FAA Integrated Oversight Philosophy

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ORDER FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 8000.72 National Policy Effective Date: 06/28/17 SUBJ: FAA Integrated Oversight Philosophy 1-1. Purpose of This Order. This order sets forth the Federal Aviation Administration In tegrated Oversight Philosophy as the core set of principles for evolving the FAA 's safety oversight systems.

Implementation of these principles is key to supporting the FAA Risk-Based Decision Making (RBDM) Strategic Initiative and ensuring that the FAA meets the challenges of a rapidly evol ving U. S. aerospace system.

1-2. Audience. This order app li es to the safety oversight programs and activities of a ll FAA organizations that have regulatory oversight responsibilities. These organizations include the Office of Aerospace Medicine (AAM), Flight Standards Service (AFS), Aircraft Certification·Service (AIR), Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOY), Office of Airpo11s (ARP), Office of Security and Hazardous Materials Safety (ASH) , and Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST).

1-3. Where Can I Find This Order. You can find this order on the MyF AA Emp loyee Web site: https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices/. This order is available to the public at http:/lwww.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/.

1-4. Integrated Oversight Philosophy.

a. FAA Oversight and Safety Culture.

( I) The FAA defines oversight as assuring that aviation organizations and designees comply with and use safety-related standards, regulations, and associated procedures. FAA oversight is evolving to a risk management based approach that embraces many interdependent principles, including RBDM, safety management systems (SMS), Compliance Philosophy, and voluntary safety reporting programs. Oversight.is an integral part of the FAA 's safety culture. Evolving FAA oversight programs to better implement these principles supports the FAA's movement toward a safety management framework that collectively helps to define our safety culture.

(2) The FAA safety culture also influences how we conduct oversight. The F AA 's safety cu l ture expects that regu lated persons appreciate the value of self-disclosing both regulatory and non - regulatory safety issues. It allows for consideration of unintentional en-ors and creates a non-punitive environment, where en-ors are reported without fear of reprisal. This also allows certificate and non- certificate holders, and the FAA to work together to e11sure the con-ective act i on is appropriate and will address the root cause(s) of safety issues. The FAA will continue to evolve it s safety culture to support a transparent exchange of infom1ation , mutual coopera ti on, collaboration, critical thinking, and trust.

b. RBDM. The RBDM Strategic Initi ative leverages the use of consistent, data-infrn 111 ed approaches to enable the FAA to make smarter, system- level , risk-based decisions. RBDM Distribution: Electronic Initiated By : AVS-4 06/28/17 8000.72 emphasizes th e review of safety data to integrate risk into a decision making processes; enabling infom1ed decision making. The FAA is evolving its business processes to a risk-based mod el to bet1er target oversight resources.

c. SMS Attributes. SMS is the fom1al , top-down, organization-wide approach to manag ing safety risk and assuring th e effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety risk. Within SMS, Safety Risk Management and Safety Assurance processes work together to enable interoperability an1ong SMSs. Safety Assurance includes oversight processes and provides a common approach for conducting oversight.

d. Compliance Philosophy. FAA Order 8000.373, FAA Compliance Philosophy, is an integral part of the FAA 's philosophical approach to oversight and the first step in the FAA's culture shift to us e safety management principles to proactively address emerging safety risks. The FAA' s intent is to work with regulated persons to identify and cotTect underlying causes that led to a noncompliance and to ensure future compliance. Compliance Philosophy represents a focus on non-enforcement methods for correcting unintentional noncompliance, but will continue to us e enforcement when needed.

e. Reduce Duplicative Activities and Ensure Integrated Oversight.

(I) Duplicative oversight activities have been recognized across the agency. With improved integration, coordination, and collaboration-both within and between oversight organizations- duplicative activities can be reduced to resolve unnecessary burden that may be imposed on FAA and industry resources.

(2) Duplicative activities are not limited to oversight. A number of information technology (IT) tools have been developed, or are being developed, along parallel tracks, providing opportunity for integration and/or collaborative use of IT tools. Increased integration and analysis of oversight IT tools would be beneficial in providing a holistic view of hazard trends and priorities, as well as in sha1ing data/information between IT tools.

f. Attributes of a Standardized Safety Oversight System. The FAA recognizes that no single oversight system can assure the effectiveness of risk controls for all the diverse operational environments; however, oversight systems do have core attributes that are universally applicable. All FAA oversight systems must incorporate the attributes listed below.

(I) Employ internal collaboration, coordination, and communication across FAA organizations to improve consistency and standardization and project an image as a single, unified agency; (2) Be risk-based and support critical thinking and infonned decision making; (3) Employ International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recomme nded Practices, specifically Annex 19 , Safety Management, as applicable; (4) Be interoperable with the SMS of both internal and external stakeholders and facilitate process-oriented, data-driven management of risk , as applicable; 06/28/17 8000.72 . (5) Establish interfaces between FAA Safety Assurance oversight processes and Safety Risk Management functions and the product/service provider's SMS, as applicable; ( 6) Employ oversight systems that incorporate the requirements of FAA Order 8000.369, Safety Management Systems; (7) Foster a proactive approach to safety management that allows for product/service providers to develop processes to identify and disclose safety risks , prevent regulato1y noncompliance, and ensure systemic fixes are implemented when re g ulatory noncompliance exists;

(8) Assure product/service providers comply with the re gulations and manage risk at an

acceptable level ; (9) Where appropriate, use non-enforcement measures for correcting unin ten tional regulatory noncompliance while remaining mindful that some instances of unintentional regulato1y noncompliance may be subject to enforcement action as prescribed in FAA Order 8000.373, FAA Compliance Philosophy, FAA Order 2150.3 , FAA Compliance and Enforcement Pro gram, and organizational policies and guidance; (10) Incorporate Voluntary Safety Programs to include vo luntaiy safety reporting systems; (a) Create and promote a non-punitive environment for internal and external stakeholders that nurtures their willingness to report hazards without fear of reprisal; (b) Voluntary Safety Programs must be documented in directives and/or advisory circulars, as applicable; (c) Volun tmy Safety Programs must protect the confidentiality of repo1ts submit1ed thereunder to the extent allowed by applicable law, including 49 U.S.C. § 40123 , Protection c?f voluntarily submilled il?formation. 49 U.S.C. § 44735 , Limitation on disclosure of sqfety information, and 14 CFR Part 193 , Protection of Voluntarily submilled i11formation; (d) A feature of Voluntary Safety Pro g rams is FAA feedback, to persons who hav e reported on safety issues , regarding safety improvements achieved as a result of th e reports; ( 11) Base the scope, frequency, and emphasis of safety oversight on the product/service provid er's safety performance m1d risk profile; (12) Employ closed-loop processes to ensure tracking and full life-cycle management of all identified safety is sues; (13) Identif y, assess, manage, and communicate risk at a national level; (14) Reduce duplicative activities and ensure integrated oversight; 06/28/17 8000.72 (a) To the greatest extent practical, oversight organizations must reduce duplicative oversight activities, both internal and external of the organization. This includes, but is not limited to , product/serv ic e providers possessing multiple certificate/approval types and single product/service providers overseen by multiple FAA offices; (b) Oversight organizations must intef, Tate oversight throu gh communication, collaboration, and increased data sharing, as applicable; (c) To the greatest extent practical, FAA organizations must use shared information technology support applications, databases, and too lsets; ( 15) Eva lu ate designee oversight programs to ensur e: (a) Standardized designee/delegation oversight processes, as practicable; (b) FAA oversig ht processes, resource allocation, and the scope, frequency, and emphasis of FAA oversight activities is approp1iately aligned w ith the designee/delegated organization's safety perfom1a nc e and risk profile; (l 6) Facilitate the sharing of oversight resources o ut side of specific areas of geograph ic responsibility; (17) Improve oversight data collection and analysis by: (a) Collecting data with sufficient detail to allow for id entification and analysis of trends, and better target oversight activities; (b) Evaluating the freq uency of data input and analysis to ensure that oversight activities can be adjusted as risks change; (c) Ensuring increased sharing of data, identity emerging ri sks, and enable a proacti ve approach to hazard identification; (d) Evaluating data improvement programs for effectiveness, or if none exist, implement such programs; ( 18 ) Use the standardized oversight te1minology document, FAA Standardized Scrfety Oversight Terminology (Appendix A) to improve internal communication, increase interface and 71~/:l<t:J and clarify processes for stakeho ld ers.

Michael P. Huerta Administrator 06/28/17 8000.72 Appendix A Appendix A: Standardized Terminology for FAA Safety Oversight OVERVIEW This appendix contains many of the tern1s and phrases used in various FAA oversight organizations.

Tenns that have specific statutory or regulatory definitions are noted by the applicable citation. Other definitions in this appendix do not alter statutory or regulatory definitions nor do they supersede statutory or regulatory requirement. There is no expectation or mandate that external stakeholders and/or the public adopt any of these tern1s or definitions. The use of these tenns facilitates a common safety lanf,ruage and supports internal FAA communications and collaboration.

1. Acceptable Risk - The level of risk that individuals or groups are willing to accept given the benefits gained.

2. Accident • NTSB Definition. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial dan1age. (49 CFR 830.2) • FAA Definition. An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, or dan1age to , or loss of , equipment or property.

Launch Accident a. An event that causes a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated with the flight; b. An event that causes damage estimated to exceed $25 ,000 to prope11y not associated with the flight that is not located at the launch site or designated recovery area; c. An unplanned event occurring during the flight of a launch vehicle resulting in the impact of a launch vehicle, its payload or any component thereof: 1. For an expendable launch vehicle, outside designated impact limit lines; and 2. For a reusable launch vehicle, outside a designated landing site.

d. For a launch that takes place with a person on board, a fatality or serious injury to a space flight participant or crew member. ( 14 CFR 401.5.)

Reentry Accident a. Any w1planned event occurring during the reentry of a reentry vehicle resulting in the impact of the reentry vehicle, its payload, or any component thereof: outside a designated reentry site; b. An event that causes a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated with the reentry; c. An event that causes damage estimated to exceed $25 ,000 to propetty not associated with the reentry and not located within a designated reentry site; and d. For a reentry that takes place with a person on board , a fatality or serious injury to a space flight participant or crew member. ( 14 CFR 401.5).

A-1 06/28/17 8000.72 Appendix A Unmanned Aircraft Accident Reportable Under Part 107-Any operation of the small unmanned aircraft involving at least: a. Serious injury to any person or any Joss of consciousness; or b. Damage to any property, other than the small unmanned aircraft, unless one of the following conditions is satisfied: 1. The cost of repair (including materials and labor) does not exceed $500; or 2. The fair market value of the property does not exceed $500 in the event of total loss.

3. Administrative Action - A means for disposing of violations or alleged violations that do not warrant the use of legal enforcement actions. The two types of administrative action are a warning notice and a letter of correction. ( 14 CFR 13. l 1.)

4. Advisory Circular (AC) - A document published by th e Fed era l Aviation Administration (FAA) giving guidance on aviation issues.

5. Aircraft -A device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air. (14 CFR 1.1.)

6. Airport - An area of land or water that is used or intended to be used for the landing and takeoff of aircraft, and includes its buildings and facilities, if any. ( 14 CFR 1.1.)

7. Analysis- The process of identifying a question or issue to be addressed, examining the issu e, investigating the results, interpreting the results, and possibly making a recommendation. Analysis typically involves using scientific or mathematical methods for evaluation.

8. Assessment - Process of measuring or judging the value or level of something.

9. Audit -A systematic and documented process for obtaining records, statements of fact or other informat ion and evaluating it objectively to detennine th e extent to which policies, procedures or requireme nts are met.

10. Compliance - Conduct that conforms to the requirements of a statute, regulation, or order issued under a statute or regulation.

11. Compliance Action - A means for addressing noncompliance or alleged noncompliance when a person is willing and able to comply with regulatory standards, and when the noncompliance does not meet the critetia for enforcement action set forth in FAA Order 2150.3. Compliance actions are processed in accordance with the guidance of the program office exercising regulatory authotity over the person that engaged in the noncompliance.

12. Corrective Action -Action to eliminate or mitigate the cause or reduce th e effects of a detected nonconformity, noncompliance, or other undesirable situation.

A-2 06/28/17 8000.72 Appendix A 13. Designee - A private person (i.e. , individual or entity) whom the Administrator has designated to act as the Administrator's representative "in examining, in spect in g, and testing persons and a ircra ft for the purpose of i ssui ng ainnan, operating, and aircraft certificates." ( 14 CFR 183.1 ) 14. Frequency-An expression of how often a given effect occurs.

15. Gap Analysis - A technique that assists in identifying the disparity between the current and the desired future state.

16. Hazard -A condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in 49 CFR 830.2. (14 CFR 5.5) 17. Hazard Identification - A process to establ ish a list of all hazards and corresponding outcomes relevant to 'an acti vity .

J 8. Incident.

• NTSB Definition. An occun-ence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations. ( 49 CFR 830 . 2) • FAA Definition. An occurrence other than an accident that affects or could affect the safety of operations.

Launch incident - An unplanned event during the fl i ght of a launch vehicle , other than a launch accident, involving a malfunction ofa flight safety system or safety-critical system, or a fai lur e of the li censee's or pennittee's safety organization, design , or operations. ( 14 CFR 40 1.5.)

Reentry incident - Any unplanned event occ un-in g during the reentry of a reentry vehicle, other · th an a reentry accident, involving a malfunction of a reentry safety-critical system or failure of the li censee's or pem1ittee's safety organization, procedures, or operations. (14 CFR 40 1.5.)

19. Interoperability - The ability for each organization's SMS to be part of a larger SMS framework through interdependent processes and/or components with shared principles, infonnation, and governance.

20 .. Ju st Culture - An atmosphere in which regulated persons appreciate the value of se lf-disclosing both regulatory and non- regu latory safety issues. It allows for consideration of unintentional errors and creates a non-punitive environme nt , where errors are reported without fear of reprisal.

21. Launch Scnrices - Activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle and its payload for launch and the conduct of a l aunch.

22. Launch Site- The location on Earth from which a launch takes place (as defined in a li cense the Secretary issues or transfers under this chapter) and necessary facilities at that location. (14 CFR 401.5.)

A-3 06/28/17 8000.72 Appendix A 23. Launch Vehicle-A vehicle built to operate in , or plac e a payload in , outer space or a suborbital rocket. (14 CFR 401.5.)

24. Legal Enforcement Action -A means for addressing noncompliance when a person's conduct meets one or more of the criteria for legal enforcement action set fo11h in FAA Order 2150.3 or when compliance or administrative actions are not sufficient to address the noncompliance.

Examples oflegal enforcement action include certificate actions and assessment of civil penalties.

25. Letter of Correction - A letter issued by the FAA in connection with an administrative action confinning its decision in a matter when legal enforcement action is not required and stating the necessary corrective action that the alleged violator has taken or agrees to take. If the agreed corrective action is not fully completed, legal enforcement action may be taken. (14 CFR 13.l l(b)(2)) 26. Letter of Investigation - A document that serves the dual purpose of notifying an apparent violator that he/she/it is under investigation for a possible violation and providing an opportunity for the apparent violator to explain his or her version of the events.

27. Likelihood - The estimated probability or frequency , in quantitative or qualitative tenns, of a haz.ard's effect or outcome.

28. Mitigation - A means to reduce the risk of a hazard. See Safety Risk C ontrol. The tern,s Control, 1 \1itigation, and Safety Risk Control are used synonymously. This de finition does not apply to the tern, as used in the context of sanction mitigation in a legal enforcement action.

29. Monitoring - Tracking and keeping haz.ard infonnation und er systematic review.

30. Noncompliance - Conduct that is con t rary to a statute, regulation, or order issued under a statute or regulation.

31. Nonconformance- Non-fulfillment of an organization's requirements, policies, and procedures, as well as requirements of safety risk controls developed by the organi zation.

32. Oversight - A function perforn1ed by the FAA (or other regulator i.e. , in an international country) that assures that an aviation organization or designee complies with and uses safety-related standards, requirements, regulations, and associated procedures.

33. Performance - The accomplishment of a given task measured against preset known standards of accw-acy , completeness, and timeliness, which is then used to determine if the holder is managing risk and mitigating hazards.

34. Performance Assessment- Used to detennine if the certificate holder's or applicant's operating systems are producing the intended results, as well as to confirn1 the certificate holder's or applicant's risk assessment is occurring through its monitoring process and it is taking appropriate corrective action when needed. This includes mitigation or control of hazards and risks and the A-4 06/28/17 8000.72 Appendix A ability to detect latent, systemic failures that may occur over time or due to subtle environmental changes.

35. Performance-Based Standards - Requirements expressed in tem1s of outcomes rather than specifying the means to those ends.

36. Prescriptive Standards - Standards that specify methods for complying with safety requirements.

37 . Preventive Action - Preemptive action to eliminate or mitigate the potential cause or reduce the future effects of an identified unsafe condition or anticipated nonconfo,mity or other undesirable situation.

38. Procedure-A specific way to perform an activity or function that is documented and usually contains the purposes and scope of the activity or function: what is to be done and by whom; when, where, and how the activity or function is to be done; the materials, equipment, and documents to be used; and how the activity or function is to be controlled and recorded.

39. Process - A set of interrelated or interacting activities that transfo1ms inputs into outputs.

40. Product/Service Provider- An organization engaged in the delivery of aviation products or services.

41. Quality Assurance- The independent activity of providing the evidence needed to establish confidence, among all concerned, that the quality function is being perfom1ed effectively. This activity "assures quality" through independent evaluation of established processes, procedures, and documentation.

42. Quality Control - The determination of the quality of a product by inspection and testing to detem1ine compliance with standards. This activity "controls quality" through establishment of effective controls, documentation, and procedures within specific functional areas.

43. Reentry Site - The location on Earth where a reentry vehicle is intended to return. It includes the area within three standard deviations of the intended landing point (the predicted three-sigma footprint). (14 CFR 401.5.)

44. Reporting Culture - An important aspect of a positive safety culture that cultivates the willingness of every member to contribute to the organization's knowledge base.

45. Requirement - A mandatory attribute or characteristic of a system, directive, order, standard, regulation or procedure.

46. Risk- See Safety Risk. The tenns risk and safety risk are used synonymously.

47. Risk Based Decision Making (RBDM)- The use of consistent, data-info,med approaches to enable the FAA to make smarter, system-level, risk-based decisions. RBDM emphasizes the A-5 06/28/17 8000.72 Appendix A review of safety data to integrate risk into decision making processes; enabling informed decision making.

48. Risk Matrix - A table that allows for the identifica tio n of the risk tolerance level through the combination oflikelihood and severity.

49. Root Cause- The underlying cause of a systemic or recmTing noncompliance, usually identified through structured analysis.

50. Safety - The state in which the risk of ham1 to persons or property damage is acceptabl e.

51. Safety Ass urance- Processes within the SMS that function systematically to ens ure the performance and effectiveness of safety risk controls and that the organization meets or exceeds its safety o~jectives through the collection, ana l ysis, and assessment of in formation. (14 CFR 5.5.)

52. Safety Critical - Essential to safe perfom1ance or operation. A safety-critical system, subsystem, condition, event, operation, process, or item is one whose proper recognition, control, perfonnance, or tolerance is essential to system operation such that it does not jeopardize public safety.

53. Safety Culture - The shared values, actions, and behaviors that demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing goals and demands.

54. Safety Management System (SMS) - The fom1a l, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety 1isk. (14 CFR 5.5.)

55. Safety Objective - A measurable goal or desirable outcome related to safety. ( I4 CFR 5. 5.)

56. Safety Oversight - A function by which the FAA ensures effective implementation of the safety- related l aws, regulations, po li cies, and procedures. Safety oversight also ensures the national aviation in dustry provides a safety level equal to or better t han the acceptable level defined by the FAA.

57. Safety Performance - Realized or actual safety accomplishment relative to the organization's safety objectives. (14 CFR 5.5) 58. Safety Performance Target - A measurable goal used to verify the predict ed residual safety risk of a hazard.

59. Safety Policy.

• CFR D efi nition. The certificate hold er's documented commitment to safety, which defines its safety objectives and the accountabil iti es and responsibilities of its employees in regards to safety. (14 CFR 5.5) A -6 06/28/17 8000.72 Appendix A • FAA Safety Policy Definition. The documented commitment to safety of an FAA line of business or staff office, or an aviation service/ product provider, organization, or certificate holder , which defines its safety objectives and the accountabilities and responsibilities of its employees with regard to safety.

60. Safety Promotion - A combination of training and communication of safety infom1ation to support the implementation and operation of an SMS in an organization. (14 CFR 5.5.)

61. Safety Requirement - A safety condition or capability that must be met or passed by a system to satisfy a contract, standard, specification or other formally imposed document or need.

62. Safety Risk - The composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard.

63. Safety Risk Assessment- The first four steps of the SRM process (analyze the system, identify hazards, analyze safety risk, and assess safety risk).

64. Safety Risk Control -A means to reduce or eliminate the effects of hazards. The terms Control , Mitigation , and Safety Risk Control are used synonymously.

65. Safety Risk Management - A process within the SMS composed of describing the system , identifying the hazards , and analyzing, assessing, and controlling risk. (14 CFR 5.5) 66. Safety Target- The concrete objectives of the level of safety, e.g. , a) reduction in fatal airline accidents; b) reduction in se1ious incidents; c) reduction in runway excursion events; d) reduction in ground collision events; and e) the number of inspections completed quruterly.

67. Severity- The consequence or impact of a hazard 's effect or outcome in te1111s of degree of Joss or harm.

68. Stakeholder- A group or individual that is affected by or is in some way accountable for the outcome of an undertaking; an interested party having a right , share, or claim in a product or service, or in its success in possessing qualities that meet that party 's needs and/or expectations.

69. State Safety Oversight - A function by means of which States ensure effective implementation of the safety-related Standards and Recommended Practices and associated procedures contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and related ICAO documents.

70. State Safety Program (SSP)- An integrated set of regulations and activities established by a State aimed at improving safety.

71. Surveillance- The act of closely observing, evaluating, and assessing the effectiveness of an organjzation in a systematic way to verity compliance with regulations; and operation in accordance with its processes.

A-7 8000.72 06/28/17 Appendix A 72. System - An integrated set of constituent elem e nts that are combined in an operational or support environment to accomplish a defined objective. These ele. ments include people, hardware, software, fim1ware , infonnation, procedures, facilities , services and other suppo1t fac e ts.

73. System Safety - The application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize all aspects of safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time , and cost throughout all phases of the system litecycle.

74. Taxonomy - A standard industry language and set of definitions that improve the quality of infonnat ion and communication within the aviation community.

75. Unmanned Aircraft - An aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.

76. Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) - An unmanned aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for the pilot in conm1and to operate safely and efficiently in the national airspace system. (Public Law 112-95 , §331) 77. Unsafe Behavior- Conduct that is more likely to lead to incidents or accidents.

78. Validation - The process of proving the functions, procedures, controls, and safety standards are correct and the right system is being built (that is , the requirements are unambiguous, correct, complete, and verifiable).

79. Verification - The process that ensures that the system requirements have been met by the design solution and the system is ready to be used in the operational environment for which it is int e nded.

80. Violation - Conduct that is contrary to a statute, regulation or order issued under a statute or regulation.

81. Voluntary Safety Programs - Program(s) that are documented in policy, Orders, and/or Advisory Circulars for which the FAA may issue an order designating voluntarily submitted safety infom1ation as protected from disclosure in accordance with 14 CFR Part 193. Under such programs, regulated persons voluntarily report apparent regulatory violations and satety concerns and generally implement corrective action to the satisfaction of the FAA.

82. Warning Notice - A letter or fo1m addressed to the apparent violator in connection with an administrative action that brings to that person's attention the facts and circumstances of the incident. The warning notice advises that, based on available infonnation, the apparent violator's action or inaction appears to be contrary to the regulations, but does not warrant legal enforcement action. It also requests future immediate compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.

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