Avionics Manual for Cessna 175 Skylark

account of its own, each of the division's battalions drew supplies and services from FLC, either directl y or through a logistic support unit . Elements of a sin- gle battalion could draw from different elements o f FLC . During March 1970, for example, the forwar d command post and Company L of the 3d Battalion , 5th Marines, located on Hill 65, received daily resup- ply directly from FI.0 by truck . Company I of the bat- talion, on Hill 37, was resupplied by truck from Hil l 65 . Company K, split between Hills 52 and 25, de- pended on helicopter lifts from the An Hoa LSU fo r its resupply. Company M, at An Hoa, drew directl y from the LSU there .5 Helicopter resupply of the division depended heav- ily on the activities of the 1st Shore Party Battalion .* This battalion, organic to the division, deployed a company with each infantry regiment . Shore party helicopter support teams (HSTs) at each LSU assem- bled and prepared supplies for helicopter pickup. Landing zone control teams with the rifle companie s located and marked LZs, briefed the crews of incom- ing helicopters, and supervised unloading . Liaison teams at battalion CPs received control teams ; battal- ion commanders or S-4s consolidated the requests an d assigned delivery priorities 5 When 1st Shore Party Battalion was redeployed dur- ing Keystone Bluejay in March 1970, Company C o f the battalion remained in Vietnam, fulfilling the vi - *Shore party battalions were established originally to contro l movement of men and equipment across the beach . As helicopters became part of Marine amphibious operations, the battalions ex- panded their missions and training to include support of heliborn e assaults. tal HST role until final redeployment on 30 Apri l 1971 . The nucleus of an HST team usually include d two or more MOS 1381 shore party men and one o r more communicators . The actual composition de- pended on such factors as the size of the supporte d unit, the permanency of the LZ, and the helicopte r activity anticipated . Major James G. Dixon, who com- manded Company C from August to November 1970 , recalled the performance of his HST Marines : Corporals and sergeants and even lance corporals did yeo- man work as "mini" air controllers at their respective LZs . They directed the movement of the helicopters ; marshale d and positioned cargo ; rigged assorted supplies and equip- ment ; manifested and directed passengers ; and effected th e hookup of external slingloads . All these responsibilities com- bined to make the LZs hubs of activity and lifelines of th e supported unit at remote fire support bases such as Ryder , Hill 510, and Dagger .* 7 The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing drew upon both Nav y and Marine sources for logistic support . The wing received nonaviation Marine Corps supplies and am - munition through Force Logistic Command ; fo r replacement aircraft, spare aviation parts, most vehi- cles, and aircraft maintenance support, however, it re - lied on a complex of Navy agencies . Commande r Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet (ComNavAirPac), a subordinate of CinCPacFlt, was ultimately responsi- ble for aviation logistic support of the 1st MAW, as well as of fleet carrier aircraft groups .** The wing re- quisitioned its Navy material from the Navy Suppl y Depots (NSDs) at Yokosuka, Japan, and Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines .*** Until September 1970 , NSD Yokosuka, and after that date, NSD Subic, con- tracted for and oversaw major repair and rebuilding *Assuming another role previously handled by the battalion , Company C also provided forklift support to division units . **Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet, was a "type com- mander" under CinCPacFlt, responsible for Pacific Fleet aircraft, carrier aircraft, and other assigned aviation units and facilities, in- cluding those of the Marines . Responsibilities of a type command , which FMFPac also was, included primarily logistic readiness an d training . ComNavAirPac, ComdHist, 1970, OAB, NHD. ***In May 1970, Pacific Fleet decided to shift all aviation logis- tic support for units in the Western Pacific from NSD Yokosuk a to NSD Subic. This changeover began on 1 September 1970 an d was completed by mid January 1971 . All requisitions for aviatio n supplies after 1 September 1970 went through Subic . Commander, Service Force, U.S . Pacific Fleet, Operations of Service Force, U.S . Pacific Fleet, FY 71, pp. 4-7 ; U.S. Naval Supply Depot, Subic Bay, R .P., ComdHist, 1 Jan-31Dec70, pts . I and II ; U .S . Naval Suppl y Depot, Yokosuka, ComdHist 1970 and ComdHist 1971 ; all in OAB , NHD. LOGISTICS, 19704971 31 7 of Marine and Navy aircraft at plants in Japan. O n Marine logistic support questions, the wing usuall y dealt directly with FMFPac, and on Navy matters i t communicated through FMFPac with ComNavAirPa c and Naval Air Systems Command . Complicating the situation, Commander, Fleet Air, Western Pacifi c (ComFAirWestPac) occasionally gave instruction s directly to the wing or its subordinate units regard- ing transfers of individual aircraft between Marine squadrons and fleet carriers . III MAF became involved in some wing logistic matters, but the scope of it s responsibility was unclear. Colonel William C . McGraw, Jr., 1st MAW G-4, commented in mid-1970 : Sometimes you wonder who you're supposed to go as k something. We normally would come through [FMFPac] . A couple of times we got criticized for it because it should have gone to III MAF. I'm not real clear in my mind just what functions they get into . . . . They shouldn't be wor- ried about aircraft assignments or aircraft maintenance o r supply problems or anything like this .8 Within the wing, each aircraft group stored and is - sued its own supplies and did routine maintenanc e and limited repair of its aircraft. Civilian teams fro m naval aircraft repair facilities, attached to the group s under the Special Techniques for Repair and Analysi s of Aircraft Damage Program, augmented the groups ' battle damage repair capabilities . The wing shipped aircraft to Japan for major rebuilding and periodic re - habilitation. Marine Wing Support Group 17 fur- nished Marine Corps supply, postal, disbursing, an d post exchange service for all 1st MAW elements, main - tained ground equipment and SATS launching an d recovery systems, and conducted all shipment of air- craft into and out of Vietnam .* The wing operate d the Semi-Automatic Checkout Equipment (SACE ) complex at Da Nang, which diagnosed the ills o f sophisticated avionics systems .9 The III MAF logistic system, perfected during five years of warfare, in the main worked smoothly. Tem- porary shortages of 175mm ammunition, some ar- tillery and vehicle spare parts, and radio batterie s occurred ; III MAF, however, quickly remedied the m by borrowing from the Army or by securing emergenc y shipments from Marine supply facilities on Okinawa or in the United States . Many infantry battalion s suffered from a chronic shortage of qualified suppl y *MWSG-17 redeployed to Iwakuni in July-August 1970, leavin g in Vietnam its structural Fire Department, Postal, Disbursing, EOD , and Data Processing sections, among others . MWSG-17 ComdCs , Jul-Aug70 . officers and had difficulty obtaining prompt replace- ment of wornout clothing . Nevertheless, for the most part, unit commanders had few major supply worries . As Colonel Edmund G. Derning, Jr., the 7th Marines commander, put it : "The ammo flows in there . . . . You never have to think about it. POL flows in there ; you never have to think about it ." Indicative of the general abundance and quality of supply, th e 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, while operating in the Ar- izona Territory in February 1970, received weekl y helicopter lifts of "frozen steaks, containers of milk , bread and all the onions, catsup, salt, needed for a company-size cookout every Sunday ."1 0 FLC Phases Down As III MAF combat forces diminished during the various redeployments, so did Force Logistic Command and the support elements associated with it . The 1s t Shore Party Battalion redeployed during February 1970, in Keystone Bluejay. It left its Company C, at- tached to the 1st Engineer Battalion, to continue sup - porting the 1st Marine Division . During February, also, the FLC deactivated its 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Com- pany and transferred its personnel to the new Bulk Fuel Company in the Supply Battalion . In March, FLC closed the logistic support unit on Hill 55 . The 1st Marines, which had moved its CP and the bulk of its forces northward to relieve the 26th Marines, now drew its supplies and maintenance support directly fro m FLC. Through redeployment and ordinary rotation , FLC reduced its total strength by about 2,000 Marines during Keystone Bluejay.t ' Force Logistic Command underwent another majo r reduction in Keystone Robin Alpha, including redeployment of the 1st Service Battalion and deacti- vation of FLSG-B . In mid-May, while planning for th e new redeployment was still going on, the FLSG deac- tivated its Supply and Maintenance companies . I t transferred Marines from these companies statione d at the LSUs to the Supply and Maintenance Battalio n of FLC . During July, FLC completed plans for deac- tivating FLSG-B and transferring control of the LSU s to Supply Battalion . FLSG-B's Truck Company cease d operations on 15 August . On 1 September, Suppl y Battalion assumed operational and administrative con- trol over the logistic support units . By 15 September , all 1st Service Battalion companies had been reduce d to zero strength, and on that date the battalion colors left Vietnam for Camp Pendleton . As FLSG-B prepared for deactivation, LSU-1 at A n Hoa and LSU-4 at Chu Lai gradually reduced activity LOGISTICS, 1970-1971 31 9 and transferred surplus supply stocks to Da Nang . On 2 August, anticipating the evacuation of An Hoa, FLC established a new battalion-size LSU-5 on Hill 37, in- itially to support 5th Marines units relocating ther e and later to serve the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines . The An Hoa LSU closed on 21 September. On 15 October, as the last Marines pulled out of Chu Lai, LSU- 4 turned its ammunition supply point over to the U .S . Army and disbanded ." During Keystone Robin Alpha, two of FLC's dat a processing platoons redeployed . They left behin d DPP-16, with its IBM Model 360150 computer, at FLC , and Data Processing Section 28, equipped with an older IBM 1401, at 1st MAW. These two data process- ing units, which combined under one roof at FLC i n March 1971, continued supporting III MAF and the n the 3d MAB until redeployment of the last Marin e forces' 3 Initial Keystone Robin plans had called for Forc e Logistic Command to reduce the strength of 1st FS R to 2,856 Marines by 15 October . FLC itself was to b e deactivated by mid-December and replaced by a 2,000-man Provisional Service Battalion, Da Nang . This plan was based on the assumption that anothe r regiment would redeploy in Keystone Robin Bravo be - tween 15 October and 31 December, coincident with withdrawal of III MAF, 1st Division, and 1st MAW Headquarters and activation of 3d MAB . In August , after MACV exempted the Marines from Keyston e Robin Bravo, III MAF revised its plans, so as to retain FLC through the remaining redeployments, with 2,800 men in the FSR plus the 1st MP Battalion and a rein - forced company of force engineers—a total strength of around 3,800. To lessen administrative manpower requirement s and keep as many of its remaining Marines as possi- ble "down at the bottom . . . kicking boxes," FLC reduced the number of companies in its Headquart- ers and Support, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions . Maintenance Battalion had deactivated one compan y in July due to a shortage of replacements . In mid - October, Headquarters and Service Battalion elimi- nated its Communications Company, replacing it wit h a platoon attached to its Support Company . Supply Battalion at the same time reduced its Bulk Fuel, Am - munition, and Ration companies each to a platoo n under its Supply Company. t4 At the conclusion of these reductions, on 23 Oc- tober, Brigadier General James R . Jones replaced Brigadier General Padalino as FLC commander . Jones, a Texan and veteran of Guam and Iwo Jima, like Padalino was no stranger to III MAF logistics . During 1967-1968, Jones had commanded successively FLSG - A and FLSG-B and served as G-3 of Force Logistic Command . In September 1969, he had followe d Padalino to command 3d FSR. Promoted to brigadie r general on 15 August 1970, Jones again followe d Padalino to FLC two months later . FLC phased down slowly during Keystone Robin Charlie and Oriole Alpha . On 4 March 1971, as th e 5th Marines redeployed, LSU-3 at LZ Baldy cease d operations . The following month, Maintenance Bat- talion reduced three of its companies to platoons . O n 23 April, the flag of the 1st Force Service Regimen t was transferred to Camp Pendleton, but the regiment 's three battalions stayed at Da Nang to finish the mas- sive job of shipping out five years of accumulated Ma- rine Corps material .* During May and June, the FS R battalions and Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion gradually reduced their troop strength while continu- ing to support the 3d MAB. The last element of the shore party company redeployed on 22 June . By the 26th, Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Main- tenance Battalions, their tasks completed, had bee n reduced to zero strength and deactivated . The End of Naval Support Activity Da Nang Force Logistic Command was only one componen t of the United States military logistic system in I Corps . For most supplies and for a wide variety of services , III MAF depended on Naval Support Activity (NSA) Da Nang . At the end of 1969, NSA Da Nang, commande d by Rear Admiral Robert E . Adamson, Jr., consisted of over 10,000 United States Navy personnel and em- ployed a civilian work force of 69 Americans and ove r 5,800 Vietnamese . Another 123 Americans and ove r 4,800 Vietnamese and other Asians worked for NSA' s private contractors . Originally established in 1965 t o support III MAF, NSA Da Nang was under the oper- ational control of the Commander, United State s Naval Forces, Vietnam (ComNavForV) . Administra- tively, and for budgetary purposes, it was under Com- mander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet . NSA Da Nang operated the port of Da Nang, whic h it had substantially enlarged and improved, as wel l as satellite ports at Cua Viet and Tan My in norther n I Corps and Sa Huynh and Chu Lai in the souther n *With the return of the 1st FSR colors to Camp Pendleton, th e 5th FSR, located there, was redesignated the 1st FSR . 320 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMEN T provinces. With a fleet of over 250 lighters and othe r small craft and vast warehouses, storage lots, and tank farms around Da Nang, NSA handled all incomin g and outgoing military cargo. It stored and issued th e rations, fuel, and other supplies used in common by United States forces . NSA's Navy Public Works Branc h furnished electricity and water to American canton- ments and operated the Da Nang military telephon e exchange . Its civilian contractors maintained cam p generators, air conditioners, and perimeter lights . NSA managed Navy and Marine real estate holdings . Its large naval hospital at Da Nang was a major compo- nent of III MAF's medical support .ts When United States Army forces moved into I Corps in 1967-1968, they also received logistic suppor t from NSA Da Nang . The Army early in 1968 estab- lished U.S . Army Support Command (USASuppCom ) Da Nang, to perform for its units functions roughl y equivalent to those of Force Logistic Command . This organization, under the operational control of th e Commander, 1st Logistical Command, U.S . Army, by late 1969 had grown to a strength of about 7,500 sup - ply and transportation troops . It included a field depo t at Da Nang and two general support groups, the 26t h and the 89th, which supported Army units respectivel y in northern and southern I Corps . 1 8 As the I Corps logistics system had evolved up t o this point, the Navy through NSA Da Nang, acte d as wholesale provider of commonly used supplies an d service support. The Marines and Army, through FLC and USASuppCom Da Nang, distributed supplie s drawn from the NSA to their own forces and procure d and issued their own ammunition and those stores an d equipment unique to their particular Services . FLC i n addition supported the 2d ROKMC Brigade, whil e USASuppCom Da Nang established petroleum pipe - lines for use of all Services, as well as providing unser - viceable property disposal and mortuary assistance . After redeployment of the 3d Marine Division an d relocation of FLSG-B to Da Nang, the Army suppor t command furnished common supply and port facili- ties for the Marine elements remaining in norther n I Corps . * *These units were the 5th 175mm Gun Battery ; one 8-inch howit- zer platoon ; two medium helicopter squadrons; the 3d and 4th Com- bined Action Groups ; a platoon of 3d Bridge Company ; the 3 d Force Reconnaissance Company; a 3d Marine Division SCAMP detachment; the Operations Company, 1st Radio Battalion ; a detach- ment of MAG-16 ; two ASRT detachments; the 5th CIT; and th e 11th ITT; a total of 2,730 Marines. FLC Fact Sheet, Subj : Logistic Support of Marines Remaining in NICTZ, dtd 18Dec69, Tab K-3 , FLC ComdC, Jan70 . In May 1969, as redeployment planning began, Vic e Admiral Elmo R . Zumwalt, Commander of U .S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, proposed that the missions of NS A Da Nang be assumed by the Army, which already fur- nished common service support for United State s forces everywhere but in I Corps.* Zumwalt secured approval in principle of his plan from the Chief o f Naval Operations (CNO) and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt), with the proviso that th e end of Navy common service support would occur onl y in conjunction with redeployment of Marine comba t forces. General Abrams, ComUSMACV, also endorse d Zumwalt's proposal and in late May ordered USARV to make a preliminary study of the costs and manpowe r requirements of an Army logistics takeover in I Corps . USARV initially responded cautiously, noting the un- certainty of redeployment plans and recommendin g that for the time being the Navy continue its suppor t mission . " Lieutenant General Nickerson, the III MAF com- mander, when informed early in June of these prelimi - nary steps, vehemently protested . He expressed complete satisfaction with his Navy support and urged that logistics arrangements in I Corps not be disrupt- ed at a time when the enemy threat remained signifi- cant and major redeployments and realignments o f allied combat forces were in prospect . Emotion playe d a large part in the initial Marine reaction . Colonel Wil- bur F. Simlik, III MAF G-4, recalled : "We seemed to have a great fear of losing Navy support . NSA had done such a marvellous job for a number of year s . . . . With NSA leaving, we had a great sinking feel- ing of despair."18 Colonel Miller M . Blue, who becam e G-4 in February 1971, said years later that it was a mis- take to close down NSA so early: This error caused a multitude of problems, especially i n public works support ; specifically electrical power re- quirements . I personally made many late night trips to th e *Since 1966, the U .S. Army's 1st Logistical Command, a subor- dinate command of USARV, had furnished port and transporta- tion facilities and common item supply support for all United States forces in Vietnam outside I Corps . In I Corps, the Navy, by direc- tion of CinCPac, had been given responsibility for both tactical and logistic operations . Under 1st Logistical Command were two majo r base depots at Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay and five support com- mands responsible for different areas, including USASuppCom D a Nang . If reinforced, a support command, such as that at Da Nang , could perform most functions of NSA Da Nang. In addition, Arm y engineer support could be furnished by another USARV element , U.S . Army Engineer Command, Vietnam . LtGen Joseph M . Heis- er, Jr., USA, Logistic Support, Department of the Army Vietna m Studies (Washington ; Department of the Army, 1974), pp . 9-11 . LOGISTICS, 1970-1971 32 1 old NSA compound to find someone in the Army to ge t the generators running again so we could have power in , among other places, COCs and communication center s sometimes unsuccessfully.1 e III MAF Marines had become accustomed to work - ing with NSA, and many relationships were rooted a s much in tradition as formal Inter-Service agreement : According to Colonel Simlik : There were . . . many areas that were covered by the ol d Gunnery Sergeant to Chief routine, where a number of year s ago a Gunnery Sergeant had gotten a Chief to take care o f a certain function and a certain area of support, small that it may be, by seeing that he got a couple of bottles of booze or a case of beer . . . . And all of this was unwritten, of course, and passed on from Gunnery Sergeant to Gunnery Sergeant and Chief to Chief. We knew that there were great areas that we could never find out and get written down i n a contract, and we had a . . . fear that the Army would not respond? " In spite of III MAF reluctance, planning for th e Army takeover of NSA Da Nang's functions went in- exorably forward?' Marines still viewed the loss of serv- ices of NSA with resignation : "The termination of th e logistics support role of the U.S . Navy was precipi- tious," recalled Colonel James A . Sloan, who serve d as III MAF plans officer in later 1969 and early 1970 , "and was so as the result of the determination of Vice Admiral Zumwalt . The feeling I had was that the Navy was deploying on a schedule, that `Vietnamization' was reality and those forces remaining had best be preprared to fill the vacuum ." 2 2 In September 1969, at Zumwalt's suggestion, MAC V established a joint Army-Navy planning group, locate d at Da Nang, to work out the practical details of gradu- ally shifting common service support over to the Army as the Marines pulled out . The group, chaired by th e Army, included representatives of MACV, USARV , NavForV, III MAF, 1st Logistical Command, NSA D a Nang, Army Support Command Da Nang, and Forc e Logistic Command . Divided into subcommittees on specific logistic functions,* the group worked throug h October determining requirements for personnel , equipment, and funds, defining problems, an d proposing solutions . On 15 November, with both joint studies and Ma- rine redeployments well under way, General Abram s *The subcomittees were : Facilities Engineering, Construction , Communications, Medical, Ammunition, Inter-Service Suppor t Agreements, Transportation, Petroleum, Contracts, Class I, Propert y Disposal, Civilian Personnel, Security, Finance, Supply, Maintenance , and Aviation . instructed the Service components to develop a sup - port turnover schedule for presentation to MACV b y 1 January 1970 . Abrams directed that the final Arm y assumption of common support would follow th e redeployment of Marine combat units, but that par- ticular functions not required for sustenance of II I MAF should be transferred earlier whenever possible , subject to the concurrence of III MAE. Another month and a half of planning and inter - Service negotiation followed Abram's order . NavForV pressed for early Army takeover of ports and activities no longer needed by the Marines in northern I Corps . NavForV also indicated that after the Army assump- tion of common support, it would disestablish NSA Da Nang and replace it with a smaller Naval Suppor t Facility primarily concerned with small-craft main- tenance and assisting the South Vietnamese Navy . III MAF emphasized the need to move slowly and care - fully in transferring any functions/ to the Army an d reiterated that most Navy common support shoul d continue until all Marine combat forces had left Viet- nam. USARV sought the loan or transfer of Navy fa- cilities and equipment to supplement Army logisti c resources in I Corps . The Army and Navy also trie d to work out terms for renegotiating and, if necessary , prorating payment for the various civilian support con - tracts . Each Service anticipated a reduced budget i n the new fiscal year, and each was trying to minimiz e the cost to itself of supporting the forces in I Corps . How large those forces would be remained an unan- swered question throughout most of the planning . Th e logisticians did not have access to the highly classi- fied projections of future troop redeployments . Discussions dragged on past the MACV 1 Januar y deadline . On 21 January, General Abrams instructe d the Services to submit a plan by 5 February, based o n guidelines laid down by him . Abrams set 1 July 197 0 as the date for final turnover of common service sup - port in I Corps to the Army. This was the beginnin g of the new fiscal year, and change at that point woul d simplify funding and the negotiation of new suppor t contracts . The changeover was to occur on 1 July eve n if Marine combat forces remained . USARV in that case would furnish whatever common support the Marines required . The Army was to take over as many I Corps common support functions as possible before th e deadline, while the Navy was to transfer or loan t o USARV any equipment the Army needed to assum e the support mission . In response to this directive, the component commands quickly completed a timeta- 322 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMEN T Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37337 1 A Marine from the 7th Engineer Battalion hoses dow n a bulldozer as the unit prepares its heavy equipmen t for reembarkation to Okinawa in August 1970 . ble calling for a gradual transfer of functions, to be - gin in northern I Corps during February. Both NSA Da Nang and US Army Support Command Da Nan g now developed detailed plans for their own roles i n the changeover. Preliminary turnovers of equipment and a few fa- cilities in northern I Corps had begun in Novembe r and December 1969 . On 15 February 1970, Naval Sup - port Activity Da Nang disbanded its detachments a t Sa Huynh and Cua Viet ; elements of USASuppCo m Da Nang took over operation of both ports . A month later, the NSA detachment at Tan My, near Hue , ceased operations . Its function, as well as other sup - ply and support activities at Hue and Phu Bai, were assumed by the Army support command . At Da Nang during March, NSA's public works division turned ove r operation of the telephone system, as well as some car- go handling functions . The NSA hospital bega n reducing nonessential activities in preparation fo r deactivation . On 26 March, the Army took over all fue l storage and issue operations at Da Nang and Chu Lai . During April, NSA Da Nang transferred its public works maintenance shops at Phu Bai and Tan My t o the Army's facilities maintenance contractor" In early May, III MAF asked MACV to halt further scheduled turnover actions until the entire timetable could be reviewed in the light of changed redeploy- ment plans . Common service support turnover plan- ning had been predicated on another redeploymen t closely following Keystone Bluejay and on both thes e redeployments being "Marine-heavy," but Marine par - ticipation in Bluejay had been reduced and the sub- sequent withdrawal now would not begin unti l mid-summer . This meant that larger Marine comba t forces would be left after 1 July than originally expect - ed . III MAF questioned whether USARV, with its own resources diminished by redeployment, could suppor t adequately this larger Marine force and suggested tha t the Navy slow down the transfer of logistic responsi- bilities until more Marines had left. MACV in response called a common service sup - port conference, which met at Saigon from 15 to 17 May. At the conference, NavForV insisted that facili- ties transfers, contract negotiations, and budget plan- ning had gone too far to permit any postponemen t of the turnover beyond 1 July. USARV declared tha t it could furnish the Marines all the support they no w received from NSA, but it became apparent in the dis - cussions that the Army authorities did not yet com- prehend the extent and variety of those services . MACV directed that the 1 July turnover deadline b e met and instructed the Services to finish working ou t methods . During May and June, representatives of II I MAF, USA Support Command Da Nang, and Forc e Logistic Command met frequently to coordinate a smooth transfer and draw up interservice suppor t agreements detailing exactly what supplies and serv- ices the Army would furnish to III MAF. By 28 June, III MAF and USARV had approved these agreements 24 Meanwhile, the turnover continued . The NSA D a Nang Hospital closed on 15 May, and step by step th e Navy handed over its Da Nang public works function s and port facilities to the Army Support Command . USARV reinforced the Da Nang support comman d with 2,000 additional officers and men, drawn fro m elsewhere in Vietnam . The reinforcements include d the 1,000-man 5th Transportation Command,* whic h moved to Da Nang from Qui Nhon in late May an d early June and occupied the former NSA Hospita l complex . On 1 June, NSA disestablished its detach- ment at Chu Lai . By the 30th, it had transferred o r *This command consisted of terminal service, POL barge, tug , and small boat companies and detachments . The unit took ove r many of NSA Da Nang's harbor craft. LOGISTICS, 1970-1971 32 3 terminated all its remaining functions and activitie s at Da Nang . NSA Da Nang was deactivated on the 30th ; the following day, its successor organization , Naval Support Facility Da Nang, was commissioned , with headquarters at Camp Tien Sha in East Da Nang. That same day, 1 July, the Army-Marine interservic e support agreements went into effect . In a separate ac- tion on the 1st, III MAF turned its Transient Facilit y and R&R Processing Center over to Arm y management 2 5 As the USASuppCom Da Nang assumed most of NSA Da Nang's support functions, III MAF and USARV worked out plans for the Army to furnish am - munition to Marine ground units . Negotiations on this subject began early in 1970, but the Marine Corps decided to delay the ammunition turnover past 1 July , until nearer the time of the final Marine withdraw- als . Under the plan, Force Logistic Command eventu- ally was to hand over its three ammunition suppl y points (ASPs) and most of their stocks to the Army, which would issue ammunition to Marine units as re- quired . On 12 October, III MAF transferred contro l of its ASP-3 at Chu Lai to the Army. During Decem- ber, III MAF and USARV established 15 March 197 1 as the date when the Army would assume complet e responsibility for issuing ammunition to Marine ground forces, under an interservice support agree- ment . Gradually, III MAF shipped excess stocks of Marine-peculiar ammunition out of Vietnam an d transferred the rest to the U.S . Army and ARVN . The Marines shifted aviation munitions from the ASPs t o the MAG-ll and MAG-16 bomb dumps . On 15 March 1971, control of ASP-2, the principal ground ammu- nition storage facility near Da Nang, passed to U.S . Army Support Command Da Nang, as did custody of 6,800 tons of munitions . Two months later, the Ma- rines handed ASP-1, their remaining Da Nang are a ammunition facility, over to the South Vietnamese , who had been using a portion of it for storage of thei r own ammunition since early 19702 8 The shift of common service support of III MA F from NSA Da Nang to the U .S. Army Support Com- mand Da Nang was attended by a variety of problems . At the outset, the Army was short of small-boat pi - lots and crewmen for port operations ; the Da Nan g support command had to borrow Navy personnel and hire civilian workers for this purpose . Marines foun d Army logistic organization fragmented and confusing . XXIV Corps had little role in logistic matters, forcin g III MAF to deal with USASuppCom Da Nang, 1s t Logistical Command, and separate engineer and other technical commands . Disagreements arose over in- terpretation of the interservice agreements, man y resulting from belated discovery of informal arrange- ments that had not been covered . Most important, U .S . Army Support Command Da Nang, like other Army elements, labored under a sharply reduced FY 197 1 budget and simply could not afford the quantity and variety of supplies to which the Marines had been ac- customed? 7 The turnover of logistic support to the Army ha d especially disruptive effects on the maintenance of II I MAF camps and facilities . Developed piecemeal ove r the years from what were initially expected to be tem- porary installations, these facilities required continu- ous and extensive repair and rebuilding . Navy-installed generators, air conditioners, water an d sewage pumps, and other pieces of equipment b y mid-1970 were old and nearly worn out . The Army support command did not stock spare parts for many of these items . NSA Da Nang had turned over its ow n spares, but these stocks had run low as NSA close d down . Inevitably, equipment breakdowns and long de - lays in repairs plagued the Marines . To make matters worse, USASuppCom Da Nang and the Army En- gineers were short of technicians and equipment for repair of such vital items as perimeter lights . The in- ternational work force of Philco-Ford the Army' s civilian facilities maintenance contractor, further com- plicated operations . Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fails, S-4 of MAG-16 and facilities manager for Mar- ble Mountain Air Facility, recalled : "There was a n American company using Taiwanese supervisors for Korean assistant supervisors, to work with the Viet- namese . . . . [All these nationalities] . . . working with Vietnamese under an Army command, support- ing a U.S . Marine Corps unit that normally gets it s support from the Navy, just became a nightmare . . . ." 28 All the commands concerned labored diligently t o solve or at least alleviate facilities problems . USASupp - Com Da Nang, Philco-Ford, and the Army Engineers furnished all the assistance they could . Marine com- mands supplemented these efforts by self-help, occa- sionally resorting to unorthodox methods to obtai n needed material. When the Navy public works ware - house at Da Nang closed down, Lieutenant Colone l Fails "found out that some of the equipment they ha d . . . would be available to any U .S . military unit that wanted it and would sign for it ." Fails and the MAG-1 6 staff acted quickly : 324 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMEN T The next morning, with the concurrence . . . of the grou p commander, . . . we launched out every flat-bed . . . we could lay our hands on, with some of the Marine Corps ' finest scavengers . We flew over an advance party by helicopter an d made literally a pre-dawn assault on the warehouses . . . . We had clerks with us . . . . We needed everythin g . . . . We started a shifting, rotating convoy, and I thin k we got 40-some truckloads . . . of stuff out of there . . . . We were able to take that material and upgrade ou r facilities considerably.29 In spite of many difficulties, the Army support com- mand succeeded in sustaining III MAF during a peri- od of diminishing Marine strength and low-intensit y combat . III MAF developed a generally harmonious working relationship with the Army command . Ac- cording to Colonel Simlik, the III MAF G-4, the "peo- ple in the Army who were involved in the transfer wer e people we knew personally and had the greatest con- fidence in ." Brigadier General Leo J . Dulacki, III MAF Chief of Staff, summed up the predominant Marin e evaluation of Army support : "The Army logistical com - mand performed well and did not leave III MA F wanting ." 30 Engineer Support At the beginning of 1970, three Marine engineer battalions were deployed in I Corps . The 1st Engineer Battalion, organic engineer unit of the 1st Marine Di - vision,* reinforced by Company A (-), 5th Enginee r Battalion, performed light construction throughout the division TAOR, maintained water points, swep t sections of highway for mines, and conducted the 1s t Marine Division Land Mine Warfare School .** Of II I MAF's two force engineer battalions, the 7th, with th e 1st Bridge Company attached, did heavy constructio n in the Da Nang area, maintained and improved high - ways, and made clearing mine sweeps . The 9th En- gineer Battalion, with its CP and three companies a t Chu Lai and part of the fourth company at Tam Ky, concentrated most of its efforts on clearing mines fro m Route 1 between Chu Lai and the Ba Ren River and preparing the roadbed for paving . This battalion als o included a provisional land clearing company an d *A division engineer battalion normally consists of 769 officer s and men in a headquarters company, an engineer support company, and three engineer companies . Its primary mission is close comba t engineer support of the division, and it is organized to provide on e company in direct support of each infantry regiment, hence the bat- talion is equipped for light, temporary construction . **For details of operations of the Land Mine Warfare School, se e Chapter 14 . provided construction and other support to the Amer- ical Division . * In addition to these Marine engineer units, the four - battalion 45th U.S . Army Engineer Group and fou r U .S . Navy Mobile Construction (Seabee) Battalions were operating in I Corps at the beginning of 1970 . Until 9 March, III MAF, as senior United States com- mand in the corps area, supervised the entire engineer- ing effort . After that date, XXIV Corps assumed thi s responsibility. III MAF retained operational control o f its two force engineer battalions, which were unde r administrative control of the 1st Marine Division . Th e division had both operational and administrative con- trol of the 1st Engineer Battalion . With Marine, Army, and Navy elements all involved in large projects, en- gineer coordination in I Corps was a complex task . Colonel Nicholas A . Canzona, the 1st Marine Divi- sion G-4, commented: "I never saw so many engineer s in all my life working in a given area, and . . . I don' t think I've ever seen so much attention and confusio n as to who is supposed to do what and why ." 3 ' During 1970, redeployments drastically reduce d Marine engineer strength . Company A (-), 5th En- gineer Battalion and Company A, 9th Engineer Bat- talion left Vietnam in Keystone Bluejay. In late Marc h 1970, the 9th Engineer Battalion moved its CP to th e Da Nang area and located its three remaining enginee r companies at Tam Ky, Hill 34, and LZ Baldy. The bat - talion relinquished its minesweeping and constructio n mission on Route 1 south of Tam Ky while continu- ing to work on and sweep the highway from Tam Ky north to Baldy. On 19 July, as part of Keystone Robin Alpha, the 7th Engineer Battalion, with the excep- tion of its Company A, and the 9th Engineer Battal- ion stood down . Even during their stand-down period , the engineers were kept busy : `As combat engineer platoons were freed from their supporting role when their infantry battalions stood down, they immediatel y went to work on dismantling pre-engineered build- ings in the FLC compound for shipment to Okinawa," recalled Major James G . Dixon, who commande d Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion from February to June 1971 . He noted, `A late engineer project for on e combat engineer platoon newly out of the field was installation of a security fence around the USAID com - *A force engineer battalion, of 1,115 officers and men in a head - quarters company, a service company, and four engineer compa- nies, is equipped for larger and more permanent construction task s than is the division engineer battalion . LOGISTICS, 1970-1971 32 5 pound in downtown Da Nang, a drastic change of en- vironment for these versatile engineers ."32 The 7th and 9th Engineer Battalions embarked fo r the United States in September . Company A, 7th En- gineer Battalion, which had been reinforced to almos t 300 officers and men, was placed under administra- tive control of FLC and attached to Maintenance Bat- talion. Under III MAF operational control, th e company assumed on a reduced scale the missions of its parent battalion 3 3 During February and Marc h 1971, the 1st Engineer Battalion redeployed i n Keystone Robin Charlie, leaving its Company A, wit h Company A, 7th Engineers, as engineer element of the 3d MAB . Major Dixon, who redeployed with th e last engineer companies in June 1971, later observe d that during the final stages of redeployment "the de- mand for engineer support was overwhelming . . . and continued to exceed resources through the last en- gineer unit's departure . . . ."34 As long as they remained in Vietnam, all three Ma- rine engineer battalions expended much effort and material in roadbuilding and repair. Their activitie s were part of a general allied program to create a pass - able road net throughout I Corps,, both to promot e economic development and to facilitate ARVN maneuver, especially after the Americans and thei r helicopters had departed . The Marines concentrated on Route 4, running east to west from Hoi An to Thuong Duc, and the unpaved stretch of Route 1 be- tween the Ba Ren River and Baldy . During April 1970 , elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion widened Rout e 4 between Hill 52 and Thuong Duc into a two-lan e fair-weather road . Between 26 April and 24 July, th e 7th Engineer Battalion improved a six-mile segmen t of the same route east of Hill 37 into an all-weather , though unpaved, highway. Working on this heavily- mined stretch, the Marine engineers lost two me n killed, 29 wounded, and had eight pieces of machiner y destroyed . Elements of the battalion labored past their 19 July stand-down date to finish the job . By earl y 1971, the 1st Engineer Battalion, in cooperation wit h the Seabees, had paved the 12 miles of Route 4 be- tween Route 1 and Dai Loc . On Route 1 itself, Ma- rine engineers hauled rock and dirt and helped wit h grading in preparation for paving of the road by the Seabees . The Quang Nam floods of October - November 1970, which submerged most roads an d bridges under five feet or more of water, proved the worth of the engineers' efforts . Most bridges and sur- faced highways in the province emerged with only minor damage, and Marines and Seabees soon had th e major routes open again for traffic3 5 All three engineer battalions regularly swept as - signed segments of highway for buried mines . Sweep teams employed electric mine detectors and als o bought large amounts of ordnance from Vietnames e civilians under the Voluntary Informant Program .* During July 1970, for example, 17 teams from the 1s t Engineer Battalion swept over 1,550 miles of road . They detected and destroyed 10 buried mines and pur- chased 78 ordnance items, ranging from American and Communist grenades to 105mm artillery rounds 38 In accord with allied Vietnamization policy, Marine engineers during March 1970 began trainin g minesweep teams for Quang Nam Province and Quang Da Special Zone. The 1st Engineer Battalion mine warefare school established a special two-da y course for ARVN and Regional Force soldiers and dis - patched a contact team to various Vietnamese com- mands . By the end of May, 176 Vietnamese had graduated from the course and 316 had received in- struction from the mobile team . During June, the 1s t Marine Division, Quang Nam Province, and QDS Z agreed on a timetable for Vietnamese takeover of par- ticular highway segments . Actual turnover of respon- sibility fell behind schedule due to shortages o f equipment and Vietnamese procrastination, bu t gradually, as Marine engineers redeployed, the Sout h Vietnamese began sweeping longer and longer stretches of road . They continued to rely heavily o n the Americans for advice and equipment main- tenance37 Throughout the war, the enemy had benefited fro m a network of caves, tunnels, and fortifications, bur - rowed out during many years, that honeycombed Viet Cong strongholds such as the area south of Da Nang . To destroy these fighting positions and escape routes , as well as remove concealing foliage, Marine engineer s engaged in "land-clearing," systematically bulldozin g bare selected portions of countryside . For this purpose , III MAF and XXIV Corps had organized the 2d Provi- sional Clearing Company. The company consisted o f a command group from the 9th Engineer Battalion with men and equipment from both force enginee r battalions and from the 26th and 39th U.S . Army En- gineer Battalions. Land-clearing operations followed an establishe d pattern . GVN authorities designed the target areas , and the military unit in the TAOR of which the oper- *For details on this program, see Chapter 14 . 326 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMEN T Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A80039 5 Marine PFC Kyle E. Pruitt mans his .50-caliber machine gun during a Marine "Roug h Rider" supply convoy . The Marines placed armored plates and mounted machine gun s on trucks to protect the convoy from enemy ambushes. Note the improvised seat. ation would take place furnished normally a company- size security force . The land-clearing unit then estab- lished a base camp, and its bulldozers began scrapin g the assigned area section by section . As they cleared trees and brush, the heavy tractors caved in mos t trenches, tunnels, and bunkers and detonated or un- covered boobytraps . Engineers blew up any ordnance not exploded by the tractors, as well as tunnels an d bunkers too deep or strong for the bulldozers to demolish . During the first part of 1970, the Land Clearing Company worked mostly in the area southeast of Hoi An . Between 19 March and 25 May, it cleared 11,34 5 acres, obliterated 1,483 bunkers, filled in 5,000 yard s of trenches, crushed 118 yards of tunnels, and unco- vered 526 pieces of ordnance. On 27 May, with redeployment of the Marine engineer battalions im- minent, XXIV Corps disbanded the 2d Provisiona l Land Clearing Company. From then until redeploy- ment, the remaining Marine engineers participated in occasional land-clearing operations . They als o helped prepare previously cleared ground, for exam- ple on Go Noi Island, for cultivation by resettled refu - gees 38 Major Dixon remembered the effects of th e often hazardous work of the remaining engineers per - formed on Go Noi during April and May of 1971 : "Harassed by detonation of unexploded ordnanc e caused by harrow blades, the engineers resolutely oper - ated their equipment over countless acres of arabl e land creating a source of livelihood and sustenance to the resettlement hamlets located nearby!' " In areas not being farmed, jungle vegetation soo n returned, but the Viet Cong could not quickly rebuil d their tunnels and fortifications. Colonel Wilcox, th e 1st Marines commander during the first part of 1970 , reported that land-clearing "really helped our situa- tion below Da Nang ." It restricted enemy movment and "gave them no place to stage for their attacks ."4° Although III MAF was decreasing in size, the en- gineers still faced seemingly endless requirements fo r camp and firebase construction and rehabilitation . Elements of all three engineer battalions each mont h built or rebuilt bunkers, watch towers, barbed wire en - tanglements, huts, showers, and latrines . They in - stalled or improved electric and water systems . For th e 1st MAW during 1970, the engineers constructed 170 LOGISTICS, 1970-1971 32 7 steel and concrete "Wonderarch"* shelters at Da Nang Airbase and Marble Mountain, to protect aircraft against rocket and mortar fire. In the field, engineers , lifted into positions by helicopter with minidozers and other equipment, constructed fire support bases fo r both ARVN and Marine operations .4 ' As Marines withdrew from Vietnam, the engineers demolished the installations they had built earlier. During September and October 1970, elements of th e 1st Engineer Battalion, assisted by heavy equipment operators from Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion , leveled much of An Hoa Combat Base . Using an aver - age of 127 men and 20 pieces of earthmoving equip- ment per day, the engineers dismantled or demolishe d 340 buildings and flattened fortifications, leaving in - tact only the airfield, the industrial complex, and the small portion of the facility to be occupied by the ARVN .4 2 Base demolition accelerated during early 1971 . Dur- ing February, engineers from Company C, 1st Enginee r Battalion, with helilifted bulldozers, destroyed O P Roundup and FSB Ryder in the Que Sons . Ironically, the 1st Engineer Battalion had finished rehabilitat- ing huts and fortifications at Ryder only the previous September. In March and April, following the se- quence of Marine relinquishment of territory, the en- gineers leveled camps, firebases, and OPs nearer D a Nang. For each position to be demolished, Lieutenant Colonel Daryl E. Benstead, 1st Engineer Battalion commander, or a member of his staff, first reconnoi- tered the site with representatives of the occupyin g unit and prepared a destruction schedule and plan . After division review and approval of the plan, en- gineers, usually brought in with their equipment b y helicopter, would strip the position of all useabl e material and then bulldoze the fortifications4 3 Major Dixon later described this process, known then as "de - militarization :" De-militarization became a well used term at those bases not retained by either U.S . Army or Vietnamese forces, and where total destruction exceeded resources . The engineers *Introduced late in 1969, "Wonderarches" were constructed of bolted steel sections covered with 12 inches of high-strength con- crete . Each semi-cylindrical structure was 48 feet wide by 70 fee t long and housed one aircraft. Besides protecting the planes from high-trajectory fire, the shelters were designed to reduce the dange r of a fire and explosion in one aircraft spreading to others . FMFPac, MarOps, Dec69, p. 80 . would destroy command and perimeter bunkers and an y other facility that could be used as a shelter for incomin g fire, thus preventing their use by the VC 4 4 The local Vietnamese would then pick the cantonmen t clean, usually leaving nothing but a bare hilltop . The engineers were hard pressed during the fina l months of redeployment to accomplish all the task s necessary before the MAB departed Vietnam . They operated water points and leveled numerous camps , firebases, OPs, and IOD sites near Da Nang, as well as on remote hilltops . In addition, they provided com- bat engineer support to the 1st Marines, the last in- fantry regiment in Vietnam . The support given b y Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion and by its siste r unit, Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, which wa s commanded during the period by Major Gilbert R . Meibaum, "was substantial, mission essential for th e Brigade and closely and harmoniously coordinated b y the Brigade Engineer Officer, Lieutenant Colone l Benstead" 4 5 Motor Transport At the beginning of 1970, III MAF included fou r motor transport units . The 1st Motor Transport Bat- talion, reinforced by Company A, 5th Motor Trans - port Battalion, was under operational control of th e 1st Marine Division, as was the 11th Motor Transpor t Battalion, a force troops unit .* These battalions fur- nished tactical and logistical transportation for the di - vision . Force Logistic Command had operationa l control of the large Truck Company of the Headquart- ers and Service Battalion, 1st FSR, and the 7th Moto r Transport Battalion, another force troops unit newl y *The 1st Motor Transport Battalion was an organic element o f the 1st Marine Division and consisted of a headquarters and ser- vice company and three truck companies . Each truck company wa s normally equipped with 30 2½-ton cargo trucks and with 1'A-to n cargo trailers for use by supported units . Each truck company wa s also equipped with maintenance, recovery, and refueling vehicles . The 7th and 11th Motor Transport Battalions were elements of Forc e Troops and were assigned the mission of reinforcing the land trans - port of MAF elements for tactical, logistic, and administrative move- ment of troops, supplies, and equipment . Each of the force moto r transport battalions consisted of a headquarters and service com- pany, three truck companies and a transportation company. Th e truck companies were equipped with 31 5-ton cargo trucks, and the transportation company had 30 tractor prime movers, 45 hig h bed trailers, and 2 25-ton, low bed trailers. LtCol Morris S . Shimanoff, Comments on draft ms, 9May83 Vietnam Commen t File. 328 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMEN T moved to Da Nang from Quang Tri . Both of these or- ganizations supported FLC, as well as other III MAF elements . Truck Company, which had a variety o f specialized vehicles as well as a fleet of 2 .5- and 5-to n trucks, coordinated the "Rough Rider" convoys to base s in southern Quang Nam, such as Baldy, and furnishe d gun trucks* for escort. Most motor transport units redeployed late . Com- pany A, 5th Motor Transport Battalion, which ha d been supporting the 26th Marines, and the 7th Mo- tor Transport Battalion left in Keystone Bluejay ; bu t only Company C, 1st Motor Transport Battalion , redeployed in Keystone Robin Alpha . In Keyston e Robin Charlie, the H&S Company and Company B , 1st Motor Transport Battalion and the entire 11th Mo- tor Transport Battalion redeployed . Company A, 1s t Motor Transport Battalion and the FLC Truck Com- pany remained behind in support of 3d MAB, stand- ing down respectively for redeployment an d deactivation in mid June 1971 . In spite of the extensive tactical and logistic use o f helicopters, III MAF still relied heavily on trucks fo r cargo movement . The logistic support units and major bases received most of their stocks by road convoy. Dur- ing 1970, accordingly, the Marine motor transport bat- talions drove over 3,000,000 miles, hauling 566,64 6 tons of freight and 1,297,533 passengers . Over im- proved and increasingly secure highways, trucks now could reach most Marine positions in Quang Nam . Daily resupply convoys ran to Hill 37, An Hoa, Baldy , and other bases, although for safety from mines, mos t troops bound for outlying areas still went b y helicopter4 6 Viet Cong mines remained a significant threat t o Marine truckers, in spite of generally improved secu- rity and constant minesweeping . The stretch of Route 4 east of Hill 37, part of the land supply line to that position, was especially dangerous . In an effort t o reduce personnel casualties from detonations, the Ma- rines since early in the war had attached sandbags and pieces of boiler plate to cabs and other vital areas o f their vehicles; but this improvised armor could not stop most of the fragments that caused the severes t *Gun trucks were the standard 2%-ton or 5-ton trucks with th e cargo beds armored on the sides with steel plating and the floor s covered with sandbags. Each truck mounted a .50-caliber machin e gun and was equipped with a radio for convoy control, adjustmen t of supporting arms, and calls for medical evacuation . These truck s also carried tools and vehicle spare parts . injuries and its weight reduced truck efficiency and carrying capacity. During 1968, at III MAF request, the Marine Corp s had begun developing light, easily attached and re - moved armor kits for 2 .5- and 5-ton trucks . B y mid-1970, these kits had been designed, tested, and manufactured . Separate cab and bed component s could be installed in a few hours without special tool s or modification of the vehicle . Made of 5/8-inch wrought armor steel, the plates weighed about hal f as much per square foot as sandbags and could sto p fragments of the most powerful mines. During Sep- tember, delivery of the kits began to the 1st and 11t h Motor Transport Battalions . By the end of the year, the 1st Battalion had installed 62 cabs and 19 bed kit s in its 2 .5-ton trucks and cab kits in two wreckers an d two tankers . The 11th Battalion had armored the cab s of 82 of its 5-ton trucks and the beds of eight " The kits quickly proved their worth . On 4 Novem- ber 1970, a 1st Motor Transport Battalion truck, serv- ing as command vehicle of a convoy with both cab an d bed kits installed, hit a 30-pound mine on Route 4 about a mile east of Hill 37 . The explosion tore th e truck in half, but all four Marines on board survived . Although all were injured by being hurled from th e vehicle, none of the Marines suffered fragment wounds or loss of limb . The armor kits were recovered wit h only minor damage and later installed in othe r trucks 4 8 In similar incidents during the followin g weeks, truck armor repeatedly saved Marine lives . Forc e Logistic Command, which initially had not ordere d armor for its trucks, made haste to do so. By early 1971 , Truck Company was installing kits in its vehicles ." Medical Services At the beginning of 1970, III MAF included th e 1st Medical Battalion, reinforced by Company A, 5t h Medical Battalion, which maintained a 300-bed 1s t Marine Division hospital . The 1st Hospital Compa- ny, a force troops unit, which had operated a 100-bed treatment facility, was preparing to stand down fo r redeployment . About 100 Navy medical officers, 2,30 0 medical service corpsmen, and 1,781 hospital corps - men were attached to division, wing, FLC, and Com- bined Action Force units . Two Navy hospital ships, the USS Repose (AH 16) and the USS Sanctuary (AH 17) , each with a capacity of about 800 patients, were o n station off I Corps to treat the more seriously wound- ed and sick . At Da Nang, the 600-bed Naval Suppor t Activity Hospital afforded most of the services of a LOGISTICS, 1970-1971 32 9 general hospital in the United States, including a ful l surgical capability, preventive medicine and medical research units, a blood bank, and an optical shop . When necessary, III MAF could use facilities of th e 95th U S . Army Evacuation Hospital at Da Nang s o While the Naval Support Activity Hospital afford- ed MAF units basic medical care, the 1st and 11th Den - tal Companies provided a broad range of dental services to units of III MAF from 1970-1971 . The 1s t Company, which numbered 26 Naval officers and 4 0 enlisted men in March 1970, operated 15 dental fa- cilities for the 1st Marine Division in the Da Nang TAOR, including permanent clinics at the 1st Divi- sion command post at Da Nang, 5th Marines Head - quarters at An Hoa, 7th Marines Headquarters at L Z Baldy, and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines Headquarters at Hill 65, as well as operating mobile surgical van s capable of supporting units along the major road s throughout the TAOR. The 11th Dental Company, slightly smaller than the 1st, serviced the wing, FLC , and III MAF Headquarters until September 1970 , when 1st Dental Company redeployed, and the n provided support for all Marine units remaining un- til 28 May 1971, when the final detachment of the 11t h Company redeployed . Captain Meredith H . Mead , DC, USN, who assumed command of the 1st Denta l Company in March 1970, recalled the support whic h the dental companies provided : All these clinics had from one or more dentists and den- tal techs depending on the number of personnel to be serv- ed . . . . All had high speed handpieces powered by a gasolin e air compressor. This was the latest in field dental equipment. Many of the dental chairs were not field type but were ol d chairs sent from the States . The 1st Dental Company had a trailer fitted out as a mobile dental office to rotate among those people in more remote locations . . . . [The 11th Dental Company] had a very good modern prosthetic laboratory fo r fabrication of dentures . It included an automatic castin g machine that was used to make partial dentures from [a ] chromium cobalt alloy. It was better than many laborato- ries in the States 5 1 During 1969, III MAF and XXIV Corps had estab- lished a joint medical regulating center by placing a Navy-Marine regulating section with its Army coun- terpart at the 95th Evacuation Hospital . As helicop- ters picked up casualties throughout I Corps, the pilot s would contact the regulating center on a dedicate d radio frequency and report the number of patients and the type and severity of the wounds or illness . Th e regulator then checked a status board showing the fa- cilities, specialists, and space available at each hospi - tal, directed the helicopter to the appropriat e destination, and notified the hospital that casualtie s were on the way. On 10 April 1970, after XXIV Corp s became the senior U.S . command in I Corps, the Ma- rines and Navy deactivated their portion of the join t regulating unit . The U.S . Army 67th Medical Grou p then took over medical regulation for all of I Corps , including III MAF.s z Admissions to the hospitals serving III MAF reflect- ed the declining level of combat . Of 16,821 patient s treated during 1970, 21 percent were battle casualties . By comparison, in 1969, out of 22,003 hospital pa- tients, 26 per cent had been wounded in combat ; and in 1967, a year of heavy fighting, combat wounde d had accounted for 39 per cent of 23,091 admissions 53 During 1970, redeployments and deactivation s rapidly reduced III MAF's medical support facilities . The 1st Hospital Company left Vietnam on 27 Febru- ary in Keystone Bluejay, followed on 12 March by Com - pany A, 5th Medical Battalion . On 13 March, the Repose, which had been on duty in Vietnamese water s since February 1966, sailed for the United States an d deactivation s 4 For Marines, the most dramatic medical suppor t reduction was the closing on 15 May of the NSA D a Nang Hospital . More than any other aspect of the NSA phasedown, this action aroused concern among II I MAF commanders that the Marines would be left without adequate facilities, especially if the intensit y of combat should increase during the summer. In th e face of III MAF requests for postponement of the clos- ing, ComNavForV remained adamant while at th e same time assuring the Marines that the Navy in emer- gencies would furnish all necessary support . Through FMFPac, III MAF appealed to CinCPacFlt and CinC- Pac, again to no avail . III MAF finally approache d ComUSMACV. General Abrams upheld the Navy' s decision on the closing date, but, as General Dulack i recalled, "he gave his full and personal assurances tha t in the event the situation required, the Marines woul d be provided full medical support even if it meant mov- ing an Army hospital into ICTZ" s s The NSA Hospital closed on schedule, leaving II I MAF with the facilities of the 1st Medical Battalio n and the USS Sanctuary, backed by the Army 95th Evacuation Hospital . As battlefield action remained limited in scale and intensity, this medical suppor t proved more than adequate . During September, in Keystone Robin Alpha, Company C, 1st Medical Bat- 330 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT talion redeployed . The rest of the battalion, except for medical element of 3d MAB. The Sanctuary left fo r Company A, redeployed in April 1971 in Keystone the United States on 1 May. Company A stood dow n Robin Charlie . Company A remained the principal on 2 June and redeployed on the 25th 56 CHAPTER 1 9 The Logistics of Redeploymen t The 'Mixmaster' of Personnel—Mixmastering' of Equipment and Real Estate The 'Mixmaster' of Personnel The most complex logistic problem facing III MA F throughout 1970-1971 was the redeployment of me n and equipment . Redeployment was not simply a mat - ter of the whole force ceasing operations, packing up , and leaving Vietnam . Instead, in each withdrawal , selected units or parts of units had to be extricate d from continuing active operations . The departing units had to exchange most of their personnel and muc h of their equipment with other organizations still in combat before embarking by sea and air for destina- tions in the Pacific or the United States . Colonel Her- shel L . Johnson, Jr ., who assumed command of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines in August 1970, later ex- plained : ". . . the many problems of accountabilit y and the necessary preparation for turnover of equip- ment to other units was a task which would have been difficult under the best of circumstances . The require- ment to transfer critical personnel, many of who m could assist in accountability problems, was under- standable, but served to aggravate the situations ." ' At the same time, portions of Force Logistic Com- mand's large reserve material stocks had to be disposed of either by shipment out of Vietnam or by transfe r to other United States or Vietnamese Armed Services . The traffic was not all one way. Normal rotations of personnel and restockage and replacement of equip- ment had to continue, but the flow through the man - power and materiel "pipelines" had to be regulate d so as to leave III MAF at the prescribed reduce d strength at the end of each redeployment increment . Due to the length of time involved in moving me n and supplies through the pipeline, achievement of th e proper level at any point required almost impossibly precise calculation and operational coordination . For each redeployment, the White House and Defense Department, in consultation with MACV, de- termined the number of troops to be withdrawn and the beginning and concluding dates of the withdrawal . MACV, in turn, apportioned the troops to be removed among the Services and received from the component commanders a list of specific units to be redeployed . CinCPac and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and approved the troop list and determined the destina- tions of the units leaving Vietnam . The particula r Services established personnel policies for each with- drawal and developed their own plans and transpor- tation requirements for movement of men an d supplies . Finally, CinCPac, on the basis of informa- tion provided by the Services, would prepare a tenta- tive schedule for sea and air movements . At a final CinCPac movement conference, representatives of al l concerned commands would apportion aircraft an d shipping and establish a definite timetable for th e withdrawal ? FMFPac, headquartered at Camp Smith, Hawaii , was the central Marine Corps coordinator of redeploy- ment planning and execution . FMFPac, at the direc- tion of HQMC, represented the Marine Corps in consultations with other Pacific commands . In con - junction with III MAF, it suggested Marine units fo r redeployment . It transmitted manpower and logisti c guidance to III MAF and coordinated movement o f men and equipment from South Vietnam to othe r Marine bases in the Pacific and the continental Unit- ed States .s Until July 1970, Lieutenant General Hen- ry W. Buse, Jr ., a Naval Academy graduate and winne r of the Silver Star in World War II, commande d FMFPac . Buse's replacement, Lieutenant General Wil- liam K. Jones, also a World War II veteran who had earned a Silver Star Medal at Tarawa and a Navy Cros s at Saipan, had had first-hand experience wit h redeployment . As commander of the 3d Marine Di - vision during 1969, Jones had conducted its reloca- tion from northern I Corps to Okinawa. According to Colonel Simlik, the III MAF G-4, the relationship between FMFPac and III MAF o n redeployment matters was "constant and close and per- sonal" 4 Both Buse and Jones made frequent trips t o Da Nang for observation and consultation . At th e same time, both FMFPac commanders maintained a close and friendly working relationship with Admira l John S . McCain, Jr., CinCPac. General Jones recalled that McCain : . . . thought highly of my precedessor, General Buse , whom he used as a close friend and confidant and he com- plimented me by taking me in under the same ground rules . 331 332 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMEN T We had a special phone that was a dedicated phone from him to CGFMFPac and that phone rang quite regularl y . . . . He included CGFMFPac in everything and treate d him as a component commander, although of course h e wasn't . . . . The relationship between CinCPac an d CGFMFPac and CinCPac staff and CGFMFPac staff was very, very cordial s Besides maintaining contact with higher headquart- ers through FMFPac, III MAF regularly sent represen- tatives to the CinCPac movement planning conference s and other meetings concerned with redeployment . II I MAF passed redeployment directives to subordinat e commands ; coordinated plans for unit reliefs, stan d downs, and embarkations ; and dealt with MACV, th e other Services within Vietnam, and the South Viet- namese on such matters as equipment turnovers an d real estate transfers . The 1st Marine Division, 1st MAW, and FLC had primary responsibility for preparing me n and equipment for embarkation and moving them t o piers and airports on schedule . For this purpose, the 1st Marine Division in January 1970 activated a Logis - tic Operations Center under the G-4 . The Divisio n Embarkation Officer and his staff continually inspect- ed redeploying units and assisted subordinate unit s in making inventories and other preparations!' The plans for redeployment increments were drafte d in terms of units to be redeployed or deactivated an d total numbers of troops to be deducted from th e authorized strength of each Service in Vietnam . To car- ry out the Marine Corps portion of each plan, HQM C and FMFPac had to determine which individual Ma- rines to redeploy to bring III MAF down to the re- quired size and assign the men thus selected t o departing units . In deciding who should redeploy an d who should stay, the Marine commanders had to strik e a balance between contradictory military require- ments . Lieutenant General Jones explained : It was necessary to consider a whole host of complex pro- blems such as the retention of needed skills in WestPac, read- iness of remaining as well as redeploying units, the need for key personnel in each redeploying unit, tour equity fo r the individual Marine. Many of these considerations are coun- terproductive and finding the right combination has been a real experience in every sense of the word ? In practice, tour equity overshadowed all other con- siderations . Those Marines with the fewest months re- maining in their current 12-month tours normally were selected for each redeployment . In Keystone Bluejay, men who had served nine months or more of thei r tours were considered eligible; in Keystones Robin Al- pha and Robin Charlie, Marines whose tours were scheduled to end on or before a particular month wer e earmarked for redeployment . Eligible Marines with skills urgently needed by remaining III MAF units wer e kept in Vietnam in each redeployment, while a few noneligibles needed to guard and maintain equip- ment in transit were sent home early . This was not al - ways the benefit it seemed to be, as such assignment s frequently entailed long, dull voyages on amphibious ships packed with miscellaneous vehicles and stores . Since III MAF units always included Marines wit h a mixture of end-of-tour dates, no redeploying unit could simply leave with its existing personnel . Instead , in a process nicknamed the "mixmaster," each uni t selected for redeployment to Hawaii or the continen- tal United States transferred its noneligible Marines to organizations staying in Vietnam and at the sam e time filled its ranks with eligible Marines from othe r commands . As a result, few units returned to the Unit- ed States composed of Marines who had served wit h the unit in Vietnam . Units bound for Okinawa an d Japan underwent much less "mixmastering ." In orde r to maintain combat readiness, these commands em - barked with their existing personnel, including Ma- rines otherwise eligible for redeployment, who simpl y completed their Western Pacific tours at their new stations e To implement these complex manpower reshuffles , HQMC delegated broad transfer and reassignmen t authority to FMFPac . The FMFPac staff broke down each redeployment into numbers of Marines of eac h rank, grade, and skill who were to be redeployed fro m the 1st MAW, 1st Marine Division, and Force Logisti c Command, either by transfer to redeploying organi- zations or by normal rotation . A liaison team fro m FMFPac, located at III MAF Headquarters, briefed th e commands on these strength reduction requirement s and where necessary assisted in their implementation . Each of the major III MAF subordinate commands , through its G-1 section, then screened its own person- nel for Marines eligible for redeployment, arrange d for the necessary transfers between units, and prepare d and issued the thousands of individual orders an d transportation requests required . FMFPac, beside s overseeing this "mixmaster," periodically halted o r reduced the flow of replacements to III MAF to as - sure compliance with post-redeployment manpowe r ceilings . FMFPac also directed special transfers of II I MAF personnel to units on Okinawa and in Japan , both to reduce numbers in Vietnam and to rebuil d other Western Pacific commands e THE LOGISTICS OF REDEPLOYMENT 33 3 This complicated process did not always go smooth- ly. Late notification of the highly classified redeploy- ment plans often forced the division, wing, and FLC to do their own planning and implementation on ex- tremely short notice. Compounding this problem, the exact strength and composition of Marine units varie d almost from day to day, due to casualties, rotations , and replacements .* With the aid of computers, th e various staffs could make the necessary calculations i n time for the results to still be valid ; but the different headquarters often worked from different data bases . Inevitably, mistakes occurred . Personnel redeployments were attended by much organizational disruption an d individual frustrations . Marine commanders almost universally deplored th e impact of the "mixmaster" on unit effectiveness an d on the well-being of the individual Marine. For bot h redeploying and nonredeploying units, mass person- nel transfers resulted in the loss of key Marines an d undermined morale and efficiency . In Keystone Robi n Alpha, VMFA-314 was "mixmastered " three times i n as many months because of changes in redeployment plans; finally officers from squadrons staying in Viet- nam had to be assigned to temporary duty wit h VMFA-314 to fly out the squadron's aircraft. Unavoid- ably, with such personnel turbulence, "the man didn' t know who he worked for ; the supervisor didn't know who was working for him ."b o As one redeployment increment followed another , a Marine with most of his Vietnam tour yet to serv e *A HQMC handbook for manpower planners, issued in 1969 , likened the Marine Corps manpower system to a bath tub with a faucet at one end and a drain at the other. Water constantly flows in from the faucet and runs out the drain . The objective of the "plumber '/manpower planner is to adjust this flow so as to keep a given number of gallons (Marines) in the tub at any one tim e and to assure that each gallon spends a fixed length of time (tou r of duty) in the tub . The basic rate of flow could be calculated with this equation : rate of flow (manpower input) equals the numbe r of gallons in tub (strength) divided by the time in tub (tour length) . By this formula, to keep III MAF at a strength of 24,000 Marines , each serving a 12-month tour, required a monthly replacement rat e of 2,000 men (24,000 divided by 12 months) . This was an oversim- plification, since casualties in Vietnam and attrition from variou s causes elsewhere in the system would force adustments in the replace- ment flow to compensate . To plan a redeployment, one had to cal- culate normal inflow and outflow, allow for attrition, and the n determine how much additional water had to be bailed out to brin g the water level down to a set point by a given time . Add to thi s the further complication that the "water" in fact was not uniform, but was a mixture of different temperatures (ranks and skills) which had to be kept in a prescribed balance . G-1 Division, HQMC, "Th e Plumber's Helper: for Manpower Planners " (Washington : HQMC, 1969) . Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A35517 9 BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., in khaki and facing the for- mation, greets returning Marines from Vietnam o n board the USS Mobile (AKC 115) at San Diego . might be shunted from organization to organization , sometimes too rapidly for his own mail to follow him . According to General Armstrong : As units folded up and left Vietnam, a young fellow woul d go from the 7th Marines . . . to the 5th Marines ; then, as one of their outfits would leave, they'd shift him to a different outfit and finally [he] ended up in the 1st Marines . And then if he still had the most time to do, why he'd end up in the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines because that was the unit that was going to go home last . . . . In a period of si x months, he might have been in seven organizations ." In each redeployment, security requirements prevented commanders from informing their troop s concerning who was going home and when, Th e resulting spate of rumors and contradictory infor- mation adversely affected morale . Delayed instructions or last-minute changes in instructions kept com- manders themselves uncertain who could redeploy almost to the moment that troop movements were or- dered As Colonel Robert W. Teller, the 1st MAW Chief of Staff put it, "you're a day before the boats are sail- ing and you still don't know who's leaving town" 1 2 The repeated alterations of plans for Keystone Robi n Alpha forced HQMC to revise the individual redeploy- ment criteria after embarkations actually had begun, 334 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMEN T rendering ineligible Marines who had already receiv- ed aircraft or shipping assignments . Out of 1,400 1s t Marine Division troops in one Keystone Robin Alph a embarkation unit, 512 had to be told they were not redeploying. Other Marines, as a result of staff wor k incomplete for lack of time, found themselves leav- ing Vietnam without permanent new station assign- ments . These unfortunates included Genera l Armstrong . The 3d MAB commander recalled : CG, FMFPac had to send me temporary duty orders so I could leave the country [with 3d MAB] . I did not hav e the advantage of a permanent change of station (PCS) assign- ment . . . . I went back to Hawaii and stayed there on tem- porary duty assignment for three weeks before my assignmen t came through . Another who was affected was Colonel Don H . Blan- chard, the chief of staff of the 1st Division, who wa s held at Camp Pendleton for more than a month await- ing orders .1 3 Manpower shortages, both in overall strength an d in particular ranks and specialties, plagued III MA F during and between redeployment . Anticipating a n early redeployment following Keystone Bluejay, HQMC and FMFPac reduced replacements to III MAF. This action resulted in severe personnel shortages when Keystone Robin Alpha was delayed until July 1970 . By that month, the division and wing each were abou t 1,000 Marines below their manning levels,* with defi- ciencies in aviation specialists and field grade officer s among the shortages 1 4 Throughout late 1970 and early 1971, the flow of replacements was uneven and un- predictable . In the 1st Marine Division, according to Colonel Hugh S . Aitken, the G-1, "The input flow . . . varied so considerably that we were either face d with . . . a significant excess of personnel or a signifi- cant shortage . . . . Very seldom did the division stabi- lize at its authorized strength ceiling ." Repeatedly, th e division found itself with surpluses of some specialists and shortages of others . Advance information on th e composition of new replacement drafts often prove d inaccurate . Aitken reported : "We . . . try to plan fo r 350 03s [riflemen] coming in in a given month, and we end up with 50 of those and maybe 200 com- municators . . . . The entire personnel plan for tha t *The number of Marines of particular ranks, grades, and MOS s in a particular type of unit is established by its table of organiza- tion (T/O). The Marine Corps, in Vietnam and elsewhere, was force d by overall manpower shortages to keep most organizations at less than T/O strength . This reduced strength was called the "manning level," normally established as a percentage of T/O strength . month and succeeding months is useless at that point ." Aitken attributed these deficiencies to the difficult y of maintaining uniform, up-to-date strength informa- tion at all the headquarters involved in manpowe r movement and assignment .*1 5 Redeploying units began embarkation preparation s two or more months before their scheduled date of departure . While still conducting combat operations , they began taking inventory of their equipment and packing or disposing of everything not immediately required for their missions . They cancelled requisitions and began sending nonessential vehicles and materi- al to staging areas near Da Nang. The 5th Marines , which embarked in March 1971, established an Em- barkation Readiness Center at Hill 34, the CP of it s 1st Battalion, in December 1970, to process and store its equipment . By the beginning of March, when it stood down from operations, the regiment already had packed and prepared 85 percent of the material wit h which it would embark t o Units normally stood down two or three weeks be - fore embarkation and moved to secure cantonment s near Da Nang . There, they "mixmastered" their per- sonnel and finished packing and turning in supplie s and equipment, often drawing transportation, mess- ing, and other support from nonredeploying com- mands . During March 1971, Major Francis M . Kauffman, Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Ma- rines, described to his men what they could expec t during stand-down : This will be a fast moving, stressful period while we transfer personnel to other in-country units, to Okinawa, or t o ConUS . At the same time, all equipment must be cleaned , checked by technicians, packaged for shipment and stage d for embarkation . The next few weeks require cooperatio n all around . You can expect hard work, crowded living con- ditions at first, many inspections and formations . . . . Many of you will not be on the lines again . 1 7 Few redeploying organizations left Vietnam e n masse. Instead, during stand-down, units graduall y lost strength from transfers and individual redeploy- ments by air or ship . The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines , which stood down in February 1971, dropped durin g the month from 33 Marine officers and 1,066 enlist- ed men to 22 officers and 230 men . It sent 441 Ma - *The automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System (MMS) was designed to permit accurate measurement of strength at any time, but due to a shortage of trained personnel to operate it, the system in Vietnam was undermined by errors . The 1st Ma- rine Division had a MMS error rate of 15-17 percent until early 1971 . Aitken Debrief. THE LOGISTICS OF REDEPLOYMENT 33 5 rines to the United States and transferred 395 to th e 1st Marines and Force Logistic Command 1 8 At the ap - pointed embarkation date, after a farewell parade, a t least a token command group with the unit colors would emplane for their new station . Other contin- gents would board ships to accompany their unit' s heavy equipment . `Mixmastering ' of Equipment and Real Estate At the beginning of each redeployment, FMFPac instructed units concerning which categories of equip- ment and supplies to take with them and which item s of equipment to turn in to FLC for redistribution t o the Marine Corps or other United States and allied forces . Until Keystone Robin Alpha, units left Viet- nam with their standard allowances of clothing , weapons, and vehicles and with some medical supplies , packaged fuel and lubricants, and spare parts . They divested themselves of all rations, ammunition, bul k POL, and extra or special southeast Asia allowanc e equipment. Units being deactivated left most of thei r material in Vietnam . III MAF "mixmastered " equip- ment, as well as Marines, so that the newest items an d those items in the best condition remained with the organizations still committed to combat. Aircraft squa - drons, for example, exchanged airplanes to keep in Vietnam those most recently returned from progres- sive aircraft rework (PAR) .* Redeploying units as a result often embarked with unserviceable equipment; of 90 MAG-16 vehicles loaded on one LST, only on e was driven on under its own power. To alleviate this difficulty MAG-16 early in 1971 stationed a group staf f officer familiar with redeployment plans at Futema to inform the MAG-16 elements there what material t o expect in shipments from Vietnam and to help materi- al repair and rehabilitation . As redeploymen t progressed, however, the loads of gear that wer e retrograded were organized more carefully and were in better shapel a The intricacies of reshuffling personnel and equip- ment affected some units more adversely than others . Lieutenant Colonel Robert E . Wehrle, who was the ex- ecutive officer and then commanding officer of Head- quarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division fro m September 1970 to May 1971, recalled that his battal- ion became heavily reinforced with both people an d *Under the PAR system, at specified intervals, each Marine air- craft in Vietnam was shipped to aircraft plants in Japan for com- plete disassembly and rehabilitation . PAR intervals ranged from 1 8 months for A-4s to 25 months for UH-lEs . FMFPac MarOps, Dec66 , pp. 77-78 . equipment . The vehicles, alone, that Headquarter s Battalion acquired through this process created a grea t burden because they had to be cleaned, painted, and restenciled before they were loaded on the ships . The battalion became responsible for the condition of th e vehicles, many of which were marginally serviceable , and had to meet the "Department of Agriculture re- quirement that these vehicles be showroom clean be - fore they could be returned to the continental U.S " This requirement was made more difficult because th e one steam jenny in the motor transport platoon i n Service Company was of little value when it was work - ing well and at the time it was barely working . "Eve n if it had been in top working order," said Wehrle, "w e had another problem and that was the limited amount of water that we had because of the repeated break- ing of the line coming from the airfield over to th e division." Lastly, the motor transport platoon's size had been depleted by redeployment of personnel. In an effort to meet the deadline, Wehrle hire d Vietnamese and placed them on a round-the-cloc k work schedule . Vehicles were rolled on their sides and Marine supervisors "literally put Vietnamese on the m like ants with knives, what have you, scraping to get the grease, mud, and everything off of them ." Accord- ing to Wehrle, just a few days before redeployment , the Army provided Headquarters Battalion with effi- cient steam jennies : . . . they would set up almost like a conveyor belt line , . . . and I'd bring a convoy of vehicles through and they would turn their steam jennies loose on them and clean up the last amount of dirt that was on them . But this was touch and go and, as I recall, we finished up the last vehicles, I believe, the day before we were to move them to Da Nan g and stage them. Finally, before the vehicles were actually staged to b e reloaded, they were repainted and stenciled and dis- played for the Vietnamese to pick what they wanted . "This went to them as military assistance," said Wehrle , and what remained "was embarked and returned t o Camp Pendleton ." 2 0 The experience of Communication Support Com- pany (CSC) of 7th Communication Battalion, which in September 1970 assumed responsibilities of th e deactivated 5th Communication Battalion, was as frus- trating as Headquarters Battalion after inheriting the 5th's equipment including 137 vehicles . For the nex t 10 months, CSC labored to clean, paint and, in gener- al, rehabilitate the equipment to a degree acceptabl e for retrograde from Vietnam . Although CSC finally succeeded in cleaning and retrograding all salvagea- 336 VIETNAMIZATION AND REDEPLOYMEN T ble gear which had been transferred to its accounts , thousands of man-hours were spent preparing unwant- ed acquisitions and their organic gear which includ- ed over 100 vehicles, prime movers and towed loads , 25 CONEX boxes of miscellaneous equipment, as wel l as maintenance, radio and microwave equipmen t shelters . And all this was accomplished while CS C provided the preponderance of equipment, facilities , and personnel for the brigade communications center . Major Robert T. Himmerich, who commanded CS C prior to redeployment, observed years later: "Units an d organizations that made up III MAF and then 3d MAB should have displaced from Vietnam to wherever or- dered and taken their equipment and supplies wit h them . Deactivation should have been effected only af- ter all accounts were settled?' " III MAF redistributed excess equipment turned in by departing units, and in some instances also regu- lar allowance equipment,* under priorities and pro - grams established by FMFPac and MACV. Generally, Marine units still in Vietnam had first claim, followe d by the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the 2d ROKM C Brigade . On 1 August 1970, MACV initiated Projec t 805, a program under which all equipment of depart- ing units, both standard allowance and excess, was screened for items needed by the South Vietnames e Armed Forces . Later in 1970, MACV established a similar program to meet the needs of United State s Services in Vietnam . Any excess Marine unit equip- ment not selected for either of these programs wen t to FMFPac organizations outside Vietnam or to rebuild mountout and mountout augmentation (MO/ - MOA)** stocks throughout the Pacific? 2 *This was known as Table of Equipment (T/E) allowance and in- cluded the unit's weapons and vehicles. **As forces in readiness, Marine Corps units maintained specia l stocks of reserve supplies to support them during initial deploy- ment . These stocks were divided into two 30-day blocks . The first , designated the Mountout block, was supposed to be held by th e unit and move with it . The second, or Mountout Augmentation block, was carried by the service support unit (FSR or service bat- talion) responsible for support of the combat unit for which th e block was intended . During 1965-1966, Marine units had brough t both these blocks into Vietnam and used them up. The blocks ha d not been reconstituted during the war . In December 1968, FMFPa c began planning to rebuild them, using excess material resultin g from anticipated redeployments . The effort got under way in Jul y 1969, with redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, based mainl y on use of excess equipment from units ; but it did not achieve great momentum until FI.0 and the 3d FSR on Okinawa were able t o release their excess supplies during late 1970 and early 1971 . Soper, "Logistics," pp . 210-211 ; FMFPac, MarOps, Jun70, pp . 40-41, Dec70 , p. 69 . To supervise and coordinate implementation o f these programs, III MAF established a Redistributio n Center under its G-4 . This staff unit supervised equip- ment transfers between Marine organizations and to the South Vietnamese and other United States an d allied forces . Colonel Allan T. Wood, III MAF G-4 , observed : "You won't find this organization on a T/O , for it was never provided for, and it's an exceptiona l requirement existing only in . . . redeployment." 2 3 III MAF took special care in selecting and prepar- ing equipment for MACV 's Project 805 . Thirty to 3 5 days before a Marine unit was to redeploy, III MA F compared the unit's list of equipment, both standard allowance and excess on hand for United States and Hawaii-bound units and excess on hand only for or- ganizations going to Okinawa or Japan, against a MACV list of RVNAF needs . III MAF then nominat- ed the appropriate items to HQMC for turnover. Af- ter HQMC arranged for one-for-one reimbursemen t in kind by the Army and approved the transaction , Marine technicians carefully inspected each item as the owning unit stood down . Equipment offered to th e CH-46 Sea Knight aircraft from Marine Mediu m Helicopter Squadron 161 are lined up at the Tien Sh a Deep Water Pier near Da Nang for redeployment . Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422854 THE LOGISTICS OF REDEPLOYMENT 33 7 South Vietnamese had to meet exacting standards set by III MAF. Trucks, for instance, could have surfac e scratches and mildewed seat cushions ; but engines, transmissions, brakes, instruments, horns, lights, an d windshield wipers had to work; the battery had to have at least nine months of life left ; and a vehicle could not have over 17,000 miles on its speedometer. Afte r the Marines weeded out substandard pieces, represen- tatives from the ARVN 1st Area Logistic Comman d inspected the equipment again and selected what the y wanted . Between the start of Project 805 in August 1970 an d the end of Marine participation in it in May of th e following year, III MAF/3d MAB offered 11,480 separate items to the South Vie