AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98
Robinson R22 Beta · Service Bulletins
Overview
This document is an AAIB Bulletin detailing an incident involving the Robinson R22 Beta helicopter, registration G-OSEE. It outlines the circumstances of an engine power loss during a private flight, leading to a forced landing and subsequent damage to the aircraft. The bulletin discusses the design flaws in the fuel vent system that contributed to the incident and includes safety recommendations for modifications to prevent similar occurrences in the future. It serves as a critical reference for pilots and maintenance personnel regarding safety practices and engineering reviews related to the fuel system of the R22 Beta.
- The incident involved the Robinson R22 Beta helicopter, registration G-OSEE, which lost engine power shortly after takeoff.
- The fuel vent line kinked, preventing fuel from reaching the engine, despite the main tank containing 5-6 gallons of fuel.
- The original fuel vent system design was inadequate, leading to the introduction of revised vent pipes and longer tubing.
- Safety recommendation 98-57 advises monitoring modifications to the fuel tank vent system to prevent engine power loss.
- The bulletin highlights the importance of proper maintenance and inspection of the fuel vent system to ensure safety.
Document
Source
Originally published by assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. Sprinkle hosts a reference copy with an added summary, specifications and searchable full text.
Document details
- Type ·
- Service Bulletins
- Year ·
- 1998
- Pages ·
- 2
- File size ·
- 68 KB
- Publisher ·
- assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
What is the AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98?
The AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98 is a service bulletins for the Robinson R22 Beta, dated 1998.
How many pages is the AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98?
The copy of the AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98 on file runs 2 pages.
Where does the AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98 come from?
This copy of the AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98 was originally published by assets.publishing.service.gov.uk and is hosted on Sprinkle as a free, searchable reference copy.
What year was the AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98 published?
The AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98 — the Robinson R22 Beta service bulletins on file — is dated 1998.
Most owners only have the POH. Here's the essential set for the Robinson R22 Beta.
- Pilot's Operating Handbook / AFM
- Checklist
- Maintenance Manual
- Parts Catalog (IPC)
- Systems & Wiring
- Service Bulletins on file
- Type Certificate (TCDS)
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In this document
Incident Overview
The bulletin describes an incident that occurred on May 17, 1998, when the Robinson R22 Beta helicopter lost engine power shortly after takeoff. The pilot initiated autorotation but the main rotor struck the tail boom upon landing, resulting in damage. The investigation revealed that a kinked fuel vent line prevented fuel from reaching the engine, leading to the power loss.
Fuel Vent System Issues
The original fuel vent system for the R22 Beta included two vertical aluminium pipes connected to the main and auxiliary tanks with short plastic tubing. This design was found to be inadequate, prompting the introduction of revised vent pipes and longer tubing. However, the documentation did not clearly specify which tube lengths were to be used for each tank.
Safety Recommendations
The bulletin includes a safety recommendation urging the FAA to monitor the manufacturer's response to proposals for improving the fuel tank vent system. It emphasizes the need for modifications to ensure adequate venting under all operational circumstances, as previous incidents have resulted in catastrophic outcomes due to engine power loss.
Safety notes
- Loss of engine power on Robinson helicopters can lead to catastrophic consequences, including loss of rotor RPM.
- It is recommended to ensure that fuel tank vent systems are modified for adequate venting under all operational circumstances.
Full document text
Robinson R22 Beta, G-OSEE AAIB Bulletin No: 10/98 Ref: EW/G98/05/15 Category: 2.3 Aircraft Type and Registration: Robinson R22 Beta, G-OSEE No & Type of Engines: 1 Lycoming O-320-B2C piston engine Year of Manufacture: 1988 Date & Time (UTC): 17 May 1998 at 2007 hrs Location: 10 miles east of Manchester Airport Type of Flight: Private Persons on Board: Crew - 1 - Passengers - None Injuries: Crew - None - Passengers - N/A Nature of Damage: Main rotor/tail boom and rotor Commander's Licence: Private Pilot's Licence (Helicopters) Commander's Age: 46 years Commander's Flying Experience: 239 hours (of which 189 were on type) Last 90 days - 3 hours Last 28 days - 2 hours Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot The helicopter was about 2 minutes into the flight, climbing away from a private site, when the engine lost power, causing the aircraft to yaw. The low rotor RPM horn sounded and, as the pilot initiated autorotation, he noticed that the red OIL and ALTERNATOR warning lights were on indicating that the engine had stopped. The aircraft was flared as it approached the ground and the collective raised to cushion the landing, but on touchdown the main rotor struck the tail boom. Subsequent inspection revealed that the fuel vent line to the main tank had kinked and, although the main tank contained 5 or 6 gallons, no fuel came out during a ground test. (See report of accident to G-OTYA in this bulletin) The original standard of fuel vent pipes for R22s fitted with both main and auxiliary fuel tanks consisted of two vertical aluminium pipes connected to each tank by short (3 ins and 2.25 ins) lengths of plastic tubing. This arrangement proved to be unsatisfactory, and SB-83 introduced revised aluminium pipes connected to the tanks by longer (9 ins and 6.75 ins) plastic tubes. The service bulletin documentation did not give a clear indication of which tube length was to be fitted to which tank. A further change introduced another plastic tube connecting the vent systems of the two tanks, this allowed either tank to vent through the other tank; this modification was not fitted to either G-OTYA or G-OSEE. All three vent systems described above used single walled general purpose plastic tubing. The tubing had little resistance to kinking and was easily softened by the heat encountered in its location between the fuel tanks and above the engine heat shield. At the end of July 1998 the UK agent made a recommendation to the manufacturer that he carry out an engineering review of the fuel tank vent system, with particular consideration being given to the choice of material for the flexible hoses, the introduction of vented fuel filler caps and the addition of a Flight Manual warning, describing the actions to be taken in the event of unbalanced fuel consumption between the two tanks. Safety recommendation 98-57 Loss of engine power on Robinson helicopters has on previous occasions resulted in a loss of rotor RPM with catastrophic consequences. It is therefore recommended that:- The Federal Aviation Administration should monitor the manufacturers response to the UK agents proposals and ensure that Robinson helicopter fuel tank vent systems are modified to ensure adequate tank venting under all operational circumstances.