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AAIB Bulletin: 8/2007

Cessna Citation X · Other Documents

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Overview

This document is an AAIB (Air Accidents Investigation Branch) bulletin detailing an incident involving the Cessna 750 Citation X, registration G-CDCX. The report outlines the circumstances surrounding a hydraulic system failure during a flight from Newcastle to Luton Airport on September 20, 2006. The bulletin is intended for aviation professionals, including pilots and maintenance personnel, providing insights into the incident's causes and implications for safety. It discusses the operational challenges faced by the crew due to the hydraulic failure, the subsequent investigation findings, and the technical details of the hydraulic systems involved. The report emphasizes the importance of regular maintenance and the need for thorough checks of hydraulic components to prevent similar incidents in the future.

  • The Cessna 750 Citation X experienced a hydraulic system failure during a flight on September 20, 2006.
  • Hydraulic System A lost fluid, affecting landing gear and nosewheel steering operations.
  • The crew managed to land safely despite the hydraulic failure, with no injuries or damage to the aircraft.
  • The investigation identified a pressure hose failure and a defective O-ring as the primary causes of the hydraulic fluid loss.
  • Regular maintenance and checks of hydraulic systems are crucial to prevent similar incidents.

Document

Source

Originally published by assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. Sprinkle hosts a reference copy with an added summary, specifications and searchable full text.

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Document details

Type
Other Documents
Year
2007
Pages
3
File size
252 KB
Publisher
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
Documentation completeness
3/7

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In this document

Incident Overview

On September 20, 2006, the Cessna 750 Citation X experienced a hydraulic system failure during a flight. As the aircraft reached cruising altitude, the crew received a caution alert for Hydraulic System A, which subsequently lost fluid. The crew decided to continue to Luton Airport, recalculating their landing distance requirements. Upon landing, the aircraft's nosewheel steering became ineffective, causing it to drift off the runway but ultimately resulting in no damage.

Hydraulic System Description

The Cessna 750 is equipped with two independent hydraulic systems, A and B, powered by engine-driven pumps. System A is responsible for landing gear, wheel brakes, and nosewheel steering. A Power Transfer Unit (PTU) provides backup for System A, while an emergency electric pump can pressurize it if both the left engine pump and PTU fail. The report details the operation of these systems and the implications of their failure.

Investigation Findings

The investigation revealed two failures in Hydraulic System A: a pressure hose failure and a defective O-ring seal. The pressure hose was found to have been exposed to high temperatures, leading to its failure. The O-ring was damaged, contributing to fluid loss. The report discusses the implications of these failures and the importance of regular maintenance checks.

Conclusions

The report concludes that the loss of hydraulic fluid was primarily due to the pressure hose failure and the damaged O-ring. It emphasizes that the thermal damage to the hose likely resulted from prolonged operation under low fluid conditions. No further safety recommendations were deemed necessary as similar failures had not been reported.

Safety notes

  • Failure of hydraulic systems can lead to critical operational challenges during flight and landing.
  • Regular inspection of hydraulic components is essential to ensure safety and reliability.

Full document text

0 © Crown copyrght 2007 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2007 G-CDCX EW/C2006/09/20 INCIDENT Aircraft Type and Registration: Cessna 750 Citation X, G-CDCX No & Type of Engines: 2 Rolls-Royce AE 007C turbofan engnes Year of Manufacture: 2002 Date & Time (UTC): 20 September 2006 at 1740 hrs Location: Luton Arport, Bedfordshre Type of Flight: Commercial Air Transport (Passenger) Persons on Board: Crew - 2 Passengers - None Injuries: Crew - None Passengers - N/A Nature of Damage: None Commander’s Licence: Ar Transport Plot’s Lcence Commander’s Age: N/K Commander’s Flying Experience: 8,500 hours (of whch 00 were on type) Last 90 days - 20 hours Last 28 days - 0 hours Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted and AAIB investigation of failed components Synopsis As the aircraft reached its cruising altitude, the fluid contents of Hydraulic System A were lost. The crew recalculated the dstance requred for a landng wth ths falure, and decded to contnue to ther planned destnaton, Luton Arport. As the arcraft slowed down after touchdown, nosewheel steering became ineffective and the arcraft drfted to the left of the runway. The aircraft came to a halt with its nosewheel in the grass at the edge of the paved surface. The aircraft was undamaged. Two defects were identified in the hydraulic system. One of these, a pressure hose falure, had probably been damaged on a previous flight. History of the flight As the aircraft reached cruising altitude, on a flight from Newcastle to Luton Airport, the master caution light illuminated, together with a ‘LOW FLUID’ cauton for Hydraulic System A. The crew observed the hydraulic fluid level decreasing on the flightdeck display and, shortly afterwards, the A system Power Transfer Unit (PTU) failed. They completed the non-normal checklist for this problem, which included tripping the PTU circuit breaker. After declarng a ‘PAN’, the crew recalculated their landing distance requirements and decided to continue to Luton. The loss of Hydraulic System A dsabled the left engne thrust reverser and requred the landing gear to be deployed using the emergency system. It also meant that emergency braking and nosewheel steering systems would have to be used on landing.  © Crown copyrght 2007 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2007 G-CDCX EW/C2006/09/20 The touchdown was uneventful and, as the arcraft decelerated through 70 kt, nosewheel steerng was required to maintain the runway heading. After it had slowed further, nosewheel steerng proved neffectve and the arcraft began to drft to the left edge of the runway. It came to rest with the nosewheel on the grass to the side of the runway but with both main wheel on the paved surface. The crew were unnjured and the aircraft was undamaged. The aircraft was recovered from the runway and towed to a maintenance hangar for investigation and rectification. Hydraulic system description The Cessna 750 s equpped wth two ndependent hydraulic systems; each is powered by an engine driven pump (EDP). Power for System A is provided by the pump on the left engine and for System B by the pump on the right engine. Both systems provide power for the primary flight controls. System A provides the only power for the landng gear actuators, wheel brakes, nosewheel steering system, the inboard speed brakes and the outboard roll spolers. In order to provde a secondary power supply in the event of an EDP failure, Hydraulic System A is fitted with a PTU, which is essentially a hydraulic pump driven by pressure from System B. The PTU operates automatically when a drop in system pressure is detected and is fitted with a flow limiter. This prevents an excessive drop in pressure in System B in the event of a fluid leak in System A. In addition, an emergency electric pump pressurises System A should both the left engine EDP and the PTU fail. In the event of a complete failure of System A, landing gear deployment and emergency braking is provided by a pneumatic source, and nosewheel steering by a hydraulic accumulator. Two valves are fitted in the nosewheel steering system, which allow the system to become pressurised; a blocking (or sequence) valve and a steering shutoff valve. The blocking valve remains closed until it receives a signal from either of the main landng gear squat swtches, and the steerng shut off valve remains closed until the nose landing gear squat swtch s actvated. Should ether of these two valves fail to open, the nosewheel steering system remains noperatve. Aircraft examination Initial examination of the aircraft revealed that two failures were present in Hydraulic System A which had led to the loss of its hydraulic fluid. A pressure hose connecting the PTU to the system had failed, and a leak was present between a ppe unon and the hydraulc manifold. After the union had been disassembled, an O-rng seal wthn the unon was found to be defectve. Following replacement of the affected parts, tests were carried out on the nosewheel steering system and landng gear squat swtches. These revealed that the operatng solenod wthn the blocker valve was operating intermittently; however, no abnormalities had been reported during routine testing of the system, or by the flight crew, prior to this incident. The valve was removed and, together with the O-ring and the failed pipe, dispatched to the AAIB for detailed examination. Examination of the O-ring revealed signs of mechanical damage to its outer edge, which were indicative of it havng been ‘pnched’ durng nstallaton. There was also evdence of eroson of the edge of the seal face, which appeared to have been produced by a mechanical process; no evidence of any chemical erosion was identified during this examination. It was not possible to determine when the damage to the seal occurred. Footnote  The avalable evdence ndcated that falures of ths valve are

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uncommon and any reported failures are thoroughly investigated by the manufacturer. 2 © Crown copyrght 2007 AAIB Bulletin: 8/2007 G-CDCX EW/C2006/09/20 The failed hydraulic hose, Part Number AE092H052, was surrounded by a woven thermal sheath, which was in turn covered by a woven fibre protective outer sheath. The outer sheath had melted in five places along its length, exposing the thermal layer, which was discoloured. In one area, adjacent to the hose end fitting used to attach it to the pressure outlet of the PTU, the thermal layer had been ‘blown’ outwards; the hose had faled at this point. The damage observed was consistent with the hose having been exposed to abnormally high temperatures; there was no evidence of thermal distress to other components in close proximity. The aircraft’s maintenance organisation stated that, prior to this event, Hydraulic System A had suffered a leak, unrelated to the defects descrbed above, whlst the aircraft was in the descent phase of a flight. Due to a high cockpit workload, the flight crew had not tripped the crcut breaker for the PTU pror to landng, so t had remained running for some time before being shut down. They also stated that operaton of the PTU wth low fluid levels would have resulted in an increase in the temperature of the remaining fluid, and hence the PTU tself. Conclusions The failure of the emergency nosewheel steering was the result of an intermittent failure of the steering blocker valve solenoid. The loss of hydraulic fluid from System A was caused by the falure of the pressure hose connected to the PTU, and a damaged O-ring seal in a union associated with the hydraulic manifold. The failure of the O-ring, in isolation, was likely to have resulted in some loss of hydraulic fluid but it was considered unlikely that the rapid fluid loss witnessed by the flight crew would have resulted solely from this defect. The thermal damage to the PTU pressure hose ndcated that t had been subject to temperatures beyond its normal range of operation. This would have affected its ability to withstand its normal operating loads. It was possible that the heat damage associated with the failure may have occurred during the incident flight, but it was considered more likely that the prolonged operation of the PTU during the previous fluid leak event resulted in thermal distress to the hose. This went undetected and probably led to ts falure on ths flight. No other failures of this nature have been reported and therefore no safety recommendations are considered necessary by the AAIB at this time.