The Mobility War: Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in Vietnam 1962–1975

War, assisting ground operations in combat, reconnaissance, transportation, and supply. That concept stretches back to the first Marine aviators in 1912. Marine Aviation became a for- mal component of the air-ground team in 1933 with the cre- ation of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). 5 Title 10 of the U.S. Code establishes the air-ground concept in law and stipulates that the Marine Corps is organized to provide Fleet Marine- forces of combined arms with supporting air components. 6 This teamwork served as the foundation of the Marine way 4 See Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1952), 31 – 33; and MajGen John P. Condon, USMC (Ret), and Cmdr Peter B. Mersky, USN (Ret), Cor- sairs to Panthers: U.S. Marine Aviation in Korea (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, 2002), 4 – 5. 5 See LtCol Edward C. Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912 – 1940, ed. Graham A. Cosmas (Washington, DC: History and Mu- seums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1977), 61 – 65. 6 U.S. Code, Title 10 — Section 8063, United States Marine Corps: com- position; functions (1956). of warfare in Southeast Asia, an approach that coordinated ground, air, and logistics that endures today. The Marine Corps and Helicopters, 1946 – 62 The Marine Corps was at the forefront of military helicopter development in the years following World War II. Its rotary- wing program officially began when it commissioned Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-1) in 1947 at Quantico, Vir- ginia. Helicopter design was still in its first generation, the product of hobby inventors struggling to expand beyond the scale of a cottage industry. Igor Sikorsky produced the first successful American-built helicopter in 1939. His Bridgeport, Connecticut, firm turned out more than 400 aircraft for the U.S. military before the end of World War II.7 Manufacturers such as Bell Aircraft and Piasecki Helicop- ter led the field with Sikorsky through the rest of the decade. Faced with dismal commercial prospects after the war, most of the U.S. aircraft industry sought potentially lucrative military contracts.8 As a result, government-funded research and devel- opment contributed to early advancements in rotary-wing technology. Helicopters lacked power and size in the 1940s, which initially limited military applications and restricted planning. By the latter part of the decade, however, larger and more capable designs broadened operational possibilities. The Marine Corps was an early adopter of the nascent technology and began evaluating rotary-wing aircraft in 1946.9 Its search for technological solutions to deal with the new atomic battlefield ultimately led to the founding of the heli- copter program a year later. Marine planners realized that atomic weapons made amphibious operations increasingly vulnerable, as even a small number of bombs could destroy an expeditionary force. 10 Aviation-minded planners supported a new concept for amphibious operations that used helicopters, called “vertical assault.”11 Flying troops from the decks of U.S. 7 Hearing before the United States Senate Special Committee on Investigating the National Defense Program, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session, Part 32, 21 September 1945 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), 16396. 8 “Survey Shows Slump in Aircraft Sales,” Aviation Week 48, no. 15 (12 April 1948): 18. 9 LtCol Eugene W. Rawlins, USMC, Marines and Helicopters, 1946–1962, ed. Maj William J. Sambito, USMC (Washington, DC: History and Mu- seums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1976), 11. 10 As quoted in Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946–1962, 11. 11 Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946–1962, 38–39. The Mobility War| 3 Navy ships promised increased combat power projection in a new era of warfare. As Marines later understood in Vietnam, it was not the technological feat of helicopters that made them consequen- tial. Rather, the mobility they provided was the significant fac- tor. It was up to Marine helicopter pioneers to determine how best to utilize the mobility of helicopters as part of air-ground integration. Freed of the restrictions of reefs, surf, and beach defenses with which landing craft had to contend, rotary- wing aircraft offered flexibility, speed, and rapid concentra- tion of forces. They theoretically allowed both dispersion and rapid concentration of forces. Launching from aircraft carri- ers, loads of assault troops would act as the initial attack waves in an amphibious operation. Helicopters could rapidly deploy infantry beyond prepared enemy defensive positions and link ship and shore, ferrying supplies and personnel, evacuating casualties, and repositioning troops for continuing operations. In 1947, HMX-1 used tentative doctrine that the Marine Corps Schools developed to test and study the employment of helicopters in amphibious operations. 12 By 1950, the unit developed tactics and techniques and demonstrated the util- ity of rotary-wing mobility. Operational experience during the Korean War helped refine the concept. Within weeks of the war’s start, a small detachment of officers and Marines joined Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6) as part of Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33). Flying four Sikorsky HO3S-1s (S-48s), the first squadron reorganized to include helicopters in combat missions. The Marine Corps also commissioned its first transport helicopter squadron, Marine Helicopter Trans- port Squadron 161 (HMR-161), and sent it to Korea in the summer of 1951 with the dual purpose of testing and evalu- ating the new Sikorsky HSR (S-55) helicopter in an opera- tional environment and supporting the 1st Marine Division13 The helicopter program expanded rapidly during the war, but budget austerity during President Dwight D. Eisenhow- er’s first administration forced it into a period of developmen- tal stasis. Hindered by limited funding but still committed to what was now termed the vertical envelopment concept, the Marine Corps altered its organizations and tactics to align 12 Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946–1962, 14–21. 13 Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946–1962, 25–51. with available rotary-wing technology. 14 Planners based doc- trine and force structure around the large Sikorsky HR2S, but it proved too bulky and expensive and did not perform to expectations. The Marines revised their vertical envelopment concept around available helicopter technology, which meant lighter and smaller aircraft.15 By 1956, nine squadrons of the multipurpose HRS transport helicopters made up the bulk of the vertical envelopment aviation force, a total of 180 air- craft.16 These strategic, funding, and technological factors ulti- mately produced the somewhat light and mobile force that the Marine Corps deployed to Vietnam. Deployment to Southeast Asia By 1961, RVN president Ngo Dinh Diem and his government faced a growing crisis in the country as Communists and other antigovernment elements waged an insurgency that escalated into a civil war. The National Liberation Front (NLF), a South Vietnamese Communist revolutionary organization allied with Hanoi, aimed to overthrow the government in Saigon and reunify the country. It controlled, directed, and coordinated the revolutionary movement in the south. Its military arm, the Viet Cong, received materiel support from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and fought as guerrillas, intimi- dating the population, sabotaging government programs, and using hit-and-run tactics against South Vietnamese forces.17 Utilizing Mao Zedong’s concept of the “people’s war,” the Viet Cong preferred quick platoon- or company-size strikes against 14 Carl John Horn III, “Military Innovation and the Helicopter: A Com- parison of Development in the United States Army and Marine Corps, 1945–1965” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2004), 136–68. 15 Horn, “Military Innovation and the Helicopter,” 167–68. 16 Horn, “Military Innovation and the Helicopter,” 148. 17 The term Viet Cong is a colloquialism meaning “Vietnamese Commu- nist” that originated in the 1920s to differentiate the group from Chinese Communists. While some groups have assigned pejorative value to the term, it is used here purely as a descriptive identifier. The organization is also known as the Liberation Army of South Vietnam and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (not to be confused with the People’s Repub- lic of China’s armed forces, known as the People’s Liberation Army). See Brett Reilly, “The True Origin of the Term ‘Viet Cong’,” Diplomat, 31 January 2018. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is the official name of North Vietnam. This volume will use both names interchangeably. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 4 | government-allied villages or isolated outposts. Engagements lasted less than 15 minutes on average.18 For President John F. Kennedy’s administration, which pri- oritized counterinsurgency in policy planning, South Viet- namese security was a regional problem—insurgency there could theoretically destabilize Southeast Asia if not properly countered. 19 The political situation deteriorated as Commu- nist fighters infiltrated the south; in two years, the Viet Cong’s strength in the RVN grew five-fold.20 President Kennedy sent White House military representative U.S. Army General Max- well D. Taylor along with Deputy National Security Advi- sor Walt W. Rostow to the Republic of Vietnam in October 1961 to find ways of “urgently improving the effectiveness” of the South Vietnamese military, “including the rapid pro- vision of additional equipment, manned if necessary by U.S. personnel.”21 Helicopters were at the vanguard of U.S. intervention in the RVN as part of larger strategic calculations. While Diem requested troops to protect cities and villages, Taylor believed offensive operations were less expensive and more promising than defensive ones. Among Taylor’s many conclusions in his report to Kennedy, he recommended providing South Vietnam additional aviation support, including three helicopter units, to take back the initiative from the Communists. 22 To his mind, “an effective operation against the Viet-Cong requires ample air supply, as well as ample troop-lift capacity.” 23 This meant Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units and South 18 Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group, “Study No. 1, Characteris- tics of U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in the Mekong Delta, 1962,” 12 March 1963, box 5, folder 10, Vietnam Helicopter Pilots As- sociation (VHPA) Collection, item no. 2930510001, The Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX (hereafter TTU Vietnam Archive), 11. 19 Ingo Trauschweizer, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019), 119. 20 Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 5, The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961–1965 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), 270. 21 As quoted in Trauschweizer, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War, 120. 22 Trauschweizer, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War, 121. 23 “210. Letter from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the President,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961 – 1963, vol. 1, Vietnam, 1961, ed. Ronald D. Landa and Charles S. Sampson (Washing- ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 496. Vietnamese Marines reacting quicker in attack and defense against highly mobile guerrilla bands.24 As Army chief of staff during the 1950s, Taylor had been a vocal proponent of using helicopters in brushfire wars. He reasoned at the time that rotary-wing aircraft could “do for us in the air what trucks do for us on the ground.” 25 Helicop- ters seemed to offer a solution to the problem of countering elusive and quick-striking enemy fighters. Rotary-wing tech- nology might give RVN forces the opportunity to regain the offensive, allowing the South Vietnamese military to reach into the provinces where the Viet Cong operated.26 Military successes would also mean protecting the rural population who lived in fear of the Communists, possibly boosting con- fidence in the government.27 The difficulties presented by an enemy who could mass, attack, and disappear swiftly were made more difficult by the country’s rough terrain, long distances between populated areas, and lack of a sophisticated national infrastructure. 28 The Republic of Vietnam had only about 4,000 kilometers of all-weather roads at the time. The primary north-south artery, Route 1, connected coastal villages, but there were few developed roads inland. The lack of adequate means of com- munication was noticeable after leaving Saigon, as travel- ers entered a vast rural expanse. The country in 1962 had a population of 14 million, but only about 10 percent lived in urban communities. 29 Hamlets dotted the countryside while larger towns acted as government-controlled centers in the rural areas. Thirty kilometers northeast of Saigon was the major suburb of Bien Hoa, while the port city of Vung Tau 24 Official U.S. Marine Corps documents typically do not capitalize the occupation of foreign military personnel (e.g., soldier, sailor, or marine); however, the term “Marines” will be capitalized throughout when refer- ring to members of a foreign military service (e.g., South Vietnamese Ma- rines) to align with MCUP style. 25 Address by Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 3 April 1956, Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, National De- fense University Digital Archive, 7. See also Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, “The Changing Army,” Army Combat Forces Journal 6, no. 3 (October 1955): 10; and Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 58 – 61. 26 BGen Delk M. Oden, USA, U.S. Army Aviation Operations in South Vietnam (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Mili- tary Operations, Department of the Army, 1962), 4 – 5. 27 Trauschweizer, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War, 121. 28 Oden, U.S. Army Aviation Operations in South Vietnam, 4 – 5. 29 U.S. Army Area Handbook for Vietnam (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1962), 31 – 32. The Mobility War| 5 Map courtesy of Pete McPhail, adapted by MCUP SOUTH VIETNAM CORPS TACTICAL ZONES Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 6 | clung to the coastline. One-hundred thirty kilometers south- west of Saigon lay Can Tho, with My Tho roughly between the two. 30 Kennedy agreed with Taylor’s recommendation to deploy helicopter units to South Vietnam. The first came from the U.S. Army’s Transportation Corps, arriving at Saigon on 11 December 1961. 31 The initial three companies, equipped with Boeing-Vertol CH-21 Shawnee cargo helicopters, proved so successful that the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested on 17 January 1962 that Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac), Admiral Harry D. Felt review the total requirements for U.S. military support of the Republic of Vietnam. Admiral Felt recommended another Army company deploy to Southeast Asia to operate in the southern region of the country, in the Mekong River Delta.32 The commanding general of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Alan Shapley, sug- gested a Marine squadron of 24 HUS-1 Seahorses replace one of the Army companies in the coastal city of Da Nang, the center of gravity for American forces in I Corps. 33 General Paul D. Harkins, U.S. Army commander of the newly estab- lished U.S. Military Command, Vietnam (USMACV)—the central headquarters of the American military effort in Viet- nam, based in Saigon—agreed with the proposal but lobbied for the Marine squadron to operate in the Mekong Delta instead. 34 The Army’s 93d Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) only recently became operational at Da Nang. For it to move south would decrease its support just as the mon- soon season ended there, flying weather improved, and oper- ational tempo increased. On 16 March, the Joint Chiefs approved the plan to send a Marine squadron to Vietnam. The 1st Marine Air- 30 Capt Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Ad- visory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1977), 62. 31 Maj B. D. Harper, USA, Logistical Support of Airmobile Operations, Re- public of Vietnam (1961 – 1971) (St. Louis, MO: U.S. Army Aviation Sys- tems Command, 1971), 1 – 6. 32 LtCol William R. Fails, USMC, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), 28. 33 The Department of Defense’s Tri-Service aircraft designation system in November 1962 redesignated many aircraft, including the HUS-1 to the UH-34D. To avoid anachronisms, this volume uses the period-correct ter- minology where appropriate—HUS-1 before November 1962, UH-34D after. 34 Dick Camp, Assault from the Sky: U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter Opera- tions in Vietnam (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2013), 15. craft Wing—tasked with supporting Navy and Marine Corps air operations in the Western Pacific, including Viet- nam—selected HMM-362 to deploy to the RVN. The squad- ron’s orders were to support the Republic of Vietnam’s Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps, and ARVN soldiers. Designated Task Force 79.3.5 but code-named “Operation Shufly” (pro- nounced “shoe-fly”), the squadron activated on 4 April 1962.35 Three task elements comprised Shufly. The task force’s headquarters, which reported to 1st MAW, consisted of six to eight officers and enlisted. The second element was HMM- 362. To increase flexibility, the squadron deployed with its nor- mal complement of 24 Sikorsky HUS-1 medium-lift cargo helicopters as well as 3 single-engine Cessna OE-1 Bird Dog observation airplanes from Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2) and a twin-engine Douglas R4D cargo aircraft for liaison and supply flights.36 Shufly’s final piece was Sub Unit 2, an element from Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16), responsible for base support and airfield operations.37 On Sunday, 15 April, USS Princeton (LPH 5) dropped anchor 30 kilometers off the Republic of Vietnam’s coast. “As soon as we stepped out topside we knew we were in a different world,” remembered Lance Corporal Tyler K. Bush, an intel- ligence specialist in HMM-362. Even out on the darkened flight deck it “was so intense and muggy it felt like trying to breathe through a pillow.”38 Squadron commander Lieuten- ant Colonel Archie J. Clapp initiated Operation Shufly when he flew the first helicopter off Princeton’s deck and traveled 50 kilometers to a 900-meter concrete runway in the heart of the Mekong Delta, arriving at HMM-362’s new home at 0730. 39 A Japanese fighter base during World War II, the facility lay 4 kilometers south of the village of Soc Trang, 135 kilometers 35 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 57 – 59. 36 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 60. 37 Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group, “Study No. 1 Characteris- tics of U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in the Mekong Delta, 1962,” 3. 38 Tyler K. Bush, “Vietnam—25 Years Ago,” Leatherneck 70, no. 8 (Au- gust 1987): 34. 39 Summary of CTU 79.3.5 Operations [Commander Task Unit of 79.3.5, a.k.a. “Shufly”], 9 – 26 April 1962, folder 67, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive, 2. The Mobility War| 7 Warren Smith Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division HUS-1s on board USS Princeton. U.S. Navy planners originally considered the HUS-1 Seahorse to be an interim aircraft until the development and production of large assault helicopters became technologically feasible. The Navy procured it in 1954 as the HSS-1 Sea Bat, an antisubmarine helicopter. However, helicop- ter proponents within the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps saw the aircraft’s potential in a utility role. With more than twice the load- carrying capability of the Sikorsky HRS that had been in service with the Marine Corps since the Korean War, the HSS-1 had the ability to carry troops internally as well as cargo both internally or sling-loaded externally. Removing submarine-hunting equipment from the HSS-1 freed up much-needed room and shed 340 pounds from the Navy variant for the Marine-designated HUS-1. To address its new role as a utility helicopter capable of logistical and assault functions, Seahorses fea- tured reinforced floors below and behind the pilots with additional tie-down points to secure cargo. Adding a step underneath the main door allowed troops to load and unload faster. In total, the Marine Corps procured approximately 540 aircraft. In November 1962, in compliance with Department of Defense aircraft redesignations, the HUS-1 became the UH-34D, or “Dog,” as the Marines affectionally referred to it.1 1 LtCol William R. Fails, USMC, Marines and Helicop- ters, 1962 – 1973 (Washington, DC: History and Muse- ums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), 5 – 6; Dick Camp, Assault from the Sky: U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in Vietnam (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2013), 15; and Col Bob Stoffey, Cleared Hot!: A Marine Combat Pilot’s Vietnam Diary (New York: St. Mar- tin’s Press, 1992), 25. Procuring the Sikorsky HUS-1/UH-34D southwest of Saigon, in the III Corps Tactical Zone.40 With the help of HMM-261, HMM-362 flew more than 200 sor- ties between Princeton and Soc Trang by 1700 hours on the first day, moving 264 personnel and 200,000 pounds of cargo.41 With only two permanent buildings at Soc Trang—a dilapidated hanger and a structure that became the mess hall—the Marines attempted to improve living conditions and conveniences. 42 They erected 75 tents, assembled a water purification system, built a field laundry and post office, and wired telephones. 43 Two ARVN battalions provided perime- ter security while Marines from the squadron manned internal defenses. HMM-362 was operational within 24 hours. Quick preparation of the airfield at Soc Trang supported sustained operations within two weeks.44 40 This area of operations would later become IV Corps, after the govern- ment of the Republic of Vietnam and USMACV created that new tacti- cal zone in November 1962. This work refers to where Shufly operated as III Corps, as that is the historically accurate term for the period of time covered here. 41 Summary of CTU 79.3.5 Operations, 9 – 26 April 1962, 2. 42 David H. Hugel, “Colonel Archive J. Clapp: A Marine Corps Aviation Legend,” Leatherneck 92, no. 10 (October 2009): 44. 43 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 62. 44 Bush, “Vietnam—25 Years Ago,” 34; and Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 63. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 8 | Marines faced only light opposition and received no dam- age from enemy fire. Although there were regular reminders that they were involved in a war, they initially remained in an advisory role and did not fly at night or on weekends. 46 After three weeks in-country, the task force boasted it was becoming what it considered “a very potent thorn in the side of Mekong Delta guerrillas.”47 46 Gregg Jones, Last Stand at Khe Sanh: The U.S. Marines’ Finest Hour in Vietnam (Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2014), 197. 47 Summary of CTU 79.3.5 Operations, 9 – 26 April 1962, 1– 2. Early Operations HMM-362 flew its first tactical troop lift mission in the Mekong Delta during Operation Lockjaw on 22 April. Alongside the U.S. Army’s Saigon-based 57th Transporta- tion Company (Light Helicopter), Lieutenant Colonel Clapp led 16 Shufly HUS-1s in transporting 339 troops from the 7th ARVN Division. The next day, the squadron lifted South Vietnamese Marines near the southern tip of the Republic of Vietnam to evacuate a government outpost.45 The Shufly 45 After Action Report, Marine Task Unit 79.3.5, Mission Order Number 5, 21 April 1962, HD Archive. Map courtesy of Pete McPhail, adapted by MCUP MEKONG DELTA, 1962 The Mobility War| 9 Developing Tactics and Doctrine The amphibious capability around which the Marines based their vertical envelopment concept was mostly absent dur- ing Shufly. The task force’s land-based character was a depar- ture from prescribed doctrine. However, fighting in Vietnam offered a way for the Marines to test recent doctrinal theories and find the operational limits of the HUS-1.48 With greater power and a carrying capacity of between 8 to 12 combat- loaded troops, HUS-1s were capable of hauling more per- sonnel and cargo than the smaller Sikorsky HRSs. These testing efforts were not casual or ad hoc. The 1st MAW spe- cifically developed and assessed tactics and equipment with an eye toward improving the effectiveness of helicopter opera- tions.49 Under Lieutenant Colonel Clapp’s leadership, “Archie’s Angels,” as the Marines of HMM-362 referred to themselves, refined tactics and doctrine in late spring 1962, setting the standards for Marine heliborne operations in the Republic of Vietnam and becoming the archetype for the Shufly squad- rons that followed.50 In the first year of Shulfy operations, a typical helicop- ter combat assault took place on average every two days and involved 14 helicopters. Planners plotted courses between the loading and landing zones (LZ), usually 12 – 30 kilometers apart, which avoided populated areas. Pilots considered dry rice paddies the best landing zones because they were flat and free of obstacles. Their chosen routes featured landmarks in the final 15 kilometers of the strike, which pilots could iden- tify when flying at only 3 to 5 meters above the ground to avoid enemy ground fire. When possible, flight leaders recon- noitered the designated LZs the day before an operation to familiarize themselves with the area and confirm the plan’s suitability. During the strike, an observation airplane loi- tered above the standard formation of four helicopters, relay- ing heading corrections and an estimated distance remaining to the site.51 48 “Letter of Instruction, Shufly,” 12 November 1962, enc. 2, letter from commanding general (CG) of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), 5 Sep- tember 1963, folder 67, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive, 1. 49 “Letter of Instruction, Shufly” (12 November 1962), 1. 50 Robert B. Asprey, “Saga at Soc Trang: Marines in Viet-Nam,” Marine Corps Gazette 46, no. 12 (December 1962): 2. 51 Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 13 – 19 May 1962, folder 67, U.S. Ma- rine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive, 3 – 4. Flying from Soc Trang required crews to transit an average of 80 kilometers to loading points, where Republic of Viet- nam troops climbed aboard, then another 30 kilometers to the landing zone. A typical operation required anywhere from one to four lifts to shuttle troops and supplies into the LZs.52 The first operations in April 1962 revealed that local militia from the Self-Defense Corps did not board or exit aircraft efficiently enough. Helicopters spending excessive time either hovering or sitting on the ground increased the risk of drawing enemy fire. To reduce their exposure in landing zones, HMM- 362 and militia members conducted training after Operation Lockjaw in how to “embark, sit, signal, and debark” the heli- copters. The result, the squadron reported, was a “smooth run- ing [sic], expeditious operation.”53 Viet Cong fighters seldom engaged helicopter assaults dur- ing the task force’s first year. They chose instead to shelter in hideouts or blend into the civilian population, frustrating the ARVN.54 When the Viet Cong did target Marine helicopters, they occasionally scored hits. Shufly Marines had little practi- cal knowledge of how their helicopters would stand up to the rigors of combat. They discovered that while their airframes were rugged, vital components such as engines, transmissions, and tail rotor gear boxes were vulnerable and required armor plating. The squadron learned this only nine days after arriv- ing at Soc Trang, when enemy ground fire severed an engine oil line and forced an HUS-1 to make an emergency landing. Constables from the nearby city of Can Tho provided secu- rity while the crew repaired the helicopter and flew back to Soc Trang.55 Despite these vulnerabilities, most Marine crews were impressed by the ability of their aircraft to absorb dam- age and return home.56 The Viet Cong were quick to recognize and exploit patterns in Marine and ARVN techniques, tactics, and procedures. In a 52 Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group, “Study No. 1, Characteris- tics of U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in the Mekong Delta, 1962,” 5 – 10, 16. 53 After Action Report, Marine Task Unit 79.3.5, Mission Order Number 6, 21 April 1962, HD Archive. 54 Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group, “Study No. 1, Characteris- tics of U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in the Mekong Delta, 1962,” 11. 55 After Action Report, Marine Task Unit 79.3.5, Mission Order Number 14, 23 April 1962, HD Archive. 56 USMC/Vietnam Helicopter Association: Pop a Smoke (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 2001), 26. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 10 | consisted of four helicopters with nearly 50 ARVN troops that loitered until needed. After a ground commander or an OE-1 pilot located the enemy, the helicopters delivered the airborne reserves to blocking positions to cut off the fighters’ escape.59 The delta’s flat terrain often offered numerous land- ing zones for the entire flight of helicopters to land quickly and deploy the troops. Shufly ran its first quick reaction mission on 18 June during a large ground operation. Within a month, Marines consid- ered Eagle Flights a sound concept worth continued use. The method appeared to have a positive impact on the tactical sit- uation in the Mekong Delta, in that it typically generated con- tact with the enemy. Eagle Flights forced guerrilla elements to engage South Vietnamese ground units more often than at any point thus far in the war, and in several operations it was the principal means of killing, wounding, or capturing Commu- nist fighters.60 Marines and U.S. Army units used variants of the tactic throughout the war under different monikers, such as Tiger Flight, Sparrow Hawk, Chickenhawk, Pacifier, and Quick Reaction Force. 61 59 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 69. 60 Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group, “Study No. 1, Characteris- tics of U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in the Mekong Delta, 1962,” 17. 61 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 69. typical assault during the first year, Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) fixed-wing aircraft prepared landing zones with air strikes just prior to the arrival of the helicopters. This revealed the location of the LZs and gave enemy fighters time to prepare a hasty ambush. As a result, the RVNAF escorted Marine helicopters with Douglas AD-6 Skyraider attack air- craft or North American T-28 Trojan light-attack aircraft.57 Meanwhile, Marine Cessna OE-1 or ARVN Cessna L-19 observation aircraft loitered above the battlefield, relaying information to ARVN soldiers about enemy locations, mark- ing objects to orient ground troops, and guiding helicopters.58 Early on, when the ARVN located the enemy, it often took too long to engage them. In response, Shufly developed fast reaction missions as a way to speed up response times and take advantage of opportunities when they arose. Lieutenant Col- onel Clapp and Colonel John F. Carey, the task group com- mander, developed “Eagle Flights,” a new concept named for the bird of prey’s method of striking its quarry quickly from above. Working with ground elements, these missions typically 57 The Trojans, for example, carried 2.75-inch rockets, napalm canisters, bombs between 100 and 1,000 pounds, a 20-millimeter cannon, and .50-caliber machine guns. Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 65. 58 Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group, “Study No. 1, Characteris- tics of U.S. Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in the Mekong Delta, 1962,” 14. Archie J. Clapp Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division UH-34Ds from HMM-362 deliver an ARVN company during an early Shufly mission, July 1962. Defense Department (Marine Corps) A420828 LtCol Archie Clapp delivers a predawn briefing to HMM-362 pilots on 26 July 1962. The Mobility War| 11 People’s Liberation Armed Forces of Southern Vietnam • Main force units were made up of professional soldiers from both North and South Vietnam. The soldiers received training in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam before infiltrating south, and its leadership came from the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), Hanoi’s agency that coordinated Communist activities in the Republic of Vietnam. Main force units were capable of operating throughout South Vietnam and were often employed during major attacks. Equipped with arms either carried from the north or captured from the South Vietnamese military, they were organized along the same lines as the battalion-regiment-division arrangement of con- ventional forces. • Regionally based local-force units were full-time fighters who were reasonably trained, equipped, and educated but not to the same degree as their main-force comrades. They operated locally in companies or platoons, responding to district- and provincial-level authorities, and were made up of a mixture of guerrillas and insurgents from organized commands. • The third faction, part-time village guerrillas or militia detachments, operated in small units under the command of local Communist com- mittees. Although not adept fighters, they were valuable as intelligence gatherers and guides for main-force units.3 3 Warren Wilkins, Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Viet Cong’s Big Unit War Against the U.S., 1965–1966 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 15; Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Com- mand in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973, 72-73; Col George R. Hofmann Jr., USMCR, Path to War: U.S. Marine Corps Op- erations in Southeast Asia, 1961 to 1965, Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps His- tory Division, 2014), 12; and Asselin, Vietnam’s American War, 103–6. The People’s Liberation Armed Forces of Southern Vietnam, or Viet Cong (“Vietnamese Communists”), was the official military arm of the National Liberation Front. It operated a well-organized military and polit- ical insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam, answer- ing to military authorities in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.1 The Communists relied on rural work- ers, the overwhelming majority of the population in Vietnam, to fill the ranks. Recruiting efforts at the vil- lage and hamlet levels, especially in the Mekong Delta, appealed to a large percentage of people who had griev- ances against the South Vietnamese government. Through the early 1960s, the Hanoi-sanctioned revolutionary struggle remained in the initial stage of guerrilla warfare. While it openly controlled about 10 percent of the hamlets in the Republic of Vietnam, the Viet Cong reportedly enjoyed influence over another 60 percent of the villages and could access at least one- quarter of the nation’s men of military age. In early 1960, the insurgency numbered 4,000 fighters. By the time the Shufly Marines arrived, the Viet Cong were more than 20,000 strong, organized into 20 battalions, 80 separate companies, and as many as 100 platoons. 2 Using assassination and terrorism, the insurgency gained traction by early 1962. Unlike popular stereotypes in the West, which char- acterized the Viet Cong as poorly equipped peasants who farmed by day and picked up crude weapons at night, the reality is more sophisticated. There were three distinct Viet Cong factions, similar in design to the Chinese National Revolutionary Army: 1 Pierre Asselin, Vietnam’s American War: A History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 103. 2 Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2006), 72. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 12 | Shufly Relief in Place Shufly helicopter units operated on four-month rotations. Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Rathbun’s HMM-163 arrived at Soc Trang on 23 July 1962 to replace HMM-362. Like many of his contemporaries, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun had considerable experience across multiple aircraft, spending five years each in fighters, transports, and helicopters, making him well versed in all aspects of Marine aviation.62 To assist Rath- bun’s unit in familiarizing itself with the area, Clapp’s squadron provided a week of orientation flights and continued operat- ing alongside its Shufly relief. 63 HMM-163 completed the relief in place on 31 July. Archie’s Angels exited the combat theater after three-and- a-half months of combat operations from Soc Trang. In that time, crews tallied 50 combat assaults, 4,439 sorties, and 5,262 hours of flight time without losing a single aircraft or suffer- ing any casualties. HMM-362 re-formed at Marine Corps Air Station Santa Ana, but its officers and enlisted received new orders, transferring to other squadrons to become a cadre of combat-experienced pilots and crews. The unit left its 24 HUS-1 Seahorses in Vietnam, handing them over to the 217th RVNAF Helicopter Squadron. Much of the leadership of Shufly also changed when HMM-362 redeployed. Lieu- tenant Colonel Julius W. Ireland replaced Colonel Carey on 30 July. Ireland was not new to Da Nang, having commanded Marine Attack Squadron 324 (VMA-324) in April 1954 dur- ing the French Indochina War. 64 In their first month in the combat theater, “Rathbun’s Ridgerunners” compiled a new Marine squadron record in Vietnam, flying 2,500 hours. Despite the monsoon season, they “worked ’round the clock, seven days a week,” according to Lieutenant James R. Griffin. “While we were not in the air we were busy with maintenance on our aircraft, attending briefings, or trying to get a few hours [sic] sleep,” he report- ed.65 They adopted many of the tactics and techniques of their 62 Richard Tregaskis, Vietnam Diary (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), 44. 63 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 70. 64 The unit delivered 25 Vought F4U Corsair fighters to the French Far East Expeditionary Corps as support aircraft in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954), where Communist forces eventually surrounded and defeated the French. Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 70 – 71. 65 As quoted in Spec5 Joe Groner, “Marine Copter Unit Leaves Vietnam,” Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, 23 January 1963. predecessor unit, but they rejected some established ones if deemed necessary. Combat experience taught crews that the earlier decision to rely on only M3A1 submachine guns or M1 Garand rifles for defensive fire was unsound. Following an evaluation of a mounted M-60 belt-fed machine gun to sup- press light enemy ground fire, Rathbun authorized equipping all HUS-1s with the weapons inside the cargo hatches, a sig- nificant increase in firepower that gave crew chiefs a means of self-defense. 66 Strict USMACV rules of engagement applied, however, and crews could engage targets only after first receiv- ing fire and clearly identifying enemy combatants. 67 Shufly Moves North On 16 September, Shufly began the Marine Corps’ long association with the Republic of Vietnam’s northern prov- inces. The squadron made a 10-hour, 617-kilometer move- ment to Da Nang, in Quang Nam Province, leaving the rice paddies of III Corps for the mountains and coastal plains of I Corps. 68 “Mobility is our business,” one staff officer wryly quipped on the relocation. 69 HMM-163 swapped areas of operations with the U.S. Army’s 93d Transportation Com- pany (Light Helicopter), which had operated from Da Nang since February. Practicality dictated the substitution: the Army’s anemic CH-21 Shawnees struggled in the rugged I Corps, while the more powerful Marine HUS-1 Seahorses were better suited to operating in the mountains.70 As the only deepwater port and anchorage in the region, Da Nang was a busy economic center. It had a commercial air- port, seaplane service, rail line, and a well-maintained coastal road that connected it to the rest of the country. The architec- ture revealed its French naval base and resort town past. Da Nang’s modern infrastructure included electricity, telephone 66 Headquarters, Task Element 79.3.3.6, Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16), 1st MAW, “Evaluation of Helicopter Tactics and Tech- niques Report,” 10 January 1963, attached to Headquarters, Task Element 79.3.3.6, MAG-16, 1st MAW Command Diary, 6 November 1962–28 January 1963, folder 61, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201061142, TTU Vietnam Ar- chive, 7. 67 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 70. 68 Norman Sklarewitz, “Dateline Da Nang: The Choppers Move North,” Marine Corps Gazette 47, no. 1 (January 1963): 3. 69 Sklarewitz, “Dateline Da Nang,” 3. 70 Tregaskis, Vietnam Diary, 15; and “Battalion History, 93rd Transporta- tion Company/121st AHC Early History,” box 1, folder 8, VHPA Collec- tion, item no 3110108001, TTU Vietnam Archive. The Mobility War| 13 Map courtesy of Pete McPhail, adapted by MCUP SHUFLY RELOCATION TO DA NANG, SEPTEMBER 1962 Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 14 | service, paved streets, and a developed waterfront, making the city of 100,000 a vibrant hub and a mix of European and Viet- namese character and culture.71 Compared to the small, remote airfield at Soc Trang, the Da Nang facility was modern and expansive. Its nearly three- kilometer runway and fully equipped control tower meant the airfield could operate around the clock. 72 The Shufly bar- racks area was “a picturesque, if somewhat run-down, former French army compound about one kilometer from the air- strip,” remembered one Marine. Far from the primitive tent city scratched out of the Mekong, the compound featured numerous faded, yellow stucco buildings with red tile roofs alongside more modern facilities. Shufly Marines could now wash their laundry regularly, visit a dentist, attend chapel ser- vices, relax in service clubs, watch a movie, and see a barber. 73 I Corps stretched 350 kilometers from the demilitarized zone (DMZ)—the border area between the Republic of Viet- nam and Democratic Republic of Vietnam—to the II Corps boundary to the south and averaged 70 kilometers east to west. Its 16,000 square kilometers made I Corps larger than Con- necticut and one-sixth of the total size of the Republic of Viet- nam. 74 Each of its provinces bordered the South China Sea to the east. I Corps was also one of the RVN’s most densely populated regions, with roughly 90 percent of its people liv- ing within 25 kilometers of the coastline. Quang Nam Prov- ince alone averaged 2,000 people per 1.5-square kilometers. 75 By contrast, the remote inland jungles and mountains were nearly devoid of civilians.76 The most dominating features around Da Nang were the abrupt transition from the piedmont to imposing peaks that rise to higher than 1,500 meters. 77 Heavily forested moun- 71 U.S. Army Area Handbook for Vietnam, 38, 51; and Whitlow, The Advi- sory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 75. 72 Samuel Baez, “Vietnam’s First Operational U.S. Marine Corps Deaths,” Leatherneck 75, no. 11 (November 1992): 90. 73 David H. Hugel, “The Vietnam War: Shufly Remembered,” Leatherneck 79, no. 4 (April 1996): 29. 74 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 78. 75 U.S. Army Area Handbook for Vietnam, 38, 51; and Whitlow, The Advi- sory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 78. 76 Speech by Gen Lewis M. Walt to the Albuquerque Rotary Club, 21 August 1969, box 17, folder 7, Gen Keith B. McCutcheon Papers, HD Archive, 3. 77 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 79; Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 78; and LtGen Keith B. McCutch- eon, USMC, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962 – 1970,” U.S. Naval In- stitute Proceedings 97, no. 5 (May 1971): 165. tains with triple canopy in some places obscured any view of the ground. HMM-163 crews came to know that the line of mountains formed a barrier, trapping fog and rain and limiting air operations. Poor flying conditions on one side of the moun- tain could require instrument flight rules conditions while the other side of the ridge remained clear and bright. For helicop- ter crews, adaptation was mandatory. “You just grow into that wherever you’re at,” explained Bob Mills, a young lieutenant with HMM-163. “You get accustomed to what’s going on.” 78 While the dry months mostly created water shortage prob- lems for the Shufly Marines, the monsoon season’s challenges affected operations.79 From October to March, the flight ceil- ing became limited to 300 – 450 meters for days or weeks at a time. Fog, rain, and drizzle limited visibility to one or two kilometers. Occasionally, the ceiling dropped to 60 meters and visibility reduced to less than a kilometer.80 Whereas the del- ta’s flat landscape lessened concerns about flying overloaded aircraft, the rugged terrain around Da Nang required thor- ough operational planning. With so few suitable landing spots, pilots had to calculate fuel loads and usage, weight of cargo and personnel, and travel distances. 81 The constant rain and cloud cover often grounded aircraft and confined crews to their quarters, leaving Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun to deal with restless Marines and morale problems. 82 The War in I Corps As in the Mekong, Viet Cong fighters operated in Shufly’s new area of operation, a mixture of main force and provin- cial units that totaled around 4,750 soldiers.83 The task force’s home was only 135 kilometers south of the DMZ, a hotspot of cross-border infiltration by Communist fighters. Hanoi’s continual expansion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the network of roads and paths from north to south by way of the nominally neutral Laos and Cambodia, kept the Viet Cong well supplied. Throughout 1961 and into early 1962, between 500 and 1,000 Communist infiltrators crossed into the Republic of 78 Maj Bob Mills, USMC (Ret), interview with Kelly Crager, 4 May 2011, Bob Mills Collection, item no. OH0829, TTU Vietnam Archive, quote appears ca. 1:05:00 on audio recording. 79 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 112. 80 McCutcheon, “Marine Aviation in Vietnam,” 165. 81 Tregaskis, Vietnam Diary, 62–63. 82 Tregaskis, Vietnam Diary, 61–62. 83 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 80. The Mobility War| 15 Map courtesy of Pete McPhail, adapted by MCUP I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 16 | Vietnam from the north each month. They had undergone intensive political indoctrination and military training before making the trek and constituted a formidable force. Ideolog- ically ardent, many were loyal to the cause of overthrowing the South Vietnamese government.84 In addition, the Shu- fly Marines had to contend with the threat of conventional forces. American intelligence reported that the North Viet- namese Army (NVA), officially known as the People’s Army of Vietnam, was positioning units on the border.85 As of Sep- tember 1962, one NVA infantry division, two independent infantry regiments, and an artillery regiment were staged in Laos, poised for action anywhere in I Corps or northern II Corps within 20 days.86 In the face of the growing insurgency, American mili- tary and civilian policy makers attempted to craft a compre- hensive strategic plan for the United States to leave Vietnam by 1965. 87 USMACV aimed to assist the South Vietnamese in acquiring the long-term capability to defeat Communist threats after the American exit. South Vietnamese military forces grew in strength and means as additional U.S. advisors and equipment arrived throughout 1962. The principal strategy remained clearing and holding populated areas and denying the Viet Cong access to the population. The expanding influ- ence in I Corps as Communist fighters infiltrated from the north made offensive operations in the mountains next to the coastal plains militarily advisable by late 1962.88 The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s supporting role in I Corps was functionally no different than in the Mekong. Shufly Marines assumed the task of flying missions for an assort- ment of South Vietnamese forces, among them the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions, elements of the 25th ARVN Division, ARVN Ranger battalions, and paramilitary units of varying 84 Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escala- tion, 1962 – 1967 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2006), 73 –74. 85 American personnel used the term North Vietnamese Army (NVA) when discussing regular forces from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In keeping with this tradition, this book will primarily use NVA, substitut- ing People’s Army of Vietnam where it is appropriate to use the official title, such as in unit names. 86 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 80. 87 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961 – 1965, 281 – 82; and Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, 75 – 86. 88 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 80. sizes along the coastal plain. 89 ARVN ground commanders’ previous experience working with the U.S. Army’s 93d Trans- portation Company allowed for a quick transition between Army and Marine units. HMM-163’s first combat mission in its new area of operations occurred only one day after all its aircraft arrived in Da Nang. Using 14 HUS-1s, the squadron transported 2d ARVN Division troops 55 kilometers south on 18 September, delivering them unopposed in steep hill country.90 Although their role was the same, the unfamiliar terrain required HMM-163 to refine tactics and techniques as they determined what worked best. The squadron modified its land- ing zone preparation, relying on both artillery and air strikes to clear prospective sites. The Marines also staged portable refueling bladders at secure locations to extend the squad- ron’s operational reach. 91 As in the Mekong, ARVN forces in I Corps created heliborne fast reaction teams. In case of an emergency, infantry units were ready to deploy in what the Marines referred to as “Tiger Flights.” As with Eagle Flights in the Mekong, the tactic was generally useful as a means to quickly reinforce isolated positions or insert a blocking force during offensive operations. 92 First Casualties As the tempo of operations increased for HMM-163—the only Marine unit in combat in the world at the time—its crews experienced steady enemy resistance. Although the amount of small-arms fire that the squadron received in I Corps was sim- ilar to the delta, the mountainous terrain forced pilots to fly predictably at times. They navigated passes in the mountains and landed in the few clearings that could accommodate their aircraft, sometimes into the teeth of prepared enemy gun posi- tions. The consequence was a growing number of hits on air- craft and crew casualties. 93 HMM-163 aircraft first suffered battle damage near Tam Ky on 26 September while support- ing the 2d ARVN Division. In a near full-squadron lift, one of the squadron’s 22 Seahorses took damage from enemy small- 89 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 79. 90 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 80. 91 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 82. 92 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 82 – 84. 93 Sklarewitz, “Dateline Da Nang,” 3. The Mobility War| 17 arms fire. Another four aircraft were hit during the following week, killing two ARVN soldiers and wounding a crew chief.94 The first Shufly Marines killed in action in Vietnam were lost in early October 1962. Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s squadron received a request for 20 helicopters to lift elements of the 2d ARVN Division. On 6 October, HUS-1 BuNo 145790 flew as the search and rescue aircraft on the mission, 1 of 20 aircraft involved in the strike. On board were eight men: the helicopter commander, copilot, crew chief/gunner, two Navy medical personnel, and three mechanics to repair and rescue any helicopters that were forced down. Flying in formation with the sea to their portside and the mountainous 94 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 80. terrain to their starboard, the aircraft experienced mechanical problems. Breaking off from the flight, aircraft commander First Lieutenant William T. Sinnott turned his UH-34 inland to make the 80-kilometer return trip to Da Nang. Fifteen kilo- meters off the coast where the coastal plain transitioned into mountainous jungle, the helicopter flew into a valley choked with dense gray cumulus clouds. Vertigo disoriented Sinnott and the aircraft crashed into a thickly forested ridge. 95 The Seahorse caught fire on impact and rapidly reduced to ash. Seven men died in the crash or in the ensuing hours: First Lieutenant Michael J. Tunney, Sergeant Herald W. Pen- 95 Tregaskis, Vietnam Diary, 23; and Baez, “Vietnam’s First Operational U.S. Marine Corps Deaths,” 90–91. Archie J. Clapp Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division HMM-362 supporting ARVN troops in 1962. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 18 | dell, Corporal Thomas E. Anderson, Lieutenant (MC) Ger- ald C. Griffin, Sergeant Richard E. Hamilton, Lance Corporal Miguel A. Valentin Jr., and Hospital Corpsman Second Class Gerald O. Norton.96 Despite the best efforts of Marine and ARVN rescuers, the thick jungle made quick extraction impos- sible. They methodically descended the hill with the injured in search of a clearing for a landing zone. The sun set as the litter parties made slow progress. By the next morning, Lieu- tenant Sinnott was the sole survivor from the crash. Around 0700, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun arrived overhead piloting an HUS and rushed Sinnott nearly 500 kilometers down the coast to the U.S. Army 8th Field Hospital at Nha Trang. 97 The circumstances leading to the crash became familiar hazards to countless Marine helicopter crews who operated in I Corps’ rugged terrain and unpredictable weather. Transitioning Fixed-Wing Pilots to Helicopters Combat operations in Vietnam demanded that the Marine Corps continually funnel personnel and machines toward the expanding helicopter program, which included as many as 13 squadrons by mid-1962. The scheduled rotation of squadrons in Vietnam, and the increasing usefulness of helicopters oper- ating from the new landing platform helicopter (LPH) ships off the coast in the South China Sea, strained resources. By summer 1962, the number of helicopter pilots the Marine Corps required was 40 percent of the Service’s overall avia- tor pool, around 1,200 personnel. However, only 29 percent of Marine aviators were available to fly rotary-wing aircraft. 98 The high demand for rotary-wing pilots affected personal lives and careers, as near constant deployments kept Marines from their home stations. Exhausted by the commitments and looking for opportunities elsewhere, a growing number of rated helicopter pilots left the Service, worsening the problem. 99 96 Baez, “Vietnam’s First Operational US Marine Corps Deaths,” 90–91; and Tregaskis, Vietnam Diary, 16. 97 Tregaskis, Vietnam Diary, 19 – 20; Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 83; Lt Gerald Charles Griffin, USN, U.S. Navy Veterans Online Memorial, accessed 21 February 2020; and “KIA Incident 19621006, HMM-163, UH-34D, 145790+—Mechanical Fail- ure,” USMC Combat and Tiltrotor Association, accessed 21 February 2020. 98 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 69. 99 “500 Pilots to Retrain for Helicopter Duty,” Marine Corps Gazette 46, no. 10 (October 1962): 1. In November 1962, the Marine Corps reassigned 500 fixed-wing aviators who had at least one operational tour to helicopters. Planners predicted that the retraining program would provide about 86 percent of the required rotary-wing pilots by June 1964 and fill the need for more first lieutenants and captains.100 Between 100 and 125 pilots were to transition each year and be assigned to two squadrons, one on each U.S. coast. The aviators would spend 46 hours in the classroom and another 65 hours in flight training in the UH-34D Seahorse, earning them copilot status.101 The retraining took place at Marine Corps Air Facility Santa Ana and Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. HMM-362, the first Shufly squadron, reorganized as a training squadron at Santa Ana and began preparing the first pilots to transition to rotary-wing aircraft in November. The following month, HMM-262 similarly reconstituted as a training squadron and instructed pilots at Cherry Point. For almost two years, 10 fixed-wing pilots joined each helicopter squadron every month.102 Many of the original Archie’s Angels served as instructors in both training squadrons, imparting lessons from Vietnam. The Marine Corps’ infusion of talent into helicopter squadrons and use of a combat veteran unit as a training cadre prepared Marine rotary-wing aviation for the increasing commitment in Southeast Asia in the com- ing years.103 Extending Shufly In late 1962, the 1st MAW extended tours in Vietnam for helicopter squadrons and supporting units to six months—two more than originally planned.104 The extension was 1st MAW’s attempt to introduce continuity and use manpower more effec- tively in Vietnam. On 11 January 1963, the “Dough Boys” of HMM-162 relieved HMM-163. During its tour, Lieutenant Colonel Rathbun’s squadron flew nearly 11,000 hours, con- ducted 15,200 sorties, and transported 23,200 assault troops.105 100 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 70. 101 “500 Pilots to Retrain for Helicopter Duty,” 1. 102 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 70. 103 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 69 – 70. 104 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 – 1964, 83; and Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 80. 105 Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 6 – 12 January 1963, folder 67, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive, 2. The Mobility War| 19 Lieutenant Colonel Reinhardt Leu, another veteran aviator, commanded HMM-162. His unit conducted its first major combat assault a week after arriving, supporting the 2d ARVN Division 25 kilometers west of Da Nang. Eighteen UH-34Ds airlifted 300 ARVN troops into three landing zones to sweep a suspected Viet Cong base area. Poor weather conditions in I Corps persisted for the next three months, restricting flight operations to logistical sorties rather than tactical support mis- sions.106 The fast pace of combat missions resumed as better flying weather returned in April. The quicker operational tempo also meant higher losses. HMM-162 conducted a major assault on 13 April, lifting 435 soldiers from the 2d ARVN Division against another Viet Cong base area in the mountains 50 kilo- meters south of Da Nang. The mission was the first instance in the war of armed helicopters rather than fixed-wing aircraft escorting Marine UH-34s, as five U.S. Army UH-1B Iroquois gunships from the Da Nang-based 68th Aviation Company launched preparatory strikes against the landing zones.107 The first insertions were unopposed. In late afternoon, First Lieutenant Stephen W. Pless’s UH-34 was ordered to evacuate three casualties. The aircraft took small arms fire on approach, but the fire ceased while the helicopter was on the ground loading the personnel. On takeoff, a burst of .50-cal- iber machine gun fire raked the cockpit, wounding the copi- lot. About 20 rounds in total damaged the helicopter, enough to force it down.108 Pless explained in his report that there was “confusion as usual. Then shots were heard and we went down in our crippled bird.”109 When two HMM-162 helicop- ters arrived to evacuate the crew and seven passengers, enemy fire forced down one of the Seahorses near Pless’s aircraft and badly wounded the crew chief, Corporal Charley M. Camp- bell. An accompanying helicopter rushed him to Da Nang for treatment. Five kilometers away, another UH-34D support- ing the same operation went down after taking hits on final approach. Its crew made a quick field repair and limped the aircraft back to Da Nang.110 106 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 113. 107 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 115. 108 Remarks attached to After Action Report, Marine Task Unit 79.3.3.6, Mission Order Number 4-169-2, 13 April 1962, HD Archive. 109 Remarks attached to After Action Report, Marine Task Unit 79.3.3.6. 110 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 115. Two weeks later, the Shufly Marines observed that “ten- sion” was increasing “in the Da Nang area due to indications of [Viet Cong] activity nearby.”111 Likewise, beginning in late April, tension increased near the Laotian border. HMM-162 was central to the South Vietnamese response. Over 90 days, the squadron supported a 1st ARVN Division offensive in the rugged mountains of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, denying the Communists infiltration routes near the border and sweeping suspected base areas.112 Lieutenant Colonel Leu’s HMM-162 completed its six- month deployment on 8 June 1963.113 After nearly 17,700 sor- ties, it lost only three helicopters.114 Their relief squadron was the New River-based “Bulls” of HMM-261 under the com- mand of Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Shook, another vet- eran helicopter pilot with combat experience in the Korean War. HMM-261 flew its first missions the same day it relieved HMM-162. Due to enemy action in the village of Phuoc Lam, the Bulls evacuated Vietnamese women and children to Da Nang. 115 HMM-261 refined Shufly’s tactics during its deployment, much of it regarding the protection of aircraft from enemy ground fire. It standardized helicopters flying at a minimum of 450 meters during missions. Flight leaders now conducted visual reconnaissance before entering landing zones. Given that all Shufly squadrons experienced the bulk of aircraft damage while in landing zones, HMM-261 recommended 111 Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 21 – 27 April 1963, folder 67, U.S. Ma- rine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive, 2. 112 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 115; and Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 26 May – 1 June 1963, folder 67, U.S. Ma- rine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive, 2. 113 Command Diary, Headquarters, Task Element 79.3.3.6, MAG-16, 1st MAW, 1 May 1963 – 17 July 1963, folder 62, U.S. Marine Corps His- tory Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201062005, TTU Vietnam Archive, 10. 114 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 116. 115 Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 9–15 June 1963, folder 67, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive; and Command Diary, Headquar- ters, Task Element 79.3.3.6, MAG-16, 1st MAW, 1 May 1963–17 July 1963, 10. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 20 | In February 1954, the U.S. Army announced a design competition for its first turbine-powered helicopter. Based on experience from the Korean War, it desired a relatively light and powerful utility helicopter. Bell Helicopter won the competition with the H-40, pow- ered by the new Lycoming T53 turboshaft powerplant, leading to a design contract in June 1955. The first pro- duction model, the HU-1A Iroquois, arrived in July 1959 and the upgraded HU-1B in April 1961. As part of the November 1962 Department of Defense redes- ignations, the Iroquois became the UH-1. However, the HU-1 designation had already given the aircraft its popular nickname: the “Huey.” Bell UH-1s first deployed to the Republic of Viet- nam in April 1962 as medical evacuation (medevac/ dustoff ) aircraft with the Army’s 57th Medical Detach- ment. Armed variants began operations in October 1962. Updated UH-1Bs arrived later in the year fitted with the first professionally engineered external arma- ment kits for a helicopter, including the Emerson Elec- tric M-6E3 flexible quad-machine gun system equipped with four 7.62mm M60s (two on either side of the fuse- lage), and 14 2.75-inch folding-fin aerial rockets. In 1962, the Marine Corps chose the UH-1 to replace the Kaman HH-43 Huskie observation heli- copter. Its variant of the Huey was designated the UH-1E—the Marines did not share the Army’s cus- tom of naming its helicopters after Native American tribes. The UH-1E was identical to the UH-1B in terms of airframe design, Lycoming T53-1-11 power- plant, and rotor system, but it differed in some aspects in order to meet the requirements of an amphibious force. While Army variants used lightweight magne- sium components, the material’s propensity to corrode when exposed to salt water, and its dangerous volatil- ity upon catching fire, forced the replacement of many parts with aluminum. The UH-1Es were also fitted with specific radios, avionics, and revised electrical systems, as well as brakes to stop spinning rotors quickly and keep them stationary when on board ship. The initial deliv- ery of a handful of UH-1Es occurred in October 1963. Production versions began arriving in February 1964. The Marines sent the first armed versions to Vietnam in 1965 and ultimately received 208 aircraft by the end of the production run in September 1968. 1 1 “Army Planning New Helicopter Designs,” Aviation Week 58, no. 16 (20 April 1953): 21; “Bell HU-1A Helicopter Ordered in Production,” Aviation Week 68, no. 7 (17 February 1958): 34; and Bill Siuru, The Huey and Huey Cobra (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books, 1987), 71 – 80. Bell UH-1 “Huey” Defense Department (Marine Corps), photo by LCpl Alex Wasinski The Mobility War| 21 coordinated close air support from T-28s Trojans and AD-6 Skyraiders during casualty evacuation sorties. 116 HMM-261 redeployed to New River on 30 September. The squadron flew 11,400 sorties, clocked nearly 5,300 hours in combat, lifted more than 6,000 troops and almost 2 million pounds of cargo, and conducted more than 600 casualty evac- uations.117 HMM-261 transferred authority of Shufly opera- tions on 2 October 1963 to the “Flying Tigers” of HMM-361 116 Headquarters, Task Element 79.3.3.6, MAG-16, 1st MAW, “Evalua- tion of Helicopter Tactics and Techniques Report,” 19 July 1963, attached to Headquarters, Task Element 79.3.3.6, MAG-16, 1st MAW Command Diary, 1 May 1963–17 July 1963, folder 62, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201062005, TTU Vietnam Archive, 2. 117 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 117– 20. led by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Ross, a decorated fighter pilot in World War II and the Korean War. 118 In its first month, HMM-361 experienced more enemy encounters in a four-week period than any Shufly squadron to that point, taking fire on 46 different occasions.119 The squad- ron’s first casualties occurred on 8 October when two of its 118 Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 28 September – 4 October 1963, folder 67, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Col- lection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive, 2; and Biography of Thomas J. Ross. 119 Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 28 September – 4 October 1963, 2; Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 5 – 11 October 1963, 2; Weekly Summa- ry [1st MAW], 12 – 18 October 1963, 2; Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 19 –25 October 1963, 2; and Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 26 Octo- ber –1 November 1963, 2. All found in folder 67, U.S. Marine Corps His- tory Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067185, TTU Vietnam Archive. Archie J. Clapp Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division An HMM-362 aircraft supporting ARVN troops. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 22 | UH-34Ds crashed while responding to a downed RVNAF T-28 some 65 kilometers southwest of Da Nang. Fading light halted the recovery operation. The next day, a recovery team found the bodies of the pilots and copilots, HMM-361’s flight surgeon, and five crew among the wreckage. Evidence of bullet damage made clear that the enemy scored hits on the aircraft while in flight. Due to the close proximity of the wrecks, how- ever, the recovery team could not rule out a midair collision.120 USMACV planned to withdraw more than 1,000 Amer- icans from Vietnam by the end of 1963, including the Shufly Marines at Da Nang. However, the Marine Corps extended Shufly operations until the first half of 1964 to train RVNAF pilots and crews to fly UH-34s. Upon completion, the Marines would transfer their aircraft to the RVNAF and end Shu- fly operations. On 22 January 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Marine Corps’ 30 June deadline for the train- ing and aircraft handover. 121 The “Purple Foxes” of HMM- 364 assumed the additional task, beginning operations at Da Nang on 1 February. The new program provided crucial train- ing backed by experience. As a result, commanding general of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, requested and received approval from the Joint Chiefs to maintain the task force and postpone the rotation of Marine helicopter squadrons. Shufly would continue to operate as the American involvement in Vietnam expanded.122 Deepening U.S. Military Commitment A series of political events involving the South Vietnamese government contributed to the extension of Marine rotary- wing operations in Vietnam. On 2 October 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and General Taylor, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted a report to President Kennedy on the military situation in the Repub- lic of Vietnam. They concluded that victory was possible, but it would require a continuation of the U.S. military advisory effort until 1965.123 On 1 November, a group of ARVN officers overthrew the South Vietnamese government and killed President Ngo Dinh 120 Weekly Summary [1st MAW], 5 – 11 October 1963, 3; and Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 120. 121 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 80. 122 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 80. 123 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 288 – 90. Diem.124 The instability evidenced by the coup prompted a renewed American commitment in Vietnam to stabilize the political and military situation. Three weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson inherited a steadily growing American commitment in Southeast Asia. His approach was not dissim- ilar to Kennedy’s, as he chose gradual escalation of U.S. mili- tary intervention rather than wholesale commitment from the outset.125 On 7 February 1964, Communist fighters launched a wave of attacks across Vietnam, the largest against the U.S. compound and airfield at Pleiku in the Central Highlands. At the urging of many of his advisors, who called for swift retribution, President Johnson authorized limited retaliatory air strikes against DRV targets. The United States and the South Vietnamese governments claimed that these were jus- tified, as they were direct responses to the ongoing Hanoi- organized infiltrations into the south and Viet Cong attacks. In an address to the nation, President Johnson made clear his conviction to support the Republic of Vietnam and help guar- antee its security and independence.126 For Shufly, little changed during the first half of 1964. The end of the planned withdrawal at the close of 1963 and finite extension for training purposes had made it appear the task force was at an end. In May, USMACV ordered HMM- 364 to transfer their aircraft to the 217th RVNAF Squadron. The rotation of Shufly units continued uninterrupted when HMM-162 returned to South Vietnam on 17 June, the first Marine helicopter squadron to redeploy for a second tour. 127 The U.S. posture toward the war began to change, however, following reported North Vietnamese attacks on the destroyer USS Maddox (DD 731) on 2 August 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 7 August, authorizing President Johnson to use conventional 124 Philip E. Catton, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Viet- nam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 200 – 2. 125 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Esca- lation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 126 Graham A. Cosmas, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960 – 1968, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012), 213 –15. 127 See “Appendix: Marine Rotary-Wing Chronology during the Vietnam War.” The Mobility War| 23 military forces in Southeast Asia without a formal declara- tion of war. 128 Shufly’s existence to this point had been part of limited U.S. military support for the Republic of Vietnam. However, the escalation of the war and the greater American involve- ment necessitated changes to the organizational scheme of Marine helicopter support. Officially, the last task force squadron was Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler Jr.’s HMM- 365, which replaced Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtis’s HMM-162 in October 1964. On the final day of the calendar year, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, changed the designation of Marine helicopter operations from Task Element 79.3.3.6 to Task Unit 79.3.5, Marine Unit, Vietnam. Lieutenant Colo- nel Koler’s HMM-365 remained in-country until Lieutenant Colonel Norman G. Ewers’s HMM-163 relieved it on 17 Feb- ruary 1965 in a scheduled rotation as Marine Unit, Vietnam’s operating squadron.129 The name change did not alter the mis- sion. Command and control relationships also remained the same, as USMACV had operational control over the task unit while the 1st MAW’s commanding general retained responsi- bility for administrative and logistical support. 130 The military and political situation in Vietnam in early 1965 had deteriorated to the extent that the White House concluded that the only policy options were to escalate or withdraw. Johnson believed that direct U.S. military involve- ment alone could prevent a collapse of the South Vietnamese government and a Communist victory in Southeast Asia.131 In February, Army General William C. Westmoreland, who took command of USMACV the previous June, proposed deploy- ing ground troops as security forces for major U.S. bases. On 20 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Secre- tary McNamara that a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) of about 8,500 officers and enlisted deploy to protect Da Nang Air Base. The commander in chief, United States Pacific Com- mand, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., thought the situa- 128 The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or the Southeast Asia Resolution, Pub.L. 88 – 408, 78 Stat. 384, 10 August 1964; and Logevall, Choosing War, 324 – 26. 129 USMC/Vietnam Helicopter Association: Pop a Smoke, 13; and Jack Shu- limson and Maj Charles M. Johnson, USMC, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965 (Washington, DC: History and Muse- ums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), 235. 130 Whitlow, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954 –1964, 165; and Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 235. 131 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 532 – 33. tion in South Vietnam warranted sending a MEB to Da Nang, but phased in gradually. 132 He recommended first sending the command and control element, a helicopter squadron, and a battalion landing team. Existing Marine security forces at Da Nang could make up a second battalion landing team, and a third could be sent when there was adequate logistical support for it. The Joint Chiefs agreed with Sharp’s plan and immedi- ately forwarded it to McNamara. 133 In response to escalating Communist attacks against American and South Vietnamese installations and a crum- bling government in Saigon, on 26 February 1965 the Johnson administration approved deploying Marine units to Viet- nam to protect the Da Nang Air Base. 134 Johnson authorized deploying a helicopter squadron and two battalion landing teams to Da Nang, and on 6 March he ordered 3,500 more Marines to Da Nang.135 On 8 March, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade arrived at Da Nang. The brigade included two battalion land- ing teams: 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. As the buildup of forces continued, the 9th MEB took operational control of the Da Nang area with Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch in command. 136 The arrival of the first U.S. ground combat units marked the transition from pro- viding the RVN with military assistance to an Americaniza- tion of the war.137 It also meant the resumption of the air-ground team con- cept around which Marine operations were based. Changes to the Marine Corps’ aviation units in Vietnam accompa- nied the deployment of Marine ground combat units. The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade absorbed the helicopters of Marine Unit, Vietnam, making them an organic part of the air-ground team within the brigade. The headquarters of 132 Cosmas, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960 –1968, pt. 2, 238 – 39. 133 Cosmas, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968, pt. 2, 239; and Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 532 – 33. 134 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 532; and Shu- limson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 16. 135 Edward J. Drea, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 6, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965 – 1969 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011), 24. 136 Col Rod Andrew Jr., USMCR, The First Fight: U.S. Marines in Opera- tion Starlite, August 1965, Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2015), 3. 137 Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 532; and Shu- limson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 15. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 24 | Defense Department (Marine Corps) A183773 UH-34D Bureau Number (BuNo) 150255 from HMM-162 lands among billowing dust on Hill 327 southwest of Da Nang on 10 March 1965. Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16) moved from Okinawa to Da Nang beginning on 8 March. Colonel John H. King Jr., the overall commander of the short-lived successor to Shufly at the time, assumed command of the aircraft group.138 MAG- 16 included two medium helicopter squadrons: Lieutenant Colonel Norman Ewers’s HMM-163 and Lieutenant Colo- nel Oliver Curtis’s HMM-162.139 In the midst of the changes, helicopter operations kept pace. The two squadrons flew more than 2,200 sorties by the end of March. Half occurred in a 138 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 92; and Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 18. 139 Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 17. 13-square kilometer area around Da Nang, while the others supported ARVN ground operations throughout I Corps. 140 In early April, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, arrived in Viet- nam and moved to Hue, 70 kilometers north of Da Nang. The unit required more responsive helicopter support than MAG- 16 could provide from Da Nang, leading HMM-162 to estab- lish a detachment of 10 UH-34Ds at the Phu Bai airstrip. Additional helicopter support trickled in during the ensu- ing weeks. Lieutenant Colonel George F. Bauman’s VMO-2 arrived at Da Nang on 3 May. A detachment from VMO-2 had been part of Shufly since the initial deployment to Soc 140 “1st Marine Aircraft Wing Operations, Vol. 1,” folder 67, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201067181, TTU Vietnam Archive, 6-1. The Mobility War| 25 Defense Department (Marine Corps) Approaching Da Nang Air Base in 1965. Trang in 1962. Now assigned to the 9th MEB, the remain- der of the squadron relocated from Okinawa, bringing with it three Cessna O-1 Bird Dog liaison and observation aircraft.141 Most importantly, it arrived with six armed Bell UH-1Es, the first helicopter gunships procured by the Marine Corps.142 After three years of operational isolation in Vietnam, Marine helicopters rejoined infantry units as part of the air- ground team that vertical envelopment doctrine prescribed. Helicopter operations were entering a new phase. 143 The war’s 141 The 1962 Tri-Service designation system changed the OE-1 to the O-1. 142 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 81; and VMO-2 Command Chronology (ComdC), 29 April 1965 – 31 March 1966, folder 69, U.S. Marine Corps History Division Vietnam War Documents Collection, item no. 1201069086, TTU Vietnam Archive, 1. 143 Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 15. escalation also brought a change in mission for the Marines. The 9th MEB was permitted to take part in “active combat” under conditions established by Secretary McNamara with the support of Secretary of State D. Dean Rusk. The Marines, therefore, could launch offensive operations to locate and engage enemy forces after 14 April.144 A New Phase for Marine Helicopters When the first ground combat elements landed at Da Nang in March 1965, the Marine Corps had 20 helicopter squad- rons spread around the globe. Fourteen were medium trans- port squadrons, 12 of which flew UH-34Ds. Three observation units flew a mixture of Cessna O-1 Bird Dogs, Kaman HOK-1 144 Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 23. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 26 | (OH-43) Huskies, and Bell UH-1E “Huey” utility helicop- ters. Two squadrons still operated the aging Sikorsky CH-37C heavy-lift helicopter, and a final squadron was still forming.145 Meanwhile, the Marine Corps was phasing in the tandem- rotor, twin-turbine Boeing-Vertol CH-46A Sea Knight. The CH-46 would eventually become the workhorse of Marine rotary-wing operations in Southeast Asia, as it could carry two to three times the number of troops as the UH-34D. For the time being, however, Marine operations in Vietnam still relied on the dependable UH-34s. At the start of the buildup in 1965, HMM-263 operated from the amphibious assault ship USS Princeton while HMM-162 and HMM-163 flew 145 The 1962 Tri-Service aviation designation system changed the Marine Corps designation HR2S-1 to CH-37C. from Da Nang, along with a detachment of fixed-wing obser- vation aircraft.146 From the start of Shufly in April 1962, a detachment of O-1E Bird Dogs from VMO-2 operated alongside the task group’s medium helicopter squadron. Small airplanes mostly supplemented UH-1Es, which had taken over as the principal Marine observation aircraft from the O-1E and HOK-1 heli- copter.147 VMO-2 began using Hueys in the reconnaissance role as part of MAG-16 in May 1965 alongside the Cessnas. Flying out of Ky Ha, Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36) and its attached VMO-6 started operating in September 1965, giving the Marine Corps two observation squadrons within 146 USMC/Vietnam Helicopter Association: Pop a Smoke, 79. 147 LtCol Gary W. Parker, USMC, and Maj Frank M. Batha Jr., USMC, A History of Marine Observation Squadron Six (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1982), 35. Defense Department (Marine Corps) A184049 A squad from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, rushes to a waiting UH-34D en route to joining a reconnaissance patrol east of Da Nang in April 1965. The Mobility War| 27 the 1st MAW in Vietnam. A third squadron, VMO-3, started operating out of Phu Bai in January 1967. 148 VMO-2, -3, and -6 were equivalent in number to the entire prewar helicopter observation force. They flew UH-1Es exclusively, each operating from 21 to 27 aircraft.149 The Huey filled dual roles in the VMO: observation and assault support. Ground forces and vulnerable transport helicopters required instantaneous suppression of enemy ground fire in landing zones. While many Marines would concede that fixed-wing support was superior, either due to weather, terrain, or other reasons, it was not always suited to the scenario.150 As a result, most of the early Marine Hueys were equipped as armed vari- ants to fill the assault support role. The small turning radius and payload characteristics made the UH-1E a convenient gun platform. Hueys equipped with TK-2 rocket- and machine- gun kits were ideal for a variety of uses, from escorts to close- air support and command and control.151 Huey gunships did not change Marine helicopter doctrine, but they added another valuable member to the air-ground team and increased the overall effectiveness of helicopter operations. 152 By mid-April, the White House believed the situation in Vietnam had deteriorated to the point that “something new must be added in the South to achieve victory.”153 The admin- istration was reluctant to deploy more forces, as it was aware of the lack of popular and congressional support. Following a civilian-military leadership conference in Honolulu, the con- ferees agreed that another 48,000 personnel should deploy to the Republic of Vietnam.154 In early May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received the president’s approval to send additional Marine ground and aviation units to Da Nang. On 6 May 148 Marine Corps Command Center, “Status of Fleet Marine Forces,” 30 June 1965, Status of Forces file, Reference Branch Collection, HD Ar- chive, 6; Marine Corps Command Center, “Status of Fleet Marine Forc- es,” 30 September 1965, 1 of 2, Status of Forces file, Reference Branch Collection, HD Archive, 5; and Marine Corps Command Center, “Status of Fleet Marine Forces,” 31 January 1967, Status of Forces file, Reference Branch Collection, HD Archive, 16-3. 149 Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962 – 1973, 109 – 11. 150 LtCol D. K. Tooker, USMC, “Now We’re Shooting Back,” Marine Corps Gazette 50, no. 5 (May 1966): 46. 151 Maj Gary L. Telfer, USMC; LtCol Lane Rogers, USMC; and V. Keith Fleming Jr., U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984), 206. 152 Tooker, “Now We’re Shooting Back,” 46. 153 As quoted in Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 30. 154 Drea, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 29 – 31. 1965, III Marine Expeditionary Force (redesignated Marine Amphibious Force, or III MAF, the following day) superseded 9th MEB.155 III MAF could now absorb the full 3d Marine Division as well as the 1st MAW. Having provided adminis- trative and logistical support to Marine helicopter operations in Vietnam from its headquarters in Okinawa since 1962, the aircraft wing moved to Da Nang on 11 May 1965. Briga- dier General Keith B. McCutcheon, a decorated aviator and key figure in the development of the Marine helicopter pro- gram, arrived two weeks later to assume command of the 1st MAW.156 General Westmoreland advised the commanding general of III MAF, Major General William R. Collins, that his mission was multifaceted: coordinate the defense of three bases with the ARVN; support the South Vietnamese military; maintain the ability to conduct patrols, offensive operations, and reserve reaction missions; and carry out contingency plans as directed by USMACV. Expanding the rotary-wing aviation mission, the Marine Corps introduced the Special Landing Force. A self-sustaining strategic contingency force, it offered a water- 155 Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 35 – 36; and USMC/Vietnam Helicopter Association: Pop a Smoke, 13. 156 Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 35 – 36. Jonathan F. Abel Collection, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division Commandant Leonard F. Chapman (center) receives a briefing at Marble Mountain on the armed UH-1E. Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series 28 | The Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight’s roots trace to the YHC-1B, a turbine-powered assault helicop- ter designed by Vertol for a U.S. Army competition in 1956. To address Marine Corps requirements, the com- pany made substantial changes to the aircraft’s structure and components, leading to the HRB-1. The Marines began testing the aircraft in April 1962. The production version—designated CH-46A and referred to by Marines as the “forty-six” and then the “Phrog” following the Vietnam War—made its first flight at Vertol’s plant in mid-October 1962. Capable of carrying a 4,000-pound payload of combat troops (between 17 and 20 when combat loaded) or cargo, the aircraft had a range of 100 nautical miles and a cruising speed of 130 knots. With its emergency water landing and takeoff capability, rear loading ramp, and folding rotors, the Sea Knight was capable of both field and amphibious operations. The first CH-46A arrived in the fleet in 1964. Demand for more helicopters in Southeast Asia brought the first examples to Vietnam on 8 March 1966 when 24 from HMM-164 landed at Marble Moun- tain Air Facility (Da Nang East Air Field), a welcome arrival for UH-34 crews flying war-weary aircraft. The Sea Knight immediately increased the lift capability of helicopter squadrons and earned praise for its payload capacity and ease of loading and unloading. HMM-265, the second squadron to fly CH-46s, arrived at Marble Mountain in May. By the close of 1966, two more squadrons began operating from Ky Ha, bringing the total to nearly 80 Sea Knights in the Republic of Vietnam; at the height of the war, there were more than 100. Catastrophic structural failures in the aft pylons of some aircraft led to tragic accidents in 1967, forcing the emergency grounding of all CH-46s. Boeing-Vertol responded with a modification program conducted in Japan that required 1,000 hours of work per airframe. By the start of 1968, most of the improved aircraft were back with their squadrons. The changes eventually led to the introduction of the CH-46D, a dependable and long-serving aircraft.1 1 “Vertol Helicopter Chosen for Marines,” Aviation Week 74, no. 9 (27 February 1961): 33; “Marine CH-46A Designed for Ship, Field Operations,” Aviation Week 77, no. 19 (5 November 1962): 108; William H. Gregory, “Vertol Flys [sic] CH-46A Assault He- licopter,” Aviation Week 77, no. 17 (22 October 1962): 30; “Ma- rines’ New Helo Flies,” Naval Aviation News, December 1962, 2; and Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Head- quarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1982), 263–64. Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight Defense Department (Marine Corps) A422475 The Mobility War| 29 borne and heliborne strike capability as part of the U.S. Sev- enth Fleet’s amphibious arm. As a strategic reserve, the SLF consisted of an infantry battalion landing team, naval surface assault craft, and a medium helicopter squadron. Vertical lift from ships provided the SLF greater flexibility and maneuver- ability than its land-based counterparts. Beginning operations in June 1965 from USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2), Colonel Ewers’s HMM-163 was the first in a regular rotation of medium heli- copter squadrons flying from on board ship.157 Marine Helicopters in 1965 Marine Commandant General Wallace M. Greene Jr. char- acterized 1965 as “a year of action for the Marine Corps.”158 It was also a year of growth and expansion. The rapid buildup of U.S. personnel, including Marine fixed-wing squadrons, crowded the airfield at Da Nang in spring 1965. For Marine Aviation in general, lack of adequate space was the principal factor limiting the deployment of more units to Vietnam.159 To address the need, the Marines constructed a new airfield east of Da Nang on a stretch of beach along the Han River. The cantonment and airfield were situated between a large green peak called Monkey Mountain to the north and the brown- gray Marble Mountain to the south.160 Elements of the 9th Marines secured the area in the early summer while members of a naval construction battalion (Seabees) built the aircraft group’s helicopter installation on the beach.161 From their new base, the Marines had an unobstructed view of the South China Sea. The ocean breeze held the mos- quitos at bay, which were a persistent annoyance for those in Da Nang. Despite the idyllic scene, oppressive heat and blow- ing sand remained inescapable. Sandbagged bunkers, concer- tina wire, and minefields were a reminder that the Viet Cong 157 In the first three years of operations, medium helicopter squadrons in the combat theater rotated between the Special Landing Force (SLF) and the air