Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency

11 Conclusion: Ten Propositions on the Defense of Air Bases 339 Shannon W. Caudill and Christopher L. Corley Afterword 367 Dr. William T. Dean III Abbreviations 373 Bibliography 381 Index 411 vii Illustrations Figures 1.1 Distributed area defense doctrine 17 2.1 Airfield attack objectives, 1940–1992 52 2.2 Air base attack tactics, 1940–1992 52 2.3 Standoff weapon footprints 56 2.4 RAF Regiment field squadron organization 75 2.5 Objektschutzregiment der Luftwaffe organization 79 2.6 RAAF airfield defense squadron organization 82 4.1 Comparison of attacks on Joint Base Balad to those on all US air bases in the Vietnam theater 203 5.1 JBB with named areas of interest depicted around the installation 222 5.2 332nd ESFG organizational chart 223 5.3 Number of rounds fired per attack in Vietnam 232 5.4 Number of rounds fired per attack at JBB 232 5.5 Median monthly attacks and attack intervals 235 on Joint Base Balad 5.6 Increasing insurgent miss distance as captured by the warning system 235 5.7 Power law (number=450*[days]-1.087) of deterred attack intervals 237 5.8 Medians give stable attack interval trends, and averages give increasing errors of attack intervals 238 viii CONTENTS 6.1 Emerging joint nonlinear battlefield 250 6.2 Notional base boundary 251 6.3 Notional area of interest and base boundary 252 6.4 Typical BDOC organization 253 6.5 Proposed Air Force battle stations 256 8.1 JBB COIN synchronization structure 294 8.2 332nd AEW organization structure 295 Tables 2.1 Deployable air force platforms and support elements 49 2.2 Typical standoff weapons 54 2.3 Nonstate groups with MANPADS, 1996–2001 55 2.4 AIRCOM risk severity map for FY 06/07 57 2.5 Relative size of allied air force ground-defense forces 99 ix Foreword This century will be characterized by a volatile international po- litical environment, persistent conflict, and internal strife. Regional tensions will continue to create uncertainty, resulting in political dy- namics ripe for civil war, political upheaval, sectarian violence, and insurgency. This is the environment in which we will conduct air op- erations for decades to come; as such, leaders will have to understand the complexity of the situation and how best to influence the battle- space adjacent to air bases. To prepare for future contingencies and enable air operations, the Air Force must grow new air base defense leaders and build capabili- ties that rapidly adapt to crises, especially in an ever-evolving, asym- metric operational environment. There are three components to im- proving base defense operations in such uncertain circumstances. First, we must develop leaders who understand and are competent in the craft of base defense in varying environments. Second, we must invest in innovative and rapidly deployable base defense assets and technologies that are also adaptable to the changing operational envi- ronment. And third, we must advocate integrated defense concepts to all Airmen and joint/coalition personnel. Producing leaders who can create and lead “learning” organiza- tions capable of adapting to the dynamics of a constantly changing irregular warfare environment is critical to enable airpower in fu- ture contingencies. This requires mentorship of subordinates, self- development through studying counterinsurgency (COIN) and other publications on irregular warfare, and creating an environment of trust and smart risk-taking up and down the chain of command. As I write this, we are still fully involved in finishing important work in Afghanistan. We must invest our time in creating leaders at all levels that are not only tactically proficient but also judicious and intelligent in restraining the application of combat power in order to gain and maintain trust with the local populations surrounding American and allied air bases. In addition to cultivating smart, adaptable leaders, we also need to develop competent tactical leaders capable of defending air bases in these uncertain environments. Small-unit leadership has been and will continue to be the cornerstone of tactical effectiveness. Future Airmen must be challenged early in their careers during diverse training scenarios to mature and to learn the basics of traditional x FOREWORD combat base defense operations, while supporting complex situations such as those presented in stability and support missions. As case studies in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have shown, tac- tical leadership frequently determines the outcomes of air base ground attacks, as well as directly impacting and deterring indirect attacks on air assets. Confident and competent tactical leadership is the prereq- uisite for disciplined COIN tactics and traditional air base defense-in- depth concepts. Improving the intuitive capabilities of Airmen by stressing them under realistic combat scenarios will continue to be critical to the creation of agile and rapid decentralized decision mak- ers in combat. Gen Wilbur Creech, former Tactical Air Command commander once commented, “The number one job of a leader is to grow more leaders.” This could not be truer in creating combat-ready tactical leaders for the air base defense fight of the future. The Air Force recognizes that each operating environment pres- ents unique security challenges. Realizing that no single solution set or doctrine will fit all circumstances requires that we leverage tech- nology and other security advancements to aid in the overall base defense scheme. The integrated defense (ID) approach allows com- manders to choose from a wide array of defense options and tools to maintain proper installation security and asset force protection in this stressed environment. Key to this effort are thinking outside the box, challenging outdated assumptions, using technological security advances where applicable, and tailoring ID to the defense needs of the operational environment. Finally, the Air Force has made great strides to create a more capability- and effects-based approach to security through the ID concept. The Joint Base Balad case study contained in this book shows that ID tenets create a truly adaptable and dynamic base de- fense force that can benefit air operations and the joint community. Much remains to be done to ensure all Airmen and base personnel play a role in ID. To achieve synergistic base defense, there must be a personal investment, supported by good ID plans, that integrates all personnel and assets into a base defense scheme. It is also essential that we partner with and energize host-nation security forces and/or local law enforcement as part of ID plans with particular emphasis on detection and response outside the base. This requires a full commit- ment to supporting the rule-of-law approach as part of existing status of forces agreements and established rules of engagement. As demon- strated in Iraq, it is equally critical to be fully joined with the ground xi FOREWORD forces commander who operates in the indirect fire belt around the air base to fully synchronize base defense efforts and COIN plans. In summary, I am thrilled that Air University Press has invested in this anthology that adds to the history of base defense and provides guideposts to future leaders charged with defending air operations in complex environments. As Airmen, we must reflect upon and debate the important issues addressed in this volume. Our duty as leaders is to build upon the lessons learned from recent conflicts in order to lay a solid foundation for the future, so that the Air Force and our joint partners can deploy airpower anywhere on the globe from a secure air base. Allen J. Jamerson Brigadier General, USAF xiii About the Authors Col David P. Briar, USAF, (BS, United States Air Force Academy; MS, Troy University; certificate of homeland security, Canyon Col- lege) is the Integration Division chief for the director of security and special program oversight, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Prior to his current assignment, he was the chief of antiterrorism and critical infrastructure protection for United States Forces Korea. He has served in a variety of operational and staff positions including multiple squadron commands, six overseas assignments, and two combat tours in Iraq. Colonel Briar is board-certified by the Ameri- can Society for Industrial Security International as a protection pro- fessional. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, US Army Command and General Staff College, and the Air War College. Lt Col John M. Busch, USAF, (BS, University of Michigan; MS, University of Kansas) is chief of the Threat and Intelligence Doctrine Branch, Force Protection and Operations Division, Directorate of Se- curity Forces and Force Protection, Headquarters US Air Force, Pen- tagon, Washington, DC. A member of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), he is a veteran counterintelligence and spe- cial investigations officer who has held a variety of command and staff positions, including AFOSI detachment commander, director of staff, operations officer, and Air Staff officer. Colonel Busch also served as task force counterintelligence coordinator for Combined Joint Task Force 7 and Multinational Force–Iraq in Baghdad, respon- sible for all counterintelligence activities supporting operations and force protection. Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF, (BS, Norwich University; MSA, Central Michigan University; MMS, Marine Corps University; MSS, Air University) is the director of support at the Jeanne M. Holm Cen- ter for Officer Accessions and Citizen Development. He is a former Air War College instructor and deputy chairman, Department of Leadership and Strategy, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Prior to his current assignment at Maxwell AFB, he was commander of the 532nd Expeditionary Security Forces Squad- ron, Joint Base Balad, Iraq, where he was responsible for counter– indirect fire and counterinsurgency patrols and the installation’s en- try control points. As a career Air Force security forces officer, he has worked at the unit, major command, and Joint Staff levels; com- manded three security forces squadrons; served in four overseas as- xiv ABOUT THE AUTHORS signments; and accumulated 18 months of combat experience in Iraq. Colonel Caudill has written numerous white papers and articles on terrorism, interagency leadership, base defense, and law enforce- ment, which have been published in Air and Space Power Journal, Joint Force Quarterly, American Diplomacy, and The Guardian—the Joint Staff ’s antiterrorism publication. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Joint Forces Staff College, and Air War College’s Grand Strategy Program. Lt Col Christopher L. Corley, USAF, (BA, Texas A&M Univer- sity; MS, Central Michigan University; MA, Naval Postgraduate School) is a deputy course director in the Department of Leadership and Strategy, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala- bama. Prior to his current assignment, he served as the executive of- ficer to the director of security forces, Pentagon, Washington, DC. As a career Air Force security forces officer, he has worked at the unit, numbered air force, major command, Headquarters United States Air Force, and Joint Staff levels; commanded two security forces squadrons; served in three overseas assignments; and accumulated 12 months of combat experience in Afghanistan. Colonel Corley is best known for his work on the financing methods of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, published in Financing Terrorism: Case Stud- ies by Michael Freeman. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. William T. Dean III (BA, University of the South; MA, Uni- versity of Chicago; PhD, University of Chicago) is an associate profes- sor of comparative military studies at Air University’s Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Dr. Dean has served on the Air Command and Staff College faculty since 1999. During this pe- riod, he has held the positions of chief of publications, director of Small Wars Lecture Series, director of publications and research, and assistant professor of comparative military studies. Since 2005 he has also served as an adjunct faculty member at Joint Special Operations University and the USAF Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida, where he teaches courses ranging from counterinsur- gency to cross-cultural communications. Dr. Dean served on a USAF team that evaluated the effectiveness of foreign internal defense ef- forts in Iraq in 2011. Dr. Dean has also taught at Troy State University, Lyndon State College, and Norwich University. He is widely published on the topics of insurgency, small wars, and the history of warfare. xv ABOUT THE AUTHORS Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes, USAF, retired, (BA, David Lipscomb College; MA, Georgia State University) was formerly director, Inter- Agency Task Force, Center for Special Operations, Headquarters US Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Florida, and a former director of security forces and force protection, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School; Air Command and Staff College; Armed Forces Staff College; Air War College; the International Conflict Resolution Course, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; the Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; and the Funda- mentals of Negotiation, The Negotiation Project, Harvard University. The general is a master parachutist and military freefall parachutist. General Holmes retired from active duty on 1 September 2009. Maj Benjamin R. Jacobson, USAF, (BS, University of Idaho; MBA with criminal justice emphasis, Touro University; MMOAS, Air Command and Staff College) is the commander of the 42nd Security Forces Squadron and former deputy course director, Air, Space, and Cyber Power Studies Course, Department of Leadership and Strat- egy, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Prior to his current assignment, he was commander of the 96th Ground Combat Training Squadron, Eglin AFB, Florida. As a career Air Force security forces officer, he has worked at the unit, wing, and major command levels and served in two overseas assignments. He is a graduate of the Aerospace Basic Course, Squadron Officer School, and Air Command and Staff College. Brig Gen Allen J. Jamerson, USAF, (BA, University of North Car- olina at Pembroke; BS, University of North Carolina at Pembroke; MA, Webster University; MA, US Army War College) is director of security forces, deputy chief of staff for logistics, installations, and mission support, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. He is the focal point for ensuring the physical security of Air Force nuclear assets and planning and programming for more than 39,000 active duty and reserve component security forces at locations worldwide. He provides policy and oversight for protecting Air Force resources from terrorism, criminal acts, sabotage, and acts of war and ensures security forces are trained, equipped, and ready to support contin- gency and exercise plans. He graduated from the US Army War Col- lege, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 2003, followed by an assign- ment as deputy director of security for the National Reconnaissance xvi ABOUT THE AUTHORS Office, Chantilly, Virginia. He also commanded the 90th Security Forces Group at Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, served as vice commander of the 42nd Air Base Wing, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and commanded the 72nd Air Base Wing at Tinker, AFB, Oklahoma. Col Paul J. Kasuda, USAF, (BS, United States Air Force Academy; MA, Webster University; MS, Air University) is the commander, 820th Base Defense Group, at Moody AFB, Georgia. He is the former chief, Operations Division, Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center, Lackland AFB, Texas. He deployed in 2010 to Joint Base Balad, Iraq, where he served as deputy group commander, 332nd Expedi- tionary Security Forces Group, which constituted the largest US secu- rity forces group deployed in combat since the Vietnam conflict. Composed of more than 1,500 personnel from the US Air Force, US Navy, US Army, and Ugandan Special Security Consultants, the group was responsible for the integrated defense of Joint Base Balad to in- clude both inside and outside the wire security operations. He previ- ously commanded USAF security forces squadrons at Sheppard AFB, Texas; Hickam AFB, Hawaii; and Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea. He is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College. Col Bryan Keeling, USAF, (BS, Auburn University; MS, Lesley University) is the vice commander, Air Force Office of Special Inves- tigations, 4th Field Investigations Region. Prior to his current assign- ment, he was the deputy director of special investigations, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General. As a career special agent in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, he has held a variety of command and staff positions including detachment and squadron commander, as well as Air Staff and Joint Staff assignments. He served on the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force during 9/11 and com- pleted three combat tours (30 months) in the Middle East. He led various operations and served in numerous task forces designed to disrupt and stop al-Qaeda and hostile intelligence services. He served as the last director of counterintelligence for US Forces–Iraq. Col Joseph A. “Joe” Milner, USAF, (BS, US Air Force Academy; MS, University of South Carolina; MA, Air University; National De- fense Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses) is the Operations Divi- sion chief, HQ Security Forces Center, San Antonio, Texas. He leads more than 70 personnel, developing force protection programs and policies to execute the missions of nonnuclear weapon system secu- rity, physical and information security, integrated base defense, com- bat arms, law enforcement, antiterrorism, and resource protection for the Air Force. In 2010 Colonel Milner was selected for an Air Force xvii ABOUT THE AUTHORS Fellows program in which he wrote an analysis of base defense effec- tiveness at Joint Base Balad, Iraq. As a career security forces officer, he has served at the unit, major command, and Air Staff levels and has led at the squadron commander and deputy group commander lev- els. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College and a recipient of the Institute for Defense Analyses National Defense Fellowship. Col Anthony M. Packard, USAF, (BS, USAFA; MA, US Naval Postgraduate School) is the deputy training director, National Secu- rity Agency/Central Security Service. In 2009–10 he deployed to Iraq to serve as the officer in charge of the joint intelligence support ele- ment, Joint Base Balad, Iraq. In this latter role, he advised the defense force commander on ground-based threats to the installation and provided threat warning and intelligence overwatch to members op- erating outside the wire in the base security zone. Colonel Packard is a career intelligence officer who previously commanded the 451st In- telligence Squadron, Royal Air Force Menwith Hill, United Kingdom. He has held staff positions at Headquarters Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, and the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais- sance Agency. Colonel Packard is a distinguished graduate of both Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, and he has completed a fellowship with RAND’s Project Air Force. Col Gregory J. Reese, USAF, (BS, USAFA; MS, University of South Carolina; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology) is commander of the 37th Training Group, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. He is re- sponsible for professional and technical training for more than 39,000 military and civilians in the armed forces, international community, and other federal agencies. Training subjects include security forces, combat arms, recruiting, cryptographic equipment maintenance, services, tempest, safety, logistics, contracting, pararescue, combat controller, Tactical Air Control Party, and the enlisted aircrew under- graduate course. He has served in numerous installation, training, and staff assignments in the security forces career field. Previous as- signments include commander, 332nd Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron, Balad Air Base, Iraq; security forces staff, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia; Air Mobility Warfare Center, Fort Dix, New Jersey; and chief of air base defense and police service policy, Headquarters USAF, Pentagon, Washington, DC, where he developed new air base defense concepts and doctrine. Col- onel Reese is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Na- tional War College. xviii ABOUT THE AUTHORS Col Erik K. Rundquist, USAF, (BS, USAFA; MMAS, Army Com- mand and General Staff College; MSSC, Syracuse University; Na- tional Defense Fellow, Boston University) is chief of security forces, Headquarters, Air Combat Command. In this position, he is respon- sible for security, law enforcement, antiterrorism, force protection, and integrated defense across the command. He is tasked with orga- nizing, training, equipping, and maintaining combat-ready units to support 1,200 aircraft, 24 wings, 14 bases, and over 200 operating locations worldwide protecting 105,000 personnel. He has served in various duty positions including group commander, squadron com- mander, MAJCOM division chief, and joint staff officer. As the for- mer commander, 455th Expeditionary Mission Support Group, and commander, Task Force 1/455 at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, he led over 1,500 personnel—operating and defending the Department of Defense’s strategic air hub into Afghanistan—and was the battle- space owner for Parwan Province. His other contingency experi- ences include the United Nations Protection Force in the Balkans, Operations Allied Force and Shining Hope in Albania and Kosovo, Determined Response (USS Cole) in Yemen, Enduring Freedom in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan, and Iraqi Freedom, where he led his squadron in an operational combat jump into Bashur, Iraq, while at- tached to the 173rd Airborne Brigade. He deployed again to Tallil, Iraq, as the defense force commander for the 407th Air Expedition- ary Group and 22nd Corps Support Group and as the J7 director to the Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component Command at Balad, Iraq, and Bagram, Afghanistan. Lt Col Robert D. Sagraves, USAF, (BS, United States Air Force Academy; MMOAS, Air University; MAAS, Air University) is the deputy chief of the Air Force Readiness Division, Directorate of Op- erations, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. He is the for- mer deputy commander of the 1st Special Operations Mission Sup- port Group, 1st Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida. He is also the former commander of the 14th Weapons Squadron, US Air Force Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nevada, where he was re- sponsible for leading weapons instructors in the AC-130 and MC- 130 weapons instructor courses to provide graduate-level advanced flying and tactics training in the AC-130H/U and MC-130H/P. He has held numerous operational flying and staff positions at the squad- ron, group, and Headquarters Air Force level with operational expe- rience in the Middle East, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, Korea, and the Horn of Africa. He previously served as the chief of the Irregular xix ABOUT THE AUTHORS Warfare Branch, Directorate of Strategic Planning, Headquarters US Air Force, Pentagon, Washington, DC, and as initial cadre weapons instructor and assistant operations officer for the AC-130 Weapons Instructor Course. Colonel Sagraves is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, and the US Army War College. Brig Gen Bradley D. Spacy, USAF, (BA, Fresno State University; MS, University of Southern Mississippi) is the director of logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Headquarters US Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, Ramstein Air Base, Germany. He pro- vides direction and guidance to more than 23,000 personnel assigned to 81 locations supporting the integrated defense of 255 aircraft, more than 10,000 vehicles, more than 58 million square feet of facility space, approximately 25,000 acres of real property, and the com- mand’s $1.3 billion services portfolio. He also serves as the Air Force’s A4/7, providing operational logistics and installation support to both European Command and Africa Command. The general has a staff of 356 people, and he advocates and supports a command installations and logistics budget of approximately $5 billion. A career security forces officer with extensive experience in air base defense and antiterrorism/force protection, General Spacy pre- viously served as commander of the 47th Security Forces Squadron, Laughlin AFB, Texas. He also served as director of force protection for US Central Command Air Forces Forward in support of Opera- tions Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, during which he cre- ated, planned, and participated in Operation Desert Safeside/Task Force 1041 (an offensive combat operation to kill or capture insur- gent forces attacking Balad Air Base, Iraq). Additionally, he served as chief of the Force Protection and Operations Division, Directorate of Security Forces, Headquarters US Air Force, Pentagon, Washington, DC. General Spacy also commanded the US Air Force Honor Guard, leading 250 men and women in over 6,000 Air Force and joint service ceremonies for the president, secretary of defense, chief of staff of the Air Force, and other high-level military and civilian leaders. More- over, General Spacy was the 375th Mission Support Group com- mander, Scott AFB, Illinois; the 88th Air Base Wing and Installation commander at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; and the 81st Training Wing commander at Keesler AFB, Mississippi. General Spacy also served as the chief, Senate Liaison Office, United States Senate, Office of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Penta- gon, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. General Spacy is xx ABOUT THE AUTHORS a graduate of Squadron Officer School, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Joint Forces Staff College and was a senior ex- ecutive fellow at Harvard University. Lt Col Raymund M. Tembreull, USAF, (BS, University of Michi- gan; MA, American Military University) is chief of the Weapon Sys- tem Security Branch, Force Protection and Operations Division, Di- rectorate of Security Forces, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. From October 2009 to April 2010, he was deployed as the direc- tor of operations for the 332nd Expeditionary Security Forces Group, Joint Base Balad, Iraq. He has also served at the unit and major com- mand levels. Colonel Tembreull is a three-time squadron commander, having commanded the 15th Security Forces Squadron, Hickam AFB, Hawaii; the 741st Missile Security Forces Squadron, Malmstrom AFB, Montana; and the 36th Security Forces Squadron (36th SFS), Ander- sen AFB, Guam. During his first command with the 36th SFS, he developed a revolutionary integrated base defense concept that was adopted as the command standard in Pacific Air Forces and bench- marked by the Air Staff as the base-level implementation model. He has focused on security improvement his entire career, refining his academic body of knowledge by pursuing unique professional devel- opment opportunities, including the FBI National Academy and the Air Force National Lab Technical Fellowship at Sandia National Lab. Lt Col Paul M. Thobo-Carlsen, Canadian Forces, (BA, University of Manitoba; MDS, Royal Military College of Canada) is the Air Force Provost Marshal. Prior to his current assignment, he was command- ing officer of the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit. As a career military police officer, he has worked at the unit and headquarters levels, commanded two air base military police (MP) units, commanded a subunit of the Special Investigation Unit, served at the Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security, and served on exchange with USAF Security Forces (HQ Air Combat Com- mand). He has deployed three times, once in command of a multi- national United Nations MP platoon in the former Republic of Yugo- slavia, once as a counterintelligence officer during Operation Desert Storm, and once as a joint MP company commander during Opera- tion Enduring Freedom. He is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Staff School, Air Force Staff Course, Joint Air Operations Staff Course, and the Canadian Forces College (Joint Command and Staff Program and Canadian Security Studies Program). xxi Acknowledgments This book is the product of many authors and influences. I have simply been the conduit for discovering, synthesizing, and shaping important material that has been hidden away in military academia or buried through overclassification in military lessons-learned chan- nels. I thank the authors for their enthusiastic support and patience with my editing process. I am not a perfect servant in this effort: any errors contained within are mine, not theirs. I am deeply apprecia- tive of the support and encouragement I received from Dr. Dan Mortensen, dean of Air Force Research Institute (AFRI). Over the course of a year and a half, Dr. Mortensen was generous with his time and advice as I labored to mature a manuscript on the subjects of base defense and counterinsurgency. I also thank my editor, Dr. Ernest Rockwell, for his dedication to this project, his honest and direct feedback, and his hard work in improving it for publication. Many thanks to the AFRI team for their patient work on this project, espe- cially Demorah Hayes, Oreste “O. J.” Johnson, Sandi Davis, Vivian O’Neal, Daniel Armstrong, and so many others. This book provides a unique opportunity to publish on a subject that is relevant and im- portant to the protection of air operations and contributes to the study of these subjects for the benefit of future Airmen and joint part- ners. I have to thank a number of senior leaders for their mentorship and support through the years. After our time on the Joint Staff, my former boss, Maj Gen Peter Aylward, US Army, retired, and I found ourselves in Iraq in 2010, and he was kind enough to fly up to Joint Base Balad to have breakfast with me on two occasions for some good chats about the war, baseball, and life. During this time, with General Aylward’s support and advocacy, I began writing for publication. Prior to the Joint Staff, I was first inspired to examine warfare through a more analytical light by my former boss at Air Combat Command, Maj Gen Mary Kay Hertog, USAF, retired. It was at ACC that I first rekindled my writing and analytical habits, learning much from the questions General Hertog asked and her keen sense of deliberation on difficult issues. Many thanks to Brig Gen Jimmy McMillian, USAF, retired, who advocated to Air University (AU) Press about the need to publish on this topic. I am appreciative to Brig Gen Allen J. Jamer- son, director of security forces, for the commitment of time in writ- ing the foreword of this book. The push notes and encouragement of xxii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS these general officers made a difference with AU Press, and I am in- debted to them for their support for this project. I have many colleagues to thank at Air University for their encour- agement and insights, especially at Air Command and Staff College, where I spent two years on the faculty. Thanks go to Dr. Paul Springer for critiquing my book proposal and making many important sug- gestions for its improvement. Maj Ben Jacobson, a fellow security forces officer on the faculty, helped me tremendously by converting research papers from PDF files to Word documents. Many thanks to Dr. John T. LaSaine, former chairman of the Department of Leader- ship and Strategy, for his encouraging words and the gift of time to work on this book. Dr. William Dean III has been a mentor and friend. He is truly an expert on irregular warfare and generously agreed to write the afterword to this work. My thanks also to the for- mer commandant of Air Command and Staff College, Brig Gen Ste- phen Denker, and his vice commandant, Col Rhea Dobson, for creat- ing an educational climate that supports academic publication and intellectual pursuits by the faculty. The dean, Col Robert Smith, and assistant dean, Dr. Mary Hampton, gave me support every step of the way, for which I will always be grateful. Thanks also to my Air War College colleagues for their mentorship, especially Dr. Mark Con- versino, Col Al Hunt, Col Ray O’Mara, Col Mark Erickson, and the Grand Strategy Program faculty. I also thank my seminar mates in the Grand Strategy Program for a great year of intellectual debate, which kept me mentally engaged in a wide range of issues that no doubt helped my perspective on this project. My experience as the commander, 532nd Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron, Joint Base Balad, Iraq, was central to the launching of this research. I was awed by the leadership of the squad leaders on patrol outside the wire and the dedication of the teams at our entry control points. I continue to be inspired by the Airmen that I had the privilege to lead and serve alongside. For example, SSgt David Veros served six tours in Iraq of approximately six months each—an ex- ample of “service before self ” that will inspire generations. David and many other warriors like Lucas Hall, Rodney Lindsey, and Phillip Giovanniello suffered the results of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. During my year in Iraq, the members of our unit expe- rienced seven IED attacks and one firefight. These combat experi- ences, coupled with repeat deployments, sometimes with only four months at home station before the next predeployment training, have xxiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS taken a toll in the forms of post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, other physical and mental scars, and damage to personal relationships. I also thank the members of Detachment 3 of the 732nd Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron, whom I had the privilege of leading as the International Zone (IZ) police force in Baghdad, Iraq, in 2006. These Airmen served brilliantly, and through their security operations and compound raids, undoubtedly made the IZ a more secure place for coalition forces and the Iraqi government to operate. The country owes a debt of gratitude to these veterans that can never be repaid. This book does a small service in shedding light on their service in defending air bases and their contribution to the Iraq COIN campaign. Throughout my career, I have been blessed to work with patriots who put their country before self. I have had many great wing and group commanders and supervisors who gave me the latitude to lead and the feedback that made me a better leader and Airman. In particu- lar among them, I would like to thank Maj Gen Craig Franklin, Maj Gen Michael Stough, Col David Ptak, Col Tim Farrell, Col Mary Peter- son, Col Colleen Ryan, Col Jeffrey Wenzel, Capt Bob Stanger, and so many others. In addition, I would not have been as effective without the advice, mentorship, and leadership of chiefs and noncommissioned officers along the way, like MSgt Bob Feeley—who showed a young lieutenant the right way to lead and manage. In combat, I was lucky to have spirited, straight-shooting warriors like Chief Master Sergeants Ricardo Martinez, Bruce Spurling, Michael Lintz, and others. At home station, I was privileged to serve and learn from leaders like Chief Mas- ter Sergeants Brian Wilson, Brian McCaw, Wesley Hudson, and so many others throughout my career. I am grateful to the two Army bat- tlespace owners whom I was privileged to work alongside to protect Joint Base Balad, Iraq: Lieutenant Colonels David Hodne and Eric Timmerman, two great American leaders from whom I learned a great deal through their example and intellect. I am also thankful for the service of our Iraqi interpreters and contractors who worked alongside our Airmen in harm’s way, some of whom paid a price for their service with their lives. I must also pay homage to some mentors who were there for me over the years or revitalized my writing and thinking habits. CDR Gordon Wiram, USN, retired, a veteran of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, was like a second father to me when my own father was out to sea on deployment. He was my Naval Junior Reserve Officer Train- xxiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ing Corps instructor and left a major impact on my thinking about military issues and life. I am also indebted to Brig Gen Frank Kelley, USMC, and Dr. John Cann for the academic experience I received at Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The year I spent under their guidance influenced me to think more deeply and write more cogently. My time serving under Brig Gen Kenneth Dahl, USA, in Baghdad, Iraq, provided me valuable insights into the demands of command in a complex environment. I still use his methods and leadership style as an example when I lecture on combat and expedi- tionary leadership. Naturally, I thank my family. First, many thanks to my parents and my brother, whose love and encouragement have shaped who I am and how I think. I am proud of my father’s career in the US Navy and his Vietnam service. He will always be my hero. I will always be grate- ful to my mother for the grace she displayed throughout my father’s military career, especially as she cared for two small boys while their father deployed to sea for six- to nine-month periods. My extended family has always been an anchor for our family as we have moved around with the military. I am also thankful for my father-in-law, a former Air Force F-15 pilot and veteran, who cheered my pursuit of this book project every step of the way—as did my extended family. Finally, I offer my eternal love and appreciation to my toughest editor: my lovely wife. A writer and researcher in her own right, she provided her editorial skill and critique free of charge for some of the works herein. She is my inspiration, and I am a better man due to her encouragement, counsel, and love. Together we are raising two warrior-poet sons, who I hope will be proud of their old man for his small contribution to the study and application of airpower. xxv Introduction Shannon W. Caudill On old maps of the world, cartographers inscribed uncharted re- gions with the moniker “Here Be Monsters.” They sometimes added drawings of sea serpents, dragons, and other frightening creatures. Humans are threatened by the unknown and uncharted. So it goes with base defense. In a COIN environment, if commanders wall their forces up in a fortress with little or no interaction with the local popu- lace, the lack of interaction can potentially lead to miscommunica- tion and violence, with a profoundly negative impact on the flying mission. The monsters will materialize in the absence of action in the battlespace. Striving to eliminate the unknown is what military lead- ers must do in order to better defend air bases and erase the scribbled map drawings of beasts outside the wire. Italian general Giulio Douhet long ago noted that “it is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.” 1 This concept is reflected in Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine: “Air and space power is most vulnerable on the ground. Thus, force protection is an integral part of air and space power employment.” However, base defense—defending one’s air as- sets on the ground—is one of the least understood operational as- pects of airpower. Sound air base defense and COIN techniques pro- vide the requisite secure foundation from which the Air Force launches combat operations and protects its personnel and resources. Without a strong, synchronized base defense and COIN effort, Air Force personnel and resources, as well as those of the joint force, are vulnerable to attacks that decrease their combat effectiveness. This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and COIN. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a COIN environ- ment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force offi- cer. Four of the essays have been previously published in Air and Space Power Journal, some of which were updated to reflect changes in doctrine, and one is an excerpt from an Air Force Fellows research project. xxvi INTRODUCTION The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat COIN environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchro- nized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. Some of the chapters offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and COIN mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield. The genesis of this book comes from what I view as a fundamental need for Airmen to better understand base defense and irregular warfare operations. The idea for this book was born from my own frustration as I began my preparations for deploying to Joint Base Balad, Iraq, in 2009. I found it difficult to access relevant material on defending air bases in a counterinsurgency environment. Few write on the subject, and those who do commit time to writing on base defense often find their research papers buried in a military library or lessons-learned report—overclassified, if written in the field. There are only three other dated studies of note on the subject of air base defense, which are primarily focused on the Vietnam experience— the most recent published in 1995. The work contained in this book reopens the historiography and updates the literature in this field of study. The anthology contained within encompasses the lessons learned from air base defense in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more recent conflicts. It explores best practices for base defenders when operating in a counterinsurgency environment. While at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, I was made aware of some vocal complaints made by one of the young captains working in my squad- ron about my commitment of time to writing the group and squad- ron’s lessons-learned report. He, and many in the Air Force, viewed the time used to reflect, write, and evaluate the operational art as a waste. It seems our norms of organizational behavior dictate that we must be constantly “doing” rather than thinking and evaluating our methods and effects. This is unfortunate, especially in irregular war- fare where brainpower is often more effective than a bullet. In 1997, while critiquing the Air Force’s culture and lack of commitment to irregular warfare, Dr. Dennis Drew wrote, “US airmen have long been known for their fascination with technology and the mental toughness required to press home a bombing attack against a fierce xxvii INTRODUCTION resistance or to outduel an enemy fighter. But they have never been known for their academic inquisitiveness, their devotion to the study of the art of war, or their contributions to the theory of airpower. In- stead, American airmen have remained ‘doers’ rather than introspec- tive ‘thinkers.’ ”2 So let us commit to thinking about the challenges of operating in an age of insurgency. As such, we must create organizations and lead- ers who can “adapt” and “learn”—key words in today’s military lexi- con. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, the seminal doc- trine used by American and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, uses the phrase “adapt” 89 times but mentions “learn” or “learning” 179 times, for it is the learning that leads to the ability to adapt to new circumstances or information. A fundamental question for the mili- tary leader is, how does one create a learning organization—one that encourages experimentation and failure and promotes those that take smart risks? This is where an examination of COIN tenants and orga- nizational culture is relevant to the task. COIN doctrine challenges leaders to promote learning, adapt to a changing operational envi- ronment, and develop an effective system to circulate best practices throughout their command. This can, in part, be accomplished by leaders taking the time to mentor and challenge junior officers and noncommissioned officers at home station prior to deployment. Leaders must challenge Airmen to read about issues related to COIN and base defense and then debate the merits of different tactics or case studies. The authors of this book hope to contribute to this effort so that we deploy thinking, adaptable warriors, not simply tacticians running a defense checklist. The goal of this anthology is to stir discussion and debate about how best to protect airpower in the future. It is my hope, and the hope of the other authors, that this publication will spur interest in the his- tory of air base defense, generate healthy deliberation regarding bet- ter methods for protecting air assets in irregular warfare environ- ments, and lead to strategies and methods that better prepare Airmen for deployment to high-threat areas in which insurgents thrive. Airmen practice COIN methods every day but often do not know that they are doing it. At the core of COIN doctrine is the premise that there are second- and third-order effects to every act of kindness, dialogue, act of respect, and economic activity between coalition forces and the communities in which they operate. Some examples come to mind of Airmen contributing to successes in this arena. xxviii INTRODUCTION While not perfect by any stretch, the Joint Base Balad efforts between 2009 and 2010 offer insights and best practices on how Airmen can contribute to the ground commander’s COIN campaign plan. For ex- ample, at Balad, the wing’s civil engineers and contracting personnel facilitated economic partnerships, employment, and opportunity for the region surrounding the base. Air Force firemen trained local vol- unteer fire departments in American fire department techniques. Airmen on combat patrol conducted key-leader engagements with Iraqi forces and conducted frequent walking patrols to build relation- ships with local tribes and farmers, rendered emergency medical aid in local villages, delivered elementary school supplies, provided wheelchairs for the disabled, and conducted a multitude of small but important community-outreach activities as a “good neighbor” to the local populace. In an often unsung mission, force protection escorts contributed when they treated the populace with respect and dignity while still protecting the base through their oversight of construction projects and other contractor activities. Individuals socialized, hag- gled, and bought things at the Iraqi bazaar, contributing by interact- ing with merchants, buying their wares, and establishing relation- ships. Security forces and medical personnel routinely helped Iraqis with life-threatening injuries at the base entry control points (ECP), building a lasting bond with parents of small children, injured police- men, and others who needed help. Airmen worked along Iraqi secu- rity screeners at all of the ECPs, day and night, to protect the base, building a lasting friendship and mutual respect that comes through serving the greater good as comrades. The screeners also helped to put an Iraqi face on the coalition presence and avoid fratricide through misunderstandings with the local populace. All of these things, and so many others, were often taken for granted, yet they each directly added to the stability of the region because they contrib- uted to the overall COIN campaign and bonded Airmen with their Iraqi hosts. Defending air bases, their requisite airpower assets, and joint per- sonnel must be a concept in which all Airmen (and joint members) are involved and play a role. In 1999 I was privileged to work with an Air Force Vietnam veteran named Frank Kayter, my unit’s first ser- geant, who proudly produced photos of himself as an Airman with his M-16 rifle, standing near his assigned perimeter defense bunker. A personnel specialist by trade, he was responsible for defending a section of the base during high-threat periods. Today, Air Force doc- xxix INTRODUCTION trine states that “every Airman is a sensor” and plays a role in the new integrated base defense concept. Despite the rhetoric, the Air Force has often not lived up to this bumper-sticker slogan. Unlike the sister services, at many locations in Iraq, Airmen stood out because they were not required to carry a personal weapon for their own defense and did not play a role in base defense. Also fueling this disconnect was a propensity to contract security taskings to private firms. The attitude by some could be summed up as, “If you have a security con- cern, simply write a check.” If Airmen continue to be separated from any obligation for their own defense or defense of the base they oper- ate, there may be a price to pay down the line, either from an insider threat or direct attack by an enemy force. Indeed, it may take a calam- ity on the scale of the British in World War II to sort out the future of American base defense. Dismayed at how few of his Royal Air Force personnel participated in base defense on Crete and reeling from the loss of Crete’s three airfields to German paratroop assault, Sir Win- ston Churchill, the British prime minister lamented: Every man in Air Force uniform ought to be armed with something—a rifle, a tommy-gun, a pistol, a pike, or a mace; and every one, without exception, should do at least one hour’s drill and practice every day. Every airman should have his place in the defence scheme. . . . It must be understood by all ranks that they are expected to fight and die in the defence of their airfields. . . . The enormous mass of non-combatant personnel who look after the very few he- roic pilots, who alone in ordinary circumstances do all the fighting, is an in- herent difficulty in the organization of the Air Force. . . . Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundmen, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers.3 There is the intent of public policy and doctrine—and then there is the reality of how it is applied or rejected by the dominant organiza- tional culture. We must strive to challenge stale doctrine and faulty assumptions, learn from the successes and failures in Iraq and Af- ghanistan, and foster the critical thinking and judgment of the next generation of military professionals. As the renowned military theo- rist Karl von Clausewitz opined, “Judgment is the ability to combine hard data, questionable data and intuitive guesses to arrive at a con- clusion that events prove to be correct. Judgment-in-action includes effective problem solving, the design of strategies, the setting of pri- orities and intuitive as well as rational judgments. Most important, perhaps, it includes the capacity to appraise the potentialities of co- workers and opponents.” 4 xxx INTRODUCTION The authors of this book committed the time to reflect on the re- cent conflicts and capture lessons learned. Leaders must dedicate time to this endeavor and examine better ways to defend airpower in hostile, complex environments. The military writ large, and the Air Force in particular, needs “thinkers,” people who commit time to read, reflect, critique, and write about the problems facing the mili- tary in irregular and future warfare. Recommendations for future study include the following: 1. Much like Roger Fox’s seminal 1979 work on base defense in Vietnam, a comprehensive history of air base defense in Iraq needs to be written. Since the US military commitment in Iraq ended in December 2011, this conflict can now be studied and lessons distilled. Since the essays included in this manuscript were written during various stages of the Iraq conflict, they pro- vide snapshots in time. Much as it did at the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the Air Force History Office should commit re- sources to this effort to benefit future generations defending air- power assets against attack. 2. A hole in this manuscript effort is found in the discussion of Af- ghanistan. This may be due in fact to the reality that the Iraq theater was the main effort until well into the Obama adminis- tration’s first term. Not much has been written about air base defense in Afghanistan, and that which has been is classified. The issue of overclassification dogs the lessons-learned process, as prescient lessons often go to die in the world of classified reports. 3. I would advocate for a required reading list for those directly associated with defending air bases, including group and wing leadership. During my time in Iraq, I found many leaders up and down the chain of command who had not been exposed to the key concepts of air base defense, COIN doctrine, and ground force integration. This deficiency in knowledge was only cor- rected through vigorous briefings and gap analysis. Fortunately, leaders had a desire to learn and gain synergies, but it would have proven beneficial if all parties had some requisite weigh points for concepts and historical anecdotes. 4. While not directly related to air base defense, I would highly rec- ommend a historical study on the contributions, experiences, xxxi INTRODUCTION and lessons learned from the Airmen who deployed in direct support of the US Army under the headings of “In Lieu of Forces,” “Request for Forces,” and “Joint Expeditionary Trained” Airmen. Having been one of those Airmen, I believe it is a chapter of Air Force history that needs to be documented and explored. At Air Command and Staff College’s 2012 graduation ceremony, Lt Gen David Fadok, president and commander of Air University, ob- served that the Air Force should perhaps include in its definition of airpower the deployment of Airmen providing expertise and skill sets to the joint force, regardless of whether they are performing tra- ditional Air Force missions. These Airmen contributed to the COIN campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan as convoy truck drivers, intelli- gence specialists, military police, explosive ordnance demolition ex- perts, and specialists in other functions. Their stories and lessons must be captured and celebrated by the Air Force. Finally, I had the unique opportunity to teach US history to Air- men and Soldiers while in Baghdad during one of my deployments. Some Iraqi citizens attended this class, not for college credit, but in- stead to learn about American democracy and how our country de- veloped its institutions of government. As Americans, we often look back at our democracy through rose-colored glasses, when in reality it was a messy and often violent course of events. The following is an interesting quote to ponder: “I consider this insurrection as the first formidable fruit of the Democratic Societies; brought forth I believe too prematurely for their own views, which may contribute to the annihilation of them.” 5 That quote could very well be about Iraq’s fragile state in the wake of the US military with- drawal, but it was actually written in 1794 by our first president, George Washington, about uprisings against a newly established democratic government called the United States of America. I have come to appreciate our American history all the more be- cause of my service in combat. We are serving in a truly unique time in our nation’s history and the histories of Iraq and Afghanistan, fraught with both danger and promise. Like those brave and noble veterans before us, we are writing history. By reflecting on the issues brought forth in this book, you may well contribute to writing a good ending for Afghanistan or a future operation. xxxii INTRODUCTION Notes 1. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. and ed. Dino Ferrari, Joseph P. Harahan, and Richard H. Kohn (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009), 53–54. 2. Dennis M. Drew, “Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to Confusion,” in The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997). 3. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3, The Grand Alliance (Bos- ton, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 692–93. 4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 49. 5. George Washington, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799, vol. 33, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1940). PART 1 Historical and International Perspectives Chapter 1 A Short History of Air Base Defense From World War I to Iraq Erik K. Rundquist The C-17s dropped the 173rd Brigade right into northern Iraq. That is the first time we’ve done something like that in a very long time. Notably there were 17 airmen that jumped in with the 173rd Brigade and those airmen were responsible for get- ting down there and making sure that airfield was ready to be used as rapidly as possible. It’s a mission we’re developing on the model of the RAF [Royal Air Force] Regiment. It’s a good model to use and we’re going to press with that. —Gen John P. Jumper “Leveraging Lessons Learned with Tactical Operations” The Airmen that General Jumper, former United States Air Force (USAF) chief of staff, refers to were assigned to the 786th Security Forces Squadron (SFS) under the 86th Contingency Response Group (CRG) stationed at Ramstein Air Base (AB), Germany. This mission, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, represented the first use of a conventional USAF unit to parachute into a combat environment. Within 24 hours of the parachute assault, the team facilitated the ar- rival of C-17 Globemaster III intertheater airlift aircraft. This CRG airborne team consisted of a rated officer (pilot), medical and intelli- gence personnel, security forces, and aerial port, fuels, communica- tions, and engineering experts.1 Each respective specialist linked with a 173rd Airborne Brigade counterpart before, during, and after the operation in order to develop a joint service force protection and base operability solution to rapidly open the airfield. The United States relies heavily on airpower to rapidly deploy stra- tegic forces in response to worldwide contingency operations. Dur- ing the 1991 Gulf War, cable news programs touted film footage of This essay is an edited excerpt of an original research paper entitled “Courage in Adversity: Defending Austere Airfields with Air Force Contingency Response Groups” (research paper, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004). 4 │ RUNDQUIST laser-guided and satellite-guided munitions flying into enemy bun- kers and destroying targets with pinpoint accuracy. In addition, a massive strategic airlift effort delivered over 500,000 passengers and hauled over 540,000 short tons of cargo into the theater on nearly 16,000 sorties. Once in theater, C-130 Hercules intratheater airlift aircraft flew over 13,900 missions and transported over 242,000 per- sonnel.2 The American and allied audiences witnessed firsthand this precision engagement and rapid global mobility. Unfortunately, America’s enemies also watched these spectacular broadcasts and now fully understand the United States’ reliance on this technology and, in particular, its use of airpower. Since the first Gulf War, the United States has maintained its pat- tern of relying on airpower to conduct combat operations, respond to contingencies, and rapidly deploy combat forces. In the past 10 years, American military forces have deployed and opened austere airfields in Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, Albania, Mozambique, Afghani- stan, Iraq, and other locations. The missions at these aerial ports of debarkation (APOD) ranged from delivering humanitarian supplies and conducting noncombatant evacuation operations to creating Army lodgments and bedding down fighter aircraft in order to proj- ect combat power. Gen T. Michael Moseley, the former USAF chief of staff (and for- mer combined force air component commander for United States Central Command) stated, “We opened thirty-eight new bases in support of OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and OEF [Operation En- during Freedom]. These bases were not only used to execute USAF missions but also were the home to joint forces and numerous coali- tion activities.”3 Regardless of the use, these airfields may represent an American center of gravity, or decisive point, that an enemy force can exploit and attack. Joint doctrine supports this notion and identifies that first-in entry forces and base defense elements should deploy with sufficient organic combat power to preserve freedom of action and protect these US ports of debarkation.4 Air Base Defense: A Historical Perspective If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last one, it is to imagine that it A SHORT HISTORY OF AIR BASE DEFENSE │ 5 will be so utterly different that we can afford to ignore all the lessons of the last one. —RAF Marshal Sir John Slessor Airpower and Armies In order to understand the future of air base defense (ABD) or integrated defense, it is critical to examine history and grasp lessons learned. This analysis will provide clarity as to the importance of air- fields, related doctrinal issues, and US and international efforts to defend air bases. It will also examine how the USAF arrived at the conclusion that required a dedicated and capable force to conduct ground combat operations in order to directly enable air operations. The historical examination will thread ABD experiences from World War I through counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Af- ghanistan. World War I World War I represented history’s first large-scale employment of combat aircraft. The war, especially on the western front, was charac- terized by a series of massive and complex trench systems that stretched from Switzerland to the English Channel.5 These battle lines were stationary and rarely shifted more than a few hundred me- ters at any one time. The Allied and enemy air forces situated their crude “forward” air bases well behind these static lines and enjoyed relative comfort and a high level of security from attack by conven- tional ground forces. In addition, there were no known unconven- tional or insurgent activities launched in the European theater to de- stroy aircraft or disrupt rear area airfield operations. With the lack of ground threat, ABD was characterized by interior guards, a role deemed adequate to the task.6 Interwar Period The interwar period took all of the lessons learned from World War I and applied them to securing airfields. For the Americans, es- sentially nothing changed for ABD, despite the expanding role of military aviation.7 However, for the British, this expanding role in- cluded expeditionary air operations to economically police parts of its vast empire. Sir Hugh Trenchard’s fledgling Royal Air Force (RAF) found a niche in supporting the Colonial Office. In 1920 an air cam- 6 │ RUNDQUIST paign was launched against the “Mad Mullah” in British Somaliland, and with its success, the secretary of state for war and air, Winston Churchill, intended to use airpower throughout the Middle East. In 1921 the first of six armored car companies was created in Egypt to support expeditionary air operations, and it deployed to Iraq the fol- lowing year. These companies were the first ground combat element for the RAF, and they were used for mapping, conducting route re- connaissance, escorting convoys, and securing advanced landing strips in Transjordan, Iraq, and Kuwait. 8 In addition, the interwar period was fraught with theorists trying to come to grips with how to best employ airpower. In 1921 Italian Giulio Douhet wrote, “It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.” 9 While he implied aircraft would carry out the bombing task, the notion that airfields repre- sented lucrative targets and their parked aircraft were highly vulner- able to destruction did not escape notice. It did not take a large leap of logic to destroy these vulnerable aircraft with ground-based means, and the paratroopers of the Second World War took that leap. World War II The Second World War differed from the “Great War” in that the Germans reintroduced mobility to the battlefield when its Blitzkrieg tactics ripped through the heart of France, pushed the Allies off the continent of Europe, and controlled most of North Africa. An impor- tant strategy for the Germans was to use their paratrooper and glider forces to seize Allied airfields and disrupt rear areas in order to sup- port advancing ground columns. Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, and Norway all fell to Nazi Germany in similar fashion. 10 The German technique for capturing airfields involved medium- altitude bombers hitting the fringes of the airfield and driving the antiaircraft gunners into bunkers. This was followed up by dive- bombers and fighter aircraft strafing the airfield in order to keep the defenders buttoned up inside their shelters. Finally, the airborne as- sault would take place where paratroopers landed on the airfield, and “when the defenders came up for air, they found themselves looking into the muzzles of tommy-guns.” 11 A watershed event occurred in May 1941 when German para- troopers seized Maleme Airfield and subsequently captured the is- A SHORT HISTORY OF AIR BASE DEFENSE │ 7 land of Crete. To the Germans, this island represented a key base to project airpower into the Balkans and enable air control of the east- ern Mediterranean. The Allies had placed a low priority on Crete. In fact, the British Chiefs of Staff noted of the Mediterranean region in April of 1941 that “Libya counts first; evacuation of troops from Greece second. Tobruk shipping, unless indispensable to victory, must be fitted in as convenient; Iraq can be ignored and Crete worked up later.” 12 Essentially the Allied forces were on the run and in a state of continually reacting to Axis advances. The defenses at Crete were ill-equipped for the task. One British infantry brigade had deployed from Egypt to garrison the island, and in addition two New Zealand brigades, one Australian brigade, and remnants of the Allied evacua- tion from Greece were to defend the island. In all, the Allies had ap- proximately 40,000 troops with a few tanks, a regiment’s worth of ar- tillery, little heavy equipment, and most importantly, no Allied aircraft. The German plan, led by Gen Kurt Student, was simple. They would use three parachute regiments to assault the island’s three major towns of Maleme (west), Retimo (central), and Heraklion (east), where Crete’s airfields were located. Once the airfields were captured, the Germans would airland and ship heavier equipment and reinforcements to “roll up” British defenses along the island’s north coast road that connected the three towns. In particular, Stu- dent’s main effort would be Maleme, where he would crash land glid- ers onto the airfield to support the paratroopers with the 5th Moun- tain Division. While Student knew his force would be outnumbered by the defenders, he relied on the high quality of his troops, the Luft- waffe’s air superiority, and the element of surprise to defeat Crete’s defenders. Essentially, the Germans realized that the island’s airfields were critical to the success of the operation. Despite the fact that the at- tackers suffered horrific losses, the Allies failed in many areas. First, they did not properly prepare the terrain with obstacles to deny the use of the Maleme Airfield (the other airfield attacks at Retimo and Heraklion were repelled). Second, the Allies failed to provide enough forces to defend the airfield. Third, the Allied commander, Maj Gen Bernard Freyberg, did not properly commit reserve forces to deny the German foothold. Most important, the Allies failed to grasp the concept that the airfield represented a center of gravity. Once the paratroopers established a tenuous grip at Maleme, the Luftwaffe rap- idly reinforced the island with its transport aircraft. 13 8 │ RUNDQUIST Upon the fall of Crete, Winston Churchill, now prime minister, sent a scathing memo to the chief of Air Staff in which he remarked, “Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air groundmen and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers.” 14 The memo clearly indicted the relatively small “unemployed” RAF ground support force, whose fighters had departed from the island before the invasion. However, the army maintained the overall defense of the region, and Churchill felt that its commander, Maj Gen Freyberg, lacked imagination and directed an uninspired static defense.15 The failure implied a lack of “air-mindedness” and understanding of the potential that airpower, in this case German transports, brought to the table. In addition, there were debates in Parliament centering on the protection of airfields where their defense was catapulted into the “first essentials” category. Cited during these debates was the lackluster and uncoordinated tactical relationship between the RAF and army airfield defense forces (at home and abroad) and the differ- ent defense priorities between the two services. The Air Ministry re- acted to these developments by arming all RAF personnel, and on 8 January 1942 the decision to form the RAF Regiment was an- nounced. 16 The first robust and dedicated ABD force was born. By July 1943 the regiment had forces spread across the globe. There were over 50,000 Airmen providing light antiaircraft and ground de- fense at installations at home and forward deployed positions.17 De- fending and holding forward airfields were often tremendously diffi- cult tasks. An important illustration can be found at Meiktila Airfield in the jungles of Burma. As in Crete, the airfield represented a center of gravity. Both the British and Japanese forces stretched their aerial supply lines to the limit. The British army seized Meiktila in March 1945 as part of its strategy to support ground operations and push through the region. The Japanese launched a massive counterattack and effectively cut all ground lines of communication. The fragile British lifeline was now mainly supplied through the air, and their enemy knew it. During the three-week struggle for Meiktila Airfield, the Japanese launched attacks and occupied key terrain surrounding the base at night. Each morning, the RAF Regiment fought and gained control of the airfield in order to reestablish food, medical, and ammunition supply lines. On one occasion, the RAF Regiment drove back two companies of Japanese infantry to open the airfield. On another day, A SHORT HISTORY OF AIR BASE DEFENSE │ 9 a British transport pilot reported the RAF Regiment’s bayonet charge had cleared the runway for him to safely land. During the struggle, every officer assigned to the 1307th Wing and its four squadrons was killed in vicious fighting while leading counterattacks.18 The RAF Regiment played a crucial role in defending and holding the airfield and proved its worth and valor in combat. The American ABD experience during World War II was remark- ably quiet. Following the fall of Crete, Gen George Marshall, the Army chief of staff, approved apportioning over 53,000 African- American troops to the Army Air Forces to stand up air base security battalions. These units were created in June 1942 and were equipped with rifles and machine guns and maintained a light antiaircraft ca- pability. Planning estimates called for 296 battalions to be created; however, other requirements took precedence, and ABD unit inacti- vation started in 1943. There were no instances of conventional or insurgent ground forces attacking American airfields in England.19 Conversely, in the Pacific, the objective of seizing islands in order to use their airfields was part of the grand strategy to isolate and de- feat Japan. In fact, it has been argued that the war against Japan was essentially a fight for air bases. 20 For instance, US ground forces cap- tured Japanese-held airfields on the islands of Iwo Jima, Marianas, Okinawa, and Ie Shima in order to support the air war. In addition, during large counteroffensives in China, Japanese forces swept through and captured American airfields at Ling Ling, Tanchuk, Kweilin, and Liuchow.21 In these cases, the attacks were so massive that few tactical lessons can be applied to ABD operations. As World War II closed, all of the American air base security battalions were disbanded. World War II Aftermath The United States created a new Department of Defense and estab- lished the USAF as an independent service in 1947. The following year, the Key West Agreement of 21 April 1948 defined service roles and responsibilities. Base defense was identified as a function com- mon to all services. In this case, defense implied local security mea- sures on a facility. The agreement did not mention a USAF ground combat capability, nor did it assign the USAF the mission of ABD. Moreover, the agreement did not describe how local installation se- curity measures from all services would tie in with the Army’s role of 10 │ RUNDQUIST performing area defense, nor did it discuss local base defense geo- graphical limits. The subsequent joint doctrine did not provide guid- ance on task organization, size, or capabilities required of the base defense forces.22 While these issues seemed mundane for US bases, they proved problematic for America’s next expeditionary operation. Korean War In June 1950, the United States maintained the same lack of tacti- cal guidance concerning ABD. At the start of hostilities, the USAF possessed 10,000 active air police; however, their background fo- cused mainly on law enforcement. The USAF recognized that addi- tional troops were needed to secure forward-deployed Korean air- fields, and within 15 months, this “ground-fighting” police force expanded to over 39,000 air police. These Airmen received formal ground combat training at Tyndall AFB, Florida, and deployed with rifles, machine guns, armored vehicles, and recoilless rifles to con- duct ABD.23 Despite the “crisis management” effort to rapidly orga- nize, train, equip, and deploy these forces to Korea, the enemy for the most part did not oblige the defense effort. The major ground attacks occurred in 1950 when communist forces started their push south. Pohang was successfully defended in August 1950, only to be aban- doned in the wake of a larger advance. Guerrilla forces assaulted the airfield at Kunsan, where they harassed the base and disrupted air operations until November 1950. 24 However, the USAF’s additional troops did not arrive in theater until the following summer. For the most part, ABD was a “moot point,” despite the fact that thousands of North Korean guerrilla forces continued to operate behind friendly lines throughout the war. For some unknown reason, they neglected to launch any large-scale operations against Allied airfields. 25 As American tradition seemed to dictate, upon completion of hos- tilities, the US military began its force drawdown, and the air police were no exception. Without any codified doctrine, the USAF had dif- ficulty justifying to various congressional committees why they ex- ceeded the number of Army and Marine military police troops. Without proper justification and in the face of congressional threats to mandate massive manpower cuts, the USAF “voluntarily” reduced its air police strength by 20 percent. 26 A SHORT HISTORY OF AIR BASE DEFENSE │ 11 Vietnam War America’s ten-thousand-day war is important enough to discuss at greater length, as many issues concerning joint force and host nation interaction can be directly applied to current operations and force protection squadron task organization. The first mission for the US military in Southeast Asia was to operate as advisors and trainers in order to bolster the morale, confidence, and capability of the South Vietnamese armed forces. To support the training mission, the USAF provided assault transports, defoliate spray aircraft, reconnaissance, command and control (C2), and instruction ranging from fighter tactics and bombing to aircraft maintenance and ground supply.27 The primary threats to the aircraft and installations were consid- ered to be sabotage and terrorism versus a more sophisticated assault. The first solution to protect the early advisory air bases mirrored pro- cedures standard at USAF bases located in the United States. Security teams controlled circulation, manned entry points, checked identifi- cation badges, and monitored work centers. These tasks, for the most part, were conducted by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Additionally, random perimeter defenses and exterior pa- trols fell under the responsibility of the Army of the Republic of Viet- nam (ARVN) regional forces.28 In fact, USAF air police were only authorized to guard aircraft at Tan Son Nhut AB and were banned from the flight lines at Bien Hoa and Da Nang airfields.29 The initial absence of enemy activity around airfields lulled the USAF into a false sense of security. In February 1962, Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) conducted a staff assistance visit to exam- ine the protection of USAF advisors at the Vietnamese bases. The staff visit’s report ironically noted that if too much attention was af- forded to base defense activities, like storing ammunition and weap- ons, this activity may entice the Viet Cong forces to attack.30 As the advisory role for the United States expanded, the American forces began to further scrutinize the host-nation security. The US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam continued to state that it relied on the South Vietnamese government to protect American property, equipment, and advisors. By the end of 1963, several inspection teams from 13th Air Force, 2nd Air Division, and Headquarters PACAF noted that the South Vietnamese ABD forces were severely lacking. The host nation frequently did not man observation towers and de- fensive bunkers or conduct patrols as promised to the US Military 12 │ RUNDQUIST Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). In addition, specialized South Vietnamese forces, such as airborne and infantry elements, were often conducting “training” away from the air bases, leaving en- tire perimeters exposed and vulnerable. 31 On 1 November 1964, enemy forces launched a midnight mortar attack at Bien Hoa AB that destroyed five B-57 jet bombers and dam- aged another 22 aircraft.32 An investigation revealed that Viet Cong forces had moved to within 440 yards of the northern base perimeter and staged six 81-millimeter mortars. The enemy fired approximately 80 high-explosive rounds and departed before any South Vietnamese response teams could engage the enemy. In addition to the aircraft losses, the United States suffered four killed and 72 wounded during this standoff attack.33 A terrorist bombing of Saigon’s Brink Hotel Bachelor Officer’s Club on Christmas Eve in 1964 again highlighted the relative ease of enemy movement throughout the South. Head- quarters, PACAF continued to address ABD with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USMACV. Their initial position, which remained relatively unchanged throughout the war, called for the USAF to gain responsi- bility for the internal security and perimeter defense with the US Army or Marine Corps augmenting South Vietnamese forces to ac- tively control up to 8,000 meters around airfields. 34 The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that deploying US combat troops were “to occupy and defend critical terrain features in order to secure the airfield and, as directed, communications facilities, sup- porting US installations. The US Marine force will not repeat nor en- gage in day-to-day actions against the Viet Cong.”35 Additional forces for other airfields followed the Marine landing at Da Nang. A few months later, the US Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed to Bien Hoa. In July 1965, Gen William Westmoreland, commander USMACV, presented a force requirement list to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Westmoreland requested that the US Army pro- vide 68 infantry battalions over the next two years, with 21 battalions slated for defending Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and Nha Trang air bases immediately. Additional arriving infantry forces would be sent to defend Pleiku, Binh Thuy, Qui Nhon, Phan Rang, and Cam Ranh Bay.36 As to be expected, the USAF was extremely pleased at the attention and effort being afforded to the ABD mission. The Army’s perspective was based on an assumption that the rear area would be safe. Thus, as its forces established secure areas around airfields, it could continue to push outward and engage enemy forces. A SHORT HISTORY OF AIR BASE DEFENSE │ 13 From the USAF’s perspective, as the number of troops expanded away from its bases, the air base ground defenses obviously became weaker. This was validated as there were no “rear areas” or sanctuar- ies in South Vietnam. It represented a noncontiguous and nonlinear battlefield. The Army followed its expansion concept, and in time, the percentage of combat troops devoted to securing the air bases steadily decreased. By the end of June 1965, General Westmoreland gained approval from Pres. Lyndon Johnson to “commit US troops to combat inde- pendently of or in conjunction with Vietnamese forces.”37 Despite the buildup of combat forces, the shift to offensive operations, where the Army ventured well beyond the airfield’s tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), was greeted by the Viet Cong forces with three standoff at- tacks in July and August 1965 against Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Bien Hoa. The results of the attacks identified holes in the defensive strat- egy where, like the South Vietnamese ABD forces, the airfields were left vulnerable and exposed. These three attacks resulted in six aircraft destroyed and 14 aircraft damaged.38 By mid-1965, the USAF realized it must come to terms and accept responsibility for its own perimeter and internal defense. The air police, now security police (SP), were the logical choice in leading the USAF’s ground combat effort. By late 1965, over 2,100 SPs were rushed from the United States to South Vietnam in order to take up positions around airfields. The number of permanently assigned forces capped at around 4,700 troops in 1969.39 The USAF used its SP operations in the United States as a template and applied it to Southeast Asia. The authorized troop strength was initially based on stateside manning formulas for close-in sentry duties of fighter and bomber wings, versus the obvi- ous perimeter and standoff (mortar and rocket) threats that existed in South Vietnam. To address this issue, the USAF looked to the Army and developed a “defense in depth” philosophy. This doctrine called for building several layers of defense in order to maximize chances of detecting and defeating an attacking enemy force. The USAF recognized the need to control the tactical area outside of the airfields to prevent enemy mortar and rocket standoff attacks, ultimately the primary ground threat that faced the USAF in Viet- nam. However, the USAF tragically tended to look at the perimeter fence line as a legal demarcation, despite General Westmoreland’s call for unit and base self-protection. Here the USAF looked to other ser- vices to address the standoff attacks, knowing USMACV’s guidance 14 │ RUNDQUIST for combat forces to search and destroy the enemy far outside the base’s tactical area. Intelligence networks provided the USAF com- mander his outermost layer of defense. The intelligence mission fell under the primary responsibility of the USAF Office of Special Inves- tigations (AFOSI). From an ABD perspective, the AFOSI efforts were not very effective. Lt Col Kenton Miller, commander of the 3rd Secu- rity Police Squadron (SPS), noted at Bien Hoa, “Air Force bases were prohibited from sending reconnaissance teams off base. . . . The pres- ent system of the OSI being assigned the responsibility of off base intelligence is completely unsatisfactory.”40 Continuing with the defensive concept of operations, the USAF focused on countering penetration attacks that included sapper raids, terrorism, and large-scale assaults. The 37th SPS defense of the 20,000-meter perimeter at Phu Cat AB mirrored most other security squadrons. Their defenses consisted of several machine gun towers, hardened fighting bunkers, concertina barbed wire barriers, and minefields comprising a main line of resistance. Trip flares and mili- tary working dog (MWD) detection teams usually operated between fighting positions. If an incident occurred, a “security alert team” (SAT) immediately responded. Generally the SAT was a three- to four-man motorized team (usually in a jeep), armed with M-16 auto- matic rifles and by 1969 also regularly equipped with M-60 machine guns and grenade launchers. The key to the SAT operation seemed to be the random nature in which this patrol responded and moved around the installation. In the event of an attack, several SATs rushed to the breach and held the enemy force for the base quick reaction teams (QRT). The QRTs were often manned by at least six personnel and carried an array of weap- ons, including machine guns (.50-caliber), antitank weapons, and grenades to outflank and repulse enemy attacks. The QRTs operated in all sorts of vehicles from standard jeeps to armored personnel car- riers. 41 To highlight SP resourcefulness, the 377th SPS and others staged napalm drum canisters into constructed ditches in order to create a command-detonated wall of fire if the base were overrun. 42 The final attempt to elevate SP combat capability was the creation of a test organization called “Safe Side.” This unit was born in the wake of the Tet offensive, despite the fact the SPs had dealt horrific blows to North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong battalion- sized attacks against Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa air bases (which incidentally denied air operations for more than a day at Bien Hoa). A SHORT HISTORY OF AIR BASE DEFENSE │ 15 The intention of Operation Safe Side was to provide USAF com- manders with a highly trained and specialized “Air Force Infantry.” This unit was tasked to provide high firepower, rapid mobility, sur- veillance, and internal security. The US Army instructed Safe Side SPs on advanced infantry ranger tactics, long-range patrols, ambushes, land navigation, heavy weapons, and air assault operations. The USAF was able to bypass the manpower ceiling by sending Safe Side squadrons in a temporary duty status for six months versus a perma- nent change of station for one year. Overall the unit proved highly capable but was poorly employed in the field. Team integrity was bro- ken up; Safe Side members were placed on standard defensive posts; SP commanders were not instructed on their use and capabilities; and ultimately the program died in 1971 due to troop withdrawals and budget cuts. 43 There are several ABD lessons to take away from the Vietnam War experience. First, there was no SP staff position on USMACV’s staff after 1967, essentially leaving the ABD effort in a fragmented state. Second, the USAF and US Army were never able to address the standoff issue, and neither accepted responsibility to effectively con- trol the TAOR. Third, the host nation was ill-equipped and ineffective in its effort to control the standoff footprint. Fourth, there was often poor coordination between USAF base defense forces and South Vietnamese base defense forces operating on and off base. Finally, there was little to no intelligence effort focused on ground threats to air bases. 44 1980s: “The Light Expeditionary Period” While the main US ABD focus of the 1980s centered on forward- based operations in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion (NATO), a “light expeditionary period” followed the Vietnam War. For example, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 and Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 involved smaller SP contin- gents rapidly deploying with Military Airlift Command to secure air- craft in the Caribbean and provide enhanced security support at Howard AFB, Panama. The US Army was on the offensive side of air- field attacks with its seizures at Pearls and Salinas airfields in Grenada and Torrijos, Rio Hato, and Paitilla airfields in Panama. In both cases the USAF flowed in after the attacks to establish close-in security. 16 │ RUNDQUIST In Grenada, the SPs airlanded and defended the north and south ends of the runway, secured the Army’s tactical operation center, and provided close-in security for aircraft and the psychological opera- tions control facility. They coordinated extensively with the 82nd Air- borne Division for additional defensive firepower and operated ap- proximately 500 meters outside of the airfield to focus on areas where Cuban soldiers were firing weapons. The USAF SPs also assisted in transferring US Marine and Army control of the civilian airport back to local authorities.45 Additional deployments to various communi- cations sites throughout South and Central America highlighted close-in point defense of radar sites, albeit in some very harsh condi- tions, to support the war against drug trafficking. The greatest impact on ABD during the 1980s included an exami- nation of doctrine and a series of 31 initiatives put into motion through joint service agreements (JSA) in 1984. The USAF was ex- panding its manpower, training, and weapons capabilities to include a light armor capability for defending its airfields. Upon signing of the JSA, the SP mission rapidly turned from an off-base, tactical light-infantry-style force to an on-base police force confined to inside the perimeter. JSA 8 directed the Army and USAF to develop rear area security measures and focused on internal threats such as sabo- teurs and terrorists. Overall, the JSA directed the Army to respond to threats from less than a battalion-sized force with its military police (MP) and to use the theater combat tactical force against larger enemy formations.46 In fact, under JSA 8, effective October 1985, the Army assumed the task of external ABD security and defense during company- to battalion- sized attacks. 47 Subsequently, JSA 9 provided that the US Army would deliver ABD training for the USAF to ensure a common understand- ing of tactics and loose integration of forces. The idea of external and internal security of airfields was broken down into a distributed area defense (figure 1.1). In this case, the SP force defended the close defense area inside the air base; the MP force covered the main defense area 3–5 kilometers beyond the base perimeter; and a screening force area beyond the main defense area was routinely patrolled. This doctrine assumed that everything that affected the airfield operation was in a neatly configured and delineated area. Problems arose, however, when fuel supplies, ammunition dumps, communications facilities, and naviga- tion aids were located off of the installation. 48 Moreover, in a sus- A SHORT HISTORY OF AIR BASE DEFENSE │ 17 tained ABD operation, if the MP force was present, it more than likely would come from the reserve component. In this capacity, de- ployment estimates of the Army Reserve MP force would likely not be in theater for a “considerable” amount of time, especially during the critical opening phases of a contingency operation. There may be times when the organic USAF SP should temporarily surge and con- duct internal and external operations until relieved. 49 Even if the MPs were deployed, they conducted battlefield circulation, response force missions, convoy security, and other missions as tasked by the Army. With these issues in mind, even with the presence of the Army, it was considered unrealistic that anyone other than the USAF base defense force would provide the initial response capability to an incident.50 The JSA invited more questions rather than answers to conducting expeditionary A