facility regardless of property ownership.

(2) As it relates to aircraft, the term “control” means “operational control” as defined in the Federal Aviation Regulations at 14 CFR 1.1: “Operational control with respect to a flight means the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting, or terminating a flight.” This definition is independent of aircraft ownership.

D. The term “ dual-lock method ” means using a combination of two locking devices or methods to physically secure or disable a parked aircraft for the purpose of reducing the probability of aircraft theft and associated misuse by unauthorized persons.

E. The term “ security assessment ” refers to the result of a combined threat and vulnerability assessment. It can generally be characterized as an analysis of the probability of serious impact or damage resulting from a known or postulated threat successfully exploiting one or more vulnerabilities.

Appendix 2 DOI Aviation Facility Security Plan Template

OPM - 71 Appendix 2 Appendix 2 DOI Aviation Facility Security Plan Template Link: DOI Aviation Facility Security Plan Template

Appendix 3 DOI Aviation Facility Security Assessment

OPM - 71 Appendix 3 Appendix 3 DOI Aviation Facility Security Assessment Link: DOI Aviation Facility Security Assessment

Appendix 4 Dual-Lock Method – Locking Devices and Methods

OPM - 71 Appendix 4 Appendix 4 Dual-Lock Method – Locking Devices and Methods The dual-lock method consists of any combination of two anti-theft devices on or within the aircraft, that are designed to lock and/or disable the aircraft.

The following are examples of locking devices and methods which can be used in tandem to achieve the required dual-lock condition. Utilization of other means of securing or disabling an aircraft are acceptable provided they achieve a level of security equal to or greater than the methods listed herein.

Examples of Acceptable Dual-Lock Devices and Methods • Locking hangar door • Locking control surface “gust-lock” • Keyed ignition switch • Propeller lock • Keyed starter switch • Propeller chain lock • Keyed master power switch • Propeller cable lock • Hidden battery cutoff switches • Locking wheel lock or chock • Throttle/power lever lock • Locking tiedown cable • Mixture/fuel lever lock • Locking “Club-type” devices for control yoke • Locking fuel cutoff Where aircraft type (e.g., airtanker) or operational area conditions (e.g., requirement for ground personnel to reposition parked aircraft) preclude the effective use of external locking security devices, vehicles or other objects may be positioned to block or impede aircraft movement. When this method is utilized, a secondary locking device is still required.

Examples of Unacceptable Dual-Lock Devices and Methods • Locking aircraft doors • Fenced or gated parking area Advisements • Operational environments and personnel safety must be considered when selecting the locking devices and methods to be used.

• Locking devices and methods must be appropriate for their aircraft.

• Removal and/or disabling of locking devices and methods must be incorporated into preflight checklists to prevent injury to personnel and/or accidental damage to aircraft.

• Locking devices and methods must be installed in a manner which precludes their inadvertent interference with in-flight operations.

Source & rights

Source: doi.gov. Public-domain U.S. Government work (17 USC §105) — freely reproducible.

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Document details

Doc number
Publisher
DOI Office of Aviation Services
Year
2026
Pages
7
File size
333 KB
Chapters
20