Emergency Procedures for the CESSNA L19 305A BIRD DOG

transport friendly troops and supplies to and from the battlefield. During four air wars in Southeast Asia between 1961 and 1973, American aircraft, at different times and in different arenas, performed the functions of strategic bombing, reconnaissance, and interdiction over North Vietnam; reconnais- sance and interdiction of the trails in southern Laos; reconnaissance, interdiction, and close air support in the war waged by Laotian tribesmen against the Communists in northern Laos; and close air support, airlift, reconnaissance, air defense, and attacks against enemy supply lines and reinforcements in support of American and South Vietnamese ground forces in South Vietnam. This volume describes the U.S.Air Force’s roles in the latter of these four air wars during the period of greatest intensity, between 1965 and early 1968. Other volumes in this series round out the story. Before the war, close air support, because it ceded much control of aircraft to ground commanders, was not a favored mission of the Air Force. Anchored for decades in the strategic nuclear mission, many airmen viewed direct support of ground forces as the least efficient use of the air weapon. Despite their conviction that enemy resources were more effectively dealt with before they arrived at the battlefield, it became necessary from time to time and for a variety of reasons to use aircraft for close air support. The conflict in South Vietnam was one of those occasions. This study examines not only the results of employing air power this way, but also the tactics and techniques that evolved in an unfamiliar jungle environment, the relationship of the close air support mission to other types of missions being flown, and the interplay between the Air Force’s activities and those of the other air forces that were fighting the Communists. A special word of thanks is due to John Huston and Dick Kohn, who, as directors of the Air Force’s history program, provided a sufficiently contemplative atmosphere for research and writing. David Chenoweth labored mightily in making the text publicly presentable. A special tribute is V PREFACE in order here for Ken Sams, without whose imaginative historical work in Southeast Asia the story of the Air Force in South Vietnam would be incomplete. John Schlight vi The Author From the early 1950s, when he flew aircraft in support of the French in Indochina, through his final assignment as Deputy Chief of the Ofice of Air Force History, Col. John Schlight’s 3 1-year Air Force career bracketed America’s involvement in the Southeast Asia conflict. In Southeast Asia again in 1969 and 1970, he was in Vietnam as Deputy Director of Project CHECO (Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations), one of the Air Force’s historical efforts in the war. Possessing the MA and PhD degrees from Princeton University, he has taught military history at the United States Air Force Academy, the National War College in Washington, D.C., and at several universities in the United States and overseas. From 1977 to 1981 he directed the Vietnam War section at the Air Force History Office. In addition to articles in both medieval European and modern American military history, he is the author of Monarchs and Mercenaries (1968) and Henry II Plantagenet (1973) and the editor of The Second Indochina War (1985). He is currently Chief of the Southeast Asia Branch at the US. Army’s Center of Military History. vii United States Air Force Historical Advisory Committee (As of December 1, 1987) Mrs. Anne Foreman The General Counsel, USAF Dr. Dominick Graham University of New Brunswick Lt. Gen. Charles R. Hamm USAF Superintendent, USAF Academy Dr. John H. Morrow, Jr. University of Tennessee at Knoxville Lt. Gen. Truman Spangrud USAF Commander, Air University Dr. Norman A. Graebner University of Virginia Dr. Ira Gruber Rice University Dr. Haskell Monroe (Committee Chairman) University of Missouri-Columbia Gen. Thomas M. Ryan, Jr. USAF Retired Dr. Gerhard L. Weinberg University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ... Vlll Contents Page ...Foreword ........................................................................ 111 Preface ........................................................................... v Introduction-The Advisory Years. 1955-1964 ........................... 1 15 11. Beginning of Direct Involvement. April-June 1965 .............. 35 I11. U.S. Assumes Major Role. June-September 1965 ................ 57 IV . Air Force Deployments and Air Operations. September-December 1965 .......................................... 85 V . Settling In and Sorting Out. January-April 1966 ................ 113 VI. Setbacks for Centralized Air Power. May-December 1966 ..... 139 VII . The “Frontier” Spirit. 1966 ........................................... 167 VIII. Air Operations. 1966 ................................................... 193 IX . Refinements of Aircraft and Munitions. 1967 ..................... 223 X. Air Operations. January 1967-March 1968 ........................ 249 XI . Conclusion................................................................ 289 I . End of the Advisory Period. November 1964-April 1965 ...... Appendices 1. Major USAF Units and Aircraft in South Vietnam. 2. Sorties versus Tasks .................................................... 317 3 . Planning Factors for the Tactical Air Buildup ................... 321 1962-1 968 ............................................................. 313 4 . Psychological Warfare Leaflets .................................. ...... 329 5 . USAF Tactical Sorties in South Vietnam. 1965-1967 ........... 339 6. USAF Support of Major Ground Operations. 1965-1967 ....... 345 Notes ............................................................................. 351 Glossary .......................................................................... 371 Bibliographic Note ............................................................. 385 Index ............................................................................. 393 ix CONTENTS Page Southeast Asia ................................................... .facing page Major Battles and Prolonged Confrontations. 1965 ..................... Major Battles and Prolonged Confrontations. 1966 ..................... 138 Rolling Thunder Route Packages ........................................... 204 Tally Ho Area and Route Package 1 ...................................... 207 VNAF and USAF Advisory Group Units. June 1967 .................. 236 1 56 Units. 1965 ................................................................... 84 Areas of Operation. Major United States and Free World Areas of Operation. Major United States and Free World Units. 1966 ................................................................... 192 Fifteen Minute Tactical Air Coverage of South Vietnam .............. 218 Areas of Operation. Major United States and Free World Units. 1967 ................................................................... 248 Operation Junction City Operational Area ................................ 251 Operation Hickory Operational Area and the DMZ Area ............. 262 Major Battles and Prolonged Confrontations. 1967 ..................... 275 Operation Niagara Fire Zones ............................................... 278 Tet Offensive-Major Cities and Military Bases Attacked .............283 Charts and Graphs Joint Air-Ground Operations System ...................................... 161 ALO/FAC Units and Related Organizations in Southeast Asia ...... 164 USAF Combat Sortie/Loss Rates. WW 11. Korea. and Southeast Asia ............................................................... 219 Photographs Farm Gate aircraft. 1962 ..................................................... 4 Gen . Hunter Harris. Gen . William C. Westmoreland. and Lt . Gen . Joseph H . Moore ............................................................ 9 Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky ......................................... 12 Brink Hotel after bombing on December 24. 1964 ...................... 14 X CONTENTS Page Marines landing at Da Nang. March 1965 ............................... 18 F-105s en route to North Vietnam. October 1965 ...................... 25 Aircraft at Da Nang. 1965................................................... 27 F-100s in revetments at Da Nang. March 1965 ......................... 28 Remains of a B-57 after mortar attack at Bien Hoa ................... 33 B-52s over target in South Vietnam ....................................... 34 EC-121s at Tan Son Nhut. 1965 ........................................... 39 F-100 escorting a convoy. 1965 ............................................. 42 A-1Es over South Vietnam. 1965 ........................................... 47 Reconnaissance photo of first B-52 strike in South Vietnam ......... 53 South Vietnamese Air Force H-34 landing at a remote site .......... 59 U.S. Army OV-1 Mohawk observation plane ............................ 62 Cam Ranh Bay construction. 1965 ......................................... 67 Aluminum matting installation at Cam Ranh Bay ...................... 68 Forward Air Controller activities ......................................... .72-73 F-4 over Vietnam. 1965 ...................................................... 77 An Khe air strip. late 1965 ................................................. 80 B-52 releasing bombs over South Vietnam. October 1965 ............. 83 First F-5s in Vietnam. Bien Hoa. October 1965 ........................ 88 Early AC-47 .................................................................... 91 Ranch Hand UC-123 at Tan Son Nhut .................................. 92 U-10 dropping leaflets ........................................................ 93 South Vietnamese Air Force A-1Hs ....................................... 98 U.S. Air Force C-123 dropping supplies .................................. 100 U.S. Air Force A-1 attacking an enemy position ....................... 104 Royal Australian Air Force Caribou landing at Tan Son Nhut ...... 107 555th Civil Engineering Squadron tents. Cam Ranh Bay. 1966 ...... 112 F-5 bombing target. March 1966 ........................................... 118 Gen . John P . McConnell and Gen . Harold K . Johnson ............... 122 U.S. Army CV-2 Caribou .................................................... 124 U.S. Air Force 0-1s at a remote field .................................... 132 Livestock transported by air to Special Forces camp ................... 141 C-123 at small field. October 1966 ........................................ 144 Modified B-52s with increased bomb loads ............................... 151 Prime Beef projects ........................................................ .156-57 Chaplains helping build office at Pleiku ................................... 166 Da Nang Air Base. 1966 ..................................................... 171 xi CONTENTS Page Civilian workers erecting fencing. Phan Rang. 1966 .................... 177 Bien Hoa enlisted men’s quarters. October 1966......................... 179 Pleiku chapel. September 1966 .............................................. 180 U.S. Navy F-8 landing on USS Ticonderoga ............................. 189 Navy F-4s launching from USS Franklin D. Roosevelt ................. Maj. Bernard Fisher and Maj. Dafford Myers ........................... 200 C-130 landing during Operation Birmingham ............................ 210 F-100s heading for enemy positions. February 1966 .................... 221 191 B-57 in Operation MashedWhite Wing. February 1966 ............... 196 Cratering on Route 15 in North Vietnam ................................ 202 C-130 waits on ground during Operation Attleboro. November 1966............................................................................ 215 Electro-optical guided bomb on F-4 ....................................... 222 Aerial lighting system mounted on C-123 ................................ 226 Pave Way I laser guided bomb ............................................. 233 Air Force C-7 Caribou during Operation Junction City ............... 237 A-37s on first combat mission. August 1967 ............................ 241 Air Force UH-1F helicopter gunship ...................................... 244 F-100 and secondary explosion in Operation Junction City ........... 252 B-52s and KC-135s at U Tapao. May 1967 ............................. 256 Two-place F-100F over Vietnam. June 1967............................. 265 U.S. Marine Corps base at Khe Sanh ..................................... 277 F-100 bombing at Khe Sanh ................................................ 279 Airlift at Khe Sanh ........................................................... 281 B-52s bombing inside the Demilitarized Zone. November 1967 ...... 288 Air Force OV-10 Bronco .................................................... 294 C-141 medical evacuation aircraft at Tan Son Nhut ................... 297 F-100s landing at Tuy Hoa. December 1966 ............................ 301 C-119s being turned over to South Vietnam. February 1968 ......... 303 AC-130A Gunship I1 ......................................................... 240 xii CONTENTS Page Tables 1. U S. Military Personnel in Southeast Asia. 1960-1968 ................... 5 2 . Fighter Squadrons Needed for the 1965-1966 Ground Buildup ................................................................. 64 3. Possible Sites for New B-52 Bases ...................................... 152 4 . USAF Aircraft in Southeast Asia. 1965-1967 ......................... 159 5 . Aircraft In-Commission Rates. January 1966-June 1967............. 185 6. Sortie Generation Rates of USAF Aircraft in Southeast Asia. June 1965-December 1967 ........................................ 186 7. Tactical Aircraft Ordnance Tonnage per Sortie. January-July 1966 .................................................. 190 8. USAF Aircraft Losses in South Vietnam. 1965-1968 ................. 220 9. Munitions Provided to Southeast Asia. 1965-1967 .................... 232 10. Arc Light Sorties. June 1965-March 1968 ............................. 257 11. Compendium of Strikes in Tally Ho. January 26-August 30. 1967 ..................................... 266 xiii Introduction The Advisory Years 1955-1964 America’s direct entanglement with the travails of South Vietnam began shortly after the Geneva accords of 1954 divided Vietnam in half. This agreement ended the conflict between the French and the insurgent Viet Minh and required the withdrawal of French forces to below the 17th parallel, the line dividing the two Vietnams. Before this time, the U.S. policy for Southeast Asia had been ambivalent: on the one hand, the United States had opposed the reestablishment of French colonial rule there after World War 11; on the other, it needed French support for its proposed European Defense Community. As a compromise, between 1946 and 1954 the United States provided economic and military aid to the French in their fight against the Viet Minh in Vietnam, but stopped short of assuming a direct combat role. This military and economic assistance was predicated on the French eventually granting independence to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. With the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu early in 1954, which led to their subsequent retreat from Indochina, the United States took over as patron and benefactor of the fledgling southern nation. Involvement in so distant a region reflected America’s global determination to forestall the spread of communism. This policy of containment, originally a response to Soviet expansion in eastern Europe during the late 19&, was reinforced in Asia by the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the North Korean invasion of South Korea the following year. By 1955, U.S. policymakers were depicting the newly created South Vietnamese republic as the leading Southeast Asian domino, with its capitulation to communism leading to the similar submergence of its neighbors. 1 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM In Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, the principal instrument of U.S. aid was the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), one of twenty- three such groups the United States maintained in Third World countries around the globe. After 1955, the efforts of the MAAG, Vietnam, were guided by three politico-military policies. In line with the containment strategy, the United States sought to resist Communist advances by relying on the armed forces of the threatened nations without direct U.S. combat participation. Accordingly, the group’s activities were limited to giving counsel and advice and to providing equipment and training under the Military Assistance Program. Second, despite a warning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that President Ngo Dinh Diem’s government was weak and had to be strengthened before an effective army could be built, American policy emphasized creating a strong military force in hopes that it, in turn, would lead to the development of a viable government. As a result, the advisory group was thrust into the forefront and, at times, into conflict with the U.S. ambassador and his country team, of which the MAAG was a part. The third policy, stemming from the United States’ recent experience in Korea, called for shaping South Vietnam’s armed forces primarily to meet a large-scale invasion from the north, rather than to deal with subversion in the south. Memories of the Chinese inundation of Korea were still vivid, leading to the American view that monolithic communism, spearheaded by the Chinese, represented the chief threat to the area. These three policies determined for the next decade the type of organization, equipment, training, and counsel that the advisory group provided for the ground, air, and naval components of the Republic of Vietnam’s armed forces. Although the United States was not signatory to the Geneva accords, it at first abided by that agreement’s provision limiting the size of the advisory group to 342 officers and enlisted personnel. This number doubled early in 1956, however, with the addition of Army logistic personnel needed to recover and ship back to the United States the surplus military equipment left after the French departure. The MAAG chief, as well as 535 of its 740 personnel, were members of the U.S. Army,’ while the Air Force had 68 representatives. Overwhelming emphasis was placed on developing the South Vietnamese Army, while the Vietnamese Air Force was assigned minor ‘support roles of airlift, paradrop, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation. It was envisioned that any tactical air support that might be needed against an invasion from the north would be obtained from members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization outside Vietnam.* Diem’s government at first proved unexpectedly strong in overcoming internal opposition and in preparing an agenda for internal reform. As a result, in 1959 the leaders in Hanoi decided to resort to force to overthrow the southern regime and began gradually to infiltrate men and equipment to 2 THE ADVISORY YEARS, 1955-1964 bolster the southern revolutionaries, the Viet Cong. Although aware of the increasing tempo of attacks throughout South Vietnam, Diem’s secretiveness and suspicions led him to keep this intelligence to himself; and the United States continued to prepare the South Vietnamese against overt attack from the north. By the time of President John F. Kennedy’s inauguration in January 1961, the South Vietnamese Army of 150,000 had been organized into 7 conventional infantry divisions, an airborne group, and 19 separate battal- ions. In contrast, the Vietnamese Air Force had but 4,000 personnel in 6 squadrons: 2 C-47 transport squadrons, 2 G 1 9 (0-1) liaison squadrons, an H-19 helicopter squadron, and an AD-6 (A-1H) fighter squadron. Most of these aircraft were obsolescent, and the service was short of trained pilots and technically proficient support personnel. The containment policy suffered several sharp reverses during the first months of Kennedy’s administration in 1961. An unsuccessful invasion of Cuba in April, a humiliating summit conference in Vienna in June with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, and the Communist construction in August of the wall separating East Berlin from West Berlin threw into question the adequacy of America’s total reliance on nuclear weapons to discourage adventurism at lower levels of violence. Most serious for Asia was a string of military successes by the North Vietnamese-sponsored Pathet Lao Communists in their attempt to overrun the government of Laos. In light of these setbacks, Kennedy, strongly influenced by his military advisor, Maxwell Taylor, began to modify the country’s policy of nuclear deterrence. Taylor, a highly successful World War I1 commander of the lOlst Airborne Division in Europe and later Chief of Staff of the Army, had long doubted the ability of the threat of nuclear weapons by itself to prevent smaller conflicts. Motivated in part by his desire to restore to the U.S. Army a role in national strategy that it had not enjoyed since World War 11, Taylor advocated, and Kennedy initiated, a strategy of flexible response in which the United States would have forces that could react to aggression at any level, from nuclear attack to local insurgencie~.~ The most immediate effect of this shift in policy was an increased American presence in South Vietnam beginning late in 1961. Although the Laotian situation eased with the signing of the Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos in Geneva on July 23, 1962, the implications of the crisis for its neighbors led to an increased U.S. commitment to South Vietnam to a level just short of combat. Between the end of 1961 and the opening months of 1965, the size of the Air Force contingent multiplied almost a hundredfold, from 68 to 6,600 (table 1) personnel and from a handful of liaison planes to 84 aircraft of various types. Many of these men were members of irregular units employing aircraft and tactics improvised for the counterinsurgency environment. 3 P MVNLZCIA HLnOS NI XVM Z C H L THE ADVISORY YEARS, 1955-1964 Thailand. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in early August 1964, two squadrons of eighteen B-57s* each quickly moved from Clark AB to Bien Hoa; and the Air Force, in a deployment codenamed One Buck, rushed into the area a composite air strike force of one F-105 squadron, two F-100 squadrons, three squadrons of C-I30 transports, and six RF-101 reconnais- sance aircraft.’ US. Military Personnel in Southeast Asia 1960-1968 Year Armv USAF USMC USCG Total South Vietnam 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 ~ ~~ 790 2,050 7,890 10,119 14,697 116,755 239,422 319,521 359,794 ~~ 15 103 455 757 1,109 8,446 23,260 3 1,669 36,088 68 1,006 2,429 4,630 6,604 20,620 52,913 55,908 58,434 2 5 552 757 900 38,190 69,235 78,013 81,377 875 3,164 11,326 16,263 23,310 303 184,314 448 385,278 476 485,587 441 536,134 Thailand 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 218 424 2,755 2,730 3,374 4,765 7,995 10,330 11,330 38 39 372 285 153 185 241 656 365 Source: MACV and MACTHAI 44 57 1,212 1,086 2,943 9,117 26,113 33,395 35,791 19 22 14 25 35 40 38 102 42 94 51 94 319 542 4,353 4,126 6,505 14,107 34,489 44,517 47,631 American forward air controllers (FACs) during these advisory years had been performing a combined training and combat operation, both in their own squadron (the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron) at Bien Hoa with the +Halfof the thirty-sixE 5 7 s rotated back to Clark on October 22, only days before a mortar attack at Bien Hoa destroyed five and damaged many of the remaining Canberras. 5 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) and at province and major ground force headquarters throughout the country. Since the squadron’s arrival in the middle of 1963 with twenty-three 0-1 Bird Dogs and forty-four pilots, it had been attempting to teach the Vietnamese to perform visual reconnaissance and to direct air strikes against the Viet Cong. Air Force planners thought originally that the training could be done in one year. However, unforeseen problems, such as the Vietnamese practice of siphoning off pilots into fighter cockpits and their penchant for standing back and letting the energetic Americans fly many of the combat missions, slowed the VNAF’s progress toward self-sufficiency. When the squadron was turned over to the Vietnam- ese after one year, they were unable to assume the controller role; and by January 1965, the squadron was back in American hands. By then the Air Force had seventy-six controllers stationed throughout the country.6 As with other facets of operations in South Vietnam during these early years, the aerial reconnaissance effort supporting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was shaped by the climate and geography of the country, the insurgent nature of the war, and the existing command structure. The most effective way to locate the enemy from the air was through visual reconnaissance by forward air controllers in 0-1s or by other pilots flying over the dense jungle. In addition to the Air Force’s Bird Dogs, the Vietnamese had three C - 4 7 ~in the southern Mekong Delta region; and the U.S. Army was flying several OV-1 Mohawks on reconnaissance missions. However, the visual reporting method was far from perfect. Learning from experience that firing at aircraft gave away their positions, the Viet Cong discontinued this practice and, instead, hid or camouflaged themselves when a plane approached. They became masters of concealment. Often an enemy soldier would carry a piece of green khaki tied around his waist and, when alerted, would climb high in a palm tree, tie the khaki to two palms, and use it as a hammock. His weight would bend the palms over his body, shielding him from observation.’ The appearance of low-flying aircraft signaled the coming of an air strike, and the slow reaction of most attack planes in arriving at the scene gave the enemy ample time to move out of the area before the strike took place. At the beginning of 1965, there still was no systematic visual reconnaissance program that could keep the entire country under surveillance from above. With all its shortcomings, however, visual reporting was still more widespread than photographic reconnaissance. By late 1961 the Air Force had set up two photo processing units, one at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in 6 THE ADVISORY YEARS, 1955-1964 Saigon and the other at Don Muang Airport outside Bangkok in Thailand. The forty-five men who manned each of these units processed and interpreted the film brought in by reconnaissance jets, briefed the pilots on targets, and prepared reports on enemy activity. For the first month, there were four RF-101s at each location; but in November, the Voodoos in South Vietnam returned to Okinawa, leaving the four aircraft at Don Muang as the only jet reconnaissance force in all of Southeast Asia. A year later these planes moved to Tan Son Nhut; and in May 1963, they were joined there by two RB-57s on temporary assignment. By early the following year, the Vietnamese had a reconnaissance squadron of their own that flew T-28s from the Saigon base. A turning point for both the American and Vietnamese programs came in May of 1964. The beginning of reconnaissance flights over Laos subdivided the Air Force's already meager jet assets. Due to a shortage of fighter pilots, the Vietnamese reconnaissance squadron was disbanded that same month and the pilots retrained to form a new fighter squadron. At the same time, when the U.S.Army added to its fleet of Mohawks, the Air Force command, the 2d Air Division, wanted these aircraft placed under its operation at Tan Son Nhut to form a joint reconnaissance task force. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 2d Air Division's parent, thought differently and in December 1964 set up its own targeting branch, the Target Research and Analysis Center, at its Saigon headquarters. This further diluted the Air Force reconnaissance effort because the Mohawks were left independent and because many Air Force photo reconnaissance sorties were diverted to support the MACV function." Equally debilitating for the Air Force, it ensured that MACV rather than the 2d Air Division would determine when, where, how, and how frequently reconnaissance missions would be flown. Traditional photographic reconnaissance was hampered in Vietnam by the triple-tiered jungle canopy that covered much of the country, the frequent poor weather, and the Viet Cong proclivity to move and operate at night. Throughout the early years, both the Air Force and the Army searched for better techniques. They had some success with infrared cameras, which photographed heat radiating from human bodies and campfires. However, photography could not keep up with the mobile enemy; and early in 1965, the Air Force was experimenting with improved airborne detection equipment that could plot the location of Viet Cong radio transmitters on the ground.' One-third of the Air Force's planes in Vietnam at the beginning of 1965 were transports. Two squadrons of C-123 Providers had arrived in 1962 expecting to fly such combat missions as dropping troops and supplies and carrying out assault landings. These aspirations conflicted with the Army's 7 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM concept of air mobility that emphasized the use of Army transports and helicopters fcr these functions. lo Although the issue was still alive early in 1965, the Air Force’s airlift contingent, now grown to three squadrons at Tan Son Nhut and one at Da Nang,* had to content itself with flying resupply missions, principally to the fifty outposts strung out along South Vietnam’s western border. When the first Providers arrived in 1962, under the name Mule Train, there was no centralized arrangement for using them. Within a year, MACV had organized the C-123s into a system for South Vietnam and Thailand (the Southeast Asia Airlift System), which it operated through a troop carrier group, the 315th, at Tan Son Nhut. Keeping with its doctrine, however, Army fixed-wing and helicopter airlift planes remained outside this system, attached to the individual ground units. ’’ Besides hundreds of airlift helicopters, the Army by early 1965 was operating six companies of CV-2 Caribous, a plane about half the size and with half the load capacity of the C-123. Normally these planes operated at MACV, division, and corps levels, but were pressed into service at lower combat command levels when needed. By January 1965, the United States Air Force had a sprinkling of jet aircraft in South Vietnam and neighboring Thailand, the remnants of the force that had arrived the preceding August. Besides the reconnaissance RF-101s and RB-57s at Tan Son Nhut, a squadron of air defense F-102s was divided between Tan Son Nhut and Don Muang, and a squadron of F-100s was stationed temporarily at Da Nang. Another squadron of F-100s was located temporarily at Takhli, as was a squadron of F-105s at Korat. Ten B-57s at Bien Hoa were manned by rotating crews from the 8th and 13th Tactical Bomb Squadrons of Clark AB, Philippine Islands.” Despite repeated requests from the field to rescind the ban, none of these jets in either country was allowed to fly combat missions in South Vietnam. The command structure that had evolved for American forces in the conflict mirrored the peculiarities of the theater. For Air Force commanders, this structure posed two problems. One concerned the relationship between the resources they needed for South Vietnam and those they had to use elsewhere in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The other dealt with the interface between Air Force and non-Air Force planes inside South Vietnam. The command arrangements that had developed during the advisory period accommodated the first of these issues better than it did the second. *The 309th and 310th Troop Carrier Squadrons and the 19th Air Commando Squadron were at Tan Son Nhut; the 311th Troop Carrier Squadron was at Da Nang. See Appendix 1, Major USAF Units and Aircraft in South Vietnam, 1962-1968. 8 THE ADVISORY YEARS, 1955-1964 - I * Left to right: Gen. Hunter Harris, Jr., USAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces; Gen. William C. Westmoreland, USA, Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, Commander, 2d Air Division. The MACV, which had replaced the earlier MAAG during the escalation in early 1962, was a subordinate unified command reporting directly to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) in Hawaii. The MACV Commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, a combat veteran of World War I1 and Korea, had commanded both the 82d and lOlst Airborne Divisions and subsequently served as Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. As Secretary of Maxwell Taylor’s Army General Staff in the mid-l950s, he had played a major part in the Army’s drive to augment its role by increasing the ground force component of America’s deterrent force. Relations between the Army and the Air Force within MACV were somewhat unorthodox and at times strained, stemming from the different responsibilities held by the two services. While it was acknowledged that the conflict within the borders of South Vietnam was primarily a ground war in which air power would support the ground troops, CINCPAC’s air chief in Hawaii, Gen. Hunter Harris, Jr., Commander of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), was also looking at contingencies beyond those borders that could affect the military situation inside them. He opposed both extremes: too wide a dispersal of control over its air assets on the one hand and too narrow a concentration of air power within South Vietnam on the other. Westmore- land was given operational control of the Vietnam-based planes he needed to carry on the war against the Viet Cong, but he lacked control of the carrier- 9 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM based naval aircraft. The seeds of a future problem for the Air Force were sown when Westmoreland delegated his control of Marine planes in I Corps to the Marine commander in that area. The other aircraft in Southeast Asia were controlled by General Harris, acting through the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines. The Air Force’s focal point within Vietnam for these arrangements was the Commander of the 2d Air Division in Saigon, Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore. Like Westmoreland, Moore had seen extensive combat experience in World War 11, having flown numerous tactical missions in the Philippines and Australia and in Europe during the Normandy invasion and the subsequent campaigns across northern France and the Rhineland. He remained in tactical fighters after the war, commanding several wings and, by 1958, the Ninth Air Force. The following year, he received the Bendix Trophy for setting a new world speed record-1,216 mph-in an F-105 Thunderchief. In January 1964, he moved from his position as operations director of the Tactical Air Command to take over the 2d Air Division in Vietnam. Moore, a boyhood friend of Westmoreland, was now serving both as MACV air component commander for South Vietnam and as the Thirteenth Air Force’s forward commander for missions in the rest of Southeast Asia. For the war inside South Vietnam, the overall MACV arrangements satisfied neither the Air Force nor the Army. As a subordinate unified command, MACV should have had proportional representation from each of the services fighting the war. General Westmoreland, however, did not create a separate Army component commander comparable to his Air Force and Navy component commanders. Without a separate Army staff to handle Army matters, he used the MACV staff for both Army and unified functions. Eighty percent of the staffs efforts were devoted to Army matters, the remainder to joint affairs. Since the small number of Air Force people on the MACV staff were unfamiliar with Army military requirements and opera- tions, these functions were handled for the most part by Army representa- tives. For example, the chief of MACV plans, the only Air Force general on the staff, was excluded from day-to-day planning and concentrated on long- range matters, such as planning for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. He had little to do with the war itself, which was handled by the 5-3 Army general. The Air Force was severely underrepresented on the staff. Despite repeated proposals to place more Air Force generals in key MACV positions, Westmoreland had no intention of doing so unless the Air Force were willing to place all its air resources under his command, including the fighters in Thailand and the C-130s delivering material into Vietnam from Pacific bases. PACAF, keeping an eye on the possibility of a larger war, was loathe to tie down all these assets in South Vietnam. As a result, the Air Force lost a good deal of stature with the Army for not “joining the team.”13 MACV remained 10 THE ADVISORY YEARS, 1955-1964 a unified command in name only, and Air Force leaders were concerned that their ideas about how best to use air power would not be reflected in MACV’s plans and operation^.'^ Foremost among these ideas was the need for a centralized focus to plan and operate all American and allied air activity within Vietnam. Issues arose from doctrinal differences between the Army and the Air Force, as well as from different perceptions each service held of its roles and missions, not only in Vietnam, but in the broader arena of national security as well. Each service applied the principle of unity of command differently. For the Army, air power was seen as most responsive to ground needs when there was unity at the operating level, which in Vietnam meant the Vietnamese Army corps area.* Air Force leaders were equally convinced that, both tactically and economically, air power was most efficient, especially in this type of war, when it was centrally controlled at MACV and concentrated at vital flash points. To bring enough of the right kinds of aircraft to bear on these points, the MACV air commander needed the flexibility to call on any or all his assets when he needed them. None should be withheld for “peripheral” engagements. Air power was best employed, and with a minimum of costly duplication, when it was controlled centrally at the MACV level. Out of these differing views, two separate systems for controlling aircraft were growing up: a tactical air control system (TACS), which directed Air Force and VNAF operations, and an air-ground system, which controlled Army and Marinet aviation from each of the four corps tactical zone headquarters. Although recognition of the shortcomings of this arrangement had led in mid-1964 to some closer coordination between the two controlling agencies, a unified tactical control system was not in place at the beginning of 1965. The goal of the United States Air Force during the advisory years had been to build the Vietnamese Air Force into a balanced air arm capable of supporting Vietnamese ground forces and opposing the threat from the north. Until the escalation in 1962, American support for the Vietnamese had been low key. The small air section of the MAAG had succeeded in converting the Vietnamese way of doing things from French to American. Some new bases and units were activated, aircraft and personnel came to mirror the Air *For military purposes, South Vietnam was at first divided into three and later (November tThe Marines had a medium helicopter squadron at Da Nang that had moved there from 1962) into four corps tactical zones (CTZs). the Mekong Delta in 1962. 11 THE W A R IN SOUTH VIETNAM Force’s system, and American training methods were introduced. Between 1962 and the beginning of 1965, the VNAF created the basic force it was to use for the next 4 years, increasing the number of personnel from 4,000 to over 10,000. The 6 squadrons and 97 aircraft of 1962 had grown to 14 squadrons with 285 planes 3 years later.* The Air Force had shepherded the creation of a command structure in which control flowed, in theory, from VNAF headquarters in Saigon down to 4 tactical wings, an air training center, and a logistics wing. This expansion was too rapid and left some heavy problems in its wake. The Vietnamese Air Force suffered from a lack of strong direction from the top-a microcosm of the larger national problem. As members of a young service, emerging leaders possessed insuffcient flying and managerial experi- ence. Many of those who had such talent, such as Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, VNAF Commander, preferred to invest it in the political market.” Ky’s decisive support of the government during a coup attempt in September 1964 proved to be a mixed blessing for his air force. While it marked the rise of the service to political prominence, it also drained the VNAF of many of its experienced people. The effects were becoming apparent by early 1965, particularly in the ever-widening chasm that separated the VNAF‘s head- quarters from the squadrons. This lack of direction hampered the solution of other problems. The combat sortie rate suffered as some key units were diverted from tactical operations and placed on “coup alert” during the seemingly endless political eruptions in Saigon. Air base construction had not kept pace with the influx of people and aircraft, both American and Vietnamese, and there was serious overcrowding of facilities. Still missing were some of the basic elements of an effective combat force. Communication facilities were inadequate. The *Of these squadrons, four were tighter, four were helicopter,four were liaison, and two were air transport. 12 THE ADVISORY YEARS, 1955-1964 Vietnamese had a rudimentary reporting system and, consequently, no way to measure the results of their missions. Absence of centralized control meant that it was impossible for the VNAF to be fully integrated into the tactical air control system the Air Force advisors had installed. Both the central air operations center at Tan Son Nhut and its field tentacles, the local air support operation centers, while technically performing their primary functions of scheduling and coordinat- ing Vietnamese sorties, were actually “after the fact” agencies that did little more than schedule missions demanded by the wings. About seventy-five percent of all Vietnamese fighter attack sorties were being flown against “free strike” targets, which meant they were outside the control of a forward air controller and used little or no intelligence support.’6 The Vietnamese Air Force was still being run largely at the local level and, as a result, was seldom able to respond quickly to calls for assistance from the South Vietnamese ground forces.” In the eyes of most American advisors, the VNAF was not yet ready to fly on its own. 13 Brink Hotel in Saigon after the bombing on December 24, 1964. Chapter I End of the Advisory Period November 1964-April 1965 Indications were plentiful late in 1964 that time was running out on the South Vietnamese and, no less, on the American advisory policy. In the year since the assassinations of Presidents Diem and Kennedy, South Vietnam had been buffeted by a series of changes in governments. At the same time, the growing enemy infiltration from the north now included increasing numbers of regular North Vietnamese soldiers.’ The United States recognized the gravity of the situation but was having difficulty devising a formula for political success in this feudal, decentralized country. Until November, President Lyndon B. Johnson, occupied with the national election, continued to hope for the emergence of a leader in South Vietnam who could inject a sense of purpose into the struggle against the insurgency. He resisted repeated pressures from many of his counselors to bomb North Vietnam’ on the grounds that the Saigon government was still too weak to withstand the reaction that was certain to follow such a course of action. The introduction of a large number of American soldiers into Vietnam was not seriously considered at this time. What few discussions that did take place about sending ground forces to the south centered less on the military than on the psychological benefit of such a move. American decisionmakers were unable to predict whether the presence of American combat forces would strengthen the Vietnamese will to fight or, as Maxwell Taylor, now Ambassador to Vietnam, believed, cause the Vietnamese to “shuck off greater responsibility onto the United States” and “encourage an attitude of let the United States do it.”3 A series of military and political reverses that began in November 1964 forced the United States to reexamine its priorities for South Vietnam. The Viet Cong, bolstered by North Vietnamese regulars, were displaying new 15 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM aggressiveness and new tactics. The November mortar attack on Bien Hoa Air Base that destroyed five B-57s and their Christmas Eve bombing of the Brink Hotel American barracks in Saigon showed that they could strike with impunity. When they destroyed a Vietnamese Marine battalion and two ARVN ranger companies at Binh Gia at year’s end, it was clear that they were as adept at set piece battles as they had earlier proven themselves at hit- and-run tactic^.^ In the Bien Gia battle, an initial ARVN attempt to rely solely on armed helicopters for close air support against an attacking VC battalion proved inadequate. The South Vietnamese ground commander’s subsequent request for VNAF A-1s was turned down at ARVN headquar- ters, which deemed it unnecessary. The ensuing blood bath changed many official attitudes about tactical air power in Vietnam. General Westmoreland decided, in the aftermath of this defeat, to rely heavily on air power to turn the tide against the mounting enemy ~ffensive.~ This was to involve not only greater employment of American and Vietnamese A-ls, but eventually also the use of jet aircraft and carrier-based planes. Concurrent with this decision to use US. tactical aircraft against the enemy in South Vietnam were decisions to employ air power directly against the north and against the infiltration routes in Laos. Before the Bien Hoa attack, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were split over the question of which should come first in American policy-governmental stability in Saigon or military pressure against North Vietnam. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force Chief, and Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, advocated, in military councils, bombing the north as a means of strengthen- ing the Saigon regime. At first the other chiefs agreed with Ambassador Taylor that political stability must precede escalated military action against Hanoi. The loss of American lives and the destruction of the B-57s, however, united the chiefs; and on the 1st of November, they recommended sending American aircraft to bomb infiltration trails in Laos and to attack targets in North Vietnam. However, the Secretaries of State and Defense counseled patience; and President Johnson, concerned not only for the safety of American dependents in Vietnam but also about the outcome of the coming presidential election, heeded their advice. No reprisals were undertaken. On the first of December, however, Johnson reluctantly approved the first step of a two-phase program against the north. Covert naval attacks by the South Vietnamese on the north and American aerial raids against the supply trails in Laos were increased. On the 14th, the latter became a formal interdiction program called Barrel Roll. President Johnson also agreed in principle to the idea of reprisal bombing of the north for any “unusual actions.” Although the United States did not retaliate for the Brink Hotel bombing, that incident, along with the Vietnamese Army’s display of ineptitude at Binh Gia the following week, won over Ambassador Taylor to the side of those who favored reprisals against the north. 16 END OF THE ADVISORY PERIOD This stepped-up Viet Cong activity threatened to swamp American air assets. The United States had enough airplanes in the country and at bases in nearby countries to handle the situation, but self-imposed restrictions limited their value. The 1954 Geneva accords had banned the introduction of jets into South Vietnam; and the United States, while not a signer of the accords, had tried over the years to abide by its spirit. Until the Tonkin Gulf incident the preceding August, the civilian leadership had rejected recommendations to use jets in the country. In the wake of that attack on the American destroyer Muddox, the thirty-six B-57 Canberra bombers flew to Bien Hoa and several squadrons of F-100 Super Sabres began staging in and out of Da Nang. These tactical fighter squadrons deployed temporarily with personnel rotating after ninety days and aircraft rotating every six months. However, the ban on their use in combat inside South Vietnam continued. The Canberras flew visual reconnaissance missions along the roads leading into Saigon, and the F-100s flew in Barrel Roll. After the defeat at Binh Gia, General Westmoreland, anticipating an acceleration of enemy raids in I1 Corps during the coming Tet holidays in early February and skeptical of the ability of the politically oriented VNAF to contain them, asked again to be allowed to use the jets in South Vietnam. On the 27th of January he received permission to do so, but only in emergencies and only after receiving mission-by-mission approval from the Joint Chiefs and the concurrence of Ambassador Taylor and the Vietnamese high command.6 No occasion arose to use the jets in South Vietnam during the holidays; but a Viet Cong mortar attack near Pleiku on the 7th of February set in motion a series of American responses that, taken together, added up to a new strategy of primary reliance on air strikes against the north (along with bolstering defenses around the southern bases from which the attack planes were launched). The Pleiku raid brought a change of heart to most members of the National Security Council in Washington. Those who had formerly insisted that political reform of the Saigon government must precede attacks on the north now agreed to immediate reprisal. U.S. Navy jets from the carriers Coral Sea, Huncock, and Ranger bombed the Dong Hoi barracks just north of the Demilitarized Zone on the 7th; and the next day, VNAF planes struck at Vinh, while Farm Gate aircraft hit barracks at Chap Le. These raids, called Flaming Dart, were followed on the 11th by another attack against Dong Hoi. While this second series of strikes was taking place, fifteen E 5 2 Stratofortresses took off from Mather Air Force Base in California and another fifteen left Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. Within hours, thirty-two KC-135 refueling aircraft had departed the same bases. The bombers arrived at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, on the 12th; and by the next day, all the tankers had landed at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa. This 17 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM Marines landing at Da Nang, March 1965. contingency task force was prepared, if needed, to join in the raids against North Vietnam.' After a three-week lull the bombing attacks resumed, but without the B-52s, in what soon became a systematic program called Rolling Thunder. Although the Stratofortresses were ready to hit twenty targets in the north, it was decided to keep them in reserve. Eyes now turned toward air power as the principal instrument for bringing Hanoi to the negotiating table. At the same time, defenses in South Vietnam were shored up against expected Viet Cong reaction to the bombing. On the 8th of March, a US. Marine battalion landed at Da Nang from waiting ships, while the Air Force flew in a second battalion from Okinawa using 76 C-130s. The 3,500 Marines took up defensive positions around Da Nang Air Base, the main base in South Vietnam from which Air Force jets launched their strikes against the north.' General Westmoreland had first exercised his emergency power to use jets on the 19th of February when B-57s from Bien Hoa attacked enemy troops east of Saigon, the first use of American jets in the south. For several weeks the Canberras continued to hit the areas around Saigon, joined by F-100s from Da Nang that struck the enemy farther north in I1 Corps. On March 9, most of the remaining restrictions on jets were removed, essentially giving Westmoreland carte blanche to use the jets at his discretion. This was a new environment for jets and the crews began developing tactics and procedures to cope with it. The key to success of the attack missions, whether they were in close support of troops in contact, direct 18 END OF THE ADVISORY PERIOD support against enemy troops who were not engaged in battle, or interdiction against enemy supplies, lay in striking a balance between hitting the target accurately and avoiding ground fire. Since the enemy was using only small arms against the planes, the flyers remained above 1,500 feet as much as possible. They devised attack patterns to confuse the enemy and keep him from anticipating the direction from which the strikes would come. Ordinarily, a flight of four jets linked up with the forward air control plane; and while all the aircraft were en route to the target, the FAC and flight leader carried on a vital and often lively dialogue. The FAC first gave the flight leader a rundown on the mission, pointing out the peculiarities of the target, any restrictions to tactics, the directions of attack and breakaway to be used by the fighters, and the location of friendly troops, if any. The flight leader could, and often did, suggest changes that, if agreeable to the FAC, were adopted. When they reached the target, the FAC marked it with a smoke rocket. Then the fighters, still under FAC control, struck. A favorite tactic used by the F-100s to throw the enemy off guard was the “wheel” pattern. The general flow of aircraft around the target was circular, corresponding to the rim of a wheel, with the hub representing the target and the spokes the attack paths. While the leader made his initial run along one of the spokes, the second plane continued on around the rim and flew at the target along a spoke roughly a quarter of the way around the wheel. Continuing around, the third aircraft attacked from a heading approximately reciprocal to that of the leader, while the fourth plane came in on a heading about 180 degrees opposite that of the second craft. This called for close radio contact between all the planes. Aircraft spacing was critical. Before a pilot could strike, he had to make sure that the preceding aircraft was off the target and that he had the FAC in sight. The aim was to have continuous bombardment of the target. When the planes carried different types of ordnance, they alternated between high and low angles of attack to confuse the enemy further.’ It was often impossible to get a clear picture from the air of what these raids accomplished, since the target area was usually obscured by trees, smoke, or darkness.” Ground followups were rare, particularly in the enemy areas of War Zones C and D north of Saigon. This absence of quantifiable bomb damage assessment allowed for differences of opinion between advocates of propeller aircraft and those who favored jets. This “prop versus jet” controversy was to continue in one form or another throughout the war. The direct beneficiaries of the jet strikes, the American Army senior corps advisors in the field and the Vietnamese chiefs of the districts where the attacks took place, praised them as sorely needed morale boosters for the Vietnamese Army.” Some American diplomatic officials in Saigon, however, who had opposed the introduction of jets in the first place, questioned the wisdom of using them, pointing not only to the 19 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM Geneva accords but also to the potential for jets to alienate the Vietnamese and to hit friendly troops and civilians in areas under Viet Cong control.” Many Air Force personnel, particularly those flying the A-lEs, believed the propeller planes were more suitable in South Vietnam than were the jets. General Moore’s appraisal from Saigon early in March was cautious and based on tactical considerations. He warned that jet aircraft should not be viewed as substitutes for ground action and exhorted his staff not to rely too heavily on them. Further, he said, there was a danger that Vietnamese ground commanders, knowing that they would get American rather than Vietnamese pilots, might call in jets against targets that would be better attacked by the slower conventional A-1 ~1anes.I~ In addition, both he and General Westmoreland had been disturbed by the number of jet missions that had been canceled since the 19th of February because final approval from the Vietnamese Joint General Staff was not obtained in time. The situation improved when, on the 9th of March, the MACV Commander was permitted to use his own discretion in launching jets for missions in the south that the Vietnamese could not handle. l4 A simultaneous slackening of the reins on nonjets moved the United States further from advice to open combat. From the beginning of the American involvement in Vietnam, the advisory and training nature of the U.S. mission had required that a trained Vietnamese pilot be aboard all fighter aircraft and armed helicopter missi,ons. This rule had been relaxed slightly late in 1964 when a critical shortage of qualified Vietnamese pilots made it unworkable and the Joint Chiefs agreed that the flights could take place with Vietnamese student pilots or observers rather than experienced pilots. With the rise of military activity early in 1965, even this became difficult; and scrambles were frequently delayed and even aborted due to the lack of Vietnamese observers. For example, Col. William E. Bethea, Commander of the 34th Tactical Group at Bien Hoa, seldom found enough observers to keep all his planes in the air. He estimated that he could double his daily sortie rate if the Vietnamese assigned him the forty-four observers they promised, rather than the twenty-two or so he usually had on hand. On one desperate occasion he took an observer out of jail, fed him, sent him aloft, and then returned him to confinement after the mis~i0n.l~ However, although occasionally useful in identifying targets when flying with a FAC in a liaison plane, an observer rendered little assistance on fighter or armed helicopter missions. His primary function was to lend legitimacy to the employment of U.S. firepower.’6 General Moore relayed these difficulties to Washington late in February, emphasizing that the observer rule was not only cutting down the sortie rate, but was at least partially responsible for the slow reaction time of strike aircraft. Washington agreed on the 9th of March to drop the requirement for a Vietnamese companion on air commando flights. On the same day, 20 END OF THE ADVISORY PERIOD Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara approved putting USAF markings on Farm Gate planes to replace the Vietnamese insignia they had borne over the years." In his request for this change, General Westmoreland pointed out that, due to the gravity of the Viet Cong threat, the mission of air commando squadrons had shifted strongly toward combat and they were flying eighty percent of their sorties in support of the Vietnamese Army.18 With the removal of these restrictions on both jet and prop aircraft, the Air Force became the first of the services officially to play an overt combat role in South Vietnam. Throughout March, contingency military planning was running ahead of an American decision on an overall strategy for Vietnam. The Pacific Command had developed several plans for the use, if need be, of American forces either to take a direct part in combatting the insurgency, to counter a North Vietnamese invasion of the south, or to defend against a sweep through Southeast Asia by either the Chinese alone or in concert with the army of Hanoi. This last possibility hung like a shadow over the military planners, causing a rift between the Air Force Chief, Gen. John P. McConnell,* and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The issue centered on whether the United States, while waiting for the Vietnamese Army to rebuild itself, should place the weight of its effort on the ground in Vietnam (Plan 32) or in the air and seas around the periphery of China (Plan 39). General McConnell, strongly supported by his field commander at PACAF, General Harris, opted for the latter strategy, warning that Southeast Asia must not be viewed in isolation from the rest of the western Pacific. The plan the Air Force favored called for a holding action in the south, assisted by more direct support and reconnaissance aircraft, while deploying, initially, fifteen strike squadrons around the edges of China. These aircraft, located in Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, and Korea, would back up the operations in South Vietnam; deter (or defeat if they did not deter) the Chinese from adventures in Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia, or Thailand; and oppose any diversionary military actions the Communists might undertake in the northern Pa~ific.'~ McConnell stressed the advantages of this approach over a ground strategy. It was the most flexible of the plans being considered, adaptable to any potential development-enabling the United States to call the shots by engaging or disengaging the enemy at times and places of its own choosing. Since it relied more on technology than on *General LeMay had retired on February 8, 1965. 21 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM manpower and since a large part of the forces were already in place or on alert, it did not require extensive logistic preparations and could be turned on and off more quickly. In short, it avoided getting the United States bogged down in a land war in Asia. The political and military climate in neither Washington nor Saigon favored such a strategy. Intelligence sources in Washington played down the Chinese threat.” In Saigon, Westmoreland was convinced that the battle of Binh Gia had signaled the beginning by Hanoi of what it considered the final phase of the war. In his judgment, the enemy was close to cutting South Vietnam in two at a line running from Qui Nhon on the coast westward through Pleiku. The South Vietnamese were proving ineffective and the MACV commander pressed for American ground reinforcements. Westmoreland‘s conviction that the enemy must be met on the ground in South Vietnam was conveyed back to Washington early in March by Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, after he visited Saigon. Johnson painted a somber picture of South Vietnamese disintegration and recom- mended twenty-one military steps to halt the Communist tide. He also carried a request from Westmoreland for an American Army division for the Pleiku area in the central highlands. These American troops would hold the line by providing a favorable force ratio between the South Vietnamese and the enemy during the next few months while the former were bringing themselves to full strength.’l As the South Vietnamese Army became healthy, the Americans would gradually take over the job of guarding the enclaves in the south, releasing the Vietnamese soldiers for combat. The final proposal was to stop the infiltration from the north by sealing off the Demilitarized Zone and its extension into Laos with four divisions of American and SEAT0 troops.” The twenty-one steps included little that was new, calling for accelerat- ing programs already under way. However, they did reflect MACV’s conviction that the most immediate step in stopping the enemy would have to be taken by air power (or, as General Johnson labeled it, “heavy firepower”). More than half of the recommendations called for increased air activity, including sending three more Air Force squadrons and three Army companies of 0 - 1 s for surveillance, three more Army companies of helicopters for mobility, removing restrictions on Rolling Thunder, increas- ing air reconnaissance against Viet Cong-infested coastal areas, improving aerial interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail by separating it operationally from the rest of Laos, and speeding up the construction of jet airfields. Only on the question of sending additional jet fighter-bombers to South Vietnam did General Johnson hesitate, recommending that the decision be deferred until the results of their new unrestricted use could be ~eighed.’~ In this matter, he was probably influenced by the divided opinion in Saigon over the value of jets in the country. President Johnson, feeling increasingly 22 END OF THE ADVISORY PERIOD frustrated and cornered by persistent National Security Council recommen- dations to increase the bombing of the north, approved these measures on the 15th of March, in part to defuse his advisors’ insistence. Their implementa- tion was soon under way. The proposal to send an Army division to Vietnam and to seal off the Demilitarized Zone with SEAT0 troops was another matter. When he heard of it, General McConnell’s immediate reaction was that it was a bad idea. In his view, the suggestion contradicted what the Joint Chiefs had earlier agreed upon; and he felt it was the wrong way to go. He opposed introducing American ground forces, at least until the infdtration had been stopped and there was no way to stop it with ground forces. His staff estimated that it would take more than five divisions to seal off the north at the 17th parallel; and even if such a move succeeded, the Viet Cong, as indicated by prisoner reports, would get supplies elsewhere and continue to fight. Before any ground units were put in, the chief said, the land routes from the north should be closed by air power and the sea routes by the Navy. It would take about sixty days to learn if such an operation was working, and the United States could not get the divisions ready to go in that time. If it did succeed, there might be some rationale for introducing some ground forces later.” McConnell aired these views to the other chiefs when they discussed Johnson’s recommendations between March 17-1 9. He argued that Rolling Thunder had been hobbled and had not been given enough time to produce results. Furthermore, he said, setting an Army division down near Pleiku, an area surrounded and controlled by the Viet Cong, would plunge the United States directly into the ground war. He proposed instead taking the wraps off Rolling Thunder, deploying four fighter squadrons to the south, and limiting the Army division, should it be sent, to the mission of “developing and expanding additional coastal enclaves south of Da Nang to provide security for important installation^."^^ Over the Air Force Chiefs objections, the Joint Chiefs recommended to the Secretary sending the equivalent of three divisions (one Marine, one Army, and one Korean), increasing air attacks against the north, and dispatching four fighter squadrons to Southeast Asia.26 Although the recommendation to dispatch three ground divisions was not approved at the time, it focused the attention of the presidential advisors on the use of ground forces, a focus that was to sharpen in the succeeding weeks. Developments in South Vietnam, however, were pushing the United States almost by default into a ground strategy akin to that envisioned in Plan 3 2 4 i r e c t American participation in the counterinsurgency. The forces 23 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM called for in the second phase of that plan had been on alert since the beginning of the year. During March and April many pieces of the plan were falling into place, even though the plan had not been officially adopted. The rapid pace of events during these months placed a particularly heavy strain on the 2d Air Division. The proliferation of air programs not only stretched General Moore’s resources, but wrenched them into a new configuration. “We got caught in a whirlwind of change in our operations here,” he explained later. “We jumped suddenly from very restricted in- country operations utilizing air commando assets to a full-scale jet operation both in and out of country.”” The air war in South Vietnam had to adjust to the need to share its aircraft with operations over North Vietnam and Laos, both north and south. Thus from its birth, the American air war in Southeast Asia was circumscribed by the requirement to apportion sorties between four competing operational areas. This, in turn, made it even more imperative that air resources be managed from one central hub. Although the March call for more Bird Dogs had been approved, it would be summer before the planes were ready. Except for the 23 O-ls belonging to the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS), the Air Force had owned none of these Cessna planes since the Korean war. The Army gave the Air Force 106 of them and made them ready for combat. The planes were fitted with communication and navigation equipment, bomb shackles, adapters for launching rockets, and antigroundloop gear. The Air Force had asked the Army to fit the planes with constant-speed propellers, but the engines to handle these propellers were not available and the propellers could not be installed on the existing engines. The Army estimated that the first planes would be ready late in May and the entire lot by mid-August. While the Army prepared the planes, the Tactical Air Command expanded its existing school to train jet pilots in visual reconnaissance and strike control. The new course began in May, lasting thirty rather than the standard forty-five days. The three new squadrons of 0-1s were scheduled to be in place by August, and twenty pilots were scheduled to graduate every two weeks until the newly authorized FACs were in place. In the meantime, MACV was preparing a visual reconnaissance plan for these planes and the three Army companies of O-ls that were also on the way.28 Of the four tactical fighter squadrons that arrived in April as the first part of a deployment called “Two three went to Thailand and the fourth to Da Nang. By an understanding with the Bangkok government, the Thai-based F-105s and F 4 C s would not be used in South Vietnam. The squadron of F-104s that went to Da Nang joined the two F-100 squadrons already there in attacks over the north and in Laos. Although the number of B-57 Canberras at Bien Hoa was boosted to eighteen early in March, this provided little additional firepower for the southern campaign. Since the 19th of February, when these planes were first used in combat, they had been 24 SZ THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM missions against the enemy, who was building up for an offensive during the coming monsoon season. The airlift system was also showing the strain. Air Force C-123s and Vietnamese C 4 7 s could not keep up with logistic demands, and a backlog of cargo clogged the aerial ports. The 315th Air Commando Group* called for help from the intratheater airlift C-130s which, until then, had operated in and out of, but not within, Vietnam. In April, four of these Hercules transports were dispatched to Vietnam in what was intended as a temporary measure to eliminate the bottlenecks. Once in the country, however, the C-130s stayed; and as the tempo of operations continued to expand in the next few months, their number grew first to thirteen and later to thirty as they gradually became a permanent part of the airlift force within the country.33 The new turn of events highlighted the scarcity of operating space at South Vietnam’s air bases. The three jet airfields at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang, where the Air Force was a tenant, were seriously overcrowded. As late as the summer of 1964, when the United States was still thinking in terms of withdrawing from the country, the Air Force had been willing to put up with the tight and barely adequate conditions on these bases. However, as the Air Force responded to the new enemy strategy early in 1965, the situations at the bases worsened, with promise of even greater density in the future. At Tan Son Nhut, which also served as the Saigon International Airport, the Air Force’s headquarters and squadrons coexisted with elements of the Vietnamese Air Force, the Vietnamese Army, and the U.S. Army. In April, five EC-121D airborne control and warning planes began staging into the field from Taiwan. When added to the existing airlift, reconnaissance, and strike forces at the base, this placed a further burden on the overtaxed facilities. Conditions at Bien Hoa were no better, and real estate was at a premium. The destruction of the B-57s there in November, occasioned to no small degree by cramped conditions, was still fresh in everyone’s mind. Most of the aircraft recently deployed to South Vietnam had gone to Da Nang, which by March was at the bursting point. The base, a sleepy station only eight months earlier, had a permanent population of forty-two F-lOOs, *On March 8, this became the new name for the 315th Troop Carrier Group. Three of the group’s four troop carrier squadrons, the 309th, 310th and 311th, also became air commando squadrons. The fourth squadron, the 19th, already bore that designation. 26 END OF THE. ADVISORY PERIOD Visible under the wing of a C-130 at Da Nang in 1965: a C-124, a C-123, two C 4 7 s , and, in the far background, two F 4 s . twenty-five Vietnamese A- 1Hs, twenty-four Marine helicopters, eighteen 0-ls, sixteen C-l23s, fourteen F-l04s, four C-130 flare ships, three Vietnamese helicopters, three HU- 16 Albatrosses for search and rescue, and several F-105s. Room was set aside for an average of eight transient Air Force tactical planes daily (B-57s, RF-lOls, F-l05s, A-lEs, or F-lOOs), four to six Navy fighters (F-8s and A+), fifteen airlift C-l3Os, ten transport planes, and two to four Big Eye EC-121s. On the 13th of March, the commander of the newly arrived Marine Expeditionary Brigade, citing his inability to defend the hills west of Da Nang against either ground or air attack, asked for a third Marine battalion and two squadrons of Marine aircraft: an A 4 squadron for close air support and an F 4 squadron for air defense.34General Moore took a dim view of this proposal and said so to Westmoreland. He argued, in part, that: Da Nang air base is heavily congested and because of political restrictions all USAF jet operations into Barrel Roll, and chokepoint seeding in Laos, must be launched from Da Nang as the primary air base. And Rolling Thunder plus support aircraft, both USAF and VNAF, [fly] from Da Nang. For certain missions, augmentation aircraft make for complete saturation of all available parking areas. Marine squadrons could be accommodated, he concluded, only by removing some nonjet aircraft from the base. Since Da Nang was one of only three 27 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM F-100s in sandbag revetments at Da Nang, March 1965. bases in the country that could handle jets, priority should be given to these high-performance aircraft and they should remain at the northern base.35 Although one squadron of fifteen Marine F-4s was shoehorned onto the base by moving the Marine helicopters to nearby Phu Bai, overcrowding remained a serious problem. At a logistics planning meeting in Hawaii early in April, the conferees discussed the subject of base construction. Although the Joint Chiefs, as part of an earlier contingency plan, had arranged engineering surveys for a new jet runway at Chu Lai and a second one at Da Nang,36the Honolulu group decided to have surveys made for additional airfields at Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang, and Qui Nhon. Since this construction would be paid for by the individual services, Westmoreland spread the responsibility for the bases among his component commanders. To Moore fell the charge of planning and paying for the airfields at the three new locations, as well as improving existing air facilities at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, and New Can Tho (Binh T u ~ ) . ~ ’ Throughout March and April, the Viet Cong remained hidden, avoiding contact with major South Vietnamese units. The few minor incidents that did 28 END OF THE ADVISORY PERIOD take place were initiated by Viet Cong paramilitary groups, strengthening Westmoreland’s contention that the enemy was concentrating on training, reorganizing, and rearming for a full-scale offensive. Intelligence had pinpointed several enemy base camps in the country where Viet Cong preparations were under way. One such area was the notorious War Zone C in the Tay Ninh Forest, sixty miles northwest of Saigon and north of Tay Ninh City near the Cambodian border. This zone, given its name by the French, had resisted all attempts at penetration since World War 11. The enemy had located his major headquarters and a signal school to train local recruits and North Vietnamese infiltrators within the enclave. Over a hundred buildings, some constructed of jungle materials and others of wood, were grouped into four complexes that included living quarters, mess halls, classrooms, arms manufacturing plants, and antiaircraft positions. Individual shelters and bunkers were everywhere, connected by shallow trenches. The entire camp sat atop an intricate network of tunnels, and since the jungle foliage had been left intact, it could not be seen from the air and was virtually inaccessible from the ground. In mid-April, Westmoreland planned a major air operation against the complex, named after the nearby Black Virgin Mountain. In his original conception of the operation, the general envisioned an all-out air effort using Air Force planes from both South Vietnam and Thailand and, for the first time, Navy and Marine planes. In accordance with the rules of engagement, the aircraft from Thailand could not fly directly to the targets but would have to stage out of airfields in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese would participate if possible, but enough of their planes would have to remain on ground alert to take care of any emergencies in the country. Westmoreland had hoped that all other air missions in South Vietnam and Laos and Rolling Thunder in the north would stand down for this one-day operation. The entire air action was to be planned, coordinated, and directed by General Moore at 2d Air Division. * Hawaii’s reaction to these plans illustrates the complexity that surround- ed air operations in the theater. Adm. Ulysses s. Grant Sharp, CINCPAC, questioned the idea of using planes from Thailand, because staging them through South Vietnamese fields would aggravate the congestion there. He told Westmoreland to try to get along without them and to use them only if absolutely necessary. It was all right, he said, to cancel missions over Laos that day, but the Black Virgin operation must be planned around Rolling Thunder, which was just as important as air operations in the south.39 To support the operation, back-up units, including Air Force search and rescue helicopters, an ordnance demolition team, and an Army medical evacuation helicopter, were moved to the Tay Ninh airport. The first bombs fell at seven in the morning, and the pounding continued without interruption for 12 hours. Air Force R 5 7 s and A-1Es from Bien Hoa, together with 29 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM F-100s from Da Nang, flew 206 sorties; the Vietnamese contributed 54 A-1H sorties; and the newly arrived Marine F 4 B s managed 16 sorties. Bomb runs by Navy attack planes from the carriers Midway and Coral Sea brought the total to 417. The 2d Air Division coordinated and directed the strikes through its airborne forward air controllers using their Bird Dogs to mark targets for the attackers. Hovering higher above the action, two U-10s alternated in orchestrating the operation. By midafternoon, the 3-kilometer by 6-kilometer area was engulfed in smoke from the strikes and grass fires. One explosion sent a white cloud billowing 3,000 feet into the air. As the day wore on, large sections of tree cover were ripped off, exposing hidden buildings and uncovering entrances to underground installations. By the time the attacks ended at seven in the evening, 816 tons of bombs had been dropped. For 2 days afterward, 1,200 ARVN soldiers, flown into the area by helicopter, fanned out in search of the Viet Cong and to estimate the results of the raids. Air Force and Vietnamese A-1s and Marine F-4s provided air cover and close air support for the searchers. While the troops saw no enemy, they uncovered ample evidence of their recent departure. Sixty buildings had been destroyed from the air, and the South Vietnamese captured switch- boards, radios, communication wire, 2,000 kilograms of rice, and a variety of ordnance. Captured documents indicated that at least one North Vietnamese unit had been in the area.40 The shift to overt American air combat in the south during February and the opening of Rolling Thunder early in March thrust the Air Force directly into the battle against both the Viet Cong and Hanoi. However, impatience and disenchantment with the results of the northern attacks were not long in coming. As early as the 13th of March Ambassador Taylor cabled from Saigon that “through repeated delays we are failing to give the mounting crescendo to Rolling Thunder which is necessary to get the desired results.”41 John A. McCone, the CIA Director, lamented the halfhearted application of the bombing, intimating that the bombing should be an attempt to compel, not persuade, the North Vietnamese. “The strikes to date have not caused a change in the North Vietnamese policy,” he wrote. “If anything, [they] have hardened their attitude.”42 General Johnson noted in his report that “the tempo of punitive air strikes has been inadequate to convey a clear sense of U.S. purpose to the DRV.”43 While these leaders were opting for more bombing, General Westmoreland saw things differently. On the 27th, he reported that the air activity against the north would not have an 30 END OF THE ADVISORY PERIOD immediate effect on the war in the south and strongly urged the commitment of American ground combat forces4 A move away from principal reliance on bombing the north in favor of ground action in the south began on the 1st of April. On that day, President Johnson repeated his earlier approval of General Johnson’s twenty-one measures, but stopped short of sending an American division to Vietnam. As an alternative, he agreed to double the size of American combat forces already in the country by adding two more Marine battalions and one squadron of F-4s. In response to Ambassador Taylor’s recommendation for an enclave strategy, he approved a change in the Marine mission from defense to active participation in the ground war.45 The eleventh hour of the advisory period ended in Honolulu during the third week of April. At a one-day conference there on the 20th, Secretary McNamara and his principal military and civilian assistants, who met primarily to win Ambassador Taylor over to the new strategy, agreed that North Vietnam was more likely to respond to Viet Cong failure in the south than to the pain inflicted by bombing in the north.46At the urging of General Westmoreland, the short-lived, and inadequately tested, strategy of relying on bombing the north gave way at the meeting to a ground strategy in the south. The conferees backed Westmoreland, deciding to establish 4 more enclaves along the southern coast and to increase the number of troops, up to 82,000 Americans and 8,000 allies by September, to defend them. Of this number, 997 Air Force logistics people would go to South Vietnam and 3,900 others would move to other points in the western Pa~ific.~’ The latter would man 2 new F-100 squadrons on Taiwan and another in the Philippines; an F-105 squadron on Okinawa; F A , RF-101, and C-130 squadrons in Japan; and another troop carrier squadron in the phi lip pine^.^' At the conference, General Harris continued to lament the growing dispersion of many of his PACAF air assets, a trend which he predicted would accelerate with the new emphasis on ground warfare. In discussions with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he spoke of the adjustments he felt would be necessary for the new situation. He stressed the potential that existed for aggravating the already confusing command and control arrange- ments in the theater. By way of example, Harris pointed to contradictory instructions that had been issued for several recent air operations, such as Flaming Dart and the early Rolling Thunder missions, which had led Westmoreland to believe that “he [Westmoreland] had operational control of all USAF forces in Southeast Asia.” Harris reiterated the Air Force’s long- standing discomfort with the lack of air expertise on the MACV staff and urged that PACAF be given clear control of all air operations in Southeast Asia except for the air commando and transport forces assigned to Westmoreland in the south. The need for air expertise at the highest levels, he emphasized, had become even more imperative since the recent introduction 31 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM of first-line Air Force, Marine, and Navy aircraft into the conflict. Also, the escalating situation had created an intolerable load for General Moore and his staff in Saigon, who were still expected to act as both advisory staff and operators. Harris proposed remedying this by establishing a tactical air control center in Thailand to remove the large operational burden in that country from the shoulders of the 2d Air Division. He strongly recommended to the chairman that the 2d Air Division concentrate on operating the A-lEs, C-l23s, 0-ls, the psychological warfare program, and the tactical air control system in South Vietnam, while the Thirteenth Air Force, through an advanced echelon in Thailand, handle operations outside South Vietnam.49 The reconnaissance plane force, like the strike forces, was divided. Harris criticized the existing division of reconnaissance assets between MACV, who controlled the flights over Laos and South Vietnam, and PACAF, who ran similar operations over North Vietnam. This was in direct contravention, he noted, of the original CINCPAC guidance which made PACAF responsible for aerial reconnaissance throughout the Pacific.” The air defense picture was somewhat brighter. The responsibility for defense of the entire Pacific was Harris’~,~’ and several recent events had proved the value of having a single air defense commander. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, for example, he had been able to move F-102s rapidly into Vietnam from other bases in the theater. In February, it had taken the 315th Air Division only two days to move the Marine Hawk missile antiaircraft battalion from Okinawa to Da Nang to protect the base against air attack from the north. Continued centralization of air defense in the PACAF defense net was critical to being able to alert the entire system rapidly and tie together both American and allied resources. Harris opposed the establishment of a separate Southeast Asia command divorced from CINCPAC. The creation of such a command, which would encompass the entire mainland peninsula, had been included in some of the contingency plans in the event the United States took over the war. While a Southeast Asia command would have the advantage of concentrating forces on the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, the opportunity costs, from the Air Force’s perspective, would overshadow whatever advantages this might bring. Politically, to lump Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia together could trample on the sensitivities of these nations and create a new set of obstacles to prosecuting the war. Strategically, to separate Southeast Asia from the rest of the mainland would divide American forces in the face of the perceived Chinese threat that was common to the peninsula, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea.52 The change in strategy at the Honolulu conference to a ground war meant that the principal role of air power in South Vietnam in the future was support for American and allied ground forces. Within days of the Honolulu meeting, Sharp informed Westmoreland that past policy had been changed 32 - END OF THE ADVISORY PERIOD and that from now on “The first priority for all U.S. air assets in the Republic of Vietnam is support of the in-country (South Vietnam) effort.” Whereas barely a week earlier, at the time of the Black Virgin operation, Rolling Thunder had enjoyed at least equal status with air missions in the south, now Rolling Thunder strikes that interfered with requirements for the south were to be cut back or canceled. Operations over Laos would continue to have the lowest claim on aircraft.53 This set of priorities was to continue throughout the war despite attempts to change it. For the Air Force, this meant two things. First, the Air Force was now being called on to perform a tactical mission of close air support for which two decades of doctrine, force procurement, and training had ill-prepared it. While continuing to maintain its worldwide strategic posture, which had claimed most of its attention since World War 11, the Air Force was now directed to support a ground war. The story of the next three years is largely one of adaptation to this alien environment. Second, the need for close interservice cooperation would be more critical than ever before if this joint venture were to succeed. The rapid march of events in Vietnam in the spring of 1965, however, was outpacing the development of joint practices to guide them. At first, each service would continue, as it had throughout the advisory years, to plan for the future in terms of what it knew best-its own doctrine, organization, and weaponry. Many months of debate, experimenta- tion, and, at times, acrimony lay ahead before the beginnings of joint action would emerge to match the new joint strategy. b - “\“ 9ar h“ Members of the 13th Bomb Squadron clean up the remains of a B-57 after the Viet Cong mortar attack on November 1, 1964, at Bien Hoa. 33 Two E 5 2 s releasing their bombs over a target in South Vietnam. Chapter I1 Beginning of Direct Involvement April-June 1965 Repercussions from the Honolulu conference were immediate. The first order of business for Ambassador Taylor upon his return to Saigon was to inform the South Vietnamese Prime Minister, Phan Huy Quat, of what had taken place in Hawaii. On April 22, Taylor, with his assistant, U. Alexis Johnson, discussed with Quat the deteriorating military situation in the country and his belief that the Viet Cong, reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars, would soon open an offensive. The American Joint Chiefs, noted Taylor, estimated that the thirty-one battalions of soldiers the South Vietnamese were planning to add to their forces would not be enough to stop a determined enemy. At least twenty additional battalions were needed. In his reply, the Prime Minister avoided the issue of using foreign troops, dwelling instead on the obstacles he faced in improving his own forces. His officers lacked aggressiveness. The desertion rate was high because many commanders were not paying attention to the needs of their men. There were too many officers sitting behind desks in Saigon-he wanted to send them to the field. The meeting ended without direct mention of foreign reinforcement, even though Quat was fully aware that this was what the two Americans had uppermost in their minds.’ The 3 men met again 2 days later, a Saturday. This time the American diplomats were more specific. “We see no way of generating the necessary forces,” began Taylor, “except by an international effort.” If the Prime Minister agreed, the United States could supply 32 Army and Marine battalions totaling 33,000 men. There was reason to believe that Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and the Philippines would agree to add another 4 battalions. All together, these additions should come close to what the Joint 35 THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM Chiefs felt were necessary. Initially, these troops would be used, he explained, as were the Marines at Da Nang, to secure a few enclaves such as Bien Hoa, Chu Lai, and Qui Nhon, releasing South Vietnamese soldiers for combat. At the same time, they would provide a reserve strike force that could be in place in less than 2 months. Quat “received the above expose calmly and in complete relaxation,” almost relieved that the subject was out in the open. While he had no difficulty, he replied, in accepting the principle of introducing an international force, he had to discuss it with Maj. Gen. Tran Van Minh and Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu of the Armed Forces Council. This he would do over the weekend and give a final answer the following week.’ The Council concurred with Taylor’s reasoning and agreed to have American and some allied troops replace Vietnamese at several enclaves. On the 1st of May, MACV and the Joint Genera