A History of Army Aviation - 1950-1962

Cargo Helicopter Units ........................................... 69 Supply Support ................................................. 72 Division of Responsibility ..................................... 72 Expansion of Responsibility ................................... 72 Shortage of Parts ............................................ 72 Incompatibility of Army and Air Force Supply Structures ........... 73 Depot Transfer .............................................. 73 Endnotes ...................................................... 75 Chapter VI - Early Aviation Training .................................. 77 The Impact of the Korean Conflict .................................. 77 Helicopter Pilot Training .......................................... 79 Expansion of Courses ............................................ 80 Liaison Pilot Training ............................................ 81 Fixed Wing and Helicopter Mechanic Training ........................ 82 Development of Instrument Training ................................ 84 Endnotes ...................................................... 87 Chapter VII- The Foundation of the Army Aviation School ............... 89 Planning for Expansion ........................................... 89 Establishment of the Army Aviation School ....................... 93 Organization of the School ........................................ 94 The First Year of Operation ....................................... 95 Class Schedules ............................................. 95 Estimated Training Requirements ............................... 96 Suspension of Transfer of Air Forces Training .................... 97 vi Duplication of Training Activities .............................. 98 Shortage of Fixed Wing Pilots ................................. 98 Training of Mechanics ........................................ 99 Movement of the Army Aviation School ............................. 99 Endnotes ..................................................... 102 Chapter VIII - Plans and Programs ................................... 103 Army Aviation Plan ............................................. 104 Department of Defense Policies ................................... 109 Personnel Policies .............................................. 112 Review of Officer Grades for Army Aviators .................... 112 Recommendations for Warrant Officer Aviators .................. 114 Aviator Requirements ....................................... 114 Planning for Future Development .................................. 115 Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board ..................... 115 Rogers Committee on Army Aviation .......................... 119 The Berlin Crisis ............................................... 121 Aviator Shortages .......................................... 122 Mobilization of Reserve Aviation Units ......................... 122 Deployments to Europe ...................................... 123 Southeast Asia Deployments ...................................... 124 Accomplishments of the Period ................................... 124 Endnotes ..................................................... 126 Chapter IX - Organizational Development ............................. 129 Organization Changes in the Department of the Army ................. 130 Organization Changes in the Transportation Corps .................... 130 Organization Changes in CONARC ................................ 133 Establishment of Army Aviation Section ........................ 133 1962 Reorganization ........................................ 137 Establishment of the Army Aviation Center ...................... 137 Aircraft Systems Management .................................... 138 Doctrine on Employment of Army Transport Aviation ................. 139 Army Aviation in the New Division Organizations .................... 140 AFTA and PENTANA .......................................... 140 Aviation in the Pentomic Divisions ............................ 141 Fixed Wing Light Transport Companies ........................ 144 Medium Helicopter Aviation Company ......................... 144 Army Aviation in the ROAD Organization .......................... 145 Development of the ROAD Concept ........................... 145 Basic Concept for Assignment of Aircraft ....................... 147 The Army Aviation Battalion ................................. 147 Aviation in Separate Brigades ................................. 148 vii Army Organization for the Period 1965-1970 .................... 148 Composite Aviation Battalion ................................. 149 Special Warfare Aviation Detachment .......................... 149 Army Aviation Air Traffic Operations .............................. 150 Army Aviation Operating Detachments ......................... 150 Use of Restricted Airspace ................................... 152 U.S. Army Tactical Air Navigation and Landing Aids ............. 153 Common TA for Army Airfields .............................. 154 Organizational Progress ......................................... 155 Endnotes ..................................................... 156 Chapter X - Development of Aircraft Armament ........................ 159 Weapons System Development .................................... 159 Project ABLE BUSTER ..................................... 159 Army Aviation School Experiments ............................ 160 Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company ....................... 163 Formal Armament Program .................................. 164 Airborne Troop Test of the SS-10 Missile System ................. 167 Adoption of the Armed Helicopter ................................. 168 CDEC Experiments ............................................. 169 Army Aircraft Armament Ad Hoc Committee ........................ 174 Armament and Airmobility ....................................... 177 Endnotes ..................................................... 179 Chapter XI - The Beginning of Airmobility ............................. 181 Development of the Air Cavalry Concept ............................ 181 Sky Cavalry ............................................... 182 Exercise SAGE BRUSH ..................................... 183 Exercise SLEDGE HAMMER ................................ 187 The Armair Brigade Study ....................................... 190 Helicopter Carrier Tests ......................................... 193 Organizational Developments ..................................... 195 E ndnotes ..................................................... 197 Chapter XI - Materiel Development .................................. 199 U.S. Army Aviation Board ....................................... 199 The Development and Procurement Cycle ........................... 200 Developmental Objectives for Army Aviation ........................ 202 Helicopter Development ......................................... 203 H U -1 Iroquois ............................................. 203 Light Observation Helicopter ................................. 205 Cargo Helicopters .......................................... 207 Viii Flying Crane .............................................. 209 Development of Fixed Wing Aircraft ............................... 209 T-37 Troop Test ............................................ 210 AO-1 M ohawk ............................................. 214 AC-1 Caribou ............................................. 216 Convertiplanes and Vertical Lift Research Vehicles ................... 219 Convertiplanes ............................................. 219 H ying Saucer .............................................. 220 The Status of Aircraft Development ................................ 221 Endnotes ..................................................... 222 Chapter XII - Development of Aviation Training ....................... 225 Transfer of Training from the Air Force ............................. 225 Early Interest in Training Consolidation ......................... 225 Army Assumption of Training Responsibility .................... 226 Army Aviation Unit Tactical Training .............................. 231 Revision in Helicopter Company Activation Schedule ................. 232 Growth of the Army Aviation School ............................... 235 O rganization .............................................. 235 Operations ................................................ 236 Training Developments .......................................... 239 Courses for Senior Officers ................................... 239 Mountain Flight Training for Army Helicopter Pilots .............. 240 Instrument Training ......................................... 240 Army ROTC Right Training Program .............................. 242 Endnotes ..................................................... 244 Chapter XIV - Supply and Maintenance ............................... 247 Transfer of Depot Responsibility .................................. 248 Army Aviation Depot Plan ....................................... 249 Provisions of the Plan ....................................... 249 Implementation of the Plan ................................... 250 Army Procurement of Aircraft .................................... 252 Maintenance Personnel Problems .................................. 252 Depot Maintenance Support ...................................... 254 Fifth Echelon M aintenance ................................... 254 Fourth Echelon Maintenance ................................. 256 M aintenance Training ........................................... 257 Army Aviation School ....................................... 257 Transportation School ....................................... 261 Endnotes ..................................................... 264 ix T Chapter XV - Summary ............................................ 267 List of Abbreviations ................................................ 275 A ppendix .......................................................... 277 Fixed W ing Aircraft 1942-1962 ................................... 278 Rotary Wing Aircraft 1942-1962 .................................. 279 Convertiplanes and Vertical Lift Vehicles 1953-1962 .................. 280 Army Aviation School Courses .................................... 281 Army Aviation School Maintenance Courses ......................... 282 Transportation School Maintenance Courses ......................... 283 Headquarters, CONARC 1 Feb 1955 ............................... 284 Headquarters, CONARC 10 Oct 1957 .............................. 285 Headquarters, CONARC 1 Jan 1959 ............................... 286 Aviation in the ROAD Division ................................... 287 United States Army Aviation School ............................... 288 Army Aviation Organization ...................................... 289 Directors of Army Aviation ................................. 290- 293 Pictorial Display of Army Aircraft ............................ 294 - 313 Index .............................................................315 List Of mustrations Piper Cubs used during 1941 maneuvers ................................... 5 L-4 Grasshopper during Carolina Maneuvers in 1942 ......................... 6 L-20 and two L-19 aircraft in flight near Ft Monmouth ....................... 7 Wounded trooper evacuated during Exercise Southern Pine ................... 30 Division Support helicopter & tanks on Exercise Longhorn ................... 31 509th Transportation Company airlifting troops during Exercise Flashbum ............................................... 34 First attempt to fire rockets from H-13 helicopter .......................... 162 H-25 Army Mule firing 1.5 inch rocket .................................. 164 A rm ed H -34 ....................................................... 166 UH- 1 helicopter armed w/ SS- Il antitank rockets .......................... 170 Friendly infantry troops boarding an H-34 for Exercise Sage Brush ........... 184 Headquarters, USA primary helicopter school and Camp Wolters ............. 227 Ozark Army Airfield, Ft Rucker, 1955 .................................. 238 x Foreword Since their publication in the 1970s, the two separate works, The History of Army Aviation, PhaseI: 1950-1954, and The History of Army Aviation, Phase11, 1955-1962, have been in steady demand by U.S. Army and other military researchers in the Army aviation field. Appearing in June 1971 and September 1976, respectively, those volumes were written by Mr. Richard P. Weinert, Jr., a staff historian in the Historical Office of the U.S. Continental Army Command until 1973, then Deputy Chief Historian in the Historical Office of the Army Training and Doctrine Command. The two volumes detail the early, formative years of Army aviation following the separation of the ground and air forces of the United States Army and the establishment of the United States Air Force as an independent service by the National Security Act of 1947. The call for this documented study has repeatedly exhausted printings of the two works. Prior to his retirement from federal service in 1988, Mr. Weinert took initial steps to organize his earlier work into a single publication. Since then, Dr. Susan Canedy, Research Historian and Archivist in the Office of the Command Historian, edited the combined manuscripts and completed the many other tasks necessary to bring the work to publication. The resulting volume is a reorganization of the two volumes, in which only redundancies of introduction and conclusion have been deleted. This single volume provides a useful record of the earliest stages of the battlefield function that would come into its own so dramatically in Vietnam and that would eventually be designated an Army branch in 1983. HENRY 0. MALONE, JR. xi Author's Preface Army aviation has grown dramatically in both size and breadth of activities since its inception in 1942. No comprehensive history of this growth has appeared. This monograph attempts to delineate the activities of Army Ground Forces (AGF), the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), and the United States Continental Army Command (CONARC) in the development of the aviation program from 1950 to 1962. The period from 1950 to 1954 witnessed a critical phase in the growth of Army aviation. During this period the helicopter first began to perform a major tactical role, combat experience in Korea pointed the way to future developments, and the formation of the Army Aviation School provided a firm training base for expansion. Following 1954, Army aviation not only introduced new aircraft which significantly improved its capability, but also began development of new doctrinal concepts. The work on helicopter armament and airmobile concepts provided the ground work for the large scale airmobile combat operations which the Army would conduct during the following decade. Because of the complexity of the subject, it has been necessary to organize this monograph topically rather than chronologically. Cross references are inserted where it is considered necessary to provide clarity. Most of the primary documentary sources cited in the footnotes are located " the Civil Branch of the National Archives in Suitland, Maryland. Copies of many of these docwaents have been retained in the files of the United States Army Center of Military History and the TRADOC Command Historian. The published reports and secondary sources dealing with the Transporta- tion Corps may be found in the library of the United States Army Transportation School at Fort Eustis, Virginia. The semiannual historical reports of AGF, OCAFF, and CONARC are in the files of the TRADOC Command Historian and the Center of Military History. The annual historical summaries of the Department of the Army staff elements are also located in the files of the Center of Military History. The preparation of this monograph would not have been possible without the cooperation and assistance of the staffs of the Transportation Museum and library of the United States Army Transportation School, the United States Army Aviation Museum, United States Army Aviation Digest, the library of the United States Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, the National Archives, the United States Army Center of Military History, and the Historical Office, United States Army Materiel and Readiness Command. The cooperation and assistance of many individuals contributed significantly to the research on this project: Mr. William D. Shaver, Jr., formerly of the CONARC Historical Office; LTC Donald F. Harrison, formerly with the Office of the Chief of Military History; Mr. Thomas E. Hohmann and Mrs. Ruth Nester of the Modem Military Records Division, National Archives; Mr. James Craig of the Army Aviation Museum; and COL W. R. Mathews, Aviation Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Reserve Forces, Headquarters, CONARC. RICHARD P. WEINERT, JR. xiii Chapter I EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION Army organic aviation augments the capability of the Army to conduct effective combat operations. It is under the full and immediate control of, and subject to the direct orders of, the commander responsible for ground operations. Army aviation as it is known today dates from 1942, although aviation in various forms has been used by the Army for reconnaissance and observation since the Civil War. The capabilities of observation aircraft were developed during World War II and following that war, the helicopter began to play an increasingly important role. It was not until the Korean conflict, however, that Army aviation began to assume its present form. The period from 1950 to 1954 saw the emergence of Army aviation as a separate entity. During this period, the foundation was laid upon which the vast aviation structure of the Vietnam War period was built. Balloons and Dirigibles Aerial observation had its beginning in the United States Army on 6 June 1861 when Thaddeus S. C. Lowe brought his balloon to Washington to demonstrate its military potential. On 18 June, Lowe successfully sent a telegraph message from his balloon which in the presence of President Abraham Lincoln and War Department officials, he had maneuvered to an altitude of 500 feet. The War Department then asked Professor Lowe to ascend his balloon near Falls Church, Virginia, to determine the location of Confederate troops menacing the Capital. He began making ascensions on 22 June and eased the tense situation in Washington by reporting no offensive movement following the Confederate victory at Bull Run. He later used the balloon for artillery spotting with some success. The Balloon Corps was added to the Army of the Potomac on 25 September 1861. The corps expanded from four to seven balloons by early 1862 as operations spread out from Old Point Comfort, Virginia, west to the Mississippi River, and south to Mobile. Despite the initial success of the Balloon Corps, it was disbanded in June 1863, following a disagreement over placing it under the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps. 1 Balloons were not again used by the Army until 1892 at which time the Signal Corps had only one balloon and no trained personnel. A balloon was in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. Its observers provided the Army with valuable information concerning the roads to the front lines 1 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION and the location of the Spanish fleet, but the presence of the balloon bobbing above the advancing troops provided an ideal target for the Spanish artillery. The balloon was finally destroyed bw enemy fire, much to the relief of the infantry. By 1907, the Signal Corps had increased its number of balloons to ten, but by the beginning of World War I only five free balloons were serviceable. 2 At the outset of World War I, the training program for the Balloon Corps was stepped up with balloon companies organized and sent to the field artillery centers and schools in Texas, Oklahoma, California, and Virginia. As of 15 April 1918, the Army had only 2 balloon companies in operation, but by the armistice 33 companies and 117 officers had been sent overseas. Of the 265 balloons sent to France, 77 participated in combat, 48 of which were lost in action. During actual fighting, observation balloonists, who ascended as high as 4,500 feet and were able to see about eight miles in all directions, reported locations of enemy batteries, hostile aircraft, demolition behind enemy lines, and movement of enemy supplies and troops. After the armistice, the Army canceled a number of lighter than air projects, and by the summer of 1920, the authorized balloon strength was cut to twenty-nine companies. The introduction of the fighter plane in World War I made the balloon exceedingly vulnerable, eliminating it as an effective means of aerial observation. 3 The War Department also had been interested in dirigibles, providing $25,000 in November 1907 to procure an experimental model for the Signal Corps. A contract for $6,750 was awarded to Thomas Scott Baldwin, who after successfully completing a series of performance trials, taught three officers to fly the airship, which was designated U.S. Army Dirigible No.1. Although the airship made several demonstration flights around the country, it was not used after 1909 and was condemned and sold in 1912. The Army waited until 1919 to purchase its next airship, and by 1920 it had seven dirigibles. But like the balloon, the airship was supplanted by the airplane. Development of Military Aviation The United States became the first country in the world to contract for military aircraft when in December 1907 it called for bids on a military airplane. Of the three bids accepted by the Army, only the Wright brothers delivered. The Army accepted the aircraft on 2 August 1908, after its successful test in July by Orville Wright. By the summer of 1911, the Army had five airplanes. Another milestone was reached in November 1912 when the Army used airplanes for observation and adjustment of field artillery fire. An act of Congress of 18 July 1914 created the Aviation Section within the Signal Corps, thus increasing the strength and scope of Army aviation and giving it definite status. The First Aero Squadron, the first tactical United States aviation unit, was organized on 5 March 1913. It began practical operations in 1916 in conjunction with the Mexican Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa. Its achievements were not impressive, as most of the obsolescent aircraft broke down during preliminary reconnaissance missions. 2 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVATION American aerial reconnaissance experience in World War I centered around the First Aero Squadron, which arrived in France in September 1917. After training under French direction, the squadron went into action in the Toul Sector in April 1918 as the first American air unit to fly reconnaissance and observation missions in France. Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, com- mander of all air units of the American Expeditionary Force, added two other squadrons to the First, thus forming the 1st Corps Observation Group which reconnoitered for the artillery with distinction. By the end of the war, there were fifteen observation squadrons in Europe. 4 With legislative authority granted by the Overman Act of 20 May 1918, President Woodrow Wilson by executive order removed Army aviation from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps. Responsibilities for training and operations were vested in a Director of Military Aeronautics and the new organization was soon officially recognized as the Air Service. This designation was changed on 2 July 1926 to the Army Air Corps, but there were no fundamental changes in mission or organization. The tables of organization as of April 1926 called for a squadron of thirteen observation aircraft per division, while each corps headquarters was to have an obser- vation group of two observation squadrons, a service squadron, and a photo squadron. Each Army and the General Headquarters of the Army was to have an observation group. By 1930, emphasis began to shift to corps and division observation in coordination with ground units along the front lines. During this prewar decade, observation aircraft progressed from a series of small biplanes to the 0-47, an all metal, 3-seat monoplane with retractable landing gear, and a 550 horsepower engine. The Army Air Corps also considered a multi-engined, amphibious aircraft which would be used to observe and adjust coast artillery fire, but the Navy objected to Army encroachment on its mission of protecting the nation's shores. Subsequently, an agreement was reached which set the Army's sphere of operation and observation at 100 miles, thus forcing it out of the long range reconnaissance role. Because of a change in organization, corps observation groups had doubled in number of aircraft by 1936, with four observation squadrons and a service squadron; however, at division level an officer and a small enlisted staff remained to assist the division commander on air matters. Under a further reorganization at a later date, the division air officers' function became centralized at corps headquarters. Observation training in the thirties was neglected as pilots avoided this program because they felt that a successful and rewarding career in observation aviation was doubtful. As a result, the program faltered, morale sagged, and many officers transferred to bomber and fighter duty. The lack of funds during the thirties, along with a misunderstanding of the urgency of the require- ments, served to delay the development of observation aviation. 5 Establishment of Organic Army Aviation After purchasing a Kellett K-2 autogiro for testing in 1930, the Army waited until 1936 to obtain the Kellett YC- 1 and Pitcarn YU-2 and start combat tests at Langley Field, Virginia, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Army was particularly interested in the potential use of the 3 EARLYHISTORY OFARMYAVIATION autogiro in tactical observation and command and liaison flights because of its ability to get in and out of small areas. Several serious accidents, weight limitations, failure to install additional observer type equipment, and failure in flight tests caused the cancellation of the autogiro program of development. The answer to the problem of rotary powered flight seemed to be the helicopter. Encouraged by German success in this field in 1937, Congress appropriated $2,000,000 for the Army Air Corps to procure a helicopter. The XR-1, developed by Plait La Page Company, emerged in 1941, followed closely by the XR-IA later in the year. The advent of the war delayed any significant developments in rotary aircraft. 6 After 1939, certain field artillery officers made a concerted effort to obtain efficient aircraft for their branch to be used for artillery observation. Proposals to include light observation planes organically in field artillery units were first advanced as a consequence of experience in the Louisiana Maneuvers of September 1941. In these maneuvers, the observation aircraft provided by the newly created air support commands proved to be inadequate. During the 1941 maneuvers, conducted in Tennessee, Kansas, Louisiana, Texas, and the Carolinas from April through October, 8 Piper Cubs, 4 Aeroncas, and 4 Taylorcraft were tested. The aircraft, their pilots, and mechanics were supplied by the aircraft manufacturers at no cost to the government, except that in the final stages of the Louisiana Maneuvers the Army contracted for the use of the so-called "Grasshopper Squadron" to assure their availability for a period after the date which the manufacturers had decided to withdraw them. According to Maj. Gen. Robert M. Danford, Chief of Field Artillery, the only uniformly satisfactory report of air observation during those Louisiana Maneuvers came from those artillery units which used light commercial planes (Piper Cubs) operated by civilian pilots. General Danford renewed a previous recommendation to the War Department to make light liaison planes, operated by field artillery officer-pilots, organic in the artillery component of each division and in each corps artillery brigade. Division and corps commanders who had participated in the Louisiana Maneuvers were unanimously in favor of this change. Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, was well aware of the value of tactical air support for the ground forces and the importance of good aerial adjustment of artillery fire, but until the 1941 maneuvers he believed this was a responsibility of the Air Corps. After the maneuvers, General McNair recommended to General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army, that commercial planes be purchased to relieve the shortage of liaison aircraft. In November 1941, General Marshall agreed that the commercial aircraft were of merit in regard to cost and availability and would relieve the current pressure on the production program of heavier tactical aircraft. As a result of this decision, the Materiel Division, General Head- quarters, began negotiating for the purchase of 617 light aircraft. This initial procurement was increased more than tenfold in the next year.7 On 10 December 1941, General Marshall directed General Danford to test out his theory of organic aircraft. Two units--the 13th Field Artillery Brigade of the First Army and the 2d 4 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION PiperCubs used during 1941 maneuvers. Division Artillery of the Third Anny-received twelve TO-59 Piper Cubs with each aircraft assigned a pilot and a specially trained mechanic. During the tests, which lasted all winter, the artillerymen trained enthusiastically under their civilian instructors. On I May 1942, Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, General McNair's Chief of Staff, received a favorable test report and promptly added his recommendation for approval. The Secretary of War approved organic aviation for the field artillery on 6 June 1942. This action authorized 2 aircraft per light and medium artillery battalion, 2 per heavy artillery battalion normally assigned to brigade, 2 per field artillery group, and 2 for the headquarters and headquarters battery of each field artillery brigade and division artillery. Thus, Army aviation became a reality in the early days of World War II.S Light aircraft were utilized for almost every conceivable mission during World War II.Every major command unit, except the Antiaircraft Command, established a requirement for organic assignment of aircraft. The period, 1942-1947, was characterized by the absence of any clear-cut basic understanding among the agencies concerned regarding the organic assignment of aircraft outside of the Army Air Force. Continuous difficulties over organization and control of these 5 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMYAVIATION An L-4 GrasshopperObservation plane of the 1th Observation Squadron taxis on a road during the CarolinaManeuvers in August 1942. aircraft, referred to as liaison aircraft during this period, were further complicated by the questions of what type aircraft were to be used for the observation mission. The nearest approach to any degree of accord on the light aviation issue during the war was contained in a set of principles recommended by the Army Air Force, generally accepted by Army Ground Forces, and given due consideration by the War Department in handling decisions on Army aviation. The salient features of these principles were: maximum sustained utilization of aircraft assigned organically to the Army Ground Forces; minimum detachment of individual aircraft from the main body; minimum duplication of Army Air Force units and equipment with a compensating increase in the ability to wage war, and, last, it was generally agreed that separate airdromes, depot maintenance facilities, and training facilities would not be required. World War II Training Early in World War II, responsibilities for the equipment, maintenance, and training as- sociated with organic aviation were divided between the Army Ground Forces, which supervised tactical training of pilots and mechanics, and the Army Air Forces, which handled basic flight training of student pilots and their rating. 6 EARLYHISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION An L-20 (foreground) and two L-19 aircraft (background)in flight near Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. On 14 January 1942, fourteen officers and twenty enlisted men of the Field Artillery, who were holders of civilian pilot licenses, reported to the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, and were organized as the Air Training Detachment under the command of LL. Col. W.W.Ford. Between 14 January and 28 February, these individuals received basic instruction in short field flying techniques and maiintenance of liaison airplanes from seven civilian flying instrutors and three civilian maintenance instructors. Thirteen officers and eight enlisted men successfully com- pleted the course. When the War Department approved the adoption of organic air observation 7 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION for the field artillery, it directed that the Field Artillery School conduct training of pilots and mechanics to be procured from the Ground Forces. Trainees had to have prior flight and mechanical experience. In the organization of the Department of Air Training, highly skilled flight instructors and maintenance instructors were hired from civilian life to give pilots intensive training. Courses necessary for tactical training were organized in the Department of Air Training, set up in the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The first eighteen pilots graduated on 18 September 1942. Controversy developed between the Ground Forces and the Air Forces over the recruiting of pilots and their qualification. The original plan provided that field artillery pilots might be noncommissioned officers with the rating of staff sergeants, as were all Army Air Force liaison pilots, but the majority of those recruited from the Army Ground Forces were commissioned officers. Beginning in September 1942, the Army Air Forces was to send 100 qualified liaison pilots a month to Fort Sill. This plan failed because the Army Ground Forces had difficulty finding qualified volunteers, while the Army Air Forces challenged the qualification of those admitted to the courses at the Field Artillery School. Those student pilots supplied by the Army Air Forces often failed to measure up to flying requirements of the Field Artillery School. There was constant disagreement whether or not the pilots should be observers trained to adjust artillery fire. The Air Forces contended that adjustment of artillery fire from a multi-seated aircraft could best be performed by an observer rather than by the pilot. In September 1942, the commandant of the Field Artillery School made a concerted effort to assign responsibility for the procurement and rating of field artillery pilots to the Army Ground Forces. By November 1942, it was agreed that the Army Ground Forces should begin sending twenty-five ground officers per week to the Army Air Forces for training. These officers eventually would be included in the quota of forty which the Air Forces would send to Fort Sill every week. 9 The first class under the Department of Air Training began on 3 August 1942 and was composed of officers up to captain, and enlisted volunteers who held or recently held Civil Aeronautics Agency private pilot licenses, had logged sixty hours pilot time, and weighed 170 pounds or less. The first basically trained pilots arrived at the Field Artillery School on 19 September. Twenty-five field artillery officers began Primary Flight Instruction at Denton, Texas, on 3 December, with the same number reporting each week thereafter for seven weeks of training as liaison pilots before reporting to Fort Sill for the 5-week advanced course. The duration of the primary flight course was changed to five weeks in February 1943. Early in 1943, the War Department began to straighten out the difficulties over personnel and training that had arisen between the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces and approved certain changes in the organic aviation program as requested by the Army Ground Forces. The most important change was that pilots were to be officers, trained to adjust fire. The pilot would be accompanied by a radioman-mechanic who was to watch for hostile planes and transmit fire directions to the ground. The new system assured Army Ground Forces control of and respon- sibility for the supply of pilots. Under the new arrangement, the Army Air Forces trained AGF 8 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION volunteers as liaison pilots at the Army Air Forces flying schools at Denton and Pittsburg, Kansas, in a manner acknowledged by Army Ground Forces to be very satisfactory. The Field Artillery School no longer had to prolong its courses by giving its student pilots basic military training. Late in February 1943, Army Ground Forces expressed its desire to include organic liaison aviation in tank destroyer units and mechanized cavalry units. It also wanted to provide divisions with airplanes, in addition to those with the artillery, for the use of the division commander and his staff and for work with division reconnaissance elements. About half of the planes and men requested were to be assigned organically to divisions and the remainder to tank destroyer and mechanized cavalry forces. The War Department estimated in March, that in order to implement the proposed extension of organic aviation in ground force units, approximately 1,500 liaison planes would be required in addition to the 2,500 necessary for the existing field artillery program. The War Department turned down the AGF proposal on 28 June, thereby stabilizing the organic ground force aviation program until almost the end of World War Il. During the period, 16 March - 19 April 1943, the Army Air Forces supplied the Artillery School with forty liaison pilots weekly. First priority on the weekly input of trainees went to all Field Artillery officers supplied by Army Ground Forces who had successfully completed the flight training course and had been rated liaison pilots. Second priority was given to enlisted graduates of the civilian pilot training-liaison pilot training course. These men were to have completed basic military training and were to be rated liaison pilots prior to their transfer to Fort Sill. Third priority was reserved for well qualified enlisted volunteers who had completed basic military training and who were rated liaison pilots. On 20 April 1943, the War Department decided it would be better for enlisted men to attend officer candidate school before going to flight school. This decision was made because the enlisted men who were capable of doing an acceptable job as liaison aviators usually were officer candidate school material and left troop units for OCS shortly after reporting for duty. The duration of the course at the Field Artillery School increased from seven weeks in February 1943 to fourteen in June 1945. Stress was placed on cross country flying and the lessons learned in the combat zones. Training was suspended from the fall of 1944 to January 1945 because a sufficient number of pilots had been trained to meet Army requirements. Contracts with civilian flying schools were cancelled and Army Air Force primary flight training at Pittsburg was discontinued. Seaplane training for pilots and mechanics was begun in April 1944. Training in the use of the Brodie device was ordered by Army Ground Forces in October 1944. The Brodie device was a cable launching and landing apparatus which enabled aircraft to get in and out of confined or unimproved areas and to operate from Naval landing craft. Following the resumption of training in January 1945, pilot losses in combat necessitated an increased input of from thirty to forty students every two weeks and a reduction of basic train- ing to eleven or twelve weeks. Tactical instruction was cut to five weeks, and liaison pilots were 9 EARLY HISTORY OFARMYAVIATION rushed overseas until the situation eased. Beginning with Class Number 101, enrolled on 18 June 1945, the department reduced the student input from forty to thirty per class. 10 By the end of World War II, 2,630 pilots and 2,252 mechanics had been trained. The cessation of hostilities interrupted the procurement and training programs and subsequently reduced the aircraft inventory from 1,600 to approximately 200 aircraft by late 1945. The Separation of the Army and the Air Force The National Security Act of 1947 established the United States Air Force as an independent service. Army Regulation 95-5 set forth the missions of Army aviation under the new arrange- ment in the following terms: expediting and facilitating the conduct of operations on land; improving mobility, command, control, and logistic support of Army forces; and facilitating greater battlefield dispersion and maneuverability under conditions of atomic warfare. At the same time, the provisions prevented infringement upon those areas of responsibility delegated to the Air Force by the Key West Agreement of 21 April 1948. Joint Regulations The Army and the Air Force, acting jointly, issued a number of so-called adjustment regulations, one of which amounted to a basic agreement on the question of Army organic aviation. On 29 May 1949, Joint Army and Air Force Adjustment Regulation 5-10-1, Combat Joint Operations, Etc.: Employment of Aircraft for Performance of Certain Missions, was issued. This regulation provided for two types of Army aircraft-fixed wing, not exceeding 2,500 pounds in weight; and rotary wing, weighing no more than 3,500 to 4,000 pounds. Organic aircraft could be utilized by the Army for the purpose of expediting and improving ground combat procedures in forward areas of the battlefield. Specific functions were very similar to those of light Army liaison airplanes during World War II. They included: (1) maintenance of aerial surveillance of enemy forward areas in order to locate targets, adjust fire, and obtain information on hostile defense forces; (2) aerial route reconnaissance; (3) control of march columns; (4) camouflage inspections of ground forces areas and installations; (5) local courier and messenger service; (6) emergency aerial evacuation; (7) emergency aerial wire laying; (8) limited aerial resupply; and (9) limited front line aerial photography. The agreement specified that the Air Force would provide liaison aircraft units to perform for the Army courier service, messenger service, aerial evacuation, aerial photography, aerial supply, and aerial wire laying. Soon after publication of JAAFAR 5-10-1, the Ordnance Corps was assigned the major responsibilities for the logistical support of Army aircraft. The Army actively entered the aircraft supply field the following March when, in conjunction with the Air Force, it prescribed certain policies and procedures to be followed in "matters related to the development, procure- ment, supply, and maintenance of Army aircraft and allied aircraft equipment" On 23 March 1950, these took the form of identical documents, Army Regulation 700-50 and Air Force Regulation 65-7, Supplies and Equipment: Army Aircraft and Allied Equipment." 10 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION Training Agreements In late February 1947, General Jacob L. Devers, the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, and Lt. Gen. J. K. Cannon, the Commanding General, Air Training Command, reached an agreement on the training of Army Ground Forces pilots. The Army Air Forces would conduct technical flight training to produce liaison pilots capable of operating AGF aircraft during daylight, darkness, and under marginal weather conditions from landing strips and roads normally used by AGF units. Also, the Air Forces would rate Army Ground Forces student pilots as liaison pilots upon successful completion of the Army Air Forces Liaison Pilot Course. The Army Ground Forces agreed to conduct operational and tactical flight training; conduct instruction in the performance of first and second echelon maintenance of its aircraft; and conduct instruction in adjustment of fire, aerial reconnaissance, aerial photography, amphibious, airborne, and mountain operations, and any additional areas which might be required for Army Ground Forces pilots to accomplish their missions. All training was to be conducted at Fort Sill. Also, the AGF would evaluate the products of the Army Air Forces Liaison Pilot School through certain operational and tactical flight evaluation tests conducted by the Artillery School. The results of those tests, along with comments and constructive recommendations, wcre to be sent to the Army Ground Forces for transmittal to Air Training Command headquarters. Flight Training While the Army and the Air Force attempted to work out a division of their responsibilities, important changes had been taking place in Army organic aviation. On 7 December 1945, the Department of Air Training at the Field Artillery School had been redesignated the Army Ground Forces Air Training School, a change which resulted from an agreement to extend organic aviation to cavalry, infantry, engineer, armor, and tank destroyer units. An agreement between General Devers and General Ira C. Eaker, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, also called for additional light aircraft for the AGF. Training provided for the Army by the Air Force was conducted at several installations during the post-war period. Primary fixed wing training, which had been conducted at Sheppard Air Force Base, was transferred to Gary Air Force Base at San Marcos, Texas, in May 1946. Gary Air Force Base was closed in 1949 and all Army training was transferred to Connally Air Force Base, Waco, Texas. With the expansion of Army aviation after the outbreak of war in Korea, Gary Air Force Base was reopened and all primary flight training was transferred there, as was the training of mechanics which had been conducted at Sheppard Air Force Base. The Air Training School at Fort Sill began operation early in 1946, but by June the demobilization of the Armed Forces brought about a severe shortage of personnel. As a result, the Air Training School had to eliminate seaplane training and had to reduce sharply the time devoted to the Brodie device. In November, the Department of Air Training again was established, and the Army Ground Forces Air Training School was discontinued. The depart- ment offered training support for all of the ground arms, rather than just for artillery as it had 11 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION prior to 7 December 1945. During the period from 1946 to 1949, 486 officers graduated from the Army Ground Forces Pilot Course, while 461 enlisted men graduated from the Air Mechanic Course. As a result of the February 1947 agreements, the program of instruction of the Army Air Forces Liaison Pilot Course was lengthened from four to five and one-half months. The maximum capacity of the Artillery School under the new program of instruction would be sixty students per class. The Army Ground Forces, anticipating a 40 percent attrition rate during the Army Air Forces Liaison Pilot Course, recommended that the maximum capacity of each class be established initially at 100 for reporting and 60 for graduation. Based upon pilot replacement requirements and experience gained in conducting the revised pilot courses, AGF also recom- mended changes in class capacities one month prior to the starting date of each class. It anticipated that classes would not be filled to maximum capacity because of shortages of company grade officers in the ground arms. The Army Ground Forces Pilot Course conducted by the Artillery School was to be reduced from four to three months in order to maintain a continuous student load at the Artillery School of four 3-month classes per year. The Army Ground Forces proposed that the Artillery School attach an AGF combat-experienced pilot of field grade to the Army Air Forces Liaison Pilot School to serve as the AGF liaison officer to provide timely assistance and advice for the instructors. 12 By far the most significant development of this period was the introduction of the helicopter into Army aviation. Early in 1945, the Army began investigating the feasibility of adapting rotary wing aircraft to the Army aviation mission. In 1946, the Army obtained its first helicop- ters-thirteen Bell YR-13s. In February 1947, the Bell Helicopter Corporation began the first formal Army helicopter pilot training course under contract at its factory facilities. Primary rotary wing training began at San Marcos on 1 September 1947 under Air Force direction. 13 Army personnel qualified as helicopter pilots after twenty-five hours of flight instruction. Feeling that twenty-five hours were inadequate and that its pilots needed training in advanced techniques in helicopter flight, the Army established an advanced tactical training course at Fort Sill on 1 November 1948. Men who had taken their helicopter flight training from either the Air Force or Bell were the first instructors for the tactical helicopter training course. During 1949 and early 1950, the training of helicopter pilots by both the Army and the Air Force had low quotas, none of which exceeded ten students per class. In August 1949, the Air Force Helicopter School program for Army Field Forces officers was extended from four to five weeks in duration, with a class capacity of six. Flight training increased from 25 to 30 hours and academic training increased from 40 to 51 hours. Officers selected to attend the course were Regular Army or selected reservists rated as liaison pilots, currently on flight status. Beginning in January 1950, all students, upon successful completion of the Air Force Pilot Helicopter Course, were required to enter the Army Field Forces Helicopter Pilot Course at the Artillery School. In December 1949, the Commanding General of the Artillery Center had recommended that the Army Field Forces Helicopter Course be extended from four to five weeks in order to 12 EARLY ISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION provide increased instruction in maintenance, technical inspections, and practical field exercises. The Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces 14 approved this plan in late December and received Department of the Army approval in January 1950. Army Field Forces also authorized attendance at the Army Field Forces Helicopter Pilot Course for those officers who were trained as field artillery pilots during World War II in order to familiarize them with new tactical doctrine applicable to combat arms other than field artillery, new types of liaison airplanes, helicopters, communications equipment, and new conduct of fire procedures. In view of the possible consolidation of helicopter training, the Artillery School in March 1950 pointed out that the existing facilities at Connally Air Force Base, where the first phase of training was then being conducted, were inadequate because of air congestion. If the course were to be consolidated at Fort Sill, eight weeks would be required to train a helicopter pilot, as duplication of time in performing basic maneuvers and allowing instructor pilots to become familiar with the students would be eliminated. Also, a considerable savings in funds and a subsequent increase in output would result from consolidation. Any real progress in consolida- tion was nevertheless stymied by the impact of the Korean conflict. 15 13 EARLY HISTORY OF ARMY AVIATION Endnotes Chapter I 1. (1) Alfred Goldberg, ed., A History of the United States Air Force (Princeton: D. Nostrand Inc., 1957), pp. 1-4. (2) Richard Tierney and Fred Montgomery, The Army Aviation Story (Northport, Ala.: Colonial Press, 1963), pp. 12-20. (3) For a detailed study of balloon operations in the Civil War, see F. Stansbury Haydon, Aeronautics in the Union and Confederate Armies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941), Vol. I. 2. Tierney and Montgomery, The Army Aviation Story, pp. 20-23. 3. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 4. (1) Ibid., pp. 26-29. (2) Goldberg, A History ofthe U.S. Air Force,p. 23. (3) Capt. Irving B. Holley, Jr., Evolution of the Liaison Type Airplane, 1917-1944 (Maxwell AFB: Army Air Force Historical Office, 1946), pp. 1-2. (4) Irving B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 49, 172. 5. (1) Goldberg, The History of the U.S. Air Force,pp. 29-38, 43. (2) Holley, Evolution of the Liaison Type Airplane, 1917- 1944, pp. 7, 11, 26-27. (3) Tierney and Montgomery, The Army Aviation Story, pp. 39-43. (4) Robert F. Futrell, "Command of Observation," U.S. Air Force Historical Study No. 24 (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 1952), pp. 6, 8. (5) James C. Fahey, ed., U.S. Army Aircraft 1908-1946 (New York: Ships and Aircraft, 1946), p. 31. (6) Air Corps Advanced Flying School, Observation Aviation, p. 13. 6. (1) Col. H. Frank Gregory, Anything a Horse Can Do, The Story of the Helicopter (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), pp. 7-89. (2) Holley, Liaison Type Airplanes,p. 47. (3) Futrell, Command ofObservationAviction, p. 16. (4) Army Air Forces, Vol. I, The AAF HelicopterProgram(Wright Field: October 1946), pp. 11-22. 7. (1) Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team Including OrganicLight Aviation, AGF Study No. 35, 1948, p. 23. (2) Harrison, History of Army Aviation (Draft), pp. 40-43. 8. (1) Harrison, History of Army Aviation (Draft), pp. 44-45. (2) AGF Study No. 35, pp. 23-24. (3) Memo for CG AGF, WDGCT 320.2 (2-5-42), 6 Jun 42, subj: Organic Air Observation for Field Artillery. 9. AGF Study No. 35, pp. 24-28. 10. (1) History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Vol. 11, pp. 169-176. (2) Tierney and Montgomery, The Army Aviation Story, pp. 65-76. 11. R. Earl McClendon, Army Aviation, 1947-1953, Documentary Research Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell AFB, pp. 6-7. 12. Memo, CG AGF to CG Air Training Command, Barksdale Field, LA, 9 Apr 47, subj: Training and Rating of Army Ground Forces Pilots. 13. (1)Tierney and Montgomery, The Army Aviation Story, pp. 29- 80, 93-96. (2) History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Vol. III, pp. 10-18, 223-227,349. 14. Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, was reorganized and redesignated as the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces on 10 March 1948. 15. (1) Tierney and Montgomery, The Army Aviation Story, pp. 94- 96. (2) History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Vol. III, pp. 235-239. (3) Ltr ATTNG-12 360/83 (31 Aug 49), OCAFF to distr, 31 Aug 49, subj: H-13 Helicopter Pilots Course. (4) Ltr ARPSIAT 352.11, CG Artillery Center to OCAFF, 6 Dec 49, subj: Army Field Forces Helicopter Pilot Course, with 1st Ind CGSOT 352 (6 Dec 49), O&T Div to OCAFF, 10 Jan 50. (5) Ltr AKPSIAT 452.1, Comdt Artillery School to OCAFF, 14 Mar 50, subj: Army Helicopter Pilot Training. 14 Chapter H THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY AVIATION Organic Army aviation had emerged from World War II with a vast amount of both training and tactical experience. During the following five years the drastic reduction in the size of the Army had caused a major curtailment in aviation activities. It was during this period, however, that the Army began to give serious consideration to the use of the helicopter. Partially shackled by agreements with the Air Force, the Army in 1949 began to take the first tentative steps in expanding its aviation program. The outbreak of war in Korea gave an impetus to this expansion which resulted in a rapid growth of Army aviation in both size and importance. Late in 1949, the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) conducted studies which indicated the need for various types of helicopters to provide short-haul air transport to corps, division, and smaller tactical units of the ground forces. This proposal received strong support in a Department of the Army G-3 study prepared in May 1950. It was therefore recommended that the Army provide funds in the fiscal year 1952 budget for the organization and equipping of five transport helicopter companies which would be placed with divisions in the United States for the purpose of developing doctrine for their employment. The Transportation Corps' role in organic Army aviation stemmed from the development of this experimental program in the summer of 1950. Transportation Corps functions, largely of a staff nature, involved planning and coordination with the Army Field Forces and the Army General Staff regarding the activation, equipping, and formulation of doctrine for the employ- ment of cargo helicopter units. 1 The outbreak of the Korean conflict resulted in quick action in the development of the helicopter program. Provision was made for five Army helicopter transport companies in the Emergency Supplemental Budget for fiscal year 1951. In order to organize such units as soon as practicable and to gain combat experience in Korea, OCAFF was instructed on 9 August 1950 to undertake the early activation and training of four of the five units. These four companies were to be equipped with the H-19 CHICKASAW helicopter. The fifth company was planned to be organized in the latter part of fiscal year 1951 and would be equipped with H-21 WORKHORSE helicopters which were expected to become available in the fall of 1951. 15 THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY AVIATION Cross-servicing orders for the procurement of these helicopters were placed with the Air Force in late August and September. 2 Planning for Organic Air Transport On 8 September 1950, General J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army, requested the Air Force to lift the weight restrictions imposed by JAAFAR 5-10-1. General Collins emphasized that there was no intention on the part of the Army to infringe on the agreed roles and missions of the Air Force. But he believed that it was essential for the Army to have organic helicopters to be used for short haul transport in corps, divisions, and smaller tactical units. And the H-21, which was a basic component of the expansion plan, exceeded the weight allowed the Army. Unless the Army obtained permission from the Air Force to lift the weight restriction, the aviation expansion program would not be possible. 3 Department of the Army Proposals In October 1950, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army, prepared a study to determine the desirability of forming experimental units to be equipped with helicopters instead of ground transport. The study also explored the development procedures and doctrine for the use of organic air transport in Army units and the feasibility of converting a portion or all of the ground transportation of certain special Army units to helicopter air transport. The Department of the Army study group concluded that it was feasible to provide certain Army units with helicopters, which would not require prepared landing fields. With the aircraft currently being procured, the Army would have sufficient helicopters, pilots, and maintenance personnel by 1 January 1952, exclusive of the five authorized helicopter transport companies, to be in a position to experiment with the use of short haul organic air transport in Army units. Helicopter transport companies then being organized would perform as units for transport purposes in divisions or corps and not be broken up or utilized to provide organic unit transport on a permanent basis to company or battalion-size units. The G-3 study group recommended that as helicopters became available for operation above the requirements of the five helicopter transport companies, an experimental infantry battalion be equipped with helicopter transport in lieu of ground vehicles. The Army Airborne Center would use this battalion to test the feasibility of providing organic short haul transport. An experimental field artillery battery equipped with helicopters in lieu of vehicles would be placed under the control of the Artillery School for the same purpose. The group further recommended that an experimental infantry battalion equipped with helicopters be formed at the Infantry School which would be used to test the feasibility of providing organic air transportation to infantry units for special purposes such as mountain, arctic, and jungle operations. The group recommended the Army Field Forces explore uses for Army organic air transport which could operate without prepared landing fields. Whenever practicable, the Army Field Forces should include the use of this special air transport in training 16 THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY AVIATION exercises and maneuvers. All reports of tests and special training exercises utilizing helicopters would be submitted to the Department of the Army. 4 The Chief of Staff of the Army approved these recommendations in January 1951, directing that the experimental units at Forts Bragg, Benning, and Sill be placed in operation as rapidly as possible. As helicopters became available over and above those needed for the original five units, they would be used instead of ground vehicles in the experimental infantry and artillery battalions and in training exercises and maneuvers. Preliminary training and tests were to be conducted as soon as small helicopters were available, pending the receipt of cargo-type helicopters. The implementation of the project was to proceed on a high priority since the results might form the basis of important changes in Army transport. 5 In the weeks that followed, plans for the employment of the five helicopter companies were developed. To facilitate rapid development of techniques and doctrine, one company each was to be assigned to the Far East Command and the Transportation School and to an airborne division, an armored division, and an infantry division in the United States. Five additional companies were included in the fiscal year 1952 troop basis. On the basis of planned augmenta- tion of the Army in fiscal year 1951, anticipated future requirements totaled four helicopter transport battalions and fourteen helicopter transport companies. 6 The experimental program, and also the original five helicopter transport companies, were held up because of the continuing disagreement with the Air Force regarding the size of Army aircraft. General Collins in November requested that the Air Force expedite procurement of H-19s and H-21s for the Army. On 13 December 1950, General Hoyt S.Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, replied that he would not agree to the elimination of weight limitations on Army aircraft. He believed that the necessary air transport support of ground forces could be furnished by placing helicopters and other required equipment in Air Force assault squadrons. Following this nonconcurrence, the Air Force halted procurement of the helicopters ordered by the Army. At about the same time, the 1st Helicopter Company (later redesignated the 6th) was activated without equipment at the Artillery School . 7 General Mark W. Clark, the Chief of Army Field Forces, urged that the weight restrictions for Army aircraft be removed and that helicopters be obtained as soon as possible. General Clark recommended that the four remaining helicopter companies be activated so that they could be field tested. These field tests would provide the basis for further consideration of the most profitable employment of helicopters. 8 Since the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force had reached an impasse in regard to the weight restriction, the matter was referred to the service secretaries for decision. On 24 January 1951, Frank M. Pace, the Secretary of the Army, and Thomas K. Finletter, the Secretary of the Air Force, met to discuss the proposed revision of JAAFAR 5-10-1. They failed to reach an agreement either in the form of a new joint regulation or a special memorandum of agreement between themselves on the general subject of Army aircraft. Secretary Finletter felt that the position of the Army represented an encroachment into the area of responsibility assigned to the Air Force which would have a far-reaching effect on the field of air transport. 17 THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY AVIATION Besides its interest in cargo helicopters, the Army in the following months requested the procurement of 284 L-20 fixed-wing airplanes weighing around 3,000 pounds each, or ap- proximately 500 pounds over the limit previously set. The Air Force continued to insist that in the field of air transport it alone had broad encompassing responsibilities. In the view of the Air Force, the Army functions were restricted to primary or local responsibilities, including courier and messenger services; limited responsibilities, principally aerial supply and aerial photog- raphy; and emergency responsibilities, mainly aerial evacuation and aerial wire laying. Secretary Finletter contended that although it might perform the operations indicated in the latter two categories with aircraft on hand, the Army could justify its organic aircraft program only upon the basis of local or primary responsibilities. On 1 August 1951, however, he agreed to waive the weight restriction in order to procure the L-20s, which was done with the understanding that "the Air Force does not abrogate any of its functions," and upon the assurance by the Secretary of the Army that the "Army does not intend to build an organic Army Air Force to perform functions of the USAF.,, 9 Army Field Forces Board No. 1 Projects In mid-November 1950, Army Field Forces, realizing the increasing need for aircraft in Korea, directed Army Field Forces Board No. 1, which was a part of the Research and Development Section, G-3, toreevaluate the needs for Army aircraft in the various types of units. The board prepared and circulated a questionnaire to interested agencies for comment. The entire scope of the project, which was broken down into three related studies, was discussed at an Army aviation conference held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, between 8 and 10 January 1951. Representatives from the Department of the Army, Army Field Forces, the CONUS armies, and the principal service schools and boards attended. Two major proposals were presented. One of these recommended that Army aviation in infantry, airborne, and armored divisions be central- ized in divisional aviation companies which would serve all division needs for organic aircraft. The second proposal was the creation of an Army Aviation Corps which would embrace all elements currently present in Army aviation, including field maintenance functions then per- formed by the Ordnance Corps and aerial transport functions contemplated for the Transporta- tion Corps. Because neither of the proposals carried, they were not at that time made a part of the Army Field Forces Board report. The report made by the board in March 1951 represented the consensus of both the question- naires and the January conference. Study Number 1, which was to determine the need for additional types of aircraft in Army Field Forces units and the extent to which these aircraft should supplement or replace present types, concluded that 2- and 4-place utility helicopters should be in the TOE of units, but that light cargo helicopters should, for the present, be limited to experimental organizations such as transportation helicopter companies. The board recom- mended that research on medium helicopters be promoted. The study indicated that a require- ment existed for a light, multi-passenger, fixed wing, multi-engine aircraft for use at corps, army, and comparable headquarters, but that no requirement existed for a special aircraft for the adjustment of long range artillery fires. 18 THE EVOWTJON OF ARMY AVIATION Study Number 2 had as its purpose the determination of the aircraft requirements of Army Field Forces units assuming a decentralized organization and proven types of aircraft. No organization which answered the questionnaire reported the number of aircraft presently as- signed to be excessive; in fact, many agencies desired additional aircraft. The conferees recommended twenty-six aircraft for the infantry division. The representatives of the Artillery School disagreed, contending that 2 helicopters were required in the division artillery head- quarters and 1 additional 2-place, fixed wing aircraft was needed in each artillery battalion, thereby bringing the aircraft in the division to 32. Although the majority of agencies which answered questionnaires reported in favor of the organic assignment of aircraft to regiments and battalions, neither the conference nor Army Field Forces Board No. 1 concurred with this principle, which they considered an uneconomical method of aircraft distribution. In order to determine which type of Army aviation organization would produce the greatest efficiency in its assigned role, Army Field Forces Board No. 1 undertook Study Number 3. The board recommended that under battle conditions at least 50 percent of the aircraft assigned to a division (13 of 26) should be operational. The proposal for this number of aircraft obviogly originated from the feeling by each commander that he must have his own organic aircraft; he could not rely upon someone else, such as the artillery or the division headquarters, to furnish aircraft when it would be needed. The commander also had a feeling that if he needed one aircraft he had to have two to protect against periods when some would be nonoperational. In the opinion of Army Field Forces Board No. 1, this reasoning was unsound. Additional items of equipment should not be provided by the table of organization to guard against their misuse. Army Field Forces Board No. I in its Study Number 3 concluded that decentralized organiza- tion of Army aviation was uneconomical as it required more aircraft, more associated equipment, and more personnel than a central organization would require for the same job. The board also concluded that decentralized organization was inefficient because it would not provide adequate technical command supervision over training, maintenance, or operations; it could not afford to provide all the technical skills needed; it made it hard to to take up the slack in maintenance when mechanics were in short supply; and it did not conform to common use of basic field equipment. Following up on the recommendations of the Army Field Forces Board No. I regarding the needs for Army aircraft in the various types of units, Army Field Forces on 19 June 1951 forwarded its revision of proposed aircraft requirements to the Department of the Army. The latter approved these requirements on 26 June and included them in its current procure- ment planning.10 The Memorandum of Understanding of 1951 The negotiations with the Air Force finally resulted in Secretaries Pace and Finletter signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 2 October 1951. The most significant aspect of this memorandum was the elimination of the maximum weight restrictions on Army organic aircraft in favor of a definition solely in terms of the functions to be performed. Army organic aircraft 19 THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY AVIATION were to be used "as an integral part of its components for the purpose of expediting and improving ground combat and logistical procedures within the combat zone." The combat zone could vary in depth according to conditions, but it was understood that it would normally not exceed fifty to seventy-five miles. Army organic aircraft were to perform the following functions: (1) aerial observation for the purpose of locating, verifying, and evaluating targets, adjusting fire, studying terrain, and obtaining information on enemy forces not otherwise obtained by air reconnaissance agencies of the other services; (2) control of Army forces; (3) accomplishment of command, liaison, and courier missions; (4) performance of aerial wire laying; and (5) transportation of supplies, equipment, and small units within the combat zone. The Air Force was still assigned the primary function of supplying the necessary airlift to the Army. Army aircraft were not to duplicate the functions of the Air Force in providing close combat support, assault transport and other troop carrier airlift, aerial photography, tactical reconnaissance, and interdiction of enemy land power and communications. 1 The friction between the two services was somewhat eased later in the month when the Army decided to seek the procurement of cargo helicopters for only five, rather than ten, companies. The establishment of firmer requirements and the need for any expansion of production would be contingent on the evaluation of tests with the five companies and on the progress of aircraft development. Only limited progress was made in implementing the five company program. The 6th Helicopter Company had been assigned veteran officer pilots. Training classes for warrant officer pilots and enlisted mechanics were initiated at Fort Sill in June 1951, and in August a second unit, the 13th Transportation Helicopter Company, was activated. Neither unit had cargo helicopters, and it was necessary to provide small utility-reconnaissance types for use in training and in maneuvers held in the late summer and winter. The lack of suitable equipment adversely affected the operational readiness of the units and delayed the activation of the other companies. 1 2 Although the Memorandum of Understanding had marked a milestone in the development of Army aviation, it did not settle the basic dispute with the Air Force. Renewed discussions began on 10 November 1951 when the Army approved an urgent Far East Command request for 122 additional helicopters in Korea. Far East Command proposed that the Air Force receive fifty of the cargo helicopters and that the Army receive seventy-two. The Air Force objected that the requirements in Korea were identified largely with its own functions. Secretary Pace replied that the Air Force had not made appropriate allocation of helicopters between the two services. In order to carry out the function of transporting its "supplies, equipment, and small units within the combat zone" the Army had decided that it was necessary to organize an adequate number of transportation helicopter companies and air evacuation units. The Secretary of the Air Force maintained that the role of the Army was still limited and secondary. According to its interpretation of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Department of the Army programed transportation helicopter companies for several types of missions. The Army 20 THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY AVIATION envisioned that a primary mission of the helicopter companies would be the transportation of high priority Class I, II, and V supplies from Army depots located in the rear of the army area to supply points located immediately in the rear of the divisions. The emergency issue of all classes of supply from depots or supply points to divisions by attaching helicopters to divisions to replace conventional transportation would also be of vital importance. Another crucial mission would be the emergency lateral shifting of supplies and troops to meet unforeseen situations. Helicopters also were to be used to transport troops and critical Class IV supplies in support of such operations as river crossings, where speed and deception were vital. The transportation of supplies, equipment, and small units anywhere within the combat zone where terrain conditions or other obstructions made ground means of transportation inadequate also would be the job of the helicopter. In order to properly employ needed helicopters, the Army maintained that commanders required command and control of transportation units. Only then could they analyze their available resources and requirements and assign premium transportation to the area of maximum benefit. Because helicopter support would have to be made readily available to the unit which required assistance, helicopter units were to be assigned to the field army and temporarily attached by that headquarters to support whatever subordinate unit had the requirement, just as additional motor vehicles and tactical resources were available at the field army level to meet peak demands of subordinate echelons. The use of helicopters was expected to reduce the requirements for other transportation equipment and units. The facility with which helicopters were able to overcome obstacles such as streams, snow, and poor roads would reduce the requirement for special equipment such as amphibious trucks, assault boats, and Weasels. The helicopter, in assuming the missions of ground transport, would be under the direct operational control of the tactical unit commander. 13 Development of a Long Range Program The continuing dispute with the Air Force had not only delayed completion of the original five transportation helicopter company program, but it had also slowed the development of a long range program for Army aviation. In February 1951, the Air Force agreed to procure a limited number of cargo helicopters sufficient for the original five companies in the program. The delays in completing the equipping of the authorized companies were mainly the result of the limited production capacity of the helicopter industry. The helicopters being produced at that time were for the most part already committed to various Air Force and Navy programs. The Transportation Corps believed that it was necessary to order a substantial number of helicopters in line with the Army's ultimate expectation of its use, rather than to await complete development of doctrine, employment, and aircraft. In June, the Chief of Transportation proposed the adoption of a 3-year program for 3,000 helicopters to meet the Army's current needs and provide a base for mobilization requirements. For various reasons, there was an unwillingness at the Department of the Army level to undertake an expanded cargo helicopter program. Aside from the Air Force's reluctance to 21 THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY AVIATION procure larger transport helicopters, there appeared to be opposition within the Army to the large outlay of money required. And in some quarters there was still some doubt that the helicopter was a practical vehicle for the transportation mission. In November, the Department of the Army G-3 recommended the reinstitution of a 10-com- pany program, and money was provided to support the expanded program. To facilitate planning, the recommendations of Far East Command were requested regarding its needs for current operations and the requirements for a type field army. Far East Command set its requirements for current operations at 4 battalions of 3 companies each, and recommended 10 battalions for the type field army. To support the 10-company program, G-3 included 97 H-19s and 85 H-21s in the fiscal year 1951 and 1952 budgets, and 80 H-19s were added to the fiscal year 1953 budget. No further expansion was recommended by G-3, Department of the Army, until field experience with Army transportation helicopters proved that the advantages of additional helicopter companies jus- tified the necessary expense in funds and manpower. In addition, G-3 urged that caution would have to be taken to assure that each expansion in number or size of aircraft by the Army was preceded by an increase in the ability of the Army to operate and maintain the aircraft. Experience with four utility helicopters sent to Korea in the fall of 1950 had shown that there would be a continuous requirement in combat for Army air evacuation units operating small helicopters.14 Chief of Transportation Study The Department of the Army requested Maj. Gen. Frank A. Heileman, Chief of Transporta- tion, to submit his comments on the recommendations of the Far East Command. The comments were to include the basis of assignment of transportation helicopter companies or battalions to divisions, corps, and armies and the possible reduction in the number of other units, such as truck companies, to provide the necessary personnel spaces needed to implement an expanded helicopter program. General Heileman concurred with the requirements for transportation helicopter battalions recommended by the Commander in Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE), and supported the contention that procurement should be instituted immediately on such a scale so as to increase the production rate of the helicopter industry. The Chief of Transportation believed that the request of CINCFE was tempered by a knowledge of the present availability of helicopters, but concurred in the requirement of ten transportation helicopter battalions. He also agreed that the helicopters of a type field army should be capable of producing a total lift which would be equivalent to ten battalions of H-2 is, or other medium cargo helicopters, with approximately 14,000 pounds payload. In order to allow greater versatility and to achieve a proper balance of equipment, the Chief of Transporta- tion recommended that the ultimate assignment to field armies consist of 3 light cargo helicopter battalions (3,000 pounds payload per helicopter), 6 medium cargo battalions (4,000 - 6,000 pounds), and 1 heavy cargo battalion (8,000 - 20,000 pounds). The Chief of Transportation mentioned in passing that the CINCFE apparently overlooked the requirement for administrative 22 THE EVOLUTION OFARMY AVIATION helicopters in battalion headquarters. Proposed tables of organization and equipment allowed two cargo models and two utility helicopters per battalion headquarters. Each operating com- pany had twenty-one cargo models for task use and one utility type, in line with the CINCFE proposal. Regarding tactical deployment of troops, General Heileman surmised that the Army might use its helicopters as did the Marines in Korea. The lack of roads, railways, and prepared airfields in Korea, as well as the adverse battle conditions facing surface transportation, might necessitate the replacement of a certain number of trucks and relieve the necessity for costly road construc- tion and maintenance. In addition, any tactical needs such as movement of reserves, redeploy- ment of front line units, and the extraction of troops in tactical difficulties could be satisfied by the use of helicopters. Helicopters also could be relied upon to carry emergency and high priority cargoes amounting to an average of 10 percent of the total supply movement, thus allowing an adequate reserve for troop movement, tactical movements, and evacuation tasks. The Chief of Transportation further recommended that ten helicopter battalions be assigned to each field army with control exercised by the G-4 through his Transportation Movement Section. Control at the field army level was ruled essential in order to permit concentration of the entire fleet upon a single project and to allow shifting within the army area as required. The introduction of ten helicopter battalions into the transportation system of a field army would reduce to some extent the number of truck units required in the organization. Availability of helicopters would also completely eliminate the necessity for such expedients as human bearers and pack animals. The Chief of Transportation recommended an immediate program of production and the organization to fulfill the Army mobilization requirement for 2,500 helicopters, in order to protect foreseeable mobilization requirements, a minimum of 1,000 helicopters of the largest available type would have to be included in the 1953 budget with a similar quantity to be included in the budget for the following year. He also suggested that thirty to fifty million dollars should be made available to the three primary helicopter manufacturers for the expansion of production facilities and for expediting their production engineering program. In conclusion, General Heileman recommended that a Department of the Army panel be formed and charged with the development of a transportation helicopter program for the Chief of Staff. While concurring in the basic concepts set forth by the Chief of Transportation, the Army Field Forces commented that transportation helicopter units would be used primarily in a tactical role to provide logistical support within the forward combat areas by providing troop and supply movement. OCAFF agreed with the Chief of Transportation that helicopters of a type field army should be capable of producing a total lift equivalent of ten battalions of H-21 or other medium cargo helicopters, each with approximately 4,000 pounds payload. However, in the face of the current helicopter supply situation, a more realistic breakdown for the next several years would be 6 light helicopter battalions, 3 medium helicopter battalions, and 1 heavy helicopter battalion. OCAFF was of the opinion that for the next several years industry would be able to support 2,000-pound class helicopters (H-13s and H-23s) in greater quantities than 4,000- to 23 THE EVOLUTION OFARMYAVIATION 6,000-pound machines (H-19s and H-21s). To prevent delay in organizing and equipping battalions, consideration should be given to the use of the preponderance of helicopters which would be more readily available. The use of a more readily available helicopter would cut down the ton-mile capability, which could remain equivalent only by increasing the number of light helicopters which in turn would require additional pilots and mechanics. The Army Field Forces did not agree with the proposal for having two cargo helicopters per battalion headquarters. Each operating company already was authorized two utility helicopters in order to ensure one operational utility helicopter at all times. OCAFF also stated that because of limitation of helicopters operating at high altitudes and under certain extremely bad weather conditions, alternate forms of transportation such as human bearers and pack animals could not be completely eliminated from use at that time. According to OCAFF, consideration should be given to the availability of any operational aircraft when determining their equivalent to truck companies. The large amount of maintenance required on cargo helicopters would materially affect such comparisons. Regarding limitations of large helicopters, OCAFF agreed with the Chief of Transportation, but recommended that a proportionate ratio of various sizes be con- sidered. While agreeing with the recommendation to establish a Department of the Army panel to develop the doctrine and quantitative and qualitative standards for a helicopter program, OCAFF felt that such a panel should cover not only transportation helicopter problems but also consider the entire Army aviation structure and concept.1 5 24 THE EVOLUTION OFARMY AVIATION Endnotes Chapter H 1. Joseph Bykofsky, The Support ofArmy Aviation, 1950-1954, Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1955, p. 2. 2. Ibid., pp. 15-17. 3. Memo, CofSA for CofS USAF, 8 Sep 50, subj: Army Organic Aircraft. 4. (1) Ltr, OCAFF to DA ACofS G-3,9 Aug 50, subj: Report of Study of Requirements of Army Field Forces for Rotary Wing Aircraft, AFF Board No. 1. (2) Memo, ACofS G-3 to DA ACofS G-4, 29 Aug 50, subj: Report of Study of Requirements of Army Field Forces Board No. 1. (3) Ltr, DA ACofS G-3 to OCAFF, 23 Oct 50, subj: Army Organic Air Transport and incl, Study on Army Organic Air Transport. 8 Oct 50. 5. Ltr G-3 580 TS (12 Oct 50), DA to CAFF, 22 Jan 51, subj: Army Organic Air Transport. 6. Bykofsky, pp. 17-18. 7. (1) Ltr, General J. Lawton Collins to General Mark W. Clark, undated, with incl, Memo for CofSA, 13 Dec 50, subj: Army Organic Aircraft (Helicopter). (2) Bykofsky, p. 19. 8. MFR, DA G-3 O&T Div Orgn Br, 30 Dec 50, subj: General Clark's Recommendations on Army Aircraft and Transportation Corps Helicopter Companies. 9. McClendon, pp. 21-22. 10. (1) AFF Bd No. 1, Report of Study of Project No. AD 1250, Tables of Equipment Governing Army Aircraft, with Appendixes A-F, 14 Mar 51. (2) Ltr ATrNG 452.1, CAFF to DA ACofS G-3, 19 Jun 51, subj; Army Field Forces Board Report with 1 incl, subj: Proposed Aircraft Requirements by Type with 1st Ind AGADS 452.1 (19 Jun 51) G-3, DA AGO to CAFF, 26 Jul51, same subj. 11. (1) McClendon, pp. 22-23. (2) Ltr, General ].E. Hull, VCofS to CAFF, 8 Oct 51, subj: Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, with incl. 12. Bykofsky, p. 20. 13. Memo, DA G-3 O&T Div for CofS, 31 Mar 52, subj: Requirements for Cargo Type Helicopters, TABs C and G. 14. (1) Summary Sheet G-3 452 (4 Mar 52), DA G-3 O&T Div Orgn R&D Br, 28 Apr 52, subj: Requirements for Cargo Type Helicopters. (2) Bykofsky, pp. 22-23. 15. (1) DF (13 Nov 51), DA ACofS G-3 to Chief of Transportation, 19 Nov 51, subj: Requirements for Cargo Helicopters. (2) Ltr, Chief of Transportation to DA ACofS G-3, 4 Dec 51, subj: Army Helicopter Program, with 1st Ind ATTNG-22 452 (4 Dec 51), CAFF to DA ACofS G-3, 29 Jan 52. 25 Chapter LI THE FORMATIVE YEARS Army aviation in 1952 entered on a period of rapid expansion and change. After numerous delays and difficulties, the first helicopter companies were organized, trained, and deployed. At the same time, the entire aviation program underwent extensive review which resulted in a significant expansion of the program. By the end of 1954, the aviation program had taken the form which it was to retain until the development of the airmobility concept in the 1960s. Helicopter Units Unit Activations The Army Field Forces in June 1952 revised its plan for the activation of twelve helicopter ambulance detachments. Two units, the 37th and the 53d, were activated in July, earlier than planned, in order to establish requirements for personnel and equipment. The remaining ten detachments also were to be activated sooner than scheduled. Only the 53d was to remain in the continental United States for general use. 1 Early in 1952, the XVIII Airborne Corps recommended to OCAFF that a helicopter company be activated at Fort Bragg and attached to the corps. It was the opinion of the corps that the establishment of tactics, techniques, and doctrine concerning the tactical employment of the helicopter could be accomplished only by placing a helicopter unit at the disposal of tactical field units. Despite the recommendations of XVIII Airborne Corps and Third Army, OCAFF recommended that for the time being all transportation helicopter companies should be activated and initially trained at Fort Sill or a helicopter training school. Units would then be moved to a division station to complete their unit training. The Fort Bragg--Camp Mackall area was, in the opinion of OCAFF, a suitable station because of the presence of a division and also the availability of suitable facilities. The Department of the Army in May 1952 approved the recommendation of OCAFF that all transportation helicopter companies be activated at Fort Sill. A total of three companies in addition to the 6th and 13th Transportation Helicopter Companies had been programed for activation at Fort Sill during fiscal year 1953. The Department of the Army anticipated that the 6th Transportation Helicopter Company would be deployed overseas upon completion of unit training, which it hoped would be under a tactical unit. In order to 27 THE FORMATIVE YEARS accomplish this training, the 6th Transportation Helicopter Company was transferred to Fort Bragg in mid-1952. Late in October, the Chief of Transportation rejected the Army Field Forces proposal to use Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, Camp Cooke, Fort Lewis, Fort Riley, and Camp Polk, as training stations for transportation helicopter companies. Fort Bragg was at that time the only post equipped to conduct unit training, both from a personnel and equipment viewpoint. Estab- lishment of other training areas, in the opinion of the Chief of Transportation, would necessitate use of personnel entirely unfamiliar with the concept of employment or the problems involved in the training of such companies. The Chief of Transportation considered it inadvisable to attempt undirected unit training at locations lacking established facilities and personnel qualified by experience. Field manuals on concept of employment were then under study and were unavailable to the field. He also recommended that careful consideration be given to the use of a unit in close proximity to the manufacturers of presently contracted aircraft to facilitate the ferrying of the aircraft to the using unit. The configuration of the H-19 and H-21 was such that movement by rail or truck was impossible unless the aircraft were completely disassembled. The problem of supply had to be considered, as each additional training center would require additional supply channels, storage facilities for spares, and increased personnel to maintain and account for these supplies. By using one unit training center, the supply problem w