POWERHistory - Air Force Historical Foundation

Foundation. All rights reserved. Periodicals postage paid at Clinton, MD 20735 and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Please send change of address to the Circulation Office. The Air Force Historical Foundation Air Force Historical Foundation P.O. Box 790 Clinton, MD 20735-0790 (301) 736-1959 E-mail: angelabear@afhistory.org On the Web at http://www.afhistory.org AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 3 Jim Vertenten’s Retirement Over time, many organizations struggle, especially organizations that have been around for nearly 70 years. They struggle financially. They struggle to remain rele- vant. This is true for the Air Force Historical Foundation. In 2009, our Foundation was struggling. Founded in 1953, by the early giants of the fledgling Air Force and funded, often times, by their generosity, we were running out of money and not reach- ing our intended audience. In March 2010, then Chairman and President, Major General Dale Meyerrose, USAF, (Ret.), hired Jim Vertenten as Executive Director, and things began to change. Jim rolled up his sleeves on day one and never stopped working to save the Founda- tion. Recognizing that today’s young people operate in a digital world, Jim modern- ized our website, maintaining and updating it himself. Wading into social media, he reached out to our membership with On This Day in Air Force History, a daily post on our website and an email, Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Twitter blast high- lighting historical Air Force events. Those posts caught on and our membership grew, pulling in a younger audience. Digitizing AFHF’s publications with JSTOR was Jim’s idea. Not only was it fiscally sound, it ensured that the body of work, contained in our journals, including Air Power Historian, Aerospace Historian, Air Power History, and Air and Space Power History, dating back to 1954, is available and searchable in an electronic format. These archives are the foundation upon which our new programs are being built. In the early days, Jim turned his focus to our awards. He rebuilt our program, elevating it to a status that is worthy of our recipients. His fingerprints are on every inch of the process from organizing the event to all those pesky details like guiding the Board’s selection of candidates, liaising with Air Staff and AFSA, making sure the invitations were printed correctly, the room rented, the menus perfect, the seating charts proper, the videos working and the recipients available. That’s an abbreviated list. Not only did he revamp the program, for the first time in years, we made a profit. In 2011, he created the James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle Award, an award that recognized the contributions of an Air Force or Space Force unit in multiple con- flicts. We believe this award resonates with Doolittle’s deeply held belief that most of life’s great achievements are achieved by a team working together toward a common goal. Jim’s consistent and effective stewardship of the Foundation’s day-to-day and strategic financial affairs kept us going. When he came onboard, we were in tough financial times. He worked with our auditors, investment firm, and Board of Directors to keep the Foundation afloat. He recommended and recruited Board Members who had connections and skills. He supported every Board election and countless Board and Executive Committee meetings. He kept the Board in- formed and helped to make expenditure and stewardship decisions that would keep the AFHF financially viable. There were times when he worked without pay so that the Foundation could meet its financial obligations, often volunteer- ing evenings after working all day at a day job. But in 2012, reality hit and the Board reluctantly considered steps to close the doors. Our rescue came in the form of a large endowment from a lifetime member of the Air Force Historical Foundation. Although the donor and family requested to remain anonymous, it is acknowledged, that Jim’s ability to build relation- ships for the Foundation is what saved us. With that lifeline, Jim worked to build the AFHF into the thriving entity that it is today. He didn’t do it alone. We had steady leadership in Maj Gen Meyerrose and Lt Gen Miller. We had and still have hard working Board Members with great ideas. We have volunteers who donate their time and expertise. We have members who generously open their checkbooks, making it possible for us to succeed. But Jim assembled these Boards and built relationships with these donors. He was the glue that held us together and the engine that kept us moving forward. I think Maj. Gen. Meyerrose said it best, “When an organization’s resilience is tested, the burden falls on the shoulders of a small number of leaders in order to keep it vibrant. For the Air Force Historical Foundation over the past dozen years or so, this challenge fell to one man – Jim Vertenten. For that, we all owe him a great deal of gratitude.” Leadership’s Message You can tell a lot about a person by how they are remembered. Major General Si Johnson, USAF (Ret.), who introduced Jim to the Air Force Historical Foundation, said, “Jim Vertenten has been my friend since 1974. He was a superb Air Force of- ficer and had a superb career in the finance world. His work as Execu- tive Director of the AFHF has been second to none. He was the right per- son at the right time! Jim Vertenten is a great American and the epitome of an Airman for life!” 4 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 Air & Space Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements, either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or other communication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facie evidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air & Soace Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works, if published in the authors’ own works. On July 31, 2022, Jim retired. Not only did we lose his steady leadership, we lost Dora, his wife, who has given us countless hours over the years. She, too, will be sorely missed. Lt Gen Christopher Miller, USAF (Ret.), Chairman and Presi- dent of the AFHF from 2017 until 2021, summed it up for all of us. “Jim’s retirement from the AFHF is the end of an era. He was the practical face of the Foundation to many people for the years he served as Executive Director, and will be sorely missed. He is a foun- tain of institutional memory, of personal connection, and a tireless advocate for Airmen, the Air Force, and air and space history.” We are currently searching for someone to fill the position of ex- ecutive director, but those are big shoes to fill. In the meantime, we are saving a seat on the Board of Directors for Jim. We’ll give him a little time to catch his breath but we’re ready when he is. Respectfully, Jonna Doolittle Hoppes, General James M. Holmes, USAF (Ret.) President Chairman of the Board I wish to echo the sentiments of our leadership in wishing Jim Vertenten a fond au revoir as he retires from being our Executive Director. In my thirty years at the magazine, I can’t remember a finer human being who sat in that seat. We will all miss Jim. I know I will. We start with an article by return contributor Jayson Altieri, who writes about how the O–2 Skymasters travelled to Vietnam. Some good history on the O–2. Our second article is by first-time contributor Scott Martin, whose story is about the connections between Johnny Cash and Gregg Popovich, both former USAF members. Our third article is by another first-timer James Perry, who is writing about C3 of bomber forces in World War II and Korea. Our fourth article is by another first-time contributor, Gary Willis, a USAFA graduate who flew O–1 Bird Dogs as a FAC in Vietnam. He writes about the Cambodian Incursion. Our final article is by yet another first-time contributor, Grant Harward, who writes about aeromedical evacuation’s development during World War II. The Leadership’s Message begins on page 3. It’s worthy of the reading. Don’t miss Up- coming Events on page 62, although I fear you must continue to take many dates in that section as still uncertain at this point, but more firm than during the last two years. And the issue closes with the Mystery. Enjoy! We include another Book Review Supplement after the regular issue. Don’t skip it. From the Editor AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 5 Oscar Deuce and the Duckbutts: The USAF O–2 Skymaster Self- Deployment to South Vietnam Jayson A. Altieri T he Vietnam War, like previous 20th century wars, brought a number of militarized civilian aircraft to the front lines that were not designed for combat use. Among these civilian aircraft used throughout the past century were the over 12,000 Cessna aircraft that served in the United States military and armed forces around the world like Cessna’s O– 2 Skymaster airplane.1 Much of the story of Vietnam era aircraft, like the B–52 Stratofortress, F–4 Phantom and UH–1 Iroquois, are 46-years later still shrouded by legend, mystery and embellishments that do little to honor and recognize the courage and sacrifice military and civilian pilots made during the conflict. One such story involves how a group of civilian contract pilots flew a fleet of new O–2 aircraft from the Cessna factory in Wichita, Kansas across the Pacific Ocean directly to the battlefields of South Vietnam. The true story of the Cessna O–2’s deployment is a lesson of planning, inno- vation and audacity that even in hindsight proves the flexibility of U.S. air power in meeting operational needs to support U.S. national security objectives. The story of the O–2’s deployment also may serve as a lesson for future air power histo- rians as it relates to the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, about capturing the true stories of the men and women who serve. Oscar Deuce Founded by Clyde Cessna, the Cessna Aircraft Company has produced both civilian and military aircraft since the company’s inception in 1927. In the years prior to World War II Cessna would produce a number of light commercial air- craft including some models that flew on the air racing circuit. During World War Two the company shifted from building civilian use aircraft to building military models like the Cessna AT–8 Crane, or more famously, the “Bamboo Bomber,” as well as a number of CG–4A gliders under contract with the Waco Aircraft Company.2 As the war drew to a close, Cessna returned to peacetime production with an eye on competing with the surplus market of the post-war American airplane market.3 As a result, Cessna began designing and building low-cost airplanes with the idea of a “family car of the air.” This concept was based on the popular post-war notion that every American would take to the air and every family would own an airplane or helicopter.4 Because of this marketing strategy several early 1950’s Cessna single-engine models like the 120, 170 and 190 would become the precursors of the later and still popular Cessna designs such as the 150, 172 and 182 model aircraft still popular today.5 So popular in fact were some of Cessna’s designs that in 1950, the Cessna 170 model was adopted by the US Army as a light observation aircraft designated the L–19 “Bird Dog” to serve in the Korean Conflict. USAF personnel refueling a World Aviation Services O–2 at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, circa 1967. On February 28, 1961, the Cessna Aircraft Company introduced the revolutionary tandem twin-engine Skymas- ter airplane using much that was learned from their suc- cessful single-engine designs of the 1950s. This aircraft, known as the Model 336, featured centerline thrust (en- gines on each end of the fuselage) and twin cantilever tail booms supporting a communal stabilizer, which was the culmination of years of research and designed to develop a low-cost, safe and comfortable business aircraft.6 The tan- dem configuration of this novel aircraft gave the Skymas- ter a ceiling of 27,000 feet. Tailored for the business pilot, this model was priced at $39,950 and simplified the tran- sition from single-engine to twin-engine aircraft.7 The Sky- master went into full production and was reengineered to include retractable landing gear and provide better flying characteristics, and had updated appearance and greater speed. The Model 337 Super Skymaster, introduced in April, 1967, offered even greater performance including the 337B model with two Continental turbocharged, fuel-in- jected 210 horsepower engines which boosted the service ceiling to 33,000 feet, cruise speed to 233 mph and range to 1,640 miles.8 As a result of the need for durable light aircraft to fight the counter-insurgency war growing in Southeast Asia, the Super Skymaster (US military designation O–2) would find its way in the U.S. Air Force (USAF) which required a fast, tough forward air control aircraft that could support U.S. Army (USA), U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese ground forces in Vietnam.9 The military O–2A model ver- sions were armed with 2.75-inch rockets, 7.62 millimeter miniguns and large observation windows. Additionally, the O–2B models would carry 1,800-watt hi-fi loudspeakers and drop leaflets for psychological operations.10 Both mod- els were known among pilots as “Oscar Deuce” and the first order of seven aircraft were delivered to South Vietnam on May 20, 1967.11 The use of the O–2A and B models immediately proved their value in combat as attested to in a November 1967 edition of a Cessquire magazine article which stated:12 The Viet Cong have come to fear the small Cessna O–1E Bird Dog flown by FAC controllers in South Vietnam. When they see it [the Bird Dog] circling near them they try to hide, for in minutes after the FAC spots them they most likely will be pounded… Now the VC are having to become familiar with a new airplane that the FACs… are receiving– the twin-boom, tandem-engine O–2A Super Skymaster. Clearly the new O–2s would be in high demand sup- porting ground forces in Vietnam as the USAF’s FACs, as- signed to the Southeast Asia based Tactical Air Support Squadrons, were proving very effective in providing visual reconnaissance and artillery and/or close air support spot- ter information to the ground forces.13 While still effective, the O–1 Bird Dog’s design shortfalls were becoming all too obvious at this point of the war in South Vietnam. The O–1 was a simple plane: easily maintained, highly maneuverable and had good visibility with the fore and aft pilot and observer seats offering excellent views on both sides of the fuselage. As early as 1963 the Vietnam People’s Army and VC antiaircraft defenses were increasingly so- phisticated and dangerous, and slow, unarmored aircraft like the O–1 were extremely vulnerable to enemy ground fire.14 In addition, the O–1’s operational times were limited by its basic instrumentation and navigational equipment, which made flying in bad weather or at night difficult. The O–1’s overall lack of weaponry was also frustrating, as 6 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, USA, (Ret.), began his military service in 1984 as an enlisted Soldier with the 101st Air- borne (Air Assault) Division. Commissioned in 1989 as a U.S. Army 2d Lieutenant, he served in various Army Aviation assignments with the 82nd Airborne Division, as well as units in Afghanistan, Belgium, Ecuador, Iraq, Korea, and the Panama Canal Zone. He also served in several national security level assignments with the Na- tional Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Bel- gium, and the National War College, Washington, D.C. His last operational assignment was as the Commander, 110th Aviation Brigade, Fort Rucker, Alabama and is currently an Assistant Professor of Leadership at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He is a former Master Army Aviator and instructor pilot with more than 3000 flight hours in OH-58, TH-67, UH-1, and UH-60 helicopters. Jayson received the 2020 Air & Space Power History Article Award and has written sev- eral books and articles on aerospace and military related matters. His current book project, entitled A Guest of Mr. Lincoln: The Wartime Service of Sergeant Joseph H. Wheeless, Confederate States Army, is expected to be published sometime in early 2023. Cessna O–2 Assembly Line Wichita, Kansas, date unknown. (Photo cour- tesy of the Kansas Historical Society.) some FACs would watch the enemy disappear in the bush or a village while strike aircraft were still enroute, result- ing in many O–1 pilots and/or observers resorting to at- tacking the enemy with small arms fired out of the plane’s windows.15 As a result, by March 31, 1967, the USAF began equipping the 9th Air Commando Squadron (later redes- ignated the 9th Special Operations Squadron) with un- armed O–2B models and the 19th, 20th 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Tactical Air Support Squadrons with Cessna O–2As one month later.16 The O–2 was a temporary solution, meant to serve until the OV-10 Bronco came on line.17 The aircraft carried ordnance, was capable of longer station times, had more power and featured improved conven- tional navigation aids and in-flight instrumentation. The challenge for USAF logisticians as the Vietnam War began to expand was how to get more of the new aircraft into the- ater with minimum delay and maintenance down time. O–2 Project By 1967 the USAF had made its first purchase of what would become a total order of 532 O–2 series aircraft.18 The main obstacle was how to deploy the initial production of 191 O–2 aircraft to theater in a timely manner. The USAF had three options: 1) Fly the aircraft from the Cessna fac- tory to the west coast and turn them over to the USA for transport by cargo ship. 2) Remove the O–2 wings and de- ploy them three at a time into the cargo bay of a C–124 Globemaster II or C–133 Cargomaster transport aircraft. 3) Ferry the new Cessna aircraft under their own power to South Vietnam.19 The first deployment option, delivering the aircraft by ship, while a viable and cost-effective method as demonstrated by the movement of USA trans- port helicopters to Vietnam on converted U.S. Navy (USN) World War II escort aircraft carriers, was in fact the slowest of the options as seen in the 1965 four-week sea movement of the USA’s 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion aboard the USN’s Boxer.20 Additionally, once arriving at the ship’s destination, another twelve days were usually needed to reassemble, check and test fly a cohort of seaborne aircraft before they were released for operational use.21 The second option, moving aircraft via the USAF’s C–124 or C–133 transports, while potentially faster at de- ploying aircraft across the Pacific, also required an exten- sive disassembly and reassembly of aircraft before and after movement and tied up much needed airlift support.22 The third option, and the one chosen by the USAF, of air ferrying the Cessnas to South Vietnam, was not a new con- cept and had been done over the years with military air- craft including single engine aircraft, but rarely had been tried with commercial light aircraft like the O–2. As the majority of USAF FAC pilots with experience in light observation aircraft were deployed to support op- erations South Vietnam, the U.S. Air Force Systems Com- mand (AFSC) leadership elected to use civilian contract pilots to facilitate the movement of the O–2 aircraft from the Cessna plant in Wichita, Kansas to South Vietnam in what was to become known as the “O–2 Project.”23 The AFSC initially contracted with World Aviation Services (WAS) in Fort Lauderdale, Florida to fulfill the delivery without military oversight. WAS program managers re- quired contract pilots have a minimum of 3000 hours flight time, 1000 hours multi-engine time, three transoceanic crossings and pass a background security check; some of the pilots WAS hired did not meet these minimum require- ments so their previous experience in Cessna Skymasters was taken into account.24 The WAS pilots hired were issued an airline ticket and reported to McConnell AFB in Wi- chita, Kansas where they were required to pass a written O–2 systems exam and complete a check-out in an O–2 air- craft. However, as a result of WAS’s initial lack of proper management and oversight of the aircrew’s long-range navigational training, the first and second batch of three O–2s each enroute to South Vietnam inadvertently flew off course between California and Hawaii and narrowly es- caped ditching only after U.S. Coast Guard rescue aircraft were deployed to assist the wayward flights to Hickman AFB.25 As a result of these incidents, Brigadier General Frank K. Everest, Jr., USAF Chief of Safety recommended, and the USAF Tactical Air Command leadership directed, that the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group (ADG) assume full operational control of the delivery process.26 To accomplish the aforementioned task, TAC ordered Colonel William K. Bush, the USAF’s 4440th ADG com- mander, to lead the deployment of the Cessna aircraft to Southeast Asia on May 25, 1967.27 The 4440th ADG’s pri- mary mission was to plan, survey and exercise operational command of all aircraft movements and to control the funds allocated for ferrying missions. Every type of USAF aircraft not assigned to a specific unit was ferried from one AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 7 Col William K. Bush, 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group commander (USAF photo.) unit assignment to another by this organization. Missions of the unit included the movement of all jet fighters from the U.S. (F–84Fs, F–84Gs, F–86Fs and T–33s) over the North Atlantic (transport) Route to U.S. Air Forces in Eu- rope units and Mutual Defense Assistance Program recip- ients in 1953. It also conducted transfers of F–47 aircraft from Texas to Central and South American countries under MDAP in 1953 and B–57 aircraft to the Far East Air Force in Japan on November 4, 1955.28 The mission was trans- ferred to TAC on January 1, 1958. Aircraft delivered during this period included the F–100D/F, KB–50J, F–84F, C–130, SA–16, B–66, C–54, C–119C/G, C–47 and B–57. Finally, in the early 1960s, the 4440th ADG assumed control of 431st Air Refueling Squadron after inactivation of 4505th Air Re- fueling Wing with KB–50 tankers. The 4440th during the 1960s was responsible for the movement of USAF aircraft to South Vietnam and Thailand bases to support the war. The unit delivered aircraft like the F–4, F–100, F–105, A– 37 and various FAC O–2 and OV-10 aircraft. They also de- livered F–4, F–111 and F–105 aircraft to NATO during this same period until the unit was finally deactivated on Oc- tober 15, 1969.29 As a result of the O–2 navigational incidents, the last one occurring on May 19, 1967, and the fact the O–2 air- craft had no autopilot to reduce pilot workloads, the WAS aircrews received additional training on the O–2 aircraft’s modified fuel and lubricant systems. This aftermarket fuel system included the addition in cabin of two 90-gallon and one 60-gallon fuel tanks which replaced all of the aircraft seats except the left front seat for the pilot.30 Because of the O–2’s design, the removal of the right front seat and placement of the 60-gallon fuel tank in the front of the air- craft meant the pilot had to climb over the extra fuel tank, as well as a newly installed high frequency radio next to the fuel cell, to enter and exit the aircraft.31 Additionally, the pilots were also provided an extra cabin 5-gallon engine oil tank and hand-pump.32 According to Paul Hoffman, one of the contract pilots:33 Here again the emphasis was on safety. The examination which followed was on fuel systems and the problems which might arise, such as fuel pump failure, etc., and what to do for an anticipated emergency. Each pilot was also provided with all of the instrument flight rules and visual flight rules’ charts, flight plans and instrument approach charts for the U.S., Pacific and South- east Asia areas, as well as the Pacific Airman’s Guide and even a large supply of traveler’s checks to cover any unan- ticipated expenses.34 The pilots also received a briefing from a 4440th ADG aircrew survival expert on the nearly 40 items issued in the overwater survival kits (including a water survival immersion suit) that the pilots would carry during the transoceanic crossing.35 When a group of four WAS pilots had completed their aircraft checkouts and had been issued all needed items, the four would report back to McConnell AFB and were issued their aircraft. The pi- lots then departed as a formation of four aircraft for the 1200 nautical mile journey to Hamilton AFB, north of San Francisco, California, where the pilots would rest and me- chanics would recheck the aircraft for their first of six over- water legs to South Vietnam.36 Duckbutt The Pacific air ferry route flown by the WAS crew was initially designated “Flying Fish” and later changed to “Cornet West,” going from California (Hamilton AFB) to Hawaii (Hickam AFB), then to Midway broadcasts in a scene later reminiscent of the 1970 movie “Tora, Tora, Tora,” helping provide an ADF bearing for the crews the closer they flew to the islands.48 After an average of four- teen hours and ten minutes in the air, the O–2s would touch town at Hickman AFB, where the crews were re- ceived by another 4440th ADG unit, the 4440-1st Detach- ment, that helped provide billeting, meals, transportation, refueling and maintenance support to the O–2 flight.49 A day later the WAS crews departed for the next two legs of the journey, starting first with the 1,140 nautical mile leg to Midway Island, followed by another approximately 1,025 8 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 O–2As at Hickam AFB (USAF photo.) O–2 prior to extended fuel tank installation, Paul Hoffman standing in front, date 1967. (Paul Hoffman, “Ferrying a Fighting Skymaster to Vietnam,” The AOPA Pilot, Vol. II, no. 3, March 1968.) nautical mile leg crossing the international date line to Wake Island, where a 4440th ADG officer was forward de- ployed at each island to help facilitate the aircrews’ move- ments. One WAS pilot kept himself mentally busy over the long stretch of open water by counting all the meters, switches, knobs, buttons, controls, and warning lights in the O–2 cockpit.50 Before arriving at Wake Island, because the airfield there was administered by the Federal Aviation Administration, the 4440th ADG officer was required to call ahead and schedule block times for refueling and park- ing the O–2 aircraft overnight.51 After departing Wake Island, the next day the remain- ing legs involved the 1,300 nautical mile trip to Guam, where the aircrews were met by another 4440th ADG rep- resentative with the 4440-11th detachment based on the island’s Andersen Air Force Base.52 At this point in the Viet- nam War, Guam served as a primary staging area for B– 52 bombers conducting raids on Vietnam, so it was here the arriving WAS pilots received their first glimpse of the U.S. military’s direct involvement in Southeast Asia. After a day’s rest in Guam the WAS crews were briefed for the next-to-last leg of the deployment, the ten-hour or 1,389 nautical mile trip to Clark AFB, Philippine Islands. Upon arriving at Clark AFB, the WAS pilots were directed by the Philippine’s-based 4440th ADG’s 4440-15th detachment operations team to fly to the Manila International Airport 20 air minutes away. It was there that the local Cessna dealer had aircraft mechanics reconfigure the aircraft for delivery to the USAF in Vietnam.53 This reconfiguration consisted of removing all the O–2 cabin fuel tanks, pumps, etc., installing the necessary equipment for use in Vietnam that had been removed before the ferry flight, then rein- stalling the one cabin gas tank for the flight to Vietnam.54 Once the O–2’s modifications were completed the aircraft were flown back to Clark AFB to prepare for the final push to South Vietnam. Nha Trang In preparation for the 881 nautical mile trip from Clark AFB to the USAF’s Nha Trang Airbase located on the South-Central Coast of Vietnam, the WAS aircrews re- ceived a classified briefing on escape and evasion proce- dures in case they crashed or were shot down over Viet- nam. As part of this briefing, the pilots were issued a map with the positions of all USA special forces camps in-coun- try and a special folder with information on what to do if they inadvertently flew over communist countries.55 One note that highlighted the potential dangers of flying into South Vietnam was printed at the bottom of the aforemen- tioned map:56 One important point, no [U.S.] evader, however desperate might be his need for assistance, should ever attempt to ap- proach a [U.S. special forces] camp at night. The WAS aircrews also received classified briefings on the names, locations and frequencies of the different radar sites in South Vietnam along with the standard flight folder with air routes. These briefings included ditching procedures near the South Vietnam coast, frequencies and call signs, IFR departure and approach procedures, airfield diagrams and parking plans at Nha Trang.57 One map in particular, shown during the WAS aircrew briefing, caught the attention of many a pilot with no military experience:58 On the wall in the briefing room was a large map of Viet- nam with different colored circles on it. The yellow circles represented area that our gunfire extended in the air up to 16,000 feet. The blue circles around most the airports [in South Vietnam] represented the areas protected by [U.S.] Army Hawk [short-range air defense] missiles. In the event of [a possible North Vietnamese air attack], get out of that area fast because the Hawk missiles are not very selective and will shoot down anything in the area. Departing later that day as a flight of four aircraft from Clark AFB, the WAS aircrews would begin the last leg of their trip from Wichita to South Vietnam, where upon arrival the O–2s would be officially transferred to the 20th TASS for deployment around the theater of opera- tions. The reality of being in a combat zone was obvious to many a WAS pilot on landing at Nha Trang, as Paul Hoff- man would write:59 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 9 O–2A of the 20th TASS taxiing for takeoff, Hue Citadel Air Field, July 1967 (USAF photo.) O–2A with weapons load out, date unknown. (USAF photo.) As I walked away to get a picture of the [O–2] planes to- gether just as they were on the ramp back in the [United] States at the Cessna plant, the smoke in the background and the muffled booms of the artillery and mortar fire were a constant reminder of the almost unbelievable fact that I was in [South] Vietnam. Once the O–2 aircraft were transferred to the 20th TASS the aircrews would begin their journey back to the United States for another ferry mission. According to WAS pilot John Lear, son of Learjet founder William “Bill” Lear, the return leg to Wichita was also an adventure itself:60 Arriving in Nha Trang we would hitch a ride to Saigon and spend three days under technical house arrest each trip, pay a fine for entering the country illegally, that is being civil- ians and not coming through a port of entry, catch an air- line up to Hong Kong for a little R&R [rest and recuperation] and [go] straight back to Wichita for another airplane. While the 4440th ADG’s deployment of the initial de- livery of 191 O–2 Skymasters by WAS pilots was very suc- cessful and helped meet the USAF’s increasing operational needs in South Vietnam, there were some significant op- erational and safety challenges related to the deployment of so many aircraft over the vast distances of the United States and Pacific Ocean. First, the fact that many of the O–2 production models were not equipped with long-range or tactical air navigation systems greatly hindered the de- livery of aircraft into Hamilton AFB during north central California’s fall and winter months.61 Second, it was re- ported by the 4440th operation officers that some WAS pi- lots were reluctant to write up items which would ground aircraft and referred to the O–2 aircraft “as is” if considered flyable.62 Third, arrival dates were not always synchronized with WAS aircrews departing on a Friday and arriving at Hamilton AFB on a Saturday when most of the base’s con- tract maintenance facilities needed to prepare the O–2 air- craft for the transoceanic crossing were closed.63 All of these challenges were quickly addressed by Colonel Bush’s team and the crossings continued until the 4440th’s last O–2 air- craft was delivered to Nha Trang via the Cornet West rout- ing on March 13, 1968 by Gail Poulton, vice president of World Aviation Services.64 As with any deployment of many aircraft over long dis- tances, statistical mishaps may occur and unofficially this was the case with the O–2 Project’s deployment. According to one source, three accidents occurred during the delivery of the O–2s from Wichita, Kansas to Na Trang, Vietnam, though only one of these mishaps, a July 19, 1967 ditching of an O–2A aircraft 415 nautical miles west of Midway, was reported in the 1967 4440th ADG’s official unit histories.65 Appearances aside, the O–2 aircraft were not “technically” USAF aircraft and would not be officially until they arrived in Vietnam and were formally delivered and accepted.66 Since the O–2s were technically not US government air- craft, any mishap at the time would not be reported in USAF documentation. Additionally, as the O–2s were not registered as civil aircraft they could not have a recordable civil accident either; they were in regulatory limbo and any accidents were technically non-reportable.67 The story of the O–2 Skymasters in Vietnam does not end with their deployment in-country, as the aircraft’s worth was proven many times over both by U.S. and, later, South Vietnamese pilots flying FAC missions across South- east Asia in support of ground forces. The O–2s would con- tinue to serve to the end of the South Vietnam conflict with a number of O–2s redeploying back to the United States via USAF transport aircraft and others being left behind, like the 35 O–2s transferred to the Republic of South Viet- 10 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 WAS Pilot (name not known) exiting an extended fuel tank equipped O–2, date 1967. (Paul Hoffman, “Ferrying a Fighting Skymaster to Vietnam,” The AOPA Pilot, Vol. II, no. 3, March 1968.) WAS Pilots planning their next leg at Clark AB, Philippines, in 1967. Note the pilot on the left wearing civilian sneakers. (Paul Hoffman, “Ferrying a Fighting Skymaster to Vietnam,” The AOPA Pilot, Vol. II, no. 3, March 1968.) 1. Walt Shiel, Cessna Warbirds. News release, 2021. https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1036231. Cessna Warbirds (accessed October 1, 2021). 2. An Eye to the Sky: Cessna. (Wichita, KS: Cessna Incorpo- rated, n.d.), pp. 40-41. 3. Ibid. p. 45. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid, p. 67. 6. Centerline thrust aircraft was not a new concept and dates to the early days of aviation. Known originally as a “push-pull” configuration, the concept was used by aircraft designers. The ad- vantage it provides is the ability to mount two propellers on the aircraft’s centerline, thereby avoiding the increased drag that comes with twin wing-mounted engines. It is also easier to fly if one of the two engines fails, as the thrust provided by the remain- ing engine stays in the centerline. In contrast, a conventional twin-engine aircraft will yaw in the direction of the failed engine and become uncontrollable below a certain airspeed. Historical examples include Dornier’s Do Wal flying boat and Do 335 Pfeil fighter, as well as a number of French Farman and Dutch Fokker aircraft built in the 1920s and 1930s.; Jeffrey L. Rodengen, The Legend of Cessna. (Fort Lauderdale, FL: The Write Stuff, 1998), p. 139. 7. Jeffrey L. Rodengen, The Legend of Cessna, p. 140. 8. Chris Chant, ed. The World’s Air Forces. (Secaucus, NJ: Chartwell Books, 1979), p. 206. 9. Jeffrey L. Rodengen, The Legend of Cessna, p. 140 10. FM 44-30, Visual Aircraft Recognition. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1986), pp. 8-10 – 8-11. 11. Other names for the O–2 aircraft included: Duck, Mixmas- ter, Push-Pull, Cessna Suck-Blow, The B.S. Bomber (Nickname for O–2B psychological warfare variant). “Cessna O–2 Super Sky- master”, War Bird Alley, 2016. http://www.warbirdalley.com/ o2.htm (accessed November 01, 2021).; Jeffrey L. Rodengen, The Legend of Cessna, p. 144. 12. Jeffrey L. Rodengen, The Legend of Cessna, pp. 144-45. 13. Donald J. Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in Viet- nam. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, January 1988), p. 109. 14. John Guilmartin, Jr., and Michael O’Leary. The Illustrated History of The Vietnam War: Helicopters. (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), pp. 33-34. 15. U.S. Air Force Factsheet: FAC In SEA: Foreword Air Control Aircraft. https://web.archive.org/web/20121013112510/http:// www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID =5575&page=1 (accessed November 21, 2021); Some O–1/L–19s were armed with four to 8 2.75” rockets. The USAF carried White Phosphorus while the USA O–1’s fired high explosive warheads. Chris Mayer, Aircraft owner and historian, Email message to the author, June 26, 2022. 16. Walt Shiel, Cessna Warbirds: A Detailed and Personal His- tory of Cessna’s Involvement in the Armed Forces. (Iola, WI: Jones Publishing, Inc., 1996), p. 213. 17. U.S. Air Force Factsheet: FAC In SEA: Forward Air Control Aircraft. 18. Cessna O–2A Skymaster, https://web.archive.org/web/2008 0801213153, http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/fact- sheet.asp?id=304 (accessed November 21, 2021). 19. Richard H. Wood, “How the O–2s Really Got to Vietnam,” Night Rustics, 2000. https://nightrustics.org/Delivery.htm (ac- cessed November 2, 2021). 20. The Fort Benning, Georgia-based battalion’s four-week voy- age to Qui Nhon, South Vietnam went via Mayport, Florida, the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines. Ben- jamin S. Silver. Ride at a Gallop. (Waco, TX: Century Alpha Inc., 1990), pp. 268-69. 21. John Guilmartin, Jr., and Michael O’Leary. The Illustrated History of The Vietnam War: Helicopters, p. 29. 22. The C–133 Cargomaster aircraft was particularly well-suited for this task as it was originally designed to carry large U.S. Air Force Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles to Europe and later used to transport US Army UH–1 Huey helicopters to South Vietnam. Ibid, p. 25. 23. Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Viet- nam,” The AOPA Pilot, Volume II, No. 3, March 1968, p. 44. 24. WAS Flight Leaders were paid $1000 per trip, with the line pilots receiving $800 per trip. The pilots were expected to average three trips a month. Richard H. Wood, “How the O–2s Really Got to Vietnam”, Night Rustics, 2000.; Since the O–2s were in a tech- nical sense “public” aircraft (as opposed to civil registered aircraft) no pilot’s license was necessary to fly one for the USAF. Paul Hoff- man, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Vietnam,” The AOPA Pilot, p. 44. 25. “O–2A/B Deployment”, Telex Message, May 26, 1967, History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 January – 30 June, 1967. (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1967), pp. 1-2, U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 26. “O–2 Deliveries Placed Under 4440th Control,” History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 January – 30 June, 1967. (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1967), p. 2, U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 27. “Unit Timeline,” History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967. (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1967), n.p., U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 28. “Squadron/1738/Ferrying,” Air Force History Index.Org. http://airforcehistoryindex.org/data/000/494/640.xml (accessed November 26, 2021). 29. “1708th FW/FG-4440th ADG,” Super Saber Society. https://units.supersabresociety.com/emblems/1708th-fg-fw/ (ac- cessed November 26, 2021). 30. Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Viet- nam,” The AOPA Pilot, p. 44. 31. In an emergency, the O–2 pilot could exit the left side of the aircraft by using the pilot station’s emergency exit window. “Emergency Exits, Entrances, and Equipment,” T.O. 1L-2A-1, Flight Manual USAF Series O–2A and O–2B Aircraft. (Washing- ton, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, June 10, 1977), 3-2.; Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Vietnam,” The AOPA Pilot, p. 46. 32. According to T.O. 1L-2A-1, Flight Manual USAF Series O– 2A and O–2B Aircraft, the Skymaster only had oil pressure and oil temperature gauges to monitor the aircraft engine oil lubri- cant, therefore WAS pilots were directed to track both their oil and fuel consumption during each leg of the flight. Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Vietnam,” The AOPA Pilot, p. 45. 33. Ibid, p. 45 34. Ibid, p. 46. 35. Walt Shiel, Cessna Warbirds: A Detailed and Personal His- AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 11 NOTES nam Air Force prior to the 1975 fall of Saigon.68 Regardless of the outcome of the war, the work and dedication of the USAF airmen, Cessna employees and WAS pilots working together as a team to find an effective and inexpensive way to ferry nearly 200 small aircraft across the United States and Pacific Ocean is a story that needs to be told accurately for the benefit of these airmen, their families and aviation history.69 ■ tory of Cessna’s Involvement in the Armed Forces, p. 218. 36. Hamilton AFB was transferred to the USA in 1983 and for- mally closed in 1988 as part of the Base Realignment and Closure program. Ibid, p. 47. 37. “Required Conversions of Nicknames (TAC (DAMRDS)) Ltr, 11 July 1968,” History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Lan- gley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967 (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1967), n.p., U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 38. P.E. Matt, “The South Pacific Air Ferry Route”, Pacific Eagles, WWII Pacific Air Combat, December 15, 2015. https://pacificea- gles.net/the-south-pacific-air-ferry-route (accessed November 15, 2015). 39. “Memorandum for TAC (DOOS – Colonel Merrill), Subject: O-2 Program Review”, 9 October 1967, History of the 4440th Air- craft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 De- cember 1967. (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1967), p. 1, U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 40. The surface-to-air recovery system, whereby a rescued air- crew member was attached to a cable under a helium-filled bal- loon that was “caught” by a low-flying aircraft, was officially known as the Fulton Surface-to-Air Recovery System (STARS) and was made famous in the 1965 James Bond movie Thunder- ball.; Allison C. Brooks. “Aerospace Rescue and Recovery – South- east Asia to Apollo,” Air University Review, May-June 1967. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/ may-jun/brooks.html (accessed November 22, 2021), p. 3. 41. Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Viet- nam,” The AOPA Pilot, p. 47. 42. Ibid, p. 47. 43. One Ocean Station November ship, the USCGC Pontchar- train, was instrumental in assisting with the successful rescue of a Pan Am Boeing 377 Stratocruiser’s crew and passengers that ditched in the Pacific Ocean on October 16, 1956. Ibid. 44. The Duckbutt aircraft would fly out ahead of the four Sky- masters and hold at a position along the course until the flight had passed. Ibid. 45. There is some debate whether the 2000 pounds referenced is over the Empty Weight and not the Max Gross Weight. If for no other reason, a lot of the equipment that would be included even in the Basic Empty Weight would not be installed until it arrived in the Philippines or even later. Chris Mayer, Aircraft owner and historian, Email message to the author, June 26, 2022. 46. Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Viet- nam,” The AOPA Pilot, p. 48. 47. Ibid, p. 44. 48. Ibid, p. 49. 49. Ibid, p. 50.; “4440th Aircraft Delivery Group Organizational Chart,” History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967. (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1967), n.p., U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 50. The pilot counted exactly 171 items. Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Fer- rying A Fighting Skymaster to Vietnam,” The AOPA Pilot, p. 50. 51. Ibid. 52. “4440th Aircraft Delivery Group Organizational Chart,” His- tory of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967, n.p. 53. Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Viet- nam,” The AOPA Pilot, 50.; “4440th Aircraft Delivery Group Or- ganizational Chart,” History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967, n.p. 54. Paul Hoffman, Jr., “Ferrying A Fighting Skymaster to Viet- nam,” The AOPA Pilot, 50. 55. Ibid. 56. In 1993, during the author’s time as a Survival, Evasion, Re- sistance, and Escape (SERE) student at the USA’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, SERE instructors taught students to wait until daylight before approaching a friendly position in order to avoid a “Blue- on-Blue” or fratricide situation.; Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid, p. 52. 59. Ibid. 60. John Lear, who flew ten trans-Pacific O-2 aircraft deliveries, discussed his time working for World Aviation Services during a July 9, 2004 presentation to fellow pilots at the monthly “Hangar of Quiet Birdmen” meeting in Las Vegas, Nevada. Al Morris, “The Adventures of John Lear (son of Bill Lear),” The Rogue Aviator, January 3, 2012, https://therogueaviator.com/the-adventures-of- john-lear-son-of-bill (accessed November 1, 2021). 61. “O-2 Ferry Operations Review,” October 10, 1967, History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967, (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1967), Doc 87, U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 62. “O-2 Ferry Operations Review,” October 10, 1967, History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967, Doc 87. 63. “O-2 Program Review.” October 9, 1967, History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967. (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1967), p. 2, U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 64. History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 January 1968 – 30 June 1968. (Langley Air Force Base, VA: United States Air Force, 1968), p. 6, US Air Force His- torical Archives, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 65. The aircraft involved in the ditching incident was an O-2A, serial number 67-21323. According to the 4440th historical records, “The primary cause [of the crash] was pilot error in that the pilot failed to follow established engine failure emergency pro- cedures.” The aircraft was lost at sea, but the pilot was recovered uninjured. “Flying Safety Records,” History of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, Langley AFB, Virginia, 1 July 1967 – 31 December 1967, p. 2.; According to the late Colonel Richard H. Wood, USAF (retired), two additional aircraft accidents occurred during the two-year O-2 Project deployment: The second accident occurred when an O-2 crashed in the Philippines killing the WAS pilot. The third accident involved an O-2 experiencing a hard landing at Hickam AFB. Richard H. Wood, “How the O-2s Really Got to Vietnam”, Night Rustics, 2000. 66. According to military aviation historian Joe Baugher, approx- imately eleven O-2 1967 serial numbers are missing from official USAF data bases. The omission of these aircraft serial numbers may indicate that Cessna never officially delivered these air- frames to the USAF and validate why the two O-2 aircraft mishaps reported by Colonel Wood are not listed in the 1967 and 1968 4440th unit histories. “USAF Serial Number Search Re- sults, Cessna O-2A“, USASC-USAAS-USAAC-USAAF-USAF Military Aircraft Serial Numbers—1908 to Present, December 3, 2021, http://cgibin.rcn.com/jeremy.k/cgi-bin/gzUsafSearch.pl?tar- get=&content=Cessna+O-2A (accessed December 17, 2021).; Richard H. Wood, “How the O-2s Really Got to Vietnam”, Night Rustics, 2000. 67. World Aviation Services, Inc. appears to have ceased opera- tions sometime in 2016 and records from the period 1967-68 are were unavailable. The company’s current filing status is listed as “Forfeited - Failed to timely file Annual Report” and its File Num- ber is 7031354, “World Aviation Services, Inc.,” Bizapedia, May 16, 2016, https://www.bizapedia.com/ks/world-aviation-services- inc.html (accessed, October 19, 2021).; Ibid. 68. “South Vietnam,” Cessna Skymasters used by non-U.S. air forces, https://web.archive.org/web/20100312013338, http://www. skymaster.org.uk/military.asp (accessed November 2, 2021). 69. Walt Shiel, Cessna Warbirds: A Detailed and Personal His- tory of Cessna’s Involvement in the Armed Forces, p. 218. 12 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 13 The Man in Black, Coach Pop and Intelligence in the U.S. Air Force Scott C. Martin I f you were to do a comparative biography between two men, the combination of Johnny Cash and Gregg Popovich might not be an obvious choice. The former known as one of the greatest country-western singers in history and the other establishing himself as an all-time great National Basketball Association (NBA) head coach. Yet should one peel back the onion, you come to find a few similarities. For one, the color black is central to each man’s identity. Johnny Cash’s main nickname was “The Man in Black” which came from his dressing in black clothing while performing during concerts, as well as the title of one of his top singles. Gregg Popovich, as coach of the San Antonio Spurs, is very much associated with the color black, black and silver being the team colors. The city of San Antonio also connects the two men, as the city played a significant role in Cash’s early adult life, where he met his first wife, Vivian Liberto. Yet, there is another way that San Antonio is significant to Cash, and that factor is also another connection be- tween Cash and Popovich. When Johnny Cash met Vivian, he was there as part of his training when he enlisted in the Air Force in 1950. He completed a seven-week basic training course at Lackland AFB in the summer of 1950, re- turning in 1951 for follow-up technical training at Brooks Air Base. With Gregg Popovich, his association with the Air Force came with his attendance at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Upon graduation in 1970, he was commissioned an officer in the USAF. Both would serve the Air Force working for some aspect of Air Force Intelligence. Both served during the Cold War, with Russia a primary focus of their professional service/train- ing. Their respective experiences were different, but they played their part in the evolution of the Air Force, the Air Force’s and the nation’s intelligence capabilities and America’s overall role in the Cold War. Before the Man In Black, An Airman in Blue… For Johnny Cash, the idea that he would one day be a part of the growing U.S. intelligence complex seemed un- likely. The son of a poor farmer who settled in Dyess, Arkansas when he was 3, Cash grew up during the darkest parts of the Great Depression, when many in America struggled to put food on the table and maintain a steady em- ployment. Too young to join the fight in World War II, Johnny Cash was old enough to enlist in 1950, right as the U.S. entered the Korean War. For Cash, fresh off a stint at a Ford factory in Michigan, the Air Force offered a chance for adventure and Cash figured that if war with Korea came, and he was drafted, better to be in the Air Force.1 After taking the oath of enlistment Blytheville, Arkansas on July 7, 1950, Cash took the train from Memphis to San An- Gregg Popovich watches play. (Photo courtesy of Zereshk at Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:Pop_side_view.JPG) tonio. While in Basic Training, Cash demonstrated strong academic performance, eventually serving as a resource for fellow trainees.2 Towards the end of his basic training, aptitude tests show Cash showed profi- ciency needed to become a radio operator. Unsure of what exactly that entailed, the idea of working some- thing with “radio” in the title appealed to him.3 Upon ac- ceptance as a radio operator, John R. Cash received orders to report to Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Mis- sissippi in late summer 1950. At Keesler, Cash came to learn more about what a “radio operator” entailed. The job required Cash to learn about how the U.S. eavesdropped on enemy radio com- munications. The training at Keesler tested his concen- tration, as he and his classmates learned to sort through radio traffic to decipher Morse code signals, isolate them, transcribe the dots and dashes into letters, and pass them along to translators for decoding.4 In order to grad- uate, a trainee had to interpret the codes to produce up to twenty words a minute.5 In this environment, Cash excelled, advancing through the program ahead of his peers, earning both admiration and envy.6 His perform- ance, to include his ability to transcribe 26-30 words per minute, also impressed his instructors and superiors, es- pecially the ways that he overcame their efforts to dis- rupt his ability to decipher signals.7 As a result, they recruited Cash to join the new USAF Security Service, with posting at one of their key intercept locations.8 He applied for and was accepted into the Security Service and upon graduation from Kessler was sent back to San Antonio, this time Brooks Air Force Base, for four months of specialized training. With all the training and dramatic shift in lifestyle, Cash’s life had no shortage of upheaval. Yet his personal upheaval could not match the chaos surrounding the Air Force and the U.S. Intelligence Community as this time. The U.S. Intelligence Community, in its current form, was only a few years old, born from the National Secu- rity Act of 1947. As a Morse Code Interceptor/Inter- preter, Cash worked focused on Signals Intelligence, or SIGINT. At the time Cash entered the SIGINT world, that discipline, along with the rest of the U.S. Intelli- gence Community (U.S. IC) was in a tumultuous time. Prior to 1947, The SIGINT capabilities of the U.S. gov- ernment were mainly the domain of the military serv- ices. Each service, primarily the Army and Navy, had their own SIGINT capabilities, and integration between those entities was limited, to include how each service reported and analyzed the collected SIGINT, and what days each service worked on the SIGINT.9 The confusion and chaos only increased with the establishment of a new branch of service. The Air Force officially entered the SIGINT game with the establishment of the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) on October 20, 1948.10 For the National Intelligence Community, having three separate SIGINT entities, all controlling their own personnel, resources and operations, this proved unten- able. Given that the USAFSS could not adequately per- form its critical mission of tracking and reporting on Soviet Long Range Aviation, especially in Europe, due to manning and equipment shortfalls, the U.S. faced se- rious issues on how it could leverage its intelligence ca- pabilities.11 To try to better control the disjointed SIGINT efforts and better resource the SIGINT enter- prise, the Department of Defense established the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), with the expressed goal of directing and controlling U.S. SIGINT operations, mainly communications intelligence (COMINT).12 AFSA did leave tactical-level requirements up to the respective services, but much of the overarching guidance was to come from AFSA.13 However, due to ineffective leader- ship and a severe lack of control of resources (mainly fi- nancial and personnel), the respective services still maintained a high degree of autonomy when it came to SIGINT activities. This disorganization and bureaucratic infighting did little to help the U.S. deal with its primary concern of analyzing and reporting on the activities of America’s key rival: The Soviet Union. The former World War II al- lies now faced off in a geo-political contest with world supremacy at stake. At the start of the what became the Cold War, the U.S. found itself at a significant disadvan- tage when it came to insight about the USSR. Various 14 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 Scott Martin is an active-duty USAF officer with over 20 years of service. He received his BA from Trinity University and his MS in International Relations from Troy University. He has written for multiple pub- lications to include Air Power History, Air and Space Power Journal and Strategic Studies Quarterly. Airman J. R. Cash, radio operator trainee. efforts for U.S. spies to infiltrate the USSR yielded little success. In the late 1940s, the U.S. government was des- perately looking for any information on the USSR, to in- clude searching for a Soviet phone book. In most cases, the U.S. had to rely on its limited ability to intercept So- viet communications.14 This restriction only became tougher when on Octo- ber 29, 1948, the USSR switched its high-level commu- nications code, rendering much of the previous reporting stream useless, a date that NSA would later refer to a “Black Friday”.15 As a result, U.S. SIGINT collection on the USSR had to come from lower level government communications and Morse intercepts of Russian avia- tion/military units. From these, the U.S. and its allies could obtain some insight into Soviet capabilities and in- tent. When it came to long-range aviation, that fell under the control of the USAFSS, and as a result, men like Johnny Cash were called to focus on that activity. What Johnny Cash might have known about the tur- moil within the U.S. SIGINT community is uncertain, but this was the environment he walked into as he started his life as a Morse Code operator. Upon leaving his final training at Brooks AFB, he was assigned to 6912th Se- curity Squadron, stationed in Landsberg, Germany. For Cash, this was the optimum assignment. His talent with Morse intercept and his record of excellence set him up for such a prime tasking. Additionally, Germany seemed far most appealing than the other option of Adak, Alaska.16 With all of that resolved, Cash departed for his new adventure on Sept 20, 1951, leaving Brooklyn Naval Yard for the long trek to Landsberg, Germany. Upon his arriving to Germany, Cash reported to the 6912th Security Squadron, with specific assignment to the 12 Radio Squadron Mobile (RSM). For the next three years, Cash’s work life consisted of working eight hour shifts on the second floor of a secure facility (nowadays known as a Secure Compartmentalized Information Fa- cility (SCIF)) with no windows. With their workspace filled with coffee and cigarettes, Cash and his cohorts (up to thirty-nine other operators) listened in on head- phones, trying to pick up the activities of Soviet bombers and air defense units tracking U.S. aircraft.17 Cash’s mu- sical aptitude served him well, as he could pick out the tone of the Morse communications he sought. Once he had the signal, he quickly typed out the interpretation of the Morse, which in turn was relayed to linguist and cryptographers to translate/analyze.18 Cash’s work en- abled him to identify specific transmissions, which he sometimes named, such as “Ol’ Goober.”19 While not on the combat lines like his counterparts in Korea, Cash’s life did not lack for stress. Many a smoke/coffee break was interrupted with various cryp- tographers racing into the room to indicate another plane launched. Tensions between divided Europe re- mained high, with Germany seen as the front line for a possible major conflict, one that could go nuclear very quickly. The long hours of work and the stress of working in such tight/enclosed places could wear down the tough- est of Morse operators. On multiple occasions, an opera- tor might just suddenly “lose it”, and act funny, from cry- ing, shouting, or ramming their heads into doors.20 Even Cash confessed to losing his cool one night, throwing one of the typewriters across the room, before being escorted out for a break.21 While others do not recall a specific in- cident like this and Cash did have a habit of embellish- ing his previous actions, many of his compatriots did have troubles with the stressful work. Shift work and high stress environments can wear workers down, even in the present-day military. However, Cash continued his work, with generally exceptional results. By the time that Cash’s tour ended in 1954, Staff Sergeant Cash was more than ready to leave. The pri- mary diversions of the airmen at Landsberg, booze and women, had worn thin with Cash. He still maintained his loyalty to Vivian (save a few encounters with Ger- man women early in his time at Landsberg), even invit- ing her to live with him toward the end of his tour in late 1953. His work still focused on the activities of Russian Air and Air Defense units. This included intercepting the first flight of a Soviet jet bomber from Moscow to Smolensk.22 However, perhaps his biggest achievement was more on the geo-political realm. According to Cash, one of his Morse intercepts in April 1953, revealed the announcement of the death of Josef Stalin. The strong- man ruler of the USSR since 1927, Stalin was in failing health, but that information was not common knowl- edge. This particular account, part of the Cash legend, has not been verified by official sources. Given that most of the Western World only learned about his death from the wire services when the USSR made the official an- nouncement (with no reference to the stroke that had incapacitated him for hours prior to his death), it is hard to say that Cash truly broke that news, or if he did, it did not go beyond Air Force cryptologic channels, given the tactical focus of their mission.23 The Air Force wanted Cash to stay, but while in Germany, his passion for music had outgrown his desire to serve in the Air Force, and in April 1954, he separated, starting down the path of country music superstardom. Before Coach “Pop”, Cadet/Lt Popovich By the 1970s, Johnny Cash’s Air Force days were a distant memory, as he took his place atop the country music world. However, for Gregg Popovich, his Air Force experiences were in full swing. The son of Serbian and Croatian immigrants, Popovich grew up honing his bas- ketball skills in the basketball-mad state of Indiana, eventually able to parlay that talent and his academic record into an appointment to the Air Force Academy. At first, Popovich did not have visions of military glory, but was more looking for a place to play ball on scholarship. From 1968-1970, Cadet Popovich starred on the Air Force Academy basketball team, leading the team in scoring and assists during his senior season (his record for career shooting percentage of 54.1 percent is 3rd all- time in the Air Force Academy basketball records as of 2022).24 Upon graduation from the Academy, Popovich AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 15 commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant on June 3, 1970. Given that the Air Force lacked an Air Force Spe- cialty Code (AFSC) for basketball player, Popovich was designated for a different service track. At the Academy, he learned that he would be assigned as an 8054, the designation for an Air Force Intelligence Officer.25 It was a field that fit in line with his academic studies, as he was taking classes in Soviet Studies. Upon his commis- sioning, Popovich received his first assignment to the 6594th Support Group at Sunnyvale, CA.26 Being a freshly-minted 2nd Lt, it is likely he didn’t get too in- volved with the technical mission of the base, working initially in the administrative arm of the base while awaiting technical training.27 Still, he would have had some exposure to the mission of the base, which was a part of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Or- ganization, which had oversight on the U.S. military’s forays into space, which included Intelligence, Surveil- lance and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites.28 From there, 2nd Lt Popovich’s next foray would be for more technical training. However, his basketball prowess would move him along a different career path than his peers, as the commanding general for the U.S. Armed Forces basket- ball team assigned the former point guard to his team. Much like Johnny Cash, Popovich entered military service at a chaotic time for the nation and the intelli- gence community. As with Cash twenty years prior, Popovich entered active duty while the U.S. was engaged in major combat operations, this time in Vietnam. While the U.S. was reducing its presence in Vietnam, it still loomed as a possible focus for Popovich’s service. As with Cash, while an East Asian nation might be the primary focus of fighting, there still existed a major threat that overshadowed all: The Soviet Union. No longer quite the mystery it was during Cash’s time in service, the USSR still posed significant challenges for intelligence opera- tions. While the leadership was different (Stalin vs. Brezhnev) and there were some signs of improved rela- tions with detente, both superpowers still postured their militaries to face-off in a possible nuclear conflict. Only now, the weaponry advanced to the point that each na- tion could destroy the other without a single soldier set- ting foot on the soil of another country, between advances in aircraft, submarines and ballistic missiles. As for the U.S. IC, much had changed, but it was still a community rife with bureaucratic squabbles. The old AFSA, never able to consolidate its position among the services, eventually gave way to the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1952, which took the lead for national SIGINT policy. The military services still held control of specific missions, but the NSA proved a stronger organ- ization vs. its AFSA predecessor. Along with a strong or- ganization, NSA oversaw a significant increase in SIGINT capabilities, from more advanced technical means of collection to increased personnel for analysis and reporting. Between the times of SSgt Cash and 2nd Lt Popovich, the NSA grew into a massive entity, with an operating budget over $1B and over 93,000 military personnel assigned at the time of 2Lt Popovich’s com- missioning.29 Of note, the USAFSS still served as the Air Force service component supporting NSA and the na- tional SIGINT enterprise, not changing its name until 1990. One of the biggest advances for the intelligence com- munity came from the increased role space was playing in national defense. Whereas Cash and his counterparts relied on collection from ground-based sensors and were mainly concerned about air and land-based threats, the world of the 1970s also had to contend with threats from and transiting through space. The Soviet launch of Sput- nik in 1957 opened the gateway to space as the next frontier of the Cold War. The advent of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) posed a greater existential threat, with large missiles able to deliver lethal nuclear payloads across the globe within thirty minutes with lit- tle to no warning. The tracking of launchers and missile command and control proved one of the highest priori- ties of the intelligence community in the 1970s. Additionally, the U.S. IC used space to increase col- lection of Soviet targets. While the U.S. still used tradi- tional aircraft to collect against Soviet targets, the U.S. began using ISR satellites to collect on targets deep in- side the Soviet Union. Traditional aircraft, equipped with cameras for IMINT and SIGINT sensors, still flew, but after Gary Powers’ U–2 was shot down in 1960, along with other reconnaissance aircraft downed near Soviet territory, space-based assets seemed a safer bet.30 Starting in 1960, the U.S. used space-based satellites to collect and analyze imagery of targets deep in Soviet ter- ritory.31 From the mid-1960s, imagery and SIGINT satel- lites were launched with the purposes of gathering 16 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 U.S. Air Force Academy cadet Gregg Popovich. intelligence without the risks associated with regular aircraft. Operated by the then-covert organization of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), these ISR satel- lites, part of the Corona program, provided critical im- agery and signals intelligence to U.S. policymakers and military leaders as they continued to posture against the Soviet Union.32 For 2nd Lt Popovich, much like SrA Cash, what he knew, or was aware of the various developments and backstory for is not known for sure. Popovich, notorious for being tight-lipped in his on and off-court interviews, has said little about his time in the service and even less about his non-basketball experiences. He is more open about his experiences on the Armed Forces Basketball team, which he played on as part of a Goodwill tour in 1972. During that time, Popovich travelled throughout several cities in the USSR, to include Moscow, Kiev, Vil- nius, Tbilisi and Tallinn. Popovich, despite his designa- tion as Air Force Intelligence, likely did not have the training to make professional assessments of what he saw, but he came to learn a great deal in his time on that trip.33 He would also see other parts of the Warsaw Pact. After the Goodwill Tour, Popovich returned to his regu- lar Air Force duties, with his next assignment slated for Turkey. In 1973, now 1st Lt Popovich received an assign- ment to Diyarbakir Air Station, Turkey. This remote lo- cation housed equipment and satellites for tracking Soviet weapons activity out of Kapustin Yar, one of their main weapons testing locations. Given the location deep in Soviet territory, the U.S. had to rely on a combination of long-range ground sensors (mainly to track launch ac- tivity) and space-based assets (Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Measurements and Signals Intelligence (MASINT) and SIGINT) to determine activity at the site. Popovich, in what little he has publicly revealed about the site, noted that upon his arrival, he was greeted by a screaming, joyous man, later revealed to be the lieutenant he was slated to replace.34 However, there would be no tales of mental breakdowns or struggles, ala Cash, as Popovich recounted fond memories of interac- tions with the Turkish natives. It is unknown if Popovich did shiftwork, but at sites that require the ability to monitor and report on military activity 24/7, it is entirely possible that Popovich worked and/or supervised indi- viduals who had to work shifts to provide the required coverage. Those airmen would have been a combination of radar technicians, SIGINT analysts and other experts with training in monitoring and reporting on weapons/space activities. However, his future would not lie in the intelligence world, but on the hardwood, as the Air Force Academy recalled their former start point guard to start him on his path towards coaching. In late 1973, Popovich re- turned as an assistant coach. From there, the rest is well-documented in the sports pages, going from the Air Force Academy to coaching at a Division III college, to eventually working in the front office of the San Antonio Spurs, before taking over as head coach before the 1996- 1997 season, a position that he still holds to this day, 5 titles and 1480 combined wins later (as of the end of the 2020-2021 NBA season).35 His Air Force career saw him move into the Air Force reserves, which he honorably separated from in 1983 as a Major (his final posting at March AFB).36 He was inducted into the Air Force Acad- emy Hall of Fame in 2019 (more for his basketball suc- cess rather than in his intel background). While Popovich may not reflect a great deal on his specific work while in the service, he does continue to cite his time at the Academy and in the Air Force as a source of pride and educational experience on leadership. Conclusion/Comparison When discussing the lives of Johnny Cash and Gregg Popovich, both men have much to add to their bi- ographies. When Cash passed away in 2003, he left the stage as perhaps the greatest country western performer of all time, and nearly seventeen years later, Cash’s work still enthralls audiences of all ages. For Popovich, the book on his NBA career is far from over. While the Spurs have not won a title since 2015, his teams still contend for playoff berths at a constant rate, a difficult achieve- ment given the fluctuations in teams and players from year to year. They are Hall-of-Famers in their primary professions, but both looked back on their relatively short time in the Air Force with a degree of pride. They served at the beginning of their respective adult lives, leveraging the direct and indirect lessons that the Air Force could teach an individual (enlisted and officer) to set themselves up for the future successes their lives would follow. Yet, there Air Force careers, in different tracks and times, have important parallels. Both served in the long- running Cold War, with the threat of all-out nuclear war- fare with the USSR never far from fruition. With neither saw direct combat, their daily work focused on monitoring the activities of the key Cold War adversary, helping to maintain that delicate strategic balance that kept both sides from slipping into war. The technological advances in the sixteen years between Cash’s discharge and Popovich’s commission saw incredible advancements in technology and capabilities. Yet, the focus of the Morse Operator Cash was ultimately not that much different than Lt Popovich and his supervision of analysts in Turkey. Both monitored the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union, analyzing and reporting on their weapons capabilities, looking to see if the USSR was just exercis- ing, or perhaps, mobilizing for conflict. While Cash worked a single-source intelligence discipline of SIGINT, as com- pared to Popovich, whose mission focus would work with multiple intelligence disciplines, both mission still tied back to the USSR and their weapons capabilities. It is likely that Cash’s aptitude for Morse, detecting audio patterns to find the right frequency would have served him well in the Space Age, as overhead satellites in the 1960s and 1970s still collected on military com- munications like the ground-based sensors of the 1950s. AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 17 1. Robert Hilburn, Johnny Cash: The Life.(New York: Little, Brown & Company, 2013), p. 27. 2. Ibid, p. 30. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid, p. 31. 5. Michael Streisguth, Johnny Cash: The Biography (Philadel- phia, PA: De Capo Press, 2006), p. 40. 6. Hilburn, Johnny Cash: The Life, p. 31. 7. Streisguth, Johnny Cash: The Biography, p. 40. 8. Ibid. 9. Stephan Budiansky, Code Warriors: NSA’s Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against The Soviet Union (New York: Alfred C. Knopf, 2016), p. 90. 10. United States Air Force, “The Twenty-Fifth Air Force (ACC)” US Air Force, accessed 30 April 2020, https://www.af.mil/About- Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1397250/the-twenty-fifth-air-force/. 11. Matthew M. Aid, The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency, (New York: Bloomberg Press, 2009), p. 20. 12. Ibid 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid, p. 24. 15. Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes, “Introduction: The Im- portance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War” Intelligence and National Security 16, p. 1 (Mar 2001), p. 18. 16. Hilburn, Johnny Cash: The Life, p. 34. 17. Streisguth, Johnny Cash: The Biography, p. 41. 18. Ibid, p. 43. 19. Ibid. 20. Hilburn, Johnny Cash: The Life, p. 41. 21. Ibid, p. 42. 22. Alan Light, Johnny Cash The Life and Legacy of the Man in Black. (Washington D.C., Smithsonian Books, 2018), p. 48. 23. Aid, The Secret Sentry, p. 45. 24. Sports Reference College Basketball “1969-70 Air Force Fal- cons Roster and Stats” Sports Reference, accessed 11 June 2021 at Air Force Leaders & Records - Season | College Basketball at Sports-Reference.com. 25. Gregg Popovich Military History (Freedom Of Information Act) accessed 30 April 2020, https://www.documentcloud.org/doc- uments/1311561-spurs-coach-gregg-popovich-military- history.html. 26. John Tedesco and Tom Orsborn “Air Force Life for Popovich: Spy Satellites and Basketball” San Antonio Express News, 25 Oct 2014, https://www.expressnews.com/sports/spurs/article/Air- Force-life-for-Popovich-Spy-satellites-and-5848368.php. 27. Ibid 28. Ibid 29. Aid, The Secret Sentry, p. 148. 30. Colonel John Hughes-Wilson, The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage, (New York: Pegasus Books, 2016). pp. 177-9 31. Ibid, p. 189. 32. Ibid. 33. Tedesco and Orsborn, “Air Force Life for Popovich”. 34. Ibid 35. Basketball Reference “Gregg Popovich” accessed 11 June 2021, https://www.basketball-reference.com/coaches/popovgr99c. html. 36. Gregg Popovich Military History. 18 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 NOTES Concurrently, while Popovich might never have done the specific work that Cash did as an enlisted operator, it is likely that Popovich would have led a group of Morse radio operators and cryptographers with the same ded- ication to detail and personal empowerment he brings to the hardwood with the Spurs. Yet, for both men, an Air Force career was never the long-term goal. When their time in service was up, both men took the lessons from the Air Force, and moved on to the next, greater chapter of their lives. Yet, both men also played their part in the continu- ously evolving role of the U.S. Intelligence Community. What was a chaotic series of organizations, with compet- ing agendas and diverse offices, has continued to evolve into a massive enterprise with a worldwide focus, sup- porting all facets of the U.S. government, from military to homeland security. While both men saw the eventual fall of the Soviet Union, Russia still remains a major focus of the U.S. IC. Even today, analysts work on track- ing and reporting on Russia weaponry, from aviation to space-launched weapons, noting advancements in tech- nology and employment, all while trying to maintain the precarious balance of peace. Like the Cold War, Russia is not the only focus of the IC, and the interagency com- petition, with services vs. specific agencies and agencies vs. each other, continues. However, the core missions, the ones that faced Cash and Popovich still apply in 2022, as their fellow airmen continue to work as a part of the Department of Defense and the U.S. IC, monitoring and reporting on the actions of adversaries of all types. ■ Johnny Cash in his Air Force uniform hanging out with a Hawaiian-shirted friend. AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 19 Command, Control, and Communications of Bomber Forces in World War II and the Korean War James D. Perry C ommand, control, and communications (C3) of bomber forces in World War II and the Korean War receives relatively little attention from historians. The apparent assumption is that bombers, unlike fighters, needed little if any in- formation or direction from base after they took off. Although bombers were not directed from the ground like fight- ers on interception missions, bombers still needed effective communications with each other, with fighter escorts, and with their bases. For this purpose, bombers used Very High Frequency (VHF) radio for short-range communications, and High Frequency (HF) radio for long-range communications with their base. Bombers received navigational assistance from ground-based radio beacon systems such as Gee, Gee-H, LORAN, and SHORAN. The bombing campaigns would have been far less effective without effective C3. Communications with the ground and with other aircraft were critical for bomber survivability and for improving bombing accuracy to the limits possible with the available technology. Operational and Tactical C3 in Europe In Europe, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued general targeting directives to Spaatz to guide his employment of Eighth and Fifteenth Air Force.1 A combined Anglo-American committee recommended weekly target priorities based on the latest intelligence information. The Eighth Air Force representative on this committee passed these recommendations to the Combined Operational Planning Committee, which chose and planned the daily bombing missions.2 The day before an attack, planners used weather reports to determine which targets to attack and how to attack them. The planners sent a field order to the combat units, specifying routes, timing, altitude, geographic check points, formations, aim points, enemy defenses, and other pertinent information. Each unit involved used the field order to brief their crews. Very detailed planning and a rigid timetable was needed because large numbers of aircraft had to assemble and fly in formation.3 Missions were tightly scripted, but the targets were fixed – factories, marshalling yards, airfields, etc. Ground control did not need to update the bombers about the target location after take-off. The principal information the bombers needed was weather over the target, and P–51 “weather scouts” went ahead to determine it. Mission plans included alternate targets in case bad weather precluded visual attacks on the primary target. If weather was poor over every target, the formation could either bomb non-visually or seek a target of opportunity. Typically only six days per month were suitable for visual bombing. Bombers dropped a high percentage of their bombs non-visually (see Fig. 1). Bombers used radio-navigational aids that were based on measuring the difference in the time of arrival of pulses sent from ground beacons to determine the aircraft’s position. Gee had a range of 300 to 400 miles, and was only accurate Low-level photo of a light mobile Gee station operating in a field near Roermond, Holland. These forward stations pro- vided Gee coverage deeper into Germany, as well as strong signals for aircraft returning to bases in Western Europe. (From the collections of the Imperial War Museums.) enough for general navigation.4 Gee-H sent pulses from the aircraft that triggered ground stations to send answering pulses to the Gee-H receiver on the aircraft. Two beacons created range arcs that intersected over the target (see Fig. 2). The bombardier released the bombs after a predeter- mined period of time based on altitude, speed, and type of bomb carried. Accuracy decreased with distance from the beacons. Gee-H was used extensively against targets like V-weapon sites prior to D-Day. In September 1944, the Al- lies moved Gee-H beacons to the continent to facilitate ac- curate bombing deeper into Germany.5 Bombers used H2X airborne radar to assist navigation by detecting visible features such as rivers or lakes. H2X was particularly useful against coastal targets (see Fig. 3). In November 1944, Eighth Air Force began using Micro-H, which combined Gee-H and H2X. Micro-H had to be used within range of ground beacons, but was much more accu- rate than H2X alone (see Fig. 4).6 Even with these aids, overall accuracy was poor. Only 20 percent to 40 percent of Eighth Air Force bombs fell within 1,000 feet of the target.7 Ground control rarely issued direct orders to airborne bombers after take-off. An exception was to recall them due 20 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 James D. Perry has an M.A. in Security Policy Studies and a Ph.D. in History from George Washington Uni- versity. After obtaining his Ph.D., he was a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. He is a Senior Analyst for Northrop Grum- man Corporation, where he conducts research and analysis to support company aircraft programs. He is the author of numerous articles on military history. Figure 1: Percentage of visual and overcast bombing per month, and the accuracy of bombing for each method. (Eighth Air Force, Eighth Air Force Tactical Development: August 1942 – May 1945, July 9, 1945, p. 63.)(Source for figures 1, 3, 4 and 7 is https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collec- tion/p4013coll8/id/4112/) to bad weather. When bombers returned to base, however, voice and radio-navigational communication with the ground was critical. Ground control directed returning bombers to their home fields, or to alternate fields if weather was poor at the home field. Damaged aircraft were guided to emergency fields. If a bomber ditched in the sea, ground control guided air-sea rescue to the bomber’s last known location. The SCR-522 was the standard Very High Frequency (VHF) voice radio carried in American fighters and bombers (see Fig. 5).8 The SCR-522 had four channels. The first channel was on a frequency assigned to the individual Group for use in combat and to communicate with ground control during return to base. The second was the common air-sea rescue channel. The third was used to coordinate between bombers and their escorts. The fourth was the “fix- ing” channel that enabled ground control to triangulate the aircraft’s position when it was within radio range of British bases.9 American bombers also carried the SCR-287 High Frequency radio that was principally used to send and re- ceive long-range messages in Morse code. Range depended on atmospheric conditions and time of day. B–29 operators over Japan used HF radio to communicate with their bases over 1,500 miles away. Transmission and reception speed depended on operator skill, but was typically fifteen to twenty words per minute.10 A basic hindrance to the command and control of air- craft was lack of “over the horizon” VHF voice capability. Depending on aircraft altitude, controllers in Britain could reach pilots up to 150 to 200 miles away – not much farther than the Dutch coast. Nor could radars in Britain provide situational awareness over Germany itself. The “over the horizon” C3 capability was needed in order to control the fighter escorts. Fighter escorts typically worked in relays (see Fig. 6). When one fighter unit returned to base, an- other fighter unit took over. In principle, this could be com- pletely pre-planned. In practice, both bombers and fighters experienced delays that prevented them from being at a rendezvous point at the appointed time. This created a gap in escort coverage that the Germans could exploit. Con- trollers needed precise, complete, and continuous informa- tion on the location of the bombers, their escorts, and the enemy in order to direct the escorts.11 The USAAF solved this problem in three ways. Firstly, bombers reported their own positions. Radio si- lence was impractical and unnecessary. The German early AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 21 Figure 2: For blind bombing with Gee-H, the aircraft flew along an arc of a circle at a constant distance from one Gee-H beacon. When the range to the second beacon reached a previously calculated value, the beams in- tersected over the target, and the aircraft had reached the release point. (Brig. J. D. Haigh, The Services Textbook of Radio, Volume 7, Radioloca- tion Techniques (London: HMSO, 1960), online at http://www.radarpages. co.uk/mob/navaids/geeh/geeh1.htm) Figure 3: H2X image showing the contrast between ocean, city, and open country. (Eighth Air Force Tactical Development August 1942 – May 1945, p. 66.) Figure 4: Accuracy of Eighth Air Force bombing methods, 1 September to 31 December 1944. Only 24% of the bombing effort took place under visual conditions, and 35% of the effort was under “blind” (10/10 cloud) H2X con- ditions. Operational Analysis Section, HQ Eighth Air Force, “Report on Bombing Accuracy, Eighth Air Force, 1 September to 31 December 1944,” 20 April 1945, pp. 66-75. The lethal radius of the standard 500 pound bomb was a few tens of feet against industrial targets. (McFarland, p. 186.) warning system was so good that they knew where Amer- ican aircraft were even if they maintained radio silence. Accordingly, bombers reported to base when they reached geographical control points such as the English coast, the enemy coast, and easily recognized lakes or towns (see Fig. 7). These reports enabled the control room to build a “mis- sion progress map” showing the location of all units.12 Eighth Air Force fighter control was the first to plot mis- sion progress, but Eighth Air Force HQ and the bomber units soon realized its utility.13 The next source of information about the location of friendly units was the enemy himself. The Luftwaffe broad- cast a “running commentary” in order to tell their fighter pilots where American aircraft were. German aircraft shadowed bomber formations and broadcast their size, course, and escort status. British signals intelligence inter- cepted these transmissions and passed the product to Eighth Air Force within a minute of receiving it; thus, “the Germans were obligingly giving us a most detailed running commentary on the positions of our bombers and fighters over Reich territory.”14 The Germans often reported the bomber positions more accurately than did the bombers themselves. Signals intelligence was also used to reposition escorts if necessary. Of course, controllers had to make it sound like their warnings came from different sources than signals intelligence.15 In 1944, Eighth and Fifteenth Air Force bombers carried German-speaking radio operators who listened to German radio chatter during the mission 22 AIR & SPACE POWER History / FALL 2022 in order to warn bomber crews when an enemy attack was imminent. Finally, Eighth Air Force used airborne relays. At first, fighter pilots over the North Sea repeated messages that they heard from aircraft over Germany. Later, bombers over the North Sea were equipped with special radios that automatically relayed voice communications between ground control and aircraft over Germany. Each bomber provided relay services for up to six fighter groups.16 By late 1944, airborne relays permitted controllers to commu- nicate with aircraft as distant as Berlin (see Fig. 8). In November 1944, an SCR-584 Microwave Early Warning (MEW) radar was installed in Holland . Its 200- mile range provided coverage over much of western Ger- many. This radar supported a forward fighter control center known as “Nuthouse.” Nuthouse informed friendly aircraft of the position and altitude of enemy aircraft, steered escorts to their rendezvous with the bombers, and vectored escorts to attack enemy fighters. Pilots especially valued Nuthouse for its assistance with poor-weather nav- igation. Even with Nuthouse, Eighth Air Force still main- tained the system of bomber self-reporting, signals intercepts, and relay bombers, because many missions pen- etrated beyond the range of the MEW radar.17 Figure 5: The SCR-522 and SCR-287 radios. (Online at https://radionerds. com/images/c/c1/SCR-522_Data.png and https://radionerds.com/index. php/ File:SCR-287_Data.png) Figure 6: Escort in Relays. (65th Fighter Wing, “Colgate Calling: Offensive Strategic Fighter Control, ETO, 1943-45,” June 1945, p. 62.) (Source for figures 6 & 8 is https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4627/) Figure 7: Mission to Berlin (March 1945) ingress and egress routes with control points. (Eighth Air Force Tactical Development August 1942 – May 1945, p. 44.) The Eighth Air Force C3 system was essential to bomber survivability because it permitted the direction of the long-range escorts that protected the bombers. The sys- tem increased crew survival because it enabled ground controllers to guide bombers back to base in bad weather and to direct air-sea rescue forces to downed aircraft. Radio navigational aids enabled bombers to bomb far more effec- tively than they could have through purely visual means. Operational and Tactical C3 in the Pacific Twentieth Air Force had very different communica- tions requirements from Eighth Air Force. Bombers flying from Britain spent six hours in heavily defended German airspace. In contrast, bombers launched from the Marianas spent seven hours crossing the Pacific and one hour in com- paratively lightly defended Japanese airspace. Fighter es- corts based on Iwo Jima had very limited endurance over Japan. Thus, Twentieth Air Force, unlike Eighth Air Force, did not need a communications system to coordinate its fighters and bombers over enemy territory. The principal information the bombers needed from base was radio nav- igational guidance for their flights to and from Japan. General Arnold issued targeting directives to Twenti- eth Air Force.18 Based on these directives, XXI Bomber Command issued field orders that specified the targets, routes, altitudes, initial points, aim points, axis of attack, bomb loads, timing, and other pertinent information. Each Wing determined how to achieve the objectives of the field order and briefed its crews accordingly. Typically, crews maintained radio silence during the mis- sion. On some night missions, a B–29 flew ahead of the main